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.PREFACE
This book is an attempt to map ownership patterns and their effects on media pluralism 
and independence in the countries of South East Europe and EU member states from Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe. The eighteen country reports and a regional overview are a result 
of the project organised by the South East European Network for Professionalisation of 
the Media (SEENPM). The project was conducted from July 2003 to June 2004 and was led 
by the Peace Institute in Ljubljana, itself a member of the SEENPM.
The aim of the project has been to examine media ownership in these countries, focus-
ing on the regulatory framework and implementation mechanisms, privatisation, owner-
ship structure of the main media ownership patterns and their impact on pluralism and 
independence of the media. 
Eighteen researchers and journalists from Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Kosovo/a,1 Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, 
Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, and Slovenia, collected and an-
alysed relevant data from October 2003 to February 2004. The reports, therefore, reflect 
the situation at the end of 2003 and the beginning of 2004. Since media markets in these 
countries are very dynamic, with ownership structures and the number of titles changing 
on a daily basis, and since media legislation is subject to frequent changes as well, certain 
data in these reports will inevitably be out-of-date at the time of publication. However, this 
does not essentially affect the patterns governing the functioning of media markets, the 
behaviour of regulators and media owners, or their influence on media pluralism and in-
dependence described in these reports.
Although a common methodology was used in drafting these reports, certain varia-
tions do occur. First, the authors were free to emphasise those features of the media own-
ership situation that best illustrated the peculiarities of their media markets. Second, 
(non)availability and (non)transparency of information on media ownership in certain 
countries resulted in variations in the structuring and selection of data.
Finally, separate reports for Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo/a, although parts of the 
formally common state, were necessitated by the post-conflict situation and international 
protectorate in Kosovo/a, and separate media systems in these units. 
The project has been implemented with the support of the Open Society Institute Net-
work Media Program, the Guardian Foundation and the Fresta Program of the Danish 
Government. 
1 Considering two different names in use (Kosovo and Kosova), we have decided to use Kosovo/a in our book. The 
exceptions are official titles of documents and names of institutions.
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It has been implemented in partnership with media centers and institutes, members of 
the South East European Network for Professionalisation of the Media, and some univer-
sity departments and OSI national foundations in the respective countries.
The following institutions and the country reporters contributed to the implementa-
tion of the project:
COUNTRY PARTNER INSTITUTION COUNTRY REPORTER
ALBANIA ALBANIAN MEDIA INSTITUTE – TIRANA ILDA LONDO
BOSNIA AND 
HERZEGOVINA
MEDIA CENTER – SARAJEVO TARIK JUSIC´
BULGARIA MEDIA DEVELOPMENT CENTER VELISLAVA STOYANOVA POPOVA 
CROATIA INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION OF 
JOURNALISTS – OPATIJA
STJEPAN MALOVIC´ 
CZECH REPUBLIC OPEN SOCIETY FUND – PRAGUE MILAN ŠMÍD 
ESTONIA MEDIA CENTER TAIVO PAJU 
HUNGARY CENTER FOR INDEPENDENT JOURNALISM – BUDAPEST MIHÁLY GÁLIK 
KOSOVO/A KOSOVA FOUNDATION FOR OPEN SOCIETY ISUF BERISHA 
LATVIA MEDIA CENTER ANITA KEHRE AND ILZE NAGLA
LITHUANIA JOURNALISM CENTER AUDRONE NUGARITE 
MACEDONIA MACEDONIAN INSTITUTE FOR THE MEDIA SNEŽANA TRPEVSKA 
MOLDOVA INDEPENDENT JOURNALISM CENTER – CHISINAU TAMARA CARAUS 
MONTENEGRO MONTENEGRO MEDIA INSTITUTE – PODGORICA MLADEN ZADRIMA 
POLAND INSTITUTE FOR JOURNALISM AND SOCIAL 
COMMUNICATION – KRAKOW
BEATA KLIMKIEWICZ 
ROMANIA CENTER FOR INDEPENDENT JOURNALISM – 
BUCHAREST
MANUELA PREOTEASA 
SERBIA MEDIA CENTER – BELGRADE DRAGAN ĐOKOVIC´
SLOVAKIA CENTER FOR INDEPENDENT JOURNALISM – 
BRATISLAVA
GABRIEL ŠIPOŠ 
SLOVENIA PEACE INSTITUTE – LJUBLJANA SANDRA B. HRVATIN AND 
LENART J. KUCˇ IC´
The project advisory board contributed to drafting and implementation of the project 
with much deliberation. The board included Poul Erik Nielsen, University of Aarhus, Ian 
Wrigh and Mark Milner, the Guardian, Algirdas Lipstas, Open Society Institute, and San-
dra B. Hrvatin, University of Ljubljana and the Peace Institute.
Finally, the project team at the Peace Institute that developed and led this extensive and 
inspiring endeavour, included Brankica Petković, Sandra B. Hrvatin, Lenart J. Kučić, Olga 
Vuković, Søren Klougart and Neva Nathigal. 
The reports in this book and effort invested in their preparation and presentation de-
rive from the belief that media ownership increasingly shapes the way in which the media 
relate to public interest and citizens’ rights.
.REGIONAL OVERVIEW
Sandra B. Hrvatin and Brankica Petković
porocilo.indb   1 22.5.2004, 13:45:52
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1. INTRODUCTION
Noam Chomsky repeatedly points out a simple conclusion that no conspiracy theory is 
needed for the analysis of media deviations in western countries. A handful of individu-
als and corporations that today own the majority of media outlets, acquired their holdings 
by openly supporting political elites in the countries in which their media operate. When 
Chomsky was asked years ago how corporate elites controlled the media, he answered: 
“Th at’s like asking how corporate elites control General Motors. Th ey don’t have to con-
trol it. Th ey own it” (quoted in Halimi, : -).¹
In order to be able to analyse media ownership, and resulting media concentration, one 
has to know the right questions. Media concentration as such is not a phenomenon exclu-
sive to contemporary societies, but one of its new features is an almost “incestuous rela-
tionship between politics and the media.” Politicians use (and abuse) media for their own 
political purposes. Today it seems impossible to remain in power without the support of 
the media. On the other hand, media owners use their media to promote and disseminate 
their own political views, and exploit politicians to achieve their own (corporate) goals. By 
answering the question of who owns the media we also answer the question of who holds 
the reins of power.
Th e close interrelation of media, political and economic capital (sometimes in the 
hands of a single person) is a common feature of  member states as well as the  coun-
tries included in this study. Th is book represents an attempt to delineate some of the ba-
sic characteristics of the media markets in post-socialist countries of South Eastern and 
Central-Eastern Europe (including new  members), and to place these in the context of 
the decade-long debate over media concentration in Europe. It provides an overview of 
“media transition,” methods of media privatisation, legal frameworks, the current state of 
media markets, the largest media owners in these countries and their formal and informal 
political links. Most importantly, it highlights the implications of media concentration for 
the independence of the media. 
In transforming their media systems, post-socialist countries looked for clear “Euro-
pean standards” regarding restrictions on concentration, protection of media pluralism, 
journalistic freedom and media independence, and in so doing, they turned to the solu-
tions and models employed by established European democracies. But what, in fact, is the 
“European viewpoint” on these issues? What is the viewpoint of the European Parliament 
(), the European Commission () and the Council of Europe? Indeed, these three Eu-
ropean institutions pursue two diﬀ erent approaches.
It was the issue of media concentration that brought to light the diﬀ ering opinions and 
interests of the  and the . In the early s, the  ﬁ rst put forward certain require-
porocilo.indb   2 22.5.2004, 13:45:52
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ments regarding media concentration. Th is was followed by two draft directives, extensive 
consultation and a number of public debates coupled with strong lobbying on the part of 
the media industry. Finally, in , the  had to admit failure of its media policy.
In its  Resolution on Media Takeovers and Mergers,² the  explicitly stressed that 
“restrictions on concentration are essential in the media sector, not only for economic rea-
sons but also, and above all, as a means of guaranteeing a variety of information and free-
dom of the press”. Th is standpoint was conﬁ rmed by another resolution in , in which 
it called on the  to propose a directive regulating both the ownership structure and 
content of the industry at a pan-European level. Th e  considered media pluralism “an 
essential element in the construction of the European Union in accordance with the re-
quirements of democracy (, : §).³ In the opinion of the , the strengthening of the 
competitiveness of the European media should be accompanied by the strengthening of 
economic and cultural pluralism in this area. Th e  repeatedly stressed that media con-
centration could aﬀ ect the freedom of speech of the media as well as of every individual. 
Th e  again alerted the  to this issue in April , when it published the Report on 
the risks of violation, within the  and in Italy in particular, of freedom of expression and 
information.⁴ Th e report, describing the level of media pluralism in eight countries with a 
special stress on the dramatic situation in Italy, was written by the Committee on Citizens’ 
Freedoms and Rights, Justice and Home Aﬀ airs of the . It provoked a heated debate in 
the  on April , , which concluded with the  calling on the  to draft a directive 
on the protection of media pluralism in Europe. 
Standards pertaining to this ﬁ eld do exist and are not speciﬁ c to Europe but are univer-
sal. Article  of the European Convention on Human Rights guarantees freedom of ex-
pression and information with due respect for the principle of independence of the media. 
Provisions on media pluralism are contained in the Amending protocol to the European 
Convention on Transfrontier Television. Article , paragraph , of the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights of the European Union (/ /) stipulates: “Th e freedom and plu-
ralism of the media shall be respected.” Council of Europe Recommendation No. ()  
of the Committee of Ministers to Members States on Measures to Promote Media Plural-
ism recommends that the “member states should consider the introduction of legislation 
designed to prevent or counteract concentration that might endanger media pluralism at 
the national, regional or local levels.” 
Freedom of expression is a basic right of every individual. It is not geographically lim-
ited. It “belongs” equally to all citizens of  member states as well as citizens of all other 
countries. Th ere is no democracy without freedom of expression, nor without freedom of 
the media.
porocilo.indb   3 22.5.2004, 13:45:52
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Why, then, is it necessary to regulate media ownership? Why must certain restrictions 
be in place? Media owners are in a position to inﬂ uence media content, and the mere pos-
sibility that they would choose to exert such inﬂ uence justiﬁ es restrictions. Th eir motives 
may be political, ideological, personal or commercial, but the outcome is the same. Media 
owners are those who dictate media content. In his book “Les nouveaux chiens de garde,” 
Serge Halimi asks whether it is possible to imagine someone buying an instrument that 
oﬀ ers the prospect of inﬂ uence, but foregoing the chance of inﬂ uencing the orientation 
of such an instrument (Halimi, : ). Fewer owners means lesser diversity of content. 
A prerequisite for the diversity of content is a variety of owners, meaning that media plu-
ralism can be guaranteed only by plural ownership. Media concentration has an impact 
not only on media content but on the manner of reporting as well. Th e media are over-
whelmed with “servile” (Halimi) and market-driven journalism (McManus) where the in-
terests of owners and advertisers take priority over the interests of readers. Certain kinds 
of media content are used only as a guise to promote sponsored texts or advertising. In 
this case, “censorship is much more eﬀ ective, because the interests of the owner are mirac-
ulously the same as those of ‘information.’” (Halimi, : ) Investigative journalism and 
investigative articles are increasingly rare. Media owners tend to see journalists as non-es-
sential items on their cost sheets, so streamlining in the media business is often accompa-
nied by lay oﬀ s, salary cuts and widespread disregard for collective agreements. Today, the 
independence of both the media and journalists rests in the hands of media owners, and, 
consequently, so does the freedom of expression of every individual.
Th e reports collected in this book analyse the media in eighteen European countries: 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Kosovo/a, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Ser-
bia, Slovakia and Slovenia.
Many reports in this book highlight the threat to pluralism posed by media concentra-
tion, a problem that is present in all European countries. For those who think that the situ-
ation in Western Europe is not near as bad as it is in post-socialist countries, there is one 
important message: De te fabula narratur. (Th is story speaks about you).⁵
2. LEGISLATION – PROTECTING THE INTERESTS 
OF THE STATE OR THE CITIZENS?
Following changes in the political systems of the late s and early s, post-social-
ist countries had to adopt new legislation and replace restrictive media laws. One funda-
mental issue was how to determine the new owners of media outlets formerly owned by 
porocilo.indb   4 22.5.2004, 13:45:52
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the state or political parties. Th e state and political parties had never been media own-
ers in the real sense of the word, because their kind of ownership was not one driven by 
capital gain. Th e state had not been interested in proﬁ t but exclusively in having control 
over media content. In accordance with this goal, exercising of ownership rights took the 
form of appropriating the right of access to information. Th erefore, media markets in 
these countries were not markets as we know them elsewhere. Market laws were dictated 
and controlled by the state and the instruments employed ranged from determining the 
price of newsprint and newspapers to setting the terms of distribution and a monopoly on 
broadcast license allocation. Circulation ﬁ gures or data on the number of radio and tel-
evision sets had only statistical value and were seen as proof that media were available (if 
only declaratively).
However, while the state was not interested in commercial gain, political gain i.e. inﬂ u-
ence, was certainly the focus of its attention. In most of these countries, private persons 
were legally prevented from founding media outlets (in most cases newspapers were sub-
ject to very strict licensing requirements); the appointment of editors was a mechanism 
designed to secure political loyalty and in the broadcast ﬁ eld, state-run radio and televi-
sion broadcasters held a strong monopoly. To this list of hindrances we should add re-
strictions on freedom of expression (in fact, the state held a monopoly on public expres-
sion) that were implemented by way of various formal or informal interfering with the 
journalistic process. In practice, this censorship was eﬀ ected through an intricate system 
of measures ranging from “legal prohibition of ‘hostile propaganda’ and dissemination of 
‘upsetting news’ to ideological threats and psychological extortion of journalists and pub-
lic speakers, etc.”⁶
One would expect that changes in the political system would have prompted rapid 
changes in media legislation, but the reality was diﬀ erent. Th e adoption of new media leg-
islation proved to be a long process and, more importantly, legislators lacked vision as to 
how this area should be regulated. Th is can be partly attributed to historical factors such 
as experience of restrictive legislation through which every organisational aspect and con-
tent of the media was controlled, and the role that the media (as representatives of civil 
society) played in political changes. In fact, there was a very short period of time in which 
the public interest was not in conﬂ ict with that of the state. As a result, the opinion that 
the newly acquired freedom of expression should not be limited by restrictive media leg-
islation prevailed in most of these countries. Public debates were based on the assump-
tion that media legislation was not necessary at all, that is to say, that the media should be 
left to be freely regulated by an ideologically and politically “neutral” market (as the media 
market was seen at that time). Th erefore, most of these countries intervened in the media 
porocilo.indb   5 22.5.2004, 13:45:52
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sphere only when the eﬀ ects of market forces became manifest. Unfortunately, this inter-
vention came too late.
Oscillation between the two poles, i.e. strict regulation and deregulation (liberalisation), 
was best demonstrated by repeated amendments to existing laws. In Bulgaria, for exam-
ple, the  Law on Radio and Television was amended nine times – twice in , once 
in , three times in , twice in  and once in . Th ese interventions clearly 
demonstrated the state’s wish to (re)establish control over the media. Croatia amended its 
media laws eleven times in the past decade, with the law regulating public service broad-
casting having been amended eight times. Th e current director general of the public serv-
ice broadcaster, Hrvatska Radio Televizija (), witnessed three legislative amendments 
in the course of his term in oﬃ  ce. Some among these radically altered the composition of 
the  Council as the highest management and supervisory body – it changed from the 
Council whose members were appointed by political bodies, to the Council composed of 
individuals appointed by various civil associations (as representatives of the public inter-
est), to the Council that represented a compromise between political interests represented 
in the Croatian Parliament. On the other hand, Estonia, for example, saw four bills per-
taining to the media, but none of these was passed. Th ese bills were drafted with diﬀ er-
ent goals in mind – some attempted to deﬁ ne what media should do and others lay down 
requirements concerning objectivity and representation of the interests of various social 
groups. Although the Estonian media are (indirectly) regulated by ten diﬀ erent laws, only 
the Broadcasting Act passed in  directly addresses the media sector. But the Broad-
casting Act was adopted two years after the majority of the current broadcast media were 
established and, much like media legislation in other countries, it has undergone several 
amendments. Th e bill drafted by the Estonian Ministry of Culture in , proposing a sys-
tem of regulation (licensing) of new publications owned by foreigners, is just one exam-
ple of abortive attempts to introduce media legislation. Opposition from within the media 
community was so strong that the bill never reached Parliament.
In Moldova, the Press Law passed in  has gone through eight amendments. Most 
of these changes pertained to the regulation of ownership relations. Th e Moldovan Press 
Law and the Audio-visual Law do not include the concept of owner but instead use the 
terms founders or co-founders, meaning that these laws do not address the concepts of 
ownership and concentration. Out of a total of seventeen amendments, only one directly 
addressed the issue of ownership by prohibiting cross-ownership between telecommuni-
cations operators and broadcasters. Th is article was subsequently invalidated by the Con-
stitutional Court with the explanation that it restricted freedom of expression. Chapter 
 of the Press Law entitled “Financing” was amended four times (in , ,  and 
). According to the ﬁ rst () amendment, support to the press provided by foreign 
porocilo.indb   6 22.5.2004, 13:45:53
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legal and natural persons was allowed. However, the  amendment prohibited the gov-
ernments of foreign countries from supporting the Moldovan print media except in cases 
where such support was regulated through collateral agreements. Th is legislative initiative 
was tabled by the new parliamentary majority. Th e Audio-visual Law (passed in ) was 
amended seven times. Th e most signiﬁ cant amendments were those of , stipulating 
that  percent of all radio and television programming be in the oﬃ  cial state language.
One could argue that in many cases these frequent amendments to media laws were not 
backed by a clear vision of the implications of these changes. But some changes resulted 
from the lack of political will to implement the existing laws, only aggravating the eﬀ ort 
to create favourable conditions for an eﬀ ective functioning of institutions responsible for 
the implementation of laws.
When speaking of the diﬃ  culties experienced by these countries, we should not over-
look the fact that they were not prepared for the new conditions created by changes in the 
political sphere, and that this brought about additional problems. Some countries gave 
in to the conviction that media laws were not needed at all, while elsewhere, media laws 
turned out to be a mixture of provisions and solutions employed by “comparable” Euro-
pean countries. Nor were various European institutions any better prepared for this situ-
ation. From their perspective, the post-socialist countries looked like a kind of uniform 
“eastern system.” However, while it is true that the vast majority of these countries shared 
a communist or socialist past, their social systems were radically diﬀ erent in practice, as 
were their legal and media systems, and ultimately, their new governments and the pace 
of media democratisation. As a result, legislative models oﬀ ered to those countries look-
ing for “help” in adopting new media legislation were frequently inadequate. Th ese were 
actually attempts to transplant to post-socialist countries various individual solutions (or 
complete media legislations) employed by  member states. But these legislative pro-
posals were unsuitable and, more importantly, not adapted to the needs of these coun-
tries. Th e case of Albania is a typical example of such an inadequate solution, a model that 
smoothly operates in the source country but causes diﬃ  culties in a country to which it is 
transplanted. Th e Albanian press law passed in  was drawn up with the help of the 
German foundation, Friedrich Ebert. It was based on the recommendations of independ-
ent experts and modelled after the law of one of the German states. However, the mak-
ers of this law did not take into consideration the historical development and special fea-
tures of Albanian society, i.e. the rudimentary media system that had been subject to total 
control in the past. Th e result was a law that the media community (which was excluded 
from the drafting process) assessed as restrictive. Th is law was replaced with a new one 
in , and it included just one general provision: “Th e print media are free. Media free-
dom is protected by law.” In light of such circumstances, it is not diﬃ  cult to understand 
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the words of Albanian poet and , Prec Zogaj, who concluded that the Albanian media 
found themselves in a situation in which there was “freedom of the press, but no free.” (In-
dexmedia,  ():)
In contrast to the print media that were left almost entirely to market forces, the broad-
casting sector continued to be inﬂ uenced by the state. Most of the countries examined here 
introduced special authorities that were responsible for broadcast license allocation with a 
view to public interest, and for the supervision of radio and television stations i.e. their com-
pliance with the applicable laws. Th e problem was that in many countries, these authori-
ties were introduced too late, only after many important decisions had already be taken by 
the state. For example, all until , when the Lithuanian Radio and Television Commis-
sion was established, the Lithuanian public broadcasting sector was strictly regulated, in 
contrast to the private/commercial sector that was subject to virtually no regulation. Until 
the establishment of the Commission, the majority of radio and television stations oper-
ated on the basis of their foundation certiﬁ cates which, however, did not regulate their ba-
sic activity – radio and television broadcasting. In Slovenia, from  until the adoption 
of the Mass Media Act in , the national authority for broadcasting frequencies (Tele-
communications Oﬃ  ce) allocated broadcast licenses even though there was no legal basis 
for allocation. Th e issuing of licenses began in  under the guise of democratisation and 
under public pressure, and most licenses were granted to commercial broadcasters. All the 
important licenses, that is to say, those covering the largest portions of the country, were 
distributed before the adoption of the Mass Media Act. Consequently, the newly founded 
supervisory body, the Broadcasting Council, which according to this law was responsible 
for license allocation, inherited an exhausted frequency fund, chaotic ownership relations 
and invalid (or non-existent) programming concepts that served as the basis for grant-
ing broadcast licenses. In other words, the law established a regulatory body that could no 
longer inﬂ uence the future development of the country’s broadcasting sector.
Obviously, these formally independent institutions with wide authority, ranging from 
licensing and passing of decrees to supervising broadcasters’ operations, face numerous 
problems in their work. Th e method by which their members are appointed – one of the 
basic criteria in assessing the independence of such institutions – is just one among many 
controversial issues. In Albania, the seven-member council is conﬁ rmed by Parliament 
– one member is proposed/recommended by the head of the state and six by political 
parties (the ruling and opposition parties). In Bulgaria, members of the Electronic Media 
Council are nominated by parliamentary parties and the President. In Slovenia, the seven-
member council is nominated by civil institutions (the university, the journalists’ associa-
tion, the chambers of culture and commerce), but approved by Parliament. In Serbia, the 
implementation of the Broadcasting Law (passed in ) was delayed over the appoint-
porocilo.indb   8 22.5.2004, 13:45:53
REGIONAL OVERVIEW 17
ment of the Broadcasting Agency members. In fact, when appointing two members of 
the Agency, the previous Serbian Parliament, as the supreme legislative body, violated the 
provisions of the law that it itself adopted. Regulatory bodies nominated by political actors 
are primarily accountable to politicians and only later to the public whose interests they 
should be representing. Th eir independence can be restricted in various ways: by reducing 
their funds (Croatia, Slovenia), by refusing to conﬁ rm their annual reports (Albania, Po-
land), or by obstructing the implementation of public supervision (shortage of staﬀ ).
3. MEDIA PRIVATISATION 
One of the basic questions related to the changes in media systems was the determina-
tion of the owners of existing media outlets. Th e media (radio and television systems) were 
the property of the state, political parties and associations, or, in the case of the former 
Yugoslavia, media outlets were socially-owned. While in principle there existed a politi-
cal decision to leave the media to market forces, there was no such “consensus” regarding 
the method of privatisation. In most of these countries, privatisation began spontaneous-
ly, to be regulated by the state only later. Eventually, media were either sold oﬀ  or ended 
up in the hands of the state or various state funds. To put it diﬀ erently, in those countries 
in which media were socially-owned, state-controlled media were transformed into state-
owned media. 
In the Czech Republic, for example, the majority of the country’s media companies 
were privatised during the period of spontaneous privatisation ( to ), with the re-
mainder during the period of state-controlled privatisation (–). In , not a sin-
gle media company in the Czech Republic remained in the hands of the state. Th e Czech 
Republic was also the ﬁ rst among the Central and Eastern European countries to allocate 
a television license with national coverage to a private owner ( Nova received a nation-
al license in ). Th e new media owners who acquired their media shares in the period 
of spontaneous privatisation badly needed strategic partners to invest money in the de-
velopment of these media, because they did not have capital of their own. Journalists and 
former employees of media companies who acquired media shares during this period sold 
these once their market value increased.
In Estonia, for example, the privatisation process of the state-run media lasted approxi-
mately ﬁ ve years ( to ). In , the state held only a few print media targeted at 
specialised readership. Th e initial course of privatisation was partly induced by the inac-
tivity of the state. Th e moment the state could no longer provide the print media with pro-
duction essentials (e.g. newsprint), media companies established their own departments 
whose task was to generate revenue from advertising and provide money for the purchase 
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of essential supplies on the grey market. Th ese privately managed media naturally wished 
to be formally privatised. But although the state abandoned its responsibilities towards its 
own media, it did not completely surrender the opportunity to inﬂ uence them – pressure 
on journalists continued. Th e opinion that prevailed among journalists was that, in order 
to protect freedom of expression and ensure independence, the best solution was to sell 
media to their editorial oﬃ  ces. Th is was what Postimes did, a newspaper that later evolved 
into the largest media company in Estonia, Eesti Media. In contrast to national dailies, the 
local and regional dailies in Estonia experienced an entirely diﬀ erent fate. Most of these 
were simply “handed over” to local governments to be managed by them. Th eir privatisa-
tion (until the end of ) was accompanied by a number of conﬂ icts. Local politicians 
openly interfered with journalistic work. Some went so far as to appoint local politicians 
as editors in chief. Th e ultimate result of the privatisation of local newspapers was a sell-
oﬀ , with most of these going to large foreign-owned media companies.
Th e privatisation process in Latvia was similarly spontaneous in the initial phase and 
only later regulated by the state. Spontaneous privatisation raised the issue of determining 
formal ownership rights. Th e “new state” took over all property of the “former state” (in-
cluding state-owned media), but the issue of property of the former Communist Party and 
related organisations remained open. Th e privatisation of media previously owned by the 
Communist Party began and ended even before the state determined to whom these me-
dia actually belonged. Th e second round of privatisation began in  with the adoption 
of the Law on Privatisation. Th e largest Latvian daily, Diena, was privatised in accordance 
with this law. Only six years later, in , did the state commence with the privatisation 
of the country’s largest printing house. And it was precisely in the area of press distribu-
tion where concentration actually continued, despite the state monopoly’s never having 
been properly eliminated.
In Lithuania, the privatisation of the print media began in the s when the Gov-
ernment discreetly agreed to stop interfering with the media. Th e majority of media out-
lets were privatised to journalists and employees. Several years later, when their price in-
creased, most sold their shares to large publishing companies or foreign investors.
Privatisation in Hungary followed a similar path with the period of spontaneous pri-
vatisation having been followed by privatisation based on the newly adopted legislation. 
However, spontaneous privatisation, frequently labelled as “scandalous”, later proved to 
have involved fewer irregularities than state-controlled privatisation; the greatest scandals 
accompanied the legislation-based privatisation of the largest national media. 
Unlike the majority of other post-socialist countries, Poland pursued the model of state 
controlled privatisation from the very outset. Th e privatisation of the largest publishing 
company  (Th e Workers’ Publishing Cooperative, “Press-Book-Ruch”) that had domi-
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nated the Polish print media market for  years, may be taken as a model of print media 
privatisation in Poland. At the end of the s,  was one of the largest media compa-
nies in Central Europe. Th e legal framework for the privatisation of  was laid down by 
the  Act on Liquidation of Th e Workers’ Publishing Cooperative “Prasa-Książka-Ruch.” 
Th e process of privatisation was carried out by the liquidation commission appointed by 
the Prime Minister. In carrying out this privatisation process, the commission pursued 
three basic strategies: “assigning newspaper and magazines to staﬀ  co-operatives (this re-
quired approval from more than half the employees who were required to invest three-
month’s salary in the purchase), selling oﬀ  the press titles to private owners, and returning 
the remaining property to the control of state treasury.”⁷ At the beginning of its activities, 
the commission controlled the privatisation of  newspapers and periodicals, of which 
 were given over to editorial teams (including two leading news weeklies),  were sold 
to private owners and three were returned to the control of the state treasury. In , the 
Commission submitted its ﬁ nal report (accepted by the Minister of Finance) and formally 
concluded its mission. It turned out that the primary result of the process was the disman-
tling of this media giant, but the goal of safeguarding media pluralism was not achieved.
In the case of Slovakia, it is not possible to speak about a speciﬁ c model of privatisation. 
All print media had to struggle with the strong interests of the Government, both at the 
beginning of privatisation as well as later in connection with access to distribution net-
works and printing plants. Th e largest distribution network with a monopoly on the mar-
ket was privatised in  (six months ahead of elections). It was privatised to individuals 
very close to the ruling party.
Albania saw no privatisation of the media sector, so one cannot ﬁ nd journalists, editors 
or former media employees among the current media owners. Zerri i Popullit, the largest 
party daily in the previous system, is owned by the Socialist Party. Th e Albanian Directo-
rate of Economic Competition, charged with exercising control over the price of newspa-
pers, cannot exercise such control over party newspapers and magazines because these 
are exempt from the Law on Competition.
Early privatisation in Bosnia and Herzegovina was uncontrolled and the process is still 
underway. Local and cantonal authorities still have shares in the media and frequently use 
them to exert pressure on journalists.
According to oﬃ  cial data, in  the Croatian Government was the largest media 
owner, although the privatisation of media in Croatia began as early as the late s. Th e 
Government still owns  media companies, among these two daily newspapers, tens of 
local and regional publications, a press agency, a printing company, the public broadcast-
er, Hrvatska Radio Televizija, and the public company, Transmitters.
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4. MEDIA MARKETS
When comparing media markets in post-socialist countries we compare not only mar-
kets of diﬀ erent sizes, but primarily markets oﬀ ering essentially diﬀ erent conditions for 
media operation. In certain countries, data on media business operations are not trans-
parent – either no central register of companies exists, or data on ownership stakes sup-
plied by media companies are not checked, or circulation ﬁ gures are not available despite 
legal obligation to publish these (in some countries circulation data are treated as a busi-
ness secret), or there exist no independent surveys of the readership or audience shares. 
Despite these diﬀ erences, it is possible to identify certain common denominators. Most 
of these markets are small and fragmented, hosting a great number of media, particular-
ly broadcast media, or there are parallel markets divided along linguistic lines. Another 
feature shared by these markets is the existence of close links between the largest and the 
most inﬂ uential media on the one hand, and local owners of capital and political parties 
on the other. Th is underlines the urgent need to have transparent ownership data. Public 
access to data on media ownership and owners’ business and political links enables citi-
zens to form an opinion on the editorial policy of a speciﬁ c media outlet. Unfortunately, 
data on ownership stakes cannot reveal other potential forms of corporate linkage be-
tween companies that are not oﬃ  cially related or merged, although it is precisely these in-
formal links (those not listed in any register) that may point to the conﬂ ict of interest or, 
indirectly, to editorial dependence of a particular media outlet.
Local media markets within these countries introduce a special kind of problem. Th ese 
markets suﬀ er the most serious consequences of media concentration and of the interplay 
of economic, political and media power concentrated in the hands of a single owner. Lo-
cal media markets are particularly sensitive to various kinds of external pressures. Owing 
to the limited advertising potential (and local advertisers are also local entrepreneurs and 
politicians) and dependence on advertising income, it is journalists working for local me-
dia who are particularly exposed to strong pressure.
Private media outlets are frequently not seen as business undertakings but exclusively 
as tools for achieving economic or political power. For example, print media in Macedo-
nia are not propelled by market laws. Advertisers do not buy advertising space on the basis 
of circulation ﬁ gures or reach, but on the basis of media relations with inﬂ uential political 
and business circles in the country. Th ose companies whose chairmen or executive direc-
tors are close to government circles or political parties place their advertisements with the 
media that support government policies. Th is politics-friendly advertising artiﬁ cially keeps 
alive certain publications that would otherwise never be able to survive on their own.
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A single owner thus frequently impersonates a combination of media, economic and 
political capital. One of the most powerful Macedonian businessmen, Ljubisav Ivanov, is 
the owner of Sitel Television. Oﬃ  cially, the owner of this television station is  , a 
shareholding company of which Ivanov is the majority owner, chairman and general man-
ager. Th is same shareholding company is the founder of eleven other companies operating 
in various ﬁ elds ranging from mining, industry and agriculture to trade and ﬁ nance. Th e 
example of the former Macedonian Minister of Finance, who is the owner of one of the 
largest local television stations, Kanal , also indicates close connections between politics 
and the media. 
Th e co-owner and president of the Latvian radio station, , who was criticised for 
his open support for the liberal Latvia’s Way party during the run-up to the elections, 
claimed that on his radio station he could “do whatever he wants,” unless it scared away 
the audience.⁸ Foreign media owners buying media shares in post-socialist countries are 
well aware of the importance of local political “support”. Martin Pompadur of Murdoch’s 
News Corporation stated for the Bulgarian Capital weekly (February , ): “I cannot 
imagine us investing in newspapers. We own newspaper business in Australia, UK and a 
daily in , but outside the English-speaking world we would really feel uncomfortable 
in press business. In many countries newspapers have political aﬃ  liations, but we always 
insist on  percent independence.”⁹
Bodo Hombach,  of the German media concern, , stated for the Macedonian 
Dnevnik weekly ( November ) that  ensured the independence of editors and 
journalists working for their newspapers. “Th e situation with the media in Southeast Eu-
rope is rather hard, but wherever we are, the media are stable. We watch journalists’ backs, 
so they can concentrate on their job.”  appointed Srđan Kerim, a former diplomat and 
the former Foreign Aﬀ airs Minister in the -–Liberal Party coalition govern-
ment a member of the managing boards of all three Macedonian papers owned by .
Željko Mitrović, the owner of  Pink, the most popular regional television station in 
the former Yugoslavia, was an  in the former federal Parliament as a candidate of Mirja-
na Marković’s party (Slobodan Milošević’s wife). He described his involvement in politics 
as a pragmatic business move. In his words, he was never interested in having a political 
role but accepted it for business reasons – to protect his business.¹⁰
Among the largest owners of the Albanian  Koha one ﬁ nds the Minister of Agri-
culture and the mayor of an important Albanian city. Most of the “local/domestic” me-
dia owners are also owners of other businesses, and these other businesses are the source 
of funds used to support media outlets. Th erefore, advertising revenue is not an issue for 
these media companies. Th e main advantage of media ownership is the potential to exert 
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political inﬂ uence. Media power is political power, so for media owners, media outlets are 
primarily a political lever of inﬂ uence.
Some owners buy media in order to secure support for other lines of business. In 
Kosovo/a, for example, Ekrem Luka owns the most popular radio in Kosovo/a, Radio Du-
kagjini,  Dukagjini, Dukagjini Publishing House and Dukagjini Printing Plant, a basket-
ball team, a tobacco company, a construction company and an insurance company. 
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, state subsidies and donations rather than distribution and 
advertising revenues continue to be the main sources of income for media companies. 
Since , the .. Government alone has invested some   million to support inde-
pendent broadcast and print media. Add to this the donations of the European Commis-
sion and various s (e.g. Open Society), and it becomes obvious that the apparent me-
dia pluralism, albeit mainly external, is predominantly based on various forms of aid. “But 
it is a question how many media would be able to survive without this help. One conse-
quence of their dependence on donations is demonstrated through their speciﬁ c political 
dependence on institutions or countries that provide these funds. Experience has shown 
that the majority of sponsored media have been created as political projects and thus 
failed to achieve commercial success.”¹¹ 
In Moldova, the Law on Sponsorship and Philanthropy does not diﬀ erentiate be-
tween media outlets and other beneﬁ ciaries of sponsorship schemes. Th e share of spon-
sors’ money in some media amounts to as much as one-third of total revenue. But media 
sponsors, although likely expecting favours in exchange for their support, remain hidden. 
By deﬁ nition, sponsorship means direct or indirect ﬁ nancing of media with the purpose 
of promoting the sponsor’s name, trademark or image. A media outlet that is sponsored 
but declines to publicly disclose the name of the sponsor, or identify content that is being 
sponsored, cannot claim any real credibility. 
One form of interference with the media market is distribution or redistribution of vari-
ous kinds of state aid. In Albania, for example, there is no portion of the state budget ear-
marked for the support of media pluralism, but the state does intervene in this ﬁ eld, for ex-
ample, by renting oﬃ  ce space at a price lower than that on the real estate market. However, 
given the lack of precise criteria and non-transparency of selection methods, this kind of 
intervention may be abused. When selecting media for state-sponsored advertising, which 
represents a considerable part of the total advertising revenue on the Albanian media mar-
ket, the state opts for those media that are not critical of the Government and its policies.
Hungary also knows a “grey zone of subsidies” consisting of advertising money paid by 
government organisations, state-owned companies, municipalities and so on. While the 
amount of this sum is diﬃ  cult to estimate, most experts agree that it accounts for  to  
percent of the aggregate advertising spending (approximately   million in ). 
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Th is kind of advertising is not driven by market forces, but given the total amount of mon-
ey generated in this way, grey advertising is more important and more inﬂ uential than oth-
er oﬃ  cial sources of state aid.
One of the basic problems of media markets in post-socialist countries is monopolies 
over press distribution. In most of these countries, it was precisely the privatisation of dis-
tribution networks that demonstrated that by restricting access to distribution, it was pos-
sible to control the entry of new media. In Bulgaria, for example, the distribution network 
is in the hands of only a few owners. Two distributors have ownership links with the larg-
est publishers (one is ), so by setting unfavourable terms of distribution they can inﬂ u-
ence the market position of other print media. Th e third distribution network was bought 
by the consortium of the Bulgarian print media established exclusively for the purpose of 
this purchase with a view to securing better circumstances for the distribution of their pub-
lications. In Albania, distribution networks cover bigger cities. Add to this the fact that the 
monthly subscription to a daily newspaper amounts to  percent of the average salary, and 
it becomes obvious that the already limited market is subject to additional restrictions.
We have already said that media markets are not primarily driven by economic factors. 
A relatively large number of daily newspapers were launched with the intention of secur-
ing certain political interests. Hungary, for example, has four political dailies. According 
to industry analysts, the Hungarian market can sustain only two titles: the centre-left Nép-
szabadság (. percent owned by Ringier A.B., . percent by Bertelsmann .. and 
. percent by Free Press Foundation) and the centre-right Magyar Nemzet (its majority 
owner is a Hungarian who is also editor in chief ). 
Th e Polish print media market, dominated by foreign owners, is characterised by in-
tense consolidation. Th ere were  mergers in , with this number rising to  in . 
According to the  report from Arthur and Andersen (Report on the Media Market 
in Poland), this represents  and  percent of all mergers in Europe respectively. Th e in-
vestment needed to launch a new daily is currently estimated at   million, a sum ap-
proximately twelve times less than that needed to launch a new private  channel with 
national coverage. Local and regional media markets are those that suﬀ er the most serious 
consequences of media concentration, mergers and consolidation. As a result, the region-
al media market is almost completely in the hands of the two biggest market players, the 
Norwegian Orkla and Polska Press. 
In the Czech Republic, foreign investors initially employed the strategy of media own-
ership expansion. Particularly active were smaller German publishers who acquired al-
most complete control of the local and regional newspaper market. And why did large 
media corporations such as  or Alex Springer decide not to enter the Czech market? 
One possible explanation is that “big players” were primarily interested in the purchase 
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of national dailies, but at that time they were either unproﬁ table or already had owners 
that were not willing to sell their majority shares. Some time around the year , the 
German investors reached a mutual agreement on the future of the Czech regional press. 
Today, the publishing house Vltava-Labe-Press, owned by the German Verlagsgruppe 
Passau, controls nearly all regional and local newspapers in the Czech Republic. ’s 
Bohemia division publishes  daily newspapers, and the Moravia division  daily news-
papers.  also publishes the Prague evening paper Večerník Praha,  weekly papers as 
supplements to individual regional dailies, and  independent regional weeklies. New me-
dia are virtually prevented from entering the regional newspaper market.
Th e largest circulation daily in Kosovo/a is Koha Ditore, published by the private com-
pany Koha Group owned by Veton Surroi. Th e Koha Group portfolio also includes the 
Koha Print printing house, Koha Vision Television () with national coverage, and the 
Koha Net Internet Provider. Th e Koha Ditore daily can sustain itself, while the television 
station is ﬁ nancially supported by various s (e.g. Open Society) and governmental 
organisations (e.g. ). Radio Television  ( ) is a private multimedia company 
owned by the Saracini/Kelmendi family, comprising Television , Radio  and the web 
radio, Radio .net. Neither of the two television stations ( and Television ) would be 
able to survive on the market without foreign aid. Neither can the newspaper market sus-
tain all ﬁ ve dailies currently published in Kosovo/a (only Koha Ditore is self-sustainable). 
Furthermore, none of the weekly newspapers generates a proﬁ t. Of the ﬁ ve weekly news-
papers currently published, only Zeri has a chance of surviving in the market. 
To brieﬂ y recapitulate, the media markets covered by this study are deﬁ ned by the 
strong presence of foreign owners and close links between owners and people wielding 
economic and political power. Th eir other common features include an expanding market 
for tabloid media, concentration of local and regional markets, and a great number of ra-
dio and television stations operating in haphazard broadcasting markets with weak public 
service broadcasters.
In the past decade, the broadcasting market changed at a slower pace and was more 
thoroughly regulated by the state. Th e majority of these countries inherited state-run mo-
nopolists in the radio and television broadcasting sector from the previous system. But 
these radio and television companies, scheduled to be transformed into public services, 
were not ready for change. Th e majority had ineﬃ  cient organisational structures, were 
overstaﬀ ed, poorly managed and lacked vision or desire to change. Th e promises given 
by the new governments were only declarative commitments, but the authorities failed 
to create the essential conditions for the transformation of state-run companies. Conse-
quently, one decade of change in the broadcasting market may be described as ending in 
the replacement of the state monopoly with the commercial sector monopoly.
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In Slovakia,  Markíza has ended up with no real competitor. Slovakia passed anti-
concentration legislation only in , but its implementation proved to be a problem. 
Not one ruling of the Council for Broadcasting and Retransmission issued by  estab-
lished a breach of anti-concentration provisions. Th e Council is elected by Parliament, so 
powerful media groups can inﬂ uence the selection of candidates and prevent unfavour-
able consequences for their businesses. 
In Hungary, the two national commercial television channels,  ( percent owned 
by ) and  Klub ( percent owned by -Ufa ../Bertlesman,  percent by Matáv 
. and  percent by Pearson Netherlands ..) had a combined audience market share 
of almost  percent in , and around  percent share of the advertising market. Th e 
situation on the radio market is not much diﬀ erent. Th e shares held by the two national 
commercial radio channels broadcasting under the brand names Danubius ( percent 
owned by Advent International) and Sláger (Emmis Broadcasting International Corpora-
tion -  percent, Credit Suisse First Boston Radio Operating .. –  percent, and Szuper 
Expressz Kft –  percent) are estimated at some  percent of audience market share, and 
more than a  percent of advertising market share. Th e Hungarian Broadcasting Act was 
passed after long parliamentary debates in . Th e only relevant changes to the Broad-
casting Act of  were legislated in , but they did not touch upon anti-concentra-
tion provisions; the Competition Act of  has been amended several times.
Th e Polish broadcasting market is divided between one strong public broadcaster ( 
percent market share) and several private broadcasters ( percent share). Th e television 
landscape in Poland was shaped during the ﬁ rst licensing period (–). Th e main 
goal was initial pluralism of broadcasters addressing diﬀ erent audiences instead of com-
peting for the same audience segments. Accordingly, licenses were granted to  domestic 
broadcasters (one national – Polsat, one supra-regional – Telewizja Wisla and nine local) 
and one foreign broadcaster (pay  – Canal Plus). Th is strategy envisaged a balanced 
development of the television broadcasting market in which the dominance of the public 
broadcaster, already oﬀ ering two national channels ( ,  ),  regional channels,  
satellite channel (Polonia) and a  newspaper channel (Telegazeta), would be oﬀ set by a 
strong private sector. In , Poland had   channels, among them two digital plat-
forms, eight national and supra-regional domestic channels and nine local  channels. 
Th e  report by the National Broadcasting Council noted an increased capital concen-
tration in the radio market, in particular the intensiﬁ ed activities of two owners of local 
radio station networks – Agora (in  it owned  local stations) and  ( local ra-
dio station,  of these incorporated in the Eska network). More than half of the local radio 
stations operating in the  largest local markets in Poland are concentrated in the hands 
of these two owners.
porocilo.indb   17 22.5.2004, 13:45:55
 26 MEDIA OWNERSHIP AND ITS IMPACT ON MEDIA INDEPENDENCE AND PLURALISM
Czech media legislation does not restrict foreign participation in media. Th e only lim-
it on cross-ownership in the Czech media pertains to the broadcast media – under the 
Broadcasting Act of , one company may hold only one nation-wide television or radio 
broadcasting license. According to the criteria of the Czech Oﬃ  ce for the Protection of 
Competition, all mass media form a single market. In the market thus deﬁ ned (the thresh-
old is  percent), no publisher, broadcaster nor media company can have a dominant po-
sition on the “relevant market.”
Th e Macedonian broadcast market is highly segmented. Legal restrictions prevented 
concentration of media ownership. Under Macedonian law, a broadcasting concession may 
not be transferred to a third person. In practice this meant that it was not possible to buy 
an existing media outlet but prospective media owners had to establish new ones (i.e. apply 
for a frequency license). Understandably, pressure on the regulatory body, the Broadcast-
ing Council, was very strong. It is possible to argue that in those countries that introduced 
clear legal provisions restricting concentration, and in which regulatory bodies adhered to 
the implementation of these restrictions, there was no signiﬁ cant media concentration.
Among the key instruments used to prevent concentration in the media market are 
general competition legislation (and, more importantly, its implementation) and special 
restrictions included in media laws. Most of these countries do have general competition 
laws and special “safety valves” incorporated in media legislation, but what presents diﬃ  -
culties is the application of general competition provisions to the media ﬁ eld (deﬁ nition of 
the relevant market, dominant position and abuse of this position), a problem that is only 
augmented by the ineﬃ  ciency of special institutions protecting competition.
Most of the competition protection laws deﬁ ne concentration as cases in which indi-
vidual companies together with related persons control  percent of the relevant market. 
In Albania, for example, provisions are quite clear prohibiting the reduction of prices if the 
aim is the elimination of competition; damaging of reputation (i.e. false statements about 
competitors in order to ruin their business); convincing of employees to breach their con-
tract with a competitor and hiring those employees in order to gain a competitive edge. In 
reality, however, breaches of these provisions are a common practice. 
5. PARALLEL MARKETS
One feature of the post-socialist media markets is the existence of parallel markets di-
vided along linguistic (and ethnic) lines. Parallel markets operate as part of the internal 
market or, in some cases, they are the result of a special form of media “intrusion” from 
another (neighbouring) country. Take, for example, the Moldovan media market. It is di-
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vided into the Romanian-language and Russian-language markets. Th e Komsomoliskaia 
pravda Moldova is an eight-page publication inserted in the periodical published in Mos-
cow and distributed in Moldova. Th e Russian radio stations in Moldova “inform the 
Moldovan audience about weather forecasts for the Moscow region, decisions of Russian 
leaders, books published in Moscow which the Moldovans cannot buy, … and even about 
traﬃ  c jams on Moscow streets.”¹² However, the audience for these radio stations are the 
citizens of Moldova, many of whom have never been to Moscow or will never go to Mos-
cow. Newspaper supplements and inserts, radio and television programs broadcast by for-
eign television stations and re-transmitted in Moldova, are characteristic features of the 
Moldovan parallel media system. Another feature is two speeds of development: a slow 
pace of development characterising national daily newspapers and broadcast media with 
national coverage, and a faster pace for weekly newspapers, local media and publications 
owned by political parties. A conviction held by Moldovan businessmen (mainly ethnic 
Russians) is that “a good business is a Russian language newspaper.” But the polarisation 
of the Moldovan media market into the Romanian- and Russian-language markets has 
another consequence too: it obscures the presence of other ethnic minorities that remain 
unheard and unseen. 
In some countries, the existence of parallel (language) markets cannot be said to pro-
mote pluralism, but the eﬀ ect is just the opposite: exclusion, or media ghettoisation. In 
Estonia, for example, approximately , Russian-speaking citizens can choose from 
among  newspapers in Russian. After the Government decided, in , to stop trans-
lating television programs, the Russian-speaking population formed consumer coopera-
tives, bought satellite dishes and started to watch Russian channels by satellite. It is possi-
ble to say that the television sector in Estonia is divided between the Russian and Estonian 
ethnic groups, with each of the two viewing programs exclusively in its native language. 
Th e information and media markets in Latvia are similarly polarised along linguistic (eth-
nic) lines. Th e number of Russian print media has been on the increase, in contrast to the 
Latvian print media market that experienced consolidation. Th e print media in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina are faced with strong competition from newspapers published in Croatia and 
Serbia and distributed across Bosnia and Herzegovina. Th e Montenegrin radio and televi-
sion market was directly inﬂ uenced by political events, i.e. relations between Serbia and 
Montenegro. In , there was only one, state-run broadcaster in Montenegro. Th e only 
competition it faced was that from   and   that were watched more than 
the programming oﬀ ered by the state broadcaster. Today Montenegro has a number of its 
own radio and television programs and their strongest competitors are Serbian channels. 
In fact, virtually every Serbian television station, except , is present in Montenegro, ei-
ther broadcasting on temporarily acquired frequencies or as part of the programming of 
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Montenegrin radio and television stations. One should add that Serbian print media are 
also regularly distributed in Montenegro. By contrast, no Montenegrin radio or television 
station broadcasts its programming in Serbia. 
Th e public service broadcaster in Macedonia broadcasts in Albanian, Turkish, Romany, 
Serbian, Vlach and Bosniak, that is to say, in the languages of various ethnic minorities liv-
ing in Macedonia. Of the  local commercial  stations,  air programs in Albanian and 
two in Romany; of the  local commercial radio stations, ten air programs in Albanian, 
three in Romany and one in Turkish. One radio station in Skopje broadcasts a bilingual 
program (in Macedonian and Albanian). It is obvious that there are several parallel lan-
guage markets in Macedonia. But when determining whether a certain company abused 
its dominant position on the print media market, the Macedonian monopoly authority 
decided that the notion of the relevant market should also include newspapers in Alba-
nian, explaining that the readers of Albanian-language newspapers are also able to read 
newspapers in Macedonian. It thus ignored the basic characteristic of parallel markets i.e., 
language diﬀ erentiation, as well as the fact that it is disputable whether the Macedonian-
speaking population can also read newspapers in Albanian. 
Finally, let us mention the case of Kosovo/a, where parallel media markets mainly con-
sist of the Serbian- and Albanian-language media. Zeri and Java are the two Albanian 
weekly newspapers with the largest readerships; Jedinstvo is the only weekly in Serbian, 
Alem the only weekly in Bosniak and Yeni Donem in Turkish. Th e needs of the Serbian 
readership have been addressed by  which has been providing distribution of some 
Belgrade dailies and other print media to the Kosovo/a Serbs.
One could say that, in addition to the public broadcasters that address ethnic minori-
ties living in various countries, it is mainly the parallel markets, which operate as sepa-
rate (closed) markets, that target their products exclusively at speciﬁ c ethnic groups. Most 
problems arise from the fact that the neighbouring (native language) countries intrude 
with their media that are supported by larger readerships and consequently bigger adver-
tising markets.
6. SIGNIFICANT INDIVIDUALS
A quick look at the media owners in almost every country covered by this study reveals 
prominent individuals. An overview of their proﬁ les allows us to identify several types of 
strong individual media owners. 
Th e ﬁ rst group would thus include owners or co-owners of big companies from ﬁ elds 
other than the media industry, e.g. oil trade, construction, real estate, banking, even the 
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arms trade. All of these individuals also control several media outlets. Frequently, they are 
cross-owners of newspapers, radio and television stations and in some cases, family mem-
bers represent co-owners in their businesses. In Albania, for example, Koco Kohedhi-
ma owns the Spekter company, which publishes three daily newspapers and a weekly. He 
also has shareholdings in a television station and an advertising agency. Th e co-owner of 
the company that owns A television is Koco Kohedhima’s brother. Kohedhima also owns 
companies that deal with construction, advertising, oil reﬁ ning, etc. In Estonia, Hans H. 
Luik is the head of the large media concern, Ekspress Group, which owns one weekly and 
co-owns a daily newspaper that in turn owns three free newspapers. Express Group’s oth-
er businesses include a printing plant and a book publishing company and, in addition, it 
is a joint-owner, along with the second-strongest media group, Eesti Media, of the most 
popular tabloid,  journals and a door-to-door delivery service. Luik also has business in-
terests in other industrial sectors like real estate and waste management. In Poland, Zyg-
munt Solorz-Żak is the owner and chairman of the Polsat group whose ﬂ agship is Telewiz-
ija Polsat. Th is group owns a range of other broadcast media in Poland and Lithuania, a 
digital platform and more. In addition, Polsat invested in a pension fund, a life insurance 
company, in banking, and has a shareholding in a cellular telecommunication network 
operator. In Serbia, the brothers Bogoljub and Sreten Karić are the owners of a television 
station with national coverage which also broadcasts via satellite; they own a radio station 
and several magazines, and through the Astra company, they are the owners of a cellular 
network operator, construction companies, a bank, a college etc.¹³
In most of these cases, business interests of media owners ﬁ nd expression in the program-
ming of these media, in their manner of reporting and their selection of advertisements.
Th e second group would include individual media owners with distinct political aﬃ  lia-
tions, past or present positions within political parties, governments or parliaments. Such 
an example would be Nikolle Lesi in Abania, the owner of the media publishing house, 
Koha, which publishes two daily newspapers. Lesi and his wife are the owners of a radio 
station, and in the past, Lesi owned a television station and a magazine. Nikolle Lesi has 
been a member of two successive parliaments. Formerly aﬃ  liated with the Socialist Party, 
he is now the leader of the Democratic Christian Party. He is also a member of the Parlia-
mentary Commission on Media.
In Serbia, the most widely known representative of this group would be the owner of 
the Pink television station, Željko Mitrović, who was aﬃ  liated with the party led by Mira 
Marković, Slobodan Milošević’s wife. In Slovakia, it is Pavol Rusko, the Minister of Econ-
omy in the present Slovakian Government, and the leader of the  party (claiming lib-
eral orientation), which is a member of the Government coalition. He indeed disposed of 
his shareholding in the country’s strongest and most inﬂ uential media outlet,  Markíza, 
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before he entered politics, but he sold his interest to a friend whom he then appointed as 
his consultant. In addition to  Markíza, the Markíza Group also owns a weekly newspa-
per, a daily newspaper and the Okey radio station. Markíza has been criticised for skewing 
reporting to favour the interests of Pavol Rusko and his party. In Macedonia, this group 
of signiﬁ cant media owners would include Ljubisav Ivanov, a Socialist Party member and 
an , and Boris Stojmenov, the former Minister of Finance. In Moldova, Iurie Rosca, the 
leader of the Christian Democratic Popular Party is the owner of the Flux daily. In Bosnia 
and Herzegovina the owner of the largest newspaper publishing house,  Avaz, Fahru-
din Radončić, was allegedly aﬃ  liated with the  party for many years. 
Th e third group comprises strong publishers, owners of printing plants, distribu-
tion and sales networks, who do not have signiﬁ cant business interests in other indus-
trial branches or obvious political functions. However, they control a signiﬁ cant portion 
of the media market. In Croatia, this group would include Ninoslav Pavić, a co-owner of 
one of the largest newspaper publisher, Europapress Holding; in Kosovo/a, Veton Surroi, 
the owner of a daily newspaper, a television station, a printing house etc.; in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (Republika Srpska), Željko Kopanja, the owner of daily newspaper, a radio 
station and a printing house; in Romania, Adrian Sarbu and Ioan Tiriac, with shares in a 
television station, a radio network, a news agency, regional weekly magazines and a na-
tional press distributor; in Montenegro, professor Miodrag Perović, with stakes in a week-
ly newspaper, the Antena M radio station and a printing house, and in a daily newspaper in 
which his daughter is co-owner. In some countries, these media owners do not (yet) yield 
big proﬁ ts, but their potential for control and inﬂ uence is indisputable.
However, the categorisation of concrete individual media owners in the three groups is 
certainly not deﬁ nite since their proﬁ les change according to changes of their economic 
and political interests.
7. MEDIA INDEPENDENCE
Editorial independence with respect to the publishers and owners, as well as the need to 
ensure elaborate mechanisms and safety valves that would protect journalists against the 
inﬂ uence of media owners, are the two issues confronted by the media communities of all 
countries covered by this study.
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7.1 LEGAL PROVISIONS PERTAINING TO MEDIA INDEPENDENCE
In many countries studied here, media legislation does not include provisions that 
would explicitly address editorial independence from the publisher or owner, nor mecha-
nisms for ensuring such independence.
In Poland, one among the group of new  member states with a large media market, 
rich media activity and large journalistic community, media legislation does not include 
explicit provisions pertaining to independence. Other legislations only touch upon edito-
rial independence, like the Albanian Broadcasting Law which includes only the following 
sentence: “Editorial independence is guaranteed by law.” However, mechanisms for the 
implementation of this provision have never been elaborated and the Broadcasting Coun-
cil has never intervened on the basis of this provision.
It should be added, however, that provisions pertaining to independence are more fre-
quently found in broadcasting legislation than in press laws. For example, Macedonian 
and Polish broadcasting laws include general provisions that broadcasting activity shall be 
based on independence and autonomy of broadcasters and broadcasting organisations. 
On the other hand, the Moldovan Press Law, the Slovenian Mass Media Act and the 
Croatian Media Law stipulate that the relations between publishers and editorial oﬃ  ces 
shall be regulated by statutes. Moreover, the Croatian media law is quite precise in 
stipulating that editors have the right to resign if the publisher changes its editorial policy. 
Th e Mass Media Act in Slovenia stipulates that the publisher must seek the opinion of the 
editorial oﬃ  ce prior to implementing any radical change to the concept, as well as prior 
to the appointment or dismissal of the editor in chief. Th e internal acts of some Slovenian 
media go even further by requiring that the publisher obtain approval from the editorial 
board prior to the appointment or dismissal of editor in chief. However, such participation 
of editorial boards in the appointment of editors in chief – through opinions or even 
approvals – is rare and not found in other media legislations in the region. Media laws of 
the cantons and entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina include provisions according to which 
editorial independence is regulated by way of collective agreements and internal agree-
ments between journalists and publishers. 
7.2 COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS
Collective agreements on the national level regulating professional and social relations 
among publishers, editorial boards and journalists are rare in the countries studied here. 
For example, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Kosovo/a, Serbia, Romania, 
Croatia, Macedonia, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Estonia, Hungary, etc. do not have collec-
tive agreements. Montenegro has a general collective agreement on the national level that 
is also applicable to journalists. In Croatia, negotiations between the journalists’ trade un-
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ion and publishers concerning collective agreements on a national level are still underway. 
In Moldova, the trade union of journalists drafted a law in  on journalistic activity that 
would include provisions pertaining to professional and social rights, the mechanisms of 
implementing editorial independence and more. However, the Government pruned and 
modiﬁ ed this draft law turning it into a collective agreement for the period –, 
signed between the umbrella trade union and the Ministry of Work and Social Protection. 
Th e document was ignored by both the journalistic community and publishers.
In Slovenia, a collective agreement on the national level was concluded in the mid-s, 
but recently it has been implemented only rarely. Certain media companies openly ignore 
the provisions of this agreement and restrict journalists’ rights. “Journalists have been di-
minished to items on the publisher’s costs sheets perceived as an obstacle in generating or 
increasing proﬁ t,” says Iztok Jurančič, the President of the Trade Union of Journalists in 
Slovenia.¹⁴ Th e union indeed drafted a new agreement and has been announcing the start 
of negotiations with publishers since the beginning of last year. One novel feature of this 
agreement is that it addresses the relations between publishers and freelance contributors. 
In many countries journalists work without signing any individual contract. A  
survey of the daily newspapers in Albania showed that  percent of journalists have not 
been oﬀ ered such a contract; in Moldova, the ﬁ gure is  percent, according to a similar 
survey conducted in ; in Bosnia and Herzegovina,  percent of the  journalists 
who participated in one such survey stated that they did not conclude any contract, and 
those who stated that they concluded such contracts were mainly journalists working for 
the public radio or television broadcasters.
Th e unregulated status of journalists working for private media companies is also char-
acteristic of Romania, where there are no trade unions or agreements, and where every at-
tempt by journalists to oppose this state of aﬀ airs has so far proved futile. One argument 
frequently used by publishers to fend oﬀ  such attempts is the availability of young journal-
ists seeking jobs. Th e majority of Romanian journalists earn less than the average monthly 
salary which amounts to roughly  ; journalists working for local media are in the 
worst position as regards their autonomy and social protection. 
Th e weak position of journalists frequently arises from their inadequate education and 
the lack of professional attitude. In Slovenia, for example, there are more stipends and 
seminars available to journalists than journalists interested in applying for these. Th ese 
options are simply ignored unless they yield personal advantages. In many countries (e.g. 
Bulgaria) the expanding media market increased demand for journalists, so its needs are 
now ﬁ lled by individuals without suﬃ  cient professional qualiﬁ cations or skills needed to 
develop professional attitude, and identify and resist publishers’ attempts to use them to 
further political or economic agendas.
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Internal acts regulating the rights of journalists and relations with publishers are found 
only in some of these countries and mainly in media companies whose owners or co-own-
ers are foreign media corporations. In Croatia, for example, such an act is found in Euro-
papress Holding, which is partly owned by . In Lithuania, such a collective agreement 
is oﬀ ered by the Kauno Diena daily, whose publisher is the Norwegian Orkla. Th is same 
corporation oﬀ ers such an agreement in its media companies in Poland where in the au-
tumn of , the representatives of the journalists’ unions established the Forum of Ork-
la Media Employees. Trade unions in Estonia and some other countries began to establish 
contacts with trade unions in parent media companies abroad in order to harmonise the 
protection of their rights and social rights with regard to their owners. 
7.3 JOURNALISTS’ ORGANISATIONS
Th ere are several journalists’ organisations in many of the countries studied here, but 
most of these do not cooperate or are even antagonistic towards one another. In most cas-
es, at least one of these organisations dates back to the previous system and is opposed by 
another, independent one. In Montenegro, for example, there are two journalists’ associa-
tions and two journalists’ trade unions. Th e situation in Serbia is similar. In these coun-
tries, another dividing line is the issue of who supported the war in the former Yugoslavia 
(who cooperated with the ruling party at that time) and who condemned it. Estonia also 
has two professional organisations, one dating from the Soviet era and the other a more 
recent development. Th e two do not cooperate and each has its own press council. In Bos-
nia and Herzegovina, post-war circumstances and ethnic divisions resulted in a fragment-
ed journalistic community with six journalists’ associations. In the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia there is one trade union of journalists but without signiﬁ cant inﬂ uence. On the 
other hand, such organisations in Albania are virtually non-existent and all attempts to es-
tablish one have been aborted.
 7.4 PRESSURES, CORRUPTION AND ETHICS
Reporters from all countries emphasised pressure on journalists, particularly economic 
pressure, and also drew attention to the reduction of their social rights and autonomy. In 
a survey conducted in Poland, more than  percent of respondents stated that their jour-
nalistic freedom was restricted through “pressure exerted by owners, editors in chief, sta-
tions, and direct supervisors”. Many media owners in Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia and 
Romania are also owners of large companies involved in other businesses unrelated to the 
media industry, and many were politically active in the past or are currently involved in 
politics. Needless to say, media operating in such environments are frequently exploit-
ed for the promotion of commercial or political goals of their owners, or for negative  
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aimed at their business competitors or political opponents. Many of these media survive 
only thanks to the external funding i.e. funds provided through other businesses. Th eir 
owners cover their losses and keep these media alive only in order to secure for themselves 
a voice that will promote their economic and business interests and help them ﬁ ght their 
competitors. Th is phenomenon of media division between competing economic and po-
litical groups is not unknown in Latvia either, or to the Czech Republic. In the latter, two 
television companies protect the economic interests of their signiﬁ cant owners in such a 
way that they do not cover events which throw unfavourable light on their owners. Moldo-
va knows another phenomenon i.e. “independent sponsored media”. Although sponsoring 
may account for as much as  percent of the total revenue, the relationship with the spon-
sor is not publicly known, so it may be described as “hidden ownership”. 
In some cases, the fact that journalists are co-owners of the media for which they work 
may become a source of potential or realistic conﬂ ict of interest. For example, when se-
lecting the topics to be covered, these journalists may succumb to self-censorship and 
give priority to business interests over journalistic objectivity. Th e best known examples 
of media owned by journalists are the Polish Gazeta Wyborcza (the media group Ago-
ra), and, until recently, the main political weekly in Hungary,  (last year the journal-
ists with shareholdings in  sold most of their shares to ). Th ese renowned media 
are sometimes accused of giving priority to business interests when setting their agendas. 
 tried to prevent the conﬂ ict between owners’ interests and editorial independence by 
introducing a statute that was designed to protect editorial independence.
In some countries it is the relations between advertisers and media that are problem-
atic. In November , the Polish Chamber of Press Publishers condemned advertisers’ 
attempts to intervene in editorial content. Advertisers frequently exert pressure on editors 
by threatening to withdraw their advertisements if the media refuse to publish favourable 
articles about their work or products. Th e practice in Romania is just the opposite: me-
dia extort advertisers. For example, one of the largest daily newspapers in Romania oﬀ ers 
advertising space at two rates – a lower price for an ordinary advertisement and a higher 
price for an article not marked as an advertisement. To be more precise, a full page adver-
tisement costs  , and an “advertising story”  ,. Of course, it is journalists 
who are asked to write such article-advertisements. Th is practice even provoked interven-
tion by the International Advertising Association that accused the Romanian media of 
blackmailing international corporations advertising their products in Romania by asking 
for payment in order not to feature unfavourable articles about these corporations. Some 
Romanian advertisers pay money to those media critical of strong institutions, but do not 
place their advertisements in these media out of fear of being associated with their critical 
attitude. Covert advertising and advertorials are not typical of Romania exclusively but are 
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also present in other countries covered in this book, for example, Hungary, Slovakia (de-
spite Press Watch, a weblog monitoring the main Slovak press media) and Slovenia, where 
there is an ongoing Media Watch project including a Media Watch journal, book series, 
leaﬂ ets, panel discussions and a web page.
7.5 INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM
Investigative journalism aimed at disclosing corruption, illegal or other activities 
contrary to the public interest, has not been a traditional practice among journalists in 
post-socialist countries. Th ere is also a misunderstanding as to what investigative journal-
ism is, so in some cases even articles based on information supplied by a speciﬁ c interest 
group, about the allegedly questionable moves of an opponent, are categorised as inves-
tigative journalism. Certain eﬀ orts have been made to educate journalists in these coun-
tries in the techniques of investigative journalism. Th e  network of media training 
centres in  Europe, with the help of the Danish school of journalism, provided training 
for teachers of investigative journalism in  countries and encouraged them to establish 
a network. One of the trainees, Saša Leković from Croatia, made an attempt at develop-
ing an investigative team within Europapress Holding, but the project was unsuccessful. In 
general, publishers as well as media owners mainly do not encourage investigative journal-
ism, so attempts at developing this practice are mainly supported by s and foreign do-
nors. In Estonia, for example, the publishing of a textbook on investigative journalism was 
funded by the American embassy. A foreign media owner in Estonia provides an award of 
 , for investigative articles selected by an independent commission; Hungary has 
a similar award.
6. RECOMMENDATIONS
We have already pointed out that media systems in the countries covered in this study 
diﬀ er from one another. However, certain development trends are common to all, and 
these alert us to the fact that media concentration and its impact on media pluralism and 
independence is one area that deserves special attention. Below are several measures that 
can be employed in approaching this issue.
. Legislation regulating media concentration.
 Media concentration has an impact on the pluralism of media content. Media legis-
lation should include provisions stipulating restrictions of concentration. Experience 
shows that the application of general competition legislation alone is insuﬃ  cient, as 
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competition laws do not take into account the special role of media in society – the cre-
ation of space for public debate.
. Transparency of media ownership data.
 Publicly accessible data about media owners enable citizens to freely decide whether 
conﬂ ict of interest is involved in speciﬁ c cases. Transparent data further prevent the 
holders of political and economic power from abusing media for the promotion of their 
own interests.
. Active intervention by the state with the aim of ensuring media pluralism. 
 Restrictive measures are just one mechanism of ensuring media pluralism. Th e state 
should practice active policies in this ﬁ eld in order to support content that would oth-
erwise be unable to “survive” on the media market. Th e state support should be allocat-
ed on the basis of clear and precisely formulated criteria. It is particularly necessary to 
prevent the situation in which the state exploited this channel in order to exert pressure 
on those media critical of the government. 
. Support for public service media.
 Public service media in most of these countries are experiencing a crisis that is the re-
sult of insuﬃ  cient funds and continual interference of the state with their operations, 
or simply of the lack of political will to transform the former state-run media into the 
public service media.
. Independent sources of circulation ﬁ gures, readership, viewing and listening shares.
 Clearly presented and credible data on the circulation of print media, readership, view-
ing and listening shares represent important information for all market players, state 
agencies that formulate their media policies on the basis of this information, as well as 
media employees, researchers and citizens.
. Regulatory and self-regulatory mechanism  for ensuring editorial independence. 
 Legislation should stipulate the mechanisms that should be developed by the media in 
order to ensure editorial independence. Th ese mechanisms should be elaborated on the 
level of individual media groups or media companies, and should include separation of 
the position of media owner from the position of editor in chief.
. Regulatory and self-regulatory mechanisms  aimed at preventing the abuse of journal-
ism and media in order to advocate political and economic interests of the owner. 
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 Legislation, internal acts and codes of ethics should include the principles and mecha-
nisms for the prevention and sanctioning of the attempts to use media as instruments 
for advocating political and economic interests of the owner. Th e codes adopted by 
journalists’ associations do not fully satisfy this requirement, as these provisions should 
be binding for publishers and owners as well. Th e mechanisms of lodging complaints 
and ruling on these complaints should also be enhanced in such a way as to include 
journalists, publishers and the public as equal participants.
. Strengthening of professional and media monitoring organisations.
 It is necessary to enhance the capacities of media organisations and associations. Th ese 
organisations should cooperate, discuss and make agreements regarding interests that 
they represent. Th eir common goal should be the achievement of a modern, clear, and 
successful media operation that serves the interest of the public.
. Clear and stable relations  between employers and employees in the media industry.
 Social conditions of work within the media industry inﬂ uence the quality of work and 
professionalism of journalists and other media professionals. Given the role of the me-
dia, orderly social conditions in which media professionals are able to perform their 
work undisturbed is in the interest of society as a whole. Th e clarity and stability of so-
cial conditions should be achieved through agreements on the national level, in-house 
and individual contracts, which employers and employees should be obliged to con-
clude by law. 
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1 INTRODUCTION
After thirteen years of struggle for democracy and its consolidation, Albanian media 
has found itself in a situation when there is freedom of the press, but no free press.¹ Th e 
activity of media businesses can hardly be called transparent, and there is little or no state 
control. In addition, there are problems with legislation, its implementation, the obtaining 
of data on the media and their transparency and reliability. Market analysis is by no means 
a familiar practice in Albania, and media businesses operate in the mist, with no data on 
their eﬃ  ciency, apart from gut feelings. Th is paper aims to provide information and anal-
ysis of the existing legislation on media ownership, its implementation, the media land-
scape, its ownership structure, and the evident or foreseeable consequences. 
2 LEGISLATION
Since the early nineties, after the fall of communism, Albanian media, like the rest of 
society, have been faced with a freedom never experienced before, and with equally un-
familiar problems. Th e advent of a new political system brought about the emergence of 
new media and, consequently, the need to regulate this chaotic situation.
2.1 PRESS LAW
Th e Parliament elected in  adopted the Law on the Press. Th e initiative to draft 
such a law came from the Government, and owing to the previous legislative vacuum in 
this sector, all eyes were turned towards other countries’ experience. In this context the 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Foundation took the initiative in presenting the Government with 
examples of such a law as implemented by three German states, with one of these being 
eventually chosen. Th e Albanian law was modeled after the German state of Westphalia 
law and there was little eﬀ ort to adjust it to the Albanian context. Th e input of the persons 
most aﬀ ected by this law, namely the media community, was not considered an option at 
all while drafting the law. As a result, the media community soon faced what they consid-
ered to be repressive legislation. Th is law was annulled entirely by another legislature in 
, and a new law came into eﬀ ect. At present the print media is regulated by the Law 
on the Press² which comprises only the following vague and quite general statement: “Th e 
press is free. Freedom of the press is protected by law.” 
Th e Parliamentary Commission on Media, the journalistic community, legal advisors, 
and other interested persons have at certain points since  debated the need for a de-
tailed press law and the potential shape and eﬀ ect it can have on media development, and 
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thus on the consolidation of democracy. Th ere was a debate on one such bill in , when 
many media representatives refused to participate, considering that the bill provided an 
over-regulated media, with considerable potential for restrictions. Th e bill provided for 
the establishment of an Order of Journalists that would serve as a regulator of the media 
community and its activities, a concept which was strongly rejected as it was considered 
a structure that must be established according to the free will of journalists, and not engi-
neered by the Parliament or legally obliged to report to the Parliament. According to this 
provision all journalists would be obliged to be members of this Order and to adhere to 
its regulation.³ 
Th e trend of laissez faire in the ﬁ eld of journalism triumphed over the other interest 
groups at the time, preferring media self-regulation instead of too much regulation by 
the Parliament. Th us, with the existing extremely and vague law on press, the print media 
seems to enjoy a greater freedom than in the early nineties, but at the same time working 
on grounds that leave ample room for activities that are little, or not at all, controlled and 
much speculated about. Th e process of drafting a new law on the press is ongoing. 
2.2 BROADCAST MEDIA REGULATION
In contrast to the print media, the broadcast media is regulated by a fairly detailed Law 
on Public and Private Radio and Television. In order to guarantee its own implementa-
tion, the law provides for a regulatory body, the National Council of Radio and Television 
(), which is supposed to be independent. 
Th e  is elected by the Parliament for a maximum of two ﬁ ve-year terms. Com-
posed of seven members, one of whom is proposed by the President and the other six 
shared equally between the opposition and the majority,⁴ this body acts both as the licens-
ing authority and as the supervisor of legality in private broadcasting. Th e law provides 
the  with the authority to transform the general rules provided by the law itself into 
further speciﬁ c obligations for broadcasting operators. 
2.2.1 OWNERSHIP PROVISIONS IN THE LAW
Since the law on broadcast media sets forth criteria for the licensing and activity of ra-
dio and  stations, it also contains a number of provisions regarding media ownership in 
the ﬁ eld of broadcast media. 
First of all, the law states that persons deprived of the capacity to act by a court ruling, 
political parties and organisations, religious communities and associations, local govern-
ment authorities or other state authorities cannot obtain a broadcast license. Also exclud-
ed from applying for a license are industrial organisations, banks, and credit institutions.⁵ 
According to this law, broadcasters can obtain two kinds of licenses depending on their 
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coverage: local and national. Th e criteria to be met for national licenses are stricter than 
those for local or regional ones. 
More speciﬁ cally, the holder of a local license can be a natural or a legal person, with 
no limitation imposed on the establishment of a company. Th e law prohibits the granting 
of more than two local broadcast licenses for the same territory, be it a radio or a televi-
sion channel. However, the same broadcaster can obtain both a radio and a  broadcast 
license. A natural person may not be the owner of a station that covers an area of more 
than , inhabitants. Th ere is no limitation on foreign ownership; the shares of a lo-
cal medium can be owned one hundred percent by foreign owners, but again, it cannot 
own more than two local media stations.⁶ 
On the other hand, the limit on ownership stake in a national radio or  station is 
 percent; thus a national radio or  station must have at least three owners, either le-
gal or natural persons. Th e owners of a national radio or television outlets are forbidden 
to possess shares in another national radio or television enterprise, in whatever amount. 
It is forbidden for an owner of shares in a national broadcasting station to obtain a local 
broadcast license.⁷ Th is is a provision that aims to prevent concentration of national me-
dia and monopolies, thus safeguarding media pluralism and diversity, as well as a lucra-
tive media market. 
Regarding the owners of national media, there is no limitation at all regarding foreign 
ownership, apart from those that apply to Albanian owners of national broadcast media, 
namely the -percent limit and the other criteria of ownership. 
Apart from the limit on ownership stakes, a national media company must be regis-
tered as a joint stock company.⁸ No natural person can obtain a national license. Th e main 
aim of this limitation on ownership of national broadcast media is that legal persons are 
supposed to have greater accountability regarding , other taxes, and potential remu-
neration to third parties, as well as better control of the quality of programming in view of 
the manner of organisation of the joint stock company.⁹ 
2.2.2 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LAW
Th e body that sees to the proper implementation of the law is , which checks the 
data provided by the license applicants and supervises the implementation of the above-
mentioned rules. It is authorised by law to determine the minimum amount of capital 
a license holder should posses. So, applicants for a national radio license should pos-
sess capital of no less than ,, leks (approximately  ,), while applicants 
for a national  station should possess no less than ,, leks (approximately 
 ,).¹⁰ Th e entry barriers for a local broadcast license vary in accordance with the 
population reached in the area covered. 
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In cases of changes in data on ownership structure provided by the applicants or licen-
sees,  should be notiﬁ ed  days in advance.  can oppose the change in case it 
violates the law. In other words, in the case of a merger of two broadcasting companies or 
a broadcasting company with another media enterprise, the approval of the  is re-
quired. It may be recalled that according to the law, one person may not hold more than 
 percent of the total capital of a national broadcaster (before or after the merger) nor 
may the same person be given a license for more than two local transmission areas. Th ere-
fore in giving its approval,  should take account of these rules and prevent any oc-
currence of violation.¹¹ 
 also establishes the annual fees to be paid by the broadcasting operators. In gen-
eral it can be said that the ﬂ oors imposed on the initial capital of applicants for broadcast 
licenses plus the taxes and annual fees paid to  and other hindrances constitute rel-
atively high entry barriers for the development of new media. However, as noted in the 
description of the media landscape, this has not been a hindrance in this regard quite the 
opposite. As a report put it: “Th e  has the power to grant broadcast licenses, but 
seemingly does not have the ability to reject an application.”¹²
Th is is also one of the reasons why the work of the  has, on occasion progressed 
slowly. In fact, the  commenced its real work in  after the passing of certain 
amendments to the then broadcasting law. Ever since then the organisation has not had 
a smooth relation with part of the media companies and especially with the opposition 
which has continuously boycotted it, referring to its alleged relations with government, 
hence its lack of independence. 
One of the most contested actions of the  was the ﬁ rst wave of license granting in 
the autumn of  when many of the broadcasting stations and the opposition charged 
the  with being biased in its decision to grant national licenses to media close to the 
ruling Socialist Party. Another diﬃ  cult moment was the rejection of its annual report in 
the Parliament in February , at a time when a second rejection would have led to a re-
organisation of the . Favouritism towards media friendly to (or clients of ) particular 
clans of the Government has been a frequent charge against this body by the opposition. 
However, the  has played a certain role in stabilising the broadcast media market in 
Albania within the legal framework established by the Albanian parliament. At present it 
is being quite successful in managing to control particular aspects of the broadcasting ac-
tivity, such as the ﬁ ght against piracy, a relatively new  responsibility elaborated in 
the law that came into eﬀ ect in October .
porocilo.indb   5 22.5.2004, 13:45:58
 44 MEDIA OWNERSHIP AND ITS IMPACT ON MEDIA INDEPENDENCE AND PLURALISM
2.3 OTHER RELEVANT REGULATION
2.3.1 COMMERCIAL LAW
Th e activity of media companies is also regulated by the Law on Commercial Companies, 
applicable to media companies the same as to all other registered companies. More speciﬁ -
cally, the organisational structure of a joint stock company is supposed to provide a relative-
ly stricter system of checks on its welfare and representation of the interests of all sides. So, 
the General Assembly appoints two-thirds of the Steering Committee, while the employees 
of the company appoint one-third. Th e Steering Committee, in turn, appoints the directors 
of the association.¹³ However, so far there has been no evidence of these controlling mecha-
nisms in the Albanian media companies; they are more of a ghost mechanism.
According to the same Law on Commercial Companies, the responsibility of the mem-
bers corresponds to the contribution of their initial capital in both joint stock companies 
and limited liability ones. However, the minimal capital requested by law for joint stock 
companies is ,, leks (approximately  ,),¹⁴ while the minimal amount of 
capital for limited liability companies is , leks (approximately  ).¹⁵ As demon-
strated above, the  may impose diﬀ erent minimum amounts of capital. 
Independently of the manner of organisation or registration of a company, all media 
companies are forced by law to register their ownership changes in the commercial reg-
ister,¹⁶ in addition to the obligation of the private broadcast media to report the changes 
to the . 
2.3.2 COMPETITION LAW
Another law related to media regulation is the Law on Competition¹⁷ (in force from 
 until December ) which states the conditions that companies have to respect 
during their activity, in order to set the ground for fair competition and the maintenance 
of a lucrative market. According to this law, the concentration of the market is prohibited, 
and it is deﬁ ned as occurring when one company by itself, or merged companies, has/have 
more than a  percent share of the market.¹⁸ Th e Law on Competition elaborates the 
technical procedures governing the merger. Th e property of the constituent companies 
can be transferred to an existing company or to a new one. Even though a merger can be 
concluded between companies of diﬀ erent organisational structures, it is worth noticing 
that national broadcasters should remain joint stock companies. When a new company is 
established, its establishment occurs in accordance with the rules that are relevant to the 
form of the company established. Th e merger enters into eﬀ ect on the date of registration 
in the commercial register. When the surviving company is one of constituent (merged) 
companies, the merger enters into eﬀ ect on the date of the last meeting of the respective 
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shareholder assemblies approving the merger, unless otherwise provided by the merger 
agreement.¹⁹ 
In addition to the prohibition of market concentration, the law prohibits the lowering 
of prices if the aim is the elimination of competition. It also forbids the damaging of repu-
tation among businesses, that is false statements vis-à-vis business colleagues in order to 
ruin their business. Convincing the employees to breach their contract with a competitor 
and hiring those employees in order to gain a competitive edge is also forbidden.²⁰ 
Th ese are only some of the articles that this law contains, but of particular relevance to 
media company operations, since there has been constant breach of these articles, or al-
legations that such illegal actions took place, including the application of dumping prices, 
continuous slandering of other media, and an extremely mobile labour market, which is 
also facilitated by the lack of working contracts for most media employees. 
Th e Law on Competition also contained an amendment that expressly stated in one 
paragraph: “In the ﬁ eld of independent print media it is forbidden to lower the price of 
newspapers and magazines below the cost of their production.”²¹ Th is particular para-
graph was added upon the initiative of a group of s, in order to prevent a phenomenon 
that, time after time, various voices from within the media community have warned on, 
selling print items at prices lower than their production cost in order to get a larger share 
of the market. Recently this problem has become more important, with the ever expand-
ing market for daily papers and the excruciating battle between print and broadcast me-
dia. It must be noted that this amendment exempts party newspapers and magazines from 
price control, and, as such, it is of particular relevance to the preservation of print media 
economic independence, or at least an attempt to control the fair practice of media com-
panies within the framework of the Law on Competition.
2.3.3 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LAW
Th e supervisory body that implements the Law on Competition is the Directorate of 
Economic Competition (.) Duties of  include the following: promotion of econom-
ic competition, approval or disapproval of the ﬁ led applications, monitoring of breaches, 
channeling of undue proﬁ t to the state treasury through special decisions, market analysis, 
publication of information, etc.²² However, the work of the  in Albania is almost un-
known and it has always kept a low proﬁ le, not only regarding the media sector. More spe-
ciﬁ cally, the only media-related act in these years was the investigation into the pricing of 
some daily newspapers and its relation to their cost of production, and this investigation 
was undertaken at the request of one publisher, rather than started by the  itself. 
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2.3.4 NEW COMPETITION LAW 
Th e above competition law was in force until  December , when a new Law on the 
Protection of Competition came into eﬀ ect. Th e new law does not set any limit related to 
market domination. It only describes it as a position of “one or more enterprises, which 
allows them to act in the framework of demand and oﬀ er independently of other partici-
pants in the market, such as competitors, clients, or consumers.”²³ However, regarding 
concentration or merger of companies, it sets the obligation of asking for approval of the 
Authority on Competition, whenever their annual revenue exceeds certain limits.²⁴ Th e 
, now defunct controller of competition, has been replaced by the Authority on Com-
petition, which comprises the Commission and the Secretariat. Th is body, elected by the 
Parliament, has to control concentration of ownership, since its duties include the nam-
ing of a company and of its activity, control of annual revenue in the domestic market, the 
respective market share of the company, and the expansion of capital through the acqui-
sition of new companies or merger with other companies. In the future this section could 
become instrumental in supervising compliance with fair competition rules in the media 
ﬁ eld and beyond, and perhaps increasing the transparency of ownership as well.
3 STATE SUBSIDIES
Th e Albanian law does not expressly provide any subsidies to media companies in or-
der to protect media pluralism or safeguard independence. However, forms assisting the 
media exist although not clearly categorised as such. A possible way of subsidising the me-
dia in Albania is leasing state-owned facilities to the media outlets. Th ese facilities provide 
spacious premises at prices as low as   per m per month, whereas the rent for private 
facilities is approximately   per m for locations in downtown Tirana, from where 
the overwhelming majority of journalists choose to following the events to cover. Howev-
er, there is no special law on the rental of these state facilities, and this legal vacuum could 
turn into a form of ﬁ nancial leverage by the Government towards the media and their edi-
torial policy. 
A far more important issue and of particular consequence to the development of an 
independent media, or lack thereof, is the allocation of state advertising. In view of the 
structure and development of the Albanian economy, state advertising accounts for a dis-
proportionately large share of total advertising in the print media. “A study of advertising 
trends in ﬁ ve major dailies, conducted by a journalists’ association in September , 
found that the ﬁ ve newspapers sold  percent of their total advertising space to state 
agencies and corporations.”²⁵ Hence, state advertising would be instrumental to the sur-
porocilo.indb   8 22.5.2004, 13:45:58
ALBANIA 47
vival of independent media, and the way these ads are allocated should serve as an indica-
tor of state interest in aiding the development of independent media. 
However, this has not been the case in Albania. Most of the ads and notiﬁ cations that 
fall into the state advertising category are considered public spending and as such are sub-
ject to the public procurement laws. However, there are no regulatory bodies to supervise 
the implementation of these laws, nor the consequent fair distribution of state advertising 
among the media. Th e situation is made worse by the legal pitfalls: both the Public Pro-
curement Law and the Law on Expropriation provide that the notiﬁ cations be published 
in two national newspapers with large circulations, or in one national and one local news-
paper, without deﬁ ning, though, what “large circulation” means.²⁶ Th e situation becomes 
even more complicated when considering that there are no surveys or data on the circula-
tion of publications in Albania, in the absence of a detailed law on the press and given the 
printing houses’ obligation to keep these ﬁ gures secret. In this way, there is considerable 
potential for abuse in allocating these ads as a reward for changes in editorial policy, or 
even using them as a ﬁ nancial threat depending on the editorial policy orientation.
3.1 STATE ADVERTISING DISTRIBUTION
Th e above potential has been used several times before now. For example, an illustra-
tive case is that of Shekulli which is considered to be the top selling daily in the market. 
Th is paper received a signiﬁ cant amount of state advertising until September , which 
is the time when the paper changed its editorial policy to a critical attitude towards the 
then-Prime Minister, Meta. While Shekulli was the second top daily that received most 
state advertising until late September, by mid November other three large circulation dai-
lies carried around four pages of state advertising compared to . for Shekulli.²⁷ 
Another government subsidy representing the carrot-and-stick method was the one 
granted to Korrieri in October . Of ten million leks (approximately  ,) allocat-
ed to Korrieri, six million were earmarked for publication of “government propaganda ma-
terials,” and four for the publication of a supplement on the occasion of Independence Day.²⁸ 
Th is decision of the Council of Ministers was considered an arbitrary and biased one by the 
rest of the press, because it excluded from ﬁ nancial subsidies papers like Tema, which held a 
consistently critical stance on the Meta government, quite the opposite of Korrieri. 
4 (LACK OF) JOURNALIST STATUS
In view of the above-mentioned facts it becomes imperative to know the structure of 
ownership in the Albanian media, considering that the owners are the determining factor 
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in shaping editorial policy. Th is is even more so in the absence of laws or regulations pro-
tecting editors and journalists and safeguarding free expression. As a matter of fact, it is 
almost unthinkable for journalists to oppose the editorial policy of the media, considering 
that most of them do not have work contracts and that the journalists’ labour market is an 
extremely mobile one in Albania. For example, in the annual “Monitoring Albanian Me-
dia Landscape” survey done by the Albanian Media Institute in , of the  daily news-
papers asked how many of their employees had work contracts, four refused to respond, 
while the other papers’ total was  out of a total working staﬀ  of , thus  percent.²⁹ 
Independence of editorial policy is protected by the broadcasting law, phrased in a 
very loose manner, with no speciﬁ c conditions and provisions for this cornerstone of in-
dependent media and freedom of expression: “Editorial independence is guaranteed by 
law.”³⁰ Th is paragraph attempts to address all the points a law of this kind must comprise 
in order to be complete, but it fails to address the real problems of identifying and protect-
ing editorial independence, which is, in itself, a diﬃ  cult concept to grasp and treat. As a 
matter of fact, the  has not so far ventured on any such undertaking.
Th e other paragraph of the same article in this law also guarantees what can be consid-
ered a sort of equal employment opportunity policy: “Employment, promotion, duties and 
rights of public and private radio and television are not determined by sex, origin, politi-
cal conviction, religion, or membership in trade unions.”³¹ Again, this attempt to protect 
these two essential ingredients of independent media has many pitfalls when viewed from 
the legal angle, with no sanctions imposed in case of breach, and with no clear method of 
deﬁ ning these concepts or proving their violation. However, the regulatory authority has 
never attempted to implement this article, and neither have journalists, one reason being 
the extremely disorganised situation in which they ﬁ nd themselves vis-à-vis their employ-
ers. Associations of journalists are almost nonexistent, and all attempts to create a trade 
union have failed. 
5 MEDIA LANDSCAPE AND OWNERSHIP
5.1 A CHANGING LANDSCAPE
Th e landscape of the media in Albania has changed dramatically since the early nine-
ties, and has continued to present a dynamic picture even during the second half of the 
decade. As a matter of fact, after thirteen years of developing private, allegedly independ-
ent, media in the country, the number of media outlets has been increasing rather than 
leveling oﬀ , and announcements of new media outlets may be just around the corner.
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At the moment,  newspapers and  magazines are published in Albania, includ-
ing general and specialised publications.³² Th e list of individuals/companies licensed to 
broadcast is also extensive:  radio stations and   stations.³³ Th e  has recently 
revoked the licenses of   stations and  radio stations, mainly for failure to submit the 
required documentation for the renewal of licenses. However, the  has not taken any 
measures to interrupt the broadcasting activity of any of these. 
Print and electronic media have followed diﬀ erent paths of development, but their 
common denominator is their youth. Unlike the media in other countries, the Albanian 
media did not experience privatisation. Zeri i Popullit was the most important paper un-
der the communist regime, owned by the only party existing at that time, and reaching up 
to , copies. Other publications were owned by mass organisations, such as trade 
unions, youth organisations, or the writers’ and artists’ league, academic institutions etc., 
and their circulation ranged from , to , copies for the most important ones. 
All the publications were owned by the state, or institutions or organisations under strict 
state control and supervision. Th e concept of private property was totally unknown, and 
any discussion on its introduction in society was inconceivable. 
Of the old communist papers, only Zeri i Popullit of the Socialist Party, survived, and it 
still remains the party’s property. Another one is Sporti Shqiptar, a sports daily, which was 
closed for some time and then sold to a now powerful media group, Spekter joint stock 
company. Other publications that have survived the transition period are the professional 
state-owned ones, none of them a daily. Such publications include papers and magazines 
targeted at army oﬃ  cials, teachers, scientiﬁ c researchers, etc, which continue to remain the 
property of particular ministries and the Academy, hence under government ownership. 
Regarding broadcast media, the only existing broadcast media until  was the state-
owned radio and television, now transformed into a public service radio and television, 
but still receiving an overwhelming proportion of support from the state budget. Th us, 
unlike in other ﬁ elds in the country, privatisation was not an issue at all in the media ﬁ eld. 
Th is is also the reason why you cannot ﬁ nd any employee who also owns shares acquired 
after the demise of communism.
5.2 THE CASE OF MEDIA BLOOM
Th e overwhelming majority of Albanian media outlets emerged during the s, with 
Rilindja Demokratike, the daily of the Democratic Party, the ﬁ rst opposition party, lead-
ing the way in . For economic reasons, newspapers and magazines were the ﬁ rst in the 
country to experience a boom. Th e broadcast media started to emerge in the second half 
of the s. Th e ﬁ rst private  station started to broadcast in , and the ﬁ rst radio 
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station two years later. Ever since, the media landscape has been a fertile one, with a con-
tinuously increasing number of media outlets, especially broadcast media. 
However, more is not always better. Th is is especially true in the case of print media. 
Although the number of dailies has gone from  in  to  in , the circulation of 
all  dailies together does not exceed that of the ﬁ rst opposition paper in . Of course, 
people do not long for information in quite the same way as they did in  after surviv-
ing almost  years of darkness. Also, a wide spectrum of broadcast media is available, and 
it is indisputable now everywhere that it has the upper hand over the press. At present, 
the overall circulation of the  dailies is believed not to exceed , copies.³⁴ Having 
 dailies in a country with no more than three million inhabitants is simply beyond ra-
tional accounting.³⁵ 
Th is is even more so when one considers that the press in Albania is plagued by a mal-
functioning distribution system and infrastructure, or rather lack of it. Th e newspapers 
are distributed in cities only, and the system is far from perfect: the citizens of Saranda, 
for example, the southernmost city, receive their paper no earlier than  p.m. Also, since 
some  percent of the population lives in the countryside, it can be concluded that less 
than half the population can buy newspapers in the area where they live.³⁶ Th e subscrip-
tion system, on the other hand, is extremely weak and rarely applied. Given that the aver-
age monthly income of a teacher is around , leks (approximately  ), a teacher 
would have to allocate  percent of his/hers salary for buying a newspaper,³⁷ which makes 
the paper rather expensive.
Considering all these facts, and the emergence and consolidation of broadcast media, 
the failure of some dailies would have been a logical conclusion, but this has not been the 
case. Th e number of dailies hit  in September , and this amidst constant debate on 
their ﬁ nancial sources, since in a genuine market economy having all these papers in busi-
ness would be highly improbable. Th e most common structural feature is the one-man 
publisher in most cases. Excluding the three party dailies, which are owned  percent 
by the respective parties, only eleven of them are owned by companies, whereas eight are 
owned by one person alone, or one-person companies. 
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Table  PRINT MEDIA MARKET*
PUBLISHING 
GROUP
MARKET 
SHARE
SPEKTER 21%
KLAN 16%
KOHA 11%
PARTY PAPERS 16%
OTHER 36%
Source: Th e Commercial Register
Note: *Th is table includes all the daily newspapers, and the two main news weekly magazines, leaving out the specialised 
magazines. Th e main publishing groups are counted.
Table  OWNERSHIP OF THE MAIN RADIO AND TV STATIONS38
MEDIA OUTLET OWNERSHIP COVERAGE AREA STARTING 
YEAR
TV KLAN MEDIA 6 JSC. NATIONWIDE 1998
TVA ARBERIA JSC. NATIONWIDE 1996
TOP CHANNEL TOP CHANNEL LTD. REGIONAL 2001
TOP ALBANIA RADIO TOP ALBANIA JSC. NATIONWIDE 1998
+2 RADIO RADIO +2 JSC. NATIONWIDE 1998
VIZION + MEDIAVIZION JSC REGIONAL 1999
TV NEWS 24 EDISUD RADIO-TV LTD. REGIONAL 2002
RADIO RASH EDISUD RADIO-TV LTD. REGIONAL 2000
SHIJAK TV MEDIA + JSC. REGIONAL 1995
RADIO TIRANA PUBLIC BROADCASTER NATIONWIDE 1938
TVSH PUBLIC BROADCASTER NATIONWIDE 1961
Source: , Department of Juridiction and Licences.
5.3 MAIN MEDIA OWNERSHIP GROUPS
5.3.1 SPEKTER GROUP
Among daily newspaper companies the most prominent group is Spekter ., owned 
 percent by Koco Kokedhima.³⁹ Th is company owns the dailies Shekulli (considered to 
be the one with the largest circulation by the journalists’ community), Sporti Shqiptar and 
Biznes (specialising in sports and the economy respectively), as well as the weekly maga-
zine Spekter which is considered to be the second biggest in the market of its genre. 
Apart from this, Kokedhima directly and indirectly owns shares in a national radio sta-
tion, a television station, and an advertising agency. Th is television station ( Balkan) 
has started to broadcast only recently as  although it received its license some years 
ago, meaning that it violated the broadcasting law which states that the media should start 
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broadcasting within a year of receiving the license. Its  percent owner is K group ., 
which is owned by Kokedhima; a  percent owner is Isuf Ferra, and another  percent 
owner Aristidh Kokedhima, Koco Kokedhima’s brother. Aristidh Kokedhima also owns 
 percent of + Radio, a national radio, while Jonaq Jorgji and Myftar Troka own the re-
maining  percent.⁴⁰ Media operations are not the only activities on which Kokedhima’s 
business focuses. Other companies he owns deal with construction, advertising or graphic 
work, Internet services, oil reﬁ ning, etc. 
Chart  KOKËDHIMA MEDIA GROUP OWNERSHIP
KOÇO KOKËDIMA
 
 
+2 RADIO 2K GROUP SPECTER JSC.
 national 
   
ARISTIDH KOKËDIMA  TV A1 publications
Koço’s brother SHEKULLIdaily
SPORTI SHQIPTAR
daily
BIZNES
daily
SPEKTËR
weekly
5.3.2 KLAN GROUP
Another important group is what can be deﬁ ned as the Klan group, named after the 
national  station and the magazine this group owns. More speciﬁ cally, it is the Me-
dia  ., which owns the national television, and it is made up of Julien Roche, a French 
citizen, Marsel Skendo, and Aleksander Frangaj. Th e ﬁ rst two are businessmen who own 
other companies. Frangaj was an equal-share partner in the Koha company, which owned 
the best selling newspaper until the late s. Frangaj sold his part of the company to his 
partner in order to join the Klan group. Th ere is a discrepancy of data in this case: accord-
ing to one source, the three partners own equal shares in their company,⁴¹ and according 
to another, Frangaj owns  percent of the shares, and the other two the rest.⁴² Th e sec-
ond source is most reliable, as it is specialised in the area and is more regularly updated 
than the ﬁ rst. If we assume that the data from this source are correct, the company has 
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breached the law, since a natural or legal person cannot own more than  percent of the 
shares in a national electronic media. 
Th e Media  . also owns  percent of Media  ., which publishes Korrieri, one of 
the top selling newspapers, and Klan, probably the most reputable general weekly maga-
zine on the market. Th e remaining  percent of this company is distributed as follows: 
two prominent journalists, one currently the director of Klan magazine and the other of 
the news department at  Klan, own  percent each; another seven percent owner is the 
director of Korrieri, a well-known journalist, and the remaining eight percent owner is a 
designer. Th is is one of the rare cases in Albanian media where the owners of shares are 
employees.
Chart  KLAN MEDIA GROUP OWNERSHIP
MARCEL SKËNDO
JULIEN ROCHE
ALEKSANDËR FRANGAJ


 
MEDIA 6 JSC. FABC
company
  
  
TV KLAN
national
MEDIA 5 LTD.   ALBANIAN DAILY NEWS
daily

KORRIERI
daily
KLAN
weekly
ARMAND SHKULLAKU 17%
ANDI BUSHATI 17%
SUAD BARBULLUSHI 8%
BLENDI FEVZIU 7%
Apart from the , paper, and magazine, this group also owned Radio Klan which 
closed down a few years ago. As is often the case with these large media groups, the own-
ers’ business dates back to a time before the establishment of the media outlets. So, the 
cooperation between Roche and Skendo dates back to the time of the establishment of the 
ﬁ rst private Albanian airline company, Ada Air, in which they had equal shares and which 
closed in . Other businesses include the  company which is again a joint and 
equal-proportioned cooperation between the two. Th is ﬁ rm, apart from trade and other 
activities, owns  percent of the shares in a company called Independent Albanian Eco-
nomic Tribune, which publishes a daily, Albanian Daily News. Th is is the only paper in 
English, targeted at foreigners only, and the most expensive one in the market. Th e paper 
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was also the ﬁ rst among the dailies to build a website, with bilingual information.⁴³  
also owns  percent of Adaelekt and  percent of Adagips, companies involved in pub-
lishing and trade. Another two companies equally owned by Roche and Skendo are Alba-
com and Maro, companies dealing with trade and communication appliances. Although it 
cannot be said with certainty that all of their activity has been extremely successful busi-
ness ventures, the Fasada company has certainly been a success. It is one of the ﬁ rst post-
production studios, and Skendo and Roche own  percent of the shares, whereas the rest 
is shared between two professionals that work in this studio, meaning that the pattern of 
ownership is the same as with the publications above. 
5.3.3 KOHA GROUP
Another group to consider is Koha, very much connected with the name and personal-
ity of Nikolle Lesi, its owner. Th e publishing group Koha owns the daily Koha Jone and the 
sports daily Sport Ekspres with shares  percent owned by Lesi.⁴⁴ He also owns  per-
cent of Radio Koha while  percent is owned by Natalina Lesi, Nikolle Lesi’s wife, and  
percent by Bardhyl Ucaj, its actual director. Lesi also used to own  Koha which he sold 
in late . Th e Koha group also published a weekly magazine, , which was consid-
ered to be a quality literary and cultural magazine. 
Chart  KOHA MEDIA GROUP OWNERSHIP
BARDHYL UCAJ NATALINA LESI NIKOLLE LESI
Director of Radio Kocha Nikolle’s wife MP and head of the 
Demochristian Party
  
         
 RADIO KOHA KOHA LTD TV KOHA
 Lesi sold the TV station 
in 
  
KOHA JONE SPORT EXPRESS AKS
daily sports daily weekly that has now 
stopped the publication
Unlike the previous groups, the Koha group did not own any business prior to the estab-
lishment of media groups. In fact, the Koha Jone (established ) became the best selling 
newspaper after people started to lose interest in the other papers and in public , which 
were controlled by the Government of that time. In the period of its glory, this paper boast-
ed some of the top investigative journalists and columnists. Lesi himself has been a member 
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of the Parliament for two terms now, and until recently elected with the support of the So-
cialist Party. Although oﬃ  cially an independent candidate until the last elections, at present 
he is head of the Demochristian Party. Lesi is also a member of the Parliamentary Com-
mission on Media. However, it is hard to determine his aﬃ  liation, since his paper’s editorial 
policy seems to switch in accordance with the relations he has with other politicians.
5.4 FOREIGN MEDIA OWNERSHIP 
Another group that certainly deserves mentioning is the Edisud ., owning a daily, 
Gazeta Shqiptare, Radio Rash,  News , and Balkanweb, an online news agency. Th e 
broadcast media are registered under the company Edisud Radio- ., which is  
percent owned by Edisud.⁴⁵ Th is company has an all-Italian ownership. Th e ﬁ rst product 
that came on to the Albanian market was a daily paper, often criticised by media experts 
as a sensational one, but it was quite successful. Th is paper was published before  in 
Albania, banned after the war, and resumed in , to be later followed by other media 
outlets. Th e last one to emerge was the  station, a news channel, the only one in the Al-
banian market. However, it seems that with the implementation of the piracy law,  sta-
tions that cannot aﬀ ord to buy programs have switched to this more economic way of liv-
ing, although its sustainability is yet to be tested. 
Th e only other media outlet owned by foreigners (excluding Roche’s shares mentioned 
above) is the  station, Telenorba Shqiptare, which is  percent owned by an Italian compa-
ny, another  percent by two Italian persons, and the last  percent by Albanian persons.⁴⁶ 
Th ese are the only cases of foreign ownership in the Albanian media; otherwise, the concept 
of a foreign group controlling important media is only present in the case of Edisud .
5.5 OTHER MEDIA 
Th ere are other media that deserve mention, although not classiﬁ ed as a group, or at least 
not apparently so. One of these is Top Albania Radio, the ﬁ rst private radio station to receive 
a national license. It is owned  percent by Vjollca Hoxha,  percent by Zhuljeta Lamaj, 
and the remaining  percent by Zyhra Hamiti. Th is is supposed to be the most popular ra-
dio station in the country,⁴⁷ using state-of-the-art technology, targeted at young people, and 
heard even beyond the borders, but its owners are virtually unknown. Moreover, they are all 
women, and that is quite an exception in media ownership structure in the country. 
Th is radio station shares premises with Top Channel, owned by Dritan Hoxha, who is 
also the director of this  station. Th is  station was launched two years ago and has 
had a signiﬁ cant success. According to the latest research, Top Channel ranked third after 
the national  Klan and the public ⁴⁸ even though it has only a local license. Th is  
station has also practiced a form of networking with local  stations outside Tirana, thus 
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managing to distribute its programming in cities where it was not allowed to broadcast. 
Th is  station has been one of the most ambitious ones, and it seems that it will soon ap-
ply for a national license, in which case it should change its form from the present limited 
liability company to that of a joint stock company. Th e owner of this company also owns 
a graphic and advertising studio, whose quality work is evident in the Top Channel pro-
grams too. Before venturing into the media ﬁ eld Hoxha made his way through the coﬀ ee 
trade, establishing almost a monopoly over it in the country.⁴⁹
5.6 CONTROVERSIAL MEDIA OWNERSHIP ISSUES AND CASES
Unlike in many other countries in the region, foreign ownership is deﬁ nitely not an is-
sue in Albanian media, but political inﬂ uence certainly is. Th e debate on the relation be-
tween media owners, politicians and businesses has been attracting increasing attention 
recently. Th e potential ramiﬁ cations of uncontrolled ownership and ﬁ nancing have start-
ed to be mentioned by politicians as well as media representatives and owners.
5.6.1 POLITICIANS AS SHAREHOLDERS
 Th e sale of  Koha is one recent example of the sale of shares to politicians. Lesi, its 
formal owner, sold to a group of politicians and businessmen. Agron Duka, businessman-
turned-politician, and his brother Armand Duka, own  percent each, Ardian Abazi owns 
ten percent, whereas Lefter Koka, a businessman recently elected Mayor of Durres, the 
largest port in the country and an important city, owns  percent.⁵⁰ At present this  
station has almost stopped broadcasting, owing to the implementation of the piracy law. 
However, the ads for a new and powerful re-launch run prominently all the time, and this 
 station is undergoing reformation. If it resumes broadcasting it would be interesting to 
follow the development of the  station and its editorial policy, considering that the main 
owners are the Minister of Agriculture and the Mayor of an important city, both of them 
businessmen, thus with a cluster of interests to protect and especially to promote.
5.6.2 KEEPING THE PRICE LOW
Th e issue of protection and promotion of interests concerns all Albanian media, and it 
has surfaced recently in an investigation on print media practices. On Lesi’s request in the 
Parliament, in October  the  started an investigation into allegations that certain 
papers were sold at prices below their production cost, breaching the Competition Law 
and the special amendment on the press. Since the law does not bind the papers to sub-
mit information to the , the only papers that were willing to cooperate were Koha Jone, 
owned by Lesi, Panorama, owned by the Panorama group ., and Zeri i Popullit, owned 
by the Socialist Party. Shekulli, Sot, Republika, and Rilindja Demokratike, the other dailies 
porocilo.indb   18 22.5.2004, 13:46:00
ALBANIA 57
involved in the request for investigation, did not submit any data. Since the last two, along 
with Zeri i Popullit are party papers, they were excluded from the investigation, because 
they are not subject to the Law on Competition. 
More importantly, this episode illustrates one of the methods denounced as politicians’ 
attempts to buy favorable media coverage. As a report states: “Print media are divided 
and divisive, run either directly by politicians or their friends in business.”⁵¹ Since media 
experts agree that it is impossible to be on the market by charging  leks (approximate-
ly  .), as Shekulli does, the owners should reveal their funding sources. In a recent 
 show Kokedhima, the owner of Shekulli attributed the success of his paper to the staﬀ  
rather than to the cheap price of his paper, but did not really address the pricing ques-
tion. Although he invited the participants in the show to his media outlets, the paper 
did not cooperate in the ’s investigation. Other papers that sell at  leks include Re-
publika, , Sot, Ballkan, and Panorama. While the ﬁ rst two are party papers, the other 
papers are relatively recent ones, owned by persons who have previously established other 
businesses, such as trade activities. 
Another guest in the show featuring Kokedhima was the publisher of Panorama. A busi-
nessman in various trade activities in the early nineties, he also has shares in the main pri-
vatised Albanian beer company, Birra Malto. During this show he also declared that he and 
a co-owner of the beer company had started Panorama and bought shares in Dita respec-
tively, which is sold at  leks, while the most expensive paper is  leks. Apart from alle-
gations relating to prices, other allegations by media experts include traﬃ  c of inﬂ uence be-
tween businessmen and politicians, thus using the paper coverage in exchange for business 
favours. “Th e most serious threat to freedom of the press today is its economic depend-
ence, which leads to secret agreements between businesses, politics, and the press: these 
agreements have nothing in common with the free and accurate information,”⁵³ says Alba 
Malltezi, once vice-director of Gazeta Shqiptare, and presently director at  News .
External funding is the only way a media can survive in this small market; this is a con-
clusion lately voiced by some experts, and this opinion does not exclude the broadcast me-
dia. Th e latest report by the  on media sustainability stresses that the media survived 
through support from their owners’ other successful businesses, rather than through ad-
vertising revenues: “Th e advertising pool of  – million just does not go far enough 
to sustain the  television stations,  radio stations, and  dailies.”⁵⁴
Apart from the investigation on dumping prices in print media, there have been other 
public denouncements of what is referred to as the Berlusconi syndrome. One of the most 
outspoken persons in this ﬁ eld is analyst Fatos Lubonja who has lately started to point 
at the media’s relations with politics, especially in the case of the Spekter .. In an on-
going suit for defamation ﬁ led by Kokedhima against Lubonja, Lubonja is attempting to 
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present proof in an attempt to verify Kokedhima’s relations with and obligations towards 
politicians. Lubonja claims that these proofs show that the then-Minister of Culture and 
present Mayor of Tirana has secured public tenders for Kokedhima’s company in a man-
ner that was not in conformity with the legal procedures.⁵⁵ 
Unfortunately, the inﬂ uence of the main media groups cannot be translated into their 
market shares. Research on media, their activity and inﬂ uence, is totally lacking. Th ere are 
only sporadic audience surveys, which do not include all of the territory, and there is no 
data on circulation and readership apart from that which the owners and publishers de-
cide to provide of their own will. In this context it is very diﬃ  cult to determine in a clear, 
scientiﬁ c way which is the most inﬂ uential or popular medium, and more importantly, 
what is its proﬁ t from its activity.
6 CONCLUSIONS
In general, mapping the ownership pattern in the Albanian media landscape is not an 
easy task in view of the weak infrastructure of the data system in this area and the legal 
pitfalls that can lead to the disguise of ownership. Overall it can be said that the media 
owners have a business background and have continued to tend to their businesses; more-
over, they have expanded it. Although the media landscape is extremely rich in terms of 
the number of outlets, almost unnaturally so, it is possible to map the main media groups. 
Th eir owners have constantly been in the spotlight, particularly recently, with ongoing 
mutual accusations of relations with political groups. However, the legal deﬁ ciency and 
the weakness or lack of willingness of regulatory bodies have not enabled a conclusion to 
be reached regarding these allegations. Consequently transparency about media owner-
ship, activity, and their inﬂ uence on the public are immediate needs in the development of 
media pluralism and its independence. As one media analyst put it: “Th e Albanian press 
will start to enjoy its freedom when the ﬁ rst paper that is not read, and the ﬁ rst televi-
sion which is not watched, but are only paid to exist, go out of business. We must strive to 
achieve that day.”⁵⁶ 
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1 INTRODUCTION
At present, there are no signiﬁ cant cases of media concentration in Bosnia and Herze-
govina (i) which might potentially pose a threat to fair and open market competition, but 
the actual situation is characterized by uncertainty. Th ere are several reasons for this uncer-
tainty, which result from the speciﬁ c contextual characteristics of the country in question.
Firstly, the extremely complex state structure, with multiple levels of governance,¹ re-
sults in a general lack of insight into the processes that take place in parallel on these vari-
ous levels. Additionally, this lack of transparency is coupled with the radical ineﬃ  ciency 
of state administration that cannot ensure implementation and monitoring of its key poli-
cies, be it in the ﬁ eld of the economy, social care, or the media. To put it simply, the state is 
so complex that it cannot manage itself. In eﬀ ect, the state is not able to ensure full insight 
into, not to mention control of, media ownership patterns and their inﬂ uence on media 
pluralism and independence.
Secondly, the media market in contemporary i is extremely over-saturated. Th ere are 
simply too many media outlets competing on a too small advertising market. Th e situation 
is made even worse by the strong competition that comes from the side of state/public 
broadcasters, taking away a large part of the advertising revenues from commercial broad-
casters. In eﬀ ect, the media are rather weak and largely dependent on donors and/or state 
subsidies. It is expected that in the near future, and with the reduction in available dona-
tions, the number of media outlets will signiﬁ cantly shrink. Hence, at the moment, and 
somewhat paradoxically, we can say that pluralism threatens pluralism – there are simply 
too many media, so that almost everyone is endangered. Th is results in a general uncer-
tainty about the future of the media sphere in i.
Th irdly, the legal regulator and self-regulatory framework and institutions in the ﬁ eld 
of the media are quite weak, not to say ineﬃ  cient. Th is is especially so in the area of own-
ership and competition regulation, where media-speciﬁ c legislation is just being drafted, 
and the existing general competition legislation is completely ineﬃ  cient. Here, the ques-
tion is if the system will become operational soon enough, so that potential future moves 
towards monopolisation of speciﬁ c aspects of the media market are identiﬁ ed on time, 
and prevented. Moreover, an additional problem that results from the described situation 
is a lack of transparency of ownership in companies in general.
Th is is more so because the state has a limited say with respect to the legislation regard-
ing the media. Even when the laws are brought in at the state level, they have to be adopted 
at entity levels as well in order to be practically operational. In accordance with the Dayton 
Peace Accord,² it is the sole responsibility of entities to adopt and implement the legisla-
tion on media. Additionally, in the Federation i entity, each of ten cantons is also em-
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powered to have its own media legislation; therefore there is neither a central register of 
media nor one of commercial companies in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole, nor in the 
entity of Federation of i. In other words, there are eleven company registers and eleven 
media registers in the country: one in Republika Srpska entity, and one in each of the ten 
cantons of the Federation of i. Such a situation is a nightmare for anyone trying to get 
information about media ownership. Moreover, none of the available registers exists in the 
digital format, meaning that any inquiry has to undergo a manual digging through hard-
copy documents in basement archives. 
Fourthly, the privatisation of cantonal and municipal broadcasters is not advancing, as 
a result of the still continuing ban imposed by the Oﬃ  ce of the High Commissioner (here-
after ). Hence, only several important media enterprises have been privatised to date. 
Th is has also slowed down the consolidation of the media sphere in the country. As a re-
sult, no one knows how the forthcoming process of privatisation of these media will inﬂ u-
ence overall developments in the ﬁ eld.
And ﬁ nally, as a consequence of all the factors mentioned, and as a result of immense 
administrative obstacles and legal uncertainty for businesses, there was only a limited in-
terest on the part of large international media corporations to invest in i. In eﬀ ect, there 
was no major attempt by any of the big corporations to actually enter the media scene ag-
gressively and acquire a signiﬁ cant percentage of media companies. 
2 MEDIA MARKET DEVELOPMENT 
Considering rather speciﬁ c circumstances under which it grew, the media system of 
i is both the youngest (in terms of its operation as an industry characterized by mar-
ket competition) and, at the same time among the most complex ones in the region of 
Southeast Europe (). Th e Bosnia and Herzegovina media landscape is determined by 
the country’s complex political and administrative structures, diﬃ  cult post-war paciﬁ ca-
tion and democratization processes, and its damaged economy.³ Four years of war end-
ed in December , when the Dayton Peace Accord was signed, opening the way to re-
construction of the country and reconciliation among its three dominant ethnic groups: 
Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks. Accordingly, i now consists of two entities: Th e Republika 
Srpska, which is dominated by Serbs and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (here-
inafter Federation of i), dominated by Croats and Bosniaks, and consisting of ten can-
tons which enjoy a large measure of autonomy, and of which four have a Bosniak and four 
a Croat majority, while the remaining two are mixed cantons. 
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All in all, based on the described circumstances, one can list several key features of i 
that inﬂ uence the development of the media sphere as well:⁴ the i economy is still in a 
shambles; the market is underdeveloped, and the state largely depends on foreign aid and 
loans from the  and the World Bank; the state administration is extremely ineﬃ  cient, 
and such a complex structure is simply non-manageable; the legal and judiciary systems 
are quite ineﬀ ective; there is a general lack of civil society, or democratic and participatory 
culture; and there are substantial administrative and legal barriers to business.
In such a dynamic and fragmented environment, and under such harsh conditions, the 
media system of i developed in a rather complex way. Today, i is characterised by two 
media systems, one in each entity, and an emerging statewide public broadcasting system. 
Th e development of the media system was contradictory in its own terms, being forged 
by domestic political forces on one side, which have sought ways to create and use the me-
dia as their mouthpiece, and the international community on the other, which has invested 
enormous amounts of money in the development of an independent media sphere in post-
war i. According to the report on media environment written by Gwyneth Henderson, 
Jasna Kilalić and Boro Kontić in January ,⁵ “since  the .. Government () has 
invested some   million to support independent broadcast and print media in Bos-
nia and Herzegovina (i) –  . million since .” Adding to this investment, for 
the period –, the  has committed an additional  . million for the same 
purposes. Apart from the , other big donors such as the Open Society Fund, the Euro-
pean Commission, and many others, will spent at least the same amount for this period. 
All this points to the fact that the media sphere of i is still largely dependent on dona-
tions and foreign aid, and its pluralism needs to be taken with due reservations, since it is 
questionable what will remain functional once the foreign aid completely drains out. Nev-
ertheless, in spite of rather harsh conditions, there are simply too many media outlets in 
i. Th is is the result of the speciﬁ c circumstances described above, where “many media 
outlets are able to access ﬁ nancial support in many diﬀ erent ways, so it is very hard to as-
sess when the market may shrink to a more rational level.”⁶
As a consequence of such speciﬁ c a situation, the media market in i is weak. Accord-
ing to agency ﬁ gures for , the available annual advertising net revenue in i totals 
  million (approx.   million) and is distributed across the industry in the fol-
lowing way:  gets some   million (approx.  . million), billboards earn some 
  million (approx.   million), print gets   million (approx.   million) and 
the radio sector has   million (approx.  . million).⁷ Nevertheless, it is important 
to emphasise here that the actual size of the market, which would include advertisements 
sold directly as well as the substantial barter deals often done, should be somewhere 
around   million (approx.   million) gross worth.⁸ 
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2.1 BROADCAST MEDIA DEVELOPMENT
Th e developments in the ﬁ eld of broadcasting have been dynamic since the dissolution 
of the former Yugoslavia and the war in i. Whereas in , there were only   and  
radio stations, by  the broadcasting sector had virtually exploded, featuring  radio 
and   stations. Nevertheless, the numbers continued to grow, so that in  there 
were  radio and   stations in the country. Between  and  broadcasters 
were ﬁ nally required to apply for long-term licenses that were delivered in accordance 
with strict criteria outlined by the Communications Regulatory Agency ().⁹ Th is has 
eﬀ ectively put an end to the mushrooming of the broadcasting sector and has downsized 
it to numbers more appropriate for the limited i market.
Table  NUMBER OF BROADCASTERS IN BIH FROM 1991 TO 2000
1991 1997 2000
TV RADIO TV RADIO TV RADIO
FEDERATION BIH 34 97 42 127
REPUBLIKA SRPSKA 18 59 29 83
BIH TOTAL 5 54 52 156 71 210
Source: Udovičić et al, .
According to the latest data from the , in late  and early , there are  li-
censed broadcasters in i, plus three additional state-wide public broadcasters that form 
the Public Broadcasting System for i: Th e Public Broadcasting Service of i ( i), 
Radio and Television of the Federation i ( i) and Radio and Television of the Re-
publika Srpska (). 
Out of these  broadcasters, there are   stations and  radio stations. All to-
gether, there are  public and  private broadcasting media outlets in the country. Out 
of that number, there are  public and  private  stations, while there are  public 
and  private radio stations.
Table  NUMBER OF RADIO AND TV STATIONS IN BIH IN 2003
TOTAL PUBLIC PRIVATE
TV 42 16 26
RADIO 141 62 79
TOTAL 183 78 105
Source: Media Task Force, .
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In , there were only two  channels with national coverage, which were part of the 
state broadcaster  Sarajevo, later renamed  i. By late , throughout the war, 
the number changed, so that there were altogether three  channels with almost nation-
al coverage:  i and ,¹⁰ both covering most of the Federation of i and parts 
of the Republika Srpska, and targeting primarily the Bosniak and Croat populations, re-
spectively. Th e  channels of  (Srpska ), later renamed the Radio Television of the 
Republika Srpska, covered most of the Republika Srpska and parts of the federation i, 
targeting primarily the Serb population. 
Th e number of  channels with national coverage changed again in late  when 
the Open Broadcast Network (), a  channel established and run by the international 
community, started to operate. Its primary task was to balance the nationalist propaganda 
that was coming from state-owned and nationalist party controlled media in the country. 
By the end of , there were   channels with national coverage. Two of those are 
 channels of public broadcasters, the  i and the , the third is , and the 
fourth is    that entered the i media market in early . Th ere is also one 
national frequency reserved for the state-wide   channel, but it is yet unknown when 
that channel will eventually go on the air.
Additionally, there is a statewide program produced by a network of several local 
 stations, called Mreža Plus. Nevertheless, Mreža Plus does not have its own frequency 
but uses the frequencies of networked  stations, so we cannot really consider it to be a 
separate  channel.
Table  NUMBER OF TV CHANNELS WITH NATIONAL OR ENTITY COVERAGE 
IN BIH FROM 1990 TO 2003
1990 1995 1996 2000 2003
BIH TOTAL 2 3 4 3 4 (5)
2.1.1 COMPETITION ON THE TV MARKET
According to Dunja Mijatović, the Director of the Broadcasting Unit of the , at the 
moment, there are no available frequencies for another statewide  broadcaster in i. 
One additional frequency is reserved for the public broadcasting system, since it will be 
transformed, ﬁ nally featuring three channels.¹¹ 
Th e  has currently blocked the entrance of new broadcasters into the market in or-
der to create conditions for the stabilisation thereof “the  has decided that, for the im-
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mediate future at least, it will not issue any new general broadcasting licenses. Th is is to al-
low the market to establish and develop and will be reviewed again in , .”¹²
Th e  is considering the possibility of oﬀ ering, in the near future, a number of fre-
quencies, which will allow for a national commercial network for radio and .¹³ 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that it is impossible to establish a statewide  chan-
nel. Th rough the mechanism of transfer of broadcasting licenses, a company can buy 
oﬀ  the licenses of local and regional  or radio stations, thus eﬀ ectively establishing a 
 program with national coverage. Th is is exactly what    did in early . 
  from Serbia registered a Bosnian company,   , which then bought oﬀ  
broadcasting licenses from four local  stations in the country. 
Th e dominant position of public broadcasters, apart from their reach, results from sev-
eral sources of ﬁ nancing, according to the Law on Public Broadcasting Systems that was 
imposed by the Oﬃ  ce of the High Representative () in May . Th e Law provides 
multiple sources of funding for public broadcasters, including a license fee, advertising, 
sponsorship and direct state funding. 
Public broadcasters are now allowed to broadcast advertisements to a length of  per-
cent of their total daily programming, or a maximum of six minutes per hour (eight min-
utes per hour during prime-time). Th ese limits, although in accordance with the Europe-
an Convention of Transfrontier Television, may be problematic, considering the fact that 
the net worth of the  advertising market in i in  was around   million, of 
which some  percent or  . million goes to , while the other   stations have 
to share the remaining  . million. Th e advertising market is so limited that it serious-
ly endangers the survival of a commercial  and radio sector.¹⁴ 
Th e greatest competition for the public broadcasting  channels, ,  and 
 , now comes from the commercial  networks, Open Broadcast Network (), 
Mreža Plus and   , who also manage to cover some  to  percent of popula-
tion each. 
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Table  AUDIENCE SHARE OF TV CHANNELS IN BIH IN 2002 BY REGIONS
TV CHANNEL BIH
(%)
FEDERATION 
BIH (%)
REPUBLIKA 
SRPSKA (%)
FTV 1 30,2 44,8 6,9
FTV 2 4 5,6 1,5
HRT 1, 2, 3 8,9 3,7 17,1
RTRS 7,1 1,6 15,8
RTS 1, 2, 3 2,1 0 5,4
PINK 3,9 0,3 9,7
MREŽA PLUS 12 14,3 8,1
NTV HAYAT
ATV
TV TUZLA
HRTV OSCAR C
RTV MOSTAR
NTV ZENICA
TV TRAVNIK
TV JASMIN
4,7
3,1
1,4
0,6
0,6
1
0,6
0
7,7
0
2,3
0,9
0,9
1,6
0,9
0
0
8,1
0
0
0
0
0
0
OBN NETWORK 11,2 13,8 7,3
OBN
NTV BANJA LUKA
TV ARENA
TV CAZIN
NTV ZETEL
TV X
RTV GORAŽDE
TV KISS
6,6
2,3
0,7
0
0,7
0,4
0,4
0,1
9,9
0
1,2
0
1,2
0,7
0,6
0,2
1,4
5,9
0
0
0
0
0
0
OTHER SATELLITE 6 7,9 3
OTHER DOMESTIC 14,6 8 25,2
Source: Mareco Index Bosnia,  member of Gallup International,  Audience Measurement, May .
2.1.2 RADIO MARKET DEVELOPMENT
Radio is an important media for the local audience in i. Some  to  percent of 
the population listen to the radio regularly, at least three times a week for  to  hours at 
a time.¹⁵
As stated earlier, there are  radio stations in i. Nevertheless, only one of these, the 
public national station,  Radio, has an audience of any appreciable size, reaching a . 
percent audience share.¹⁶ Th e next station in line is Radio Federacije i, and it claims a 
 percent audience share in total, followed by several stations that are just below  per-
cent. Th us,   has . percent,  has  percent,  Big claims . percent,  
radio has . percent,   . percent and   has a  percent audience share. All 
other stations are below the  percent line. Most of the stations are music stations, and 
none of the other stations with reasonably substantial speech programming – the aver-
age ratio is  percent talk to  percent music – reach more than  percent of the total 
population.¹⁷
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Table  AUDIENCE SHARE OF 10 MOST POPULAR RADIO CHANNELS IN BIH IN 2002
RADIO CHANNEL %
BH RADIO 1 10.7
RADIO FEDERACIJE BIH 4.1
RTV BN 3.6
RTRS 3.0
RTV BIG 2.9
NES RADIO 2.6
RTV USK 2.2
RTV TK 2.0
Source: , .
Th e number of radio stations and their ratings show that the market is extremely frag-
mented. Th is also means that revenues are low, especially when one takes into account the 
assessment that the overall size of the radio advertising market does not exceed  . 
million per year. 
To some extent, the situation between private and public radio broadcasters mirrors that 
of the television sector, except that there is no state-wide formal radio network that would 
be equivalent to Mreža Plus or . Th us, there is only an informal network of radio sta-
tions, facilitated by the  Agency. Th rough this network,  stations carry and con-
tribute to news blocks produced by , and earn revenues through joint advertising. 
Th is project was initially supported for a year by the European Union with  ..¹⁸
2.2 BROADCAST MEDIA OWNERSHIP
2.2.1 OPEN BROADCAST NETWORK (OBN)
Th e  started to broadcast under its initial name, , in September , as an at-
tempt of the  and other international factors to break up the information monopolies 
enjoyed by the ruling nationalist parties at that time, and thus to establish a country-wide 
 program that would provide objective and unbiased information to the whole popula-
tion of the country. 
Th e “seed money” for the creation of the  came from the several foreign govern-
ments, most notably the United States, Sweden, Japan, Canada, Spain and Italy, but also 
from the European Commission and the Open Society Foundation.¹⁹ It is estimated that 
some   million has been spent over the period of ﬁ ve years (–) in order 
to help the establishment of .²⁰ Th e money was essentially put into a Trust, seated in 
London, which transformed its role from an informal group of donors to the oﬃ  cial owner 
of the company, and the partner company  was established in i. 
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Nevertheless, in spite of such signiﬁ cant support, the whole project ﬁ nally collapsed in 
, as major donors, dissatisﬁ ed with the  performance as well as with mutual rela-
tions, simply withdrew their support.²¹ 
What has happened in the mean time is that the  consolidated itself and its owner-
ship structure. According to the latest oﬃ  cial data, the  was registered in the Cantonal 
Court of Sarajevo as a stock company, on  February, . Th e owners of the company 
are  Limited, based in London, , and Gabriel Vukadin from Sarajevo. Vukadin, who 
is also the director, owns  percent of the company and  . owns  percent. Ac-
cording to Henderson et al.,²² one of the owners of the London-based  Limited is also 
an owner of Nova , the Croatian commercial  station. Th is means that the two sta-
tions,  and Nova , are therefore in a position to purchase the programming rights 
for both countries at favorable rates. 
Today, we can say that in spite of all its diﬃ  culties, the  is surviving. As Henderson 
et al. has put it: “It has an audience share of  percent overall –  percent in Sarajevo and 
 percent in Mostar. It has gained an additional licence from the  to complete its ter-
restrial coverage with  new transmitters. It has twelve aﬃ  liate stations which ﬁ ll in the 
gaps. Aﬃ  liates are both publicly and privately owned.”²³
2.2.2 MREŽA PLUS NETWORK
As a consequence of the collapse of the original, internationally supported , in the 
summer of  / made the decision to try one more time to create a i wide 
network of stations. Hence, through stations that had earlier been  aﬃ  liates, Mreža 
Plus was created. Th ese stations are:  Hayat Sarajevo;  Banja Luka;  Tuzla; Oscar 
 Mostar and  Mostar. 
Each station has  percent ownership, but the distribution of revenues is made ac-
cording to the market share of each individual station. From the donor side Mreža Plus 
received substantial support for infrastructure, purchase of popular programming, man-
agement and marketing training. 
Th e audience ﬁ gures from  give Mreža a  percent audience share and an estimat-
ed  percent of available advertising revenues from agencies. Th e network signal covers 
at best  percent of the population.²⁴
Mreža Plus broadcasts its programming for several hours each day during peak time, 
using the frequencies of the ﬁ ve member stations. Generally speaking, Mreža Plus as a 
network is almost indistinguishable from other i  channels. It oﬀ ers the same mix of 
ﬁ lms, soap operas and light entertainment programs, some sport and cheaply produced 
local shows. Th ere are some plans to introduce a statewide newscast, but it is not clear 
whether this will eventually happen. 
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2.2.3 TV PINK BH NETWORK
Absolutely the newest and most spectacular entry into the i media market is the ap-
pearance of  Pink  in early . Before that,  Pink  was seen in its original pack-
aging, as broadcast in Serbia, and in  its market share in i was somewhere around  
percent.²⁵ Oﬃ  cial entry into the i market was made under the name Pink  Company. 
Th e Pink  Company ., was established on  February  in Bijeljina. Th e compa-
ny is established and owned by - Bijeljina and Pink International Company 
. Belgrade. Th e Director of the company is Jovo Stanišić, but the actual owner is Željko 
Mitrović from Belgrade, who owns Pink International Company.²⁶
Th e Pink  Company has taken over, through direct transfer, the frequencies and pro-
gramming obligations of four  companies previously existing in i, thus creating the 
   network. Th e four  companies are:  Kometa,  ,  Patria and 
 Step. As such, the    network manages to reach a large chunk of the BiH 
population. Nevertheless, I was not able to obtain the latest data on its overall reach and 
market share. 
It is obvious that  Pink has already had a signiﬁ cant impact on the overall character 
of the broadcasting market, increasing competition and aggressively entering areas that 
were initially reserved for the public broadcasters,  and Mreža Plus. It is therefore not 
surprising that the creation of   has caused a series of public protests and discus-
sions, mainly among local broadcasters, which fear the market potential and competitive-
ness of  Pink. 
2.2.4 NEOVISNA TELEVIZIJA HAYAT (NTV HAYAT)
Apart from the three mentioned networks, probably the most signiﬁ cant single pri-
vate broadcaster in the country is  Hayat.  Hayat . is a private company es-
tablished by Omer Behmen, Emin Svrakić, Mahir Žiško and Nermin Karačić as well as by 
the Svrakić . company. Th e initial capital of the company was  , (approx.  
,) of which Svrakić . invested ,  (approx.  ,), thus being the ma-
jority owner of the company. Originally, the company was established on  January , 
and was re-registered in  in accordance with the new legislative requirements. Th e 
Director of the  Hayat is Elvir Svrakić.²⁷
 Hayat is generally considered the most successful and most professional local  sta-
tion in i that has established itself in the market. Th e recently launched satellite service 
for the Bosnian diaspora overseas with Mreža Plus programming will, it is believed, bring in 
additional revenue. Moreover,  Hayat has plans to extend terrestrial coverage in i.²⁸
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2.2.5 ALTERNATIVNA TELEVIZIJA (ATV)
 is registered in Banja Luka. Th e owners of the company are Nataša Tešanović ( per-
cent), Darko Aleksić ( percent) and the representative of the  (Media Development 
Loan Fund), Milan Lukić ( percent). Th e Director of the company is Nataša Tešanović.²⁹ 
 is highly regarded among media professionals. It has a strong position in Republika 
Srpska, and its importance as a news provider is well recognised. Its news programming is 
also the station’s most signiﬁ cant revenue earner. If compared to  Hayat,  is not as 
strong in ﬁ nancial terms, but since it operates within a diﬀ erent context and has a diﬀ er-
ent history, this is not surprising. Th e market in  is much weaker than the market in the 
Federation, and it has been signiﬁ cantly supported by donors to ensure that high-quality 
news and information programming by, and for, Republika Srpska is available. 
2.2.6 OWNERSHIP IN RADIO SECTOR
According to Henderson et al., there are less than a dozen serious private radio stations 
in the country. Th is is also reﬂ ected in the audience share data we have obtained. Hence, 
since the radio market is so fragmented, and since there are no truly nation-wide com-
mercial radio channels, we will not go any deeper into the analysis of the ownership pat-
terns thereof. 
Th e only radio station to which we pay attention in our report is Radio , and that 
is only because it is owned by the private company, .... , based in Banja Luka, Re-
publika Srpska, which also publishes the daily paper Nezavisne novine. Th e company is es-
tablished and owned by Željko Kopanja and Nataša Kopanja. Th e authorised representa-
tive of the company is Željko Kopanja. According to data from early , Radio  has 
respectable listening ﬁ gures at . percent,³⁰ whereas according to the  its audience 
share for i in  was . percent. 
2.3 PRINT MEDIA MARKET
 Th ere are 7 daily papers published in i, 13 published in Serbia and Croatia, plus 
46 monthly and weekly publications produced in i and 61 foreign ones available on 
the BiH market. Of these 46 weekly and monthly publications, only 7 are news-based. 
Additionally, of those 7, only two are essentially local.³¹ Hence, the competition from 
outside is very strong, and what, on the surface, looks like a relatively uncrowded market 
is actually ﬂ ooded with a great number of titles that compete for the readership. 
Th e newspaper readership in i has always been limited, and is today at its lowest lev-
els, one reason being poor economic conditions – newspapers and magazines are expen-
sive, at   ( .) and   ( ) respectively. Th e overall newspaper readership in 
Federation i is around  percent and in Republika Srpska  percent, for those who 
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read it at least  times a week. News magazines are read regularly,  or  a month, by some 
 percent of the adult population. Data from the   report are somewhat diﬀ erent, 
stating that nationwide,  percent of the adult population (+ years) read daily newspa-
pers at least once a week,  percent read weekly magazines,  percent read bi-weekly 
magazines and  percent read monthly magazines.³² 
According to some assessments,³³ the print media market is underdeveloped as a con-
sequence of the devastated economy and limited advertising revenues. In late  only  
percent of advertising investment (the total size of the advertising market is around  
 million net worth) went to print media. Th is means that the print press can count on 
less than   million in net advertising revenues per year. Consequently, it is question-
able whether the advertising market can support the survival, not to mention the develop-
ment, of the print media sector. 
Additionally, readership is signiﬁ cantly restricted by the ethnic character of the audi-
ence. Th is prevents print media from reaching a broader audience on the nationwide level, 
thus forcing them to target whatever speciﬁ c ethnic group is dominant in the region where 
a particular paper is published. 
Rather interesting is information provided in the   report, which shows that 
out of all media types, the i population has lowest conﬁ dence in the print media. Th us, 
 percent of adult respondents state that they have no conﬁ dence in any print media, in 
comparison to  percent for radio, and  percent for television. 
Whereas in  there were  dailies published in i, Oslobođenje and Večernje novine, 
in  there are seven daily newspapers. Five are published in the Federation i: Dnevni 
Avaz, Oslobođenje, Jutarnje novine and Sarajevske novine () in the city of Sarajevo, and 
Dnevni list in the city of Mostar. Nezavisne novine and Glas Srpske are published in Banja 
Luka, Republic of Srpska. Glas Srpske is the only daily owned by the Government.
As a consequence of the poor performance of the print media market, there are no re-
liable data on print media circulation. According to some assessments from  and 
, Dnevni Avaz has the highest circulation of some , copies, reaching more than 
, copies on Fridays. Th e next is the daily Oslobođenje with approximately , 
copies, and Jutarnje novine with some , copies. Nezavisne novine and Glas Srpske 
have around , copies each. 
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Table  READERSHIP OF TOP DAILY NEWSPAPERS IN BIH*
DAILY NEWSPAPER %
DNEVNI AVAZ 40
OSLOBOÐENJE 17
VECˇERNJE NOVINE 14
JUTARNJE NOVINE 13
NEZAVISNE NOVINE 13
JUTARNJI LIST 10
DNEVNI LIST 10
Source: , .
Note: *Readership from every day to at least once a week.
2.3.1 DAILY DNEVNI AVAZ
Dnevni Avaz is the daily paper with the highest circulation in i, and it is published 
by the  Avaz publishing company. Th e President of the Governing Board is Fahrudin 
Radončić, while the executive director for  publications is Nedim Lisak. Th e General 
Director of the  Avaz company is Muhamed Bakarević.³⁴ In addition to the daily paper, 
Dnevni Avaz,  Avaz also publishes several specialised magazines such as Sport, Azra 
and Express, and owns a distribution system and a printing press as well.³⁵ All this makes 
it by far the strongest and the most inﬂ uential media company in the country.
Th ere has been a lot of discussion about Avaz, its ﬁ nances and its political aﬃ  liations. 
It has been claimed that Avaz was initially supported by the ruling Bosniak nationalist 
party  (Stranka Demokratske Akcije), which has ensured the rise of this paper (see 
Kurspahić, : ). Nevertheless, the owner of the company, Fahrudin Radončić, states 
that it was its editorial policy and not  support that has made the daily Dnevni Avaz, 
such a successful media company.³⁶ In , Dnevni Avaz suddenly distanced itself from 
the  party, in an attempt to establish itself as an independent daily. Th is move was se-
verely punished by  oﬃ  cials who have used various forms of pressure, including ﬁ nan-
cial police inspectors, to put an end to this rebellion. Nevertheless, thanks to its maneu-
vering capacity and to support from the international community in i, Avaz managed to 
survive this attack and grew even stronger afterwards. Today, it is hard to estimate what its 
political aﬃ  liations are, but it is clear that its inﬂ uence on the political life of the country is 
enormous. Th e editorial concept is that of the family-oriented political daily paper. 
2.3.2 DAILY OSLOBOÐENJE
 Th e daily Oslobođenje is published by the shareholders’ company Oslobođenje which is 
registered at the Cantonal Court of Sarajevo. Th e company, as described under the section 
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on the privatisation of Oslobođenje, is now owned by the Slovenian ﬁ nancial/investment 
group, Kmečka družba, which is the majority owner with a  percent stake in the com-
pany. According to the most up-to-date oﬃ  cial information from September , the di-
rector of the company is Enes Terzić, and the executive director is Senka Kurtović. Th e su-
pervisory board consists of a President, Temin Dedić, and four members: Matjaž Prinčič, 
Hajdar Arifagić, Goran Jovanović and Petar Škert.³⁷
Once the leading daily paper in i, Oslobođenje lost its glory as well as its readers. Th e 
paper was not able to adjust to the changed post-war media market, and its importance 
signiﬁ cantly deteriorated. In a futile attempt to compete with Dnevni Avaz, Oslobođenje 
lost a large percentage of its previous readers, and not even the new ownership structure 
under Slovenian command helped the paper to re-establish itself. 
2.3.3 DAILY DNEVNE NEZAVISNE NOVINE
When speaking about the proﬁ le of the most important dailies, one could freely say 
that currently the most serious one, in terms of its content and journalistic quality, is the 
daily Nezavisne novine from Banja Luka. Th e paper is seen as an opposition paper. It now 
separates most comment from the news stories, thus standing shoulder to shoulder with 
most Western papers. Th e paper, Nezavisne novine, is a daily paper published by the pri-
vate company .... , in Banja Luka, Republika Srpska. Th e company is established 
and owned by Željko Kopanja and Nataša Kopanja. Th e authorised representative of the 
company is Željko Kopanja.³⁸
Although “overall readership of all publications has fallen over the last two years – a 
notable exception is Nezavisne novine, which has secured a sizeable increase in sales 
throughout the country, despite being based in Banja Luka.”³⁹ Hence, some  percent of 
its sales are in the Federation i, and the management of Nezavisne novine believes that 
with a further zoned edition this ﬁ gure would rise dramatically. Th e newspaper’s manage-
ment is determined to establish Nezavisne novine as the leading state-wide independent 
daily paper, but also to develop it into a lucrative business. 
According to Henderson et al, “Nezavisine novine’s business sense – the acquisition of 
its own printing press – as well as its improvements in layout, and not least its journal-
ism, are impressive. Th e company is now printing seven other companies` publications, 
including one Croatian paper and an auto magazine.⁴⁰
Th e success is even more impressive if one takes into consideration the unfair compe-
tition on the part of the subsidized government paper, Glas Srpske, continuous pressures 
from the government, as well as the pressure exerted on some institutions not to advertise 
with in Nezavisne novine. 
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2.3.4 DAILY JUTARNJE NOVINE 
Th e daily Jutarnje novine is published by the private company, Alden print, as is out-
lined in the section on privatisation of the daily Večernje novine.⁴¹ In the impressum of the 
paper, it is stated that the president of the governing board is Irfan Ljevaković, and that his 
deputy is Kemal Terzić. What is important here is the fact that Alden print is a publishing 
company that originally owned a printing press, before it acquired a daily paper (more on 
the character and the creation of Jutarnje novine in the section on privatisation).
2.3.5 WEEKLY MAGAZINE SLOBODNA BOSNA 
Based on the circulation data, the two most important weeklies are Slobodna Bosna (ac-
cording to its staﬀ , its circulation is around , copies, but other sources estimate it at 
, or even as low as ,) and Dani (between , and ,). All other political 
weekly magazines have circulation of less than , copies. Th e circulation data for the 
weeklies are also based on assessments rather than exact information. 
Th e weekly magazine, Slobodna Bosna, is published by the privately owned company 
“-” ., which was registered on  January  at the Cantonal Court of Sara-
jevo. Th e company is established and owned by Asim Metiljević and Senad Avdić. Slobod-
na Bosna is an important opposition, independent, political magazine that tries to pursue 
investigative journalism, and is extremely critical of the establishment.⁴²
2.3.6 WEEKLY MAGAZINE DANI
Th e weekly magazine, Dani, is published by the privately owned company,  ., 
which was registered on  June  at the Cantonal Court in Sarajevo. According to the 
registration decision, the owner and director of the company is Senad Pećanin. Th e weekly 
Dani was and still is an inﬂ uential paper in spite of its limited circulation. Just recently it 
went through a thorough face lift, with a completely new design and improved paper qual-
ity, with an increased cover price from   to  (  – .). As Henderson et al. says, 
“Dani is important beyond its current readership ﬁ gures – as are some other ﬁ nancially 
unstable print outlets. It is they who most often raise issues of substance and frequently 
set the agenda for the electronic media. Th eir inﬂ uence is disproportionate to their read-
ership as some of the print media is in every society.”⁴³
2.4 MEDIA CONCENTRATION AND CROSS-OWNERSHIP
At present, media market in i is characterised by an almost complete absence of sig-
niﬁ cant media concentration and cross-ownership cases. Th ere are four key reasons for 
this. Firstly, i is an undeveloped media market that has not yet produced one or two 
dominant local companies that would be able to buy out other media companies, and to 
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create signiﬁ cant cross-ownership structures and monopolies. Secondly, since the market 
is still quite insecure and with signiﬁ cant barriers to new entries, this has resulted in an ul-
timate lack of signiﬁ cant foreign investment in the media sector, and there were no signiﬁ -
cant entries of foreign media companies that wanted to buy local media enterprises. 
Probably the two most signiﬁ cant cases are Kmečka Družba’s purchase of the daily 
Oslobođenje, and the recent entry by   that bought the frequencies of four local  sta-
tions. Also, Nova  from Croatia holds part of the stock in  (see earlier section on ).
Th irdly, the strong control of the market by the  as well as the strict rules for licens-
ing of broadcasters, have resulted in the creation of a rather plural broadcasting sector 
with a total of  radio and  stations. Th is number of media outlets is also the result of 
signiﬁ cant support by foreign donors and international organisations that tried to create a 
plural media scene as a counter-balance to those media that were under the strong control 
of nationalists during and just after the war. As a result, the media scene is extremely plu-
ral in terms of numbers, and any signiﬁ cant ownership concentration would be possible 
only after a period of re-grouping and consolidating of the existing media outlets. How-
ever, in the current situation, the extreme plurality endangers the survival of all, since all 
are competing for the far too limited advertising cake.
And ﬁ nally, administrative and legal barriers to foreign investors and businesses, com-
bined with general political and economic uncertainty, have prevented the signiﬁ cant in-
ﬂ ow of foreign money and thus have delayed the more signiﬁ cant ownership transfers.
We might say that the media market has just entered the phase of consolidation that will 
lead towards a decrease in the total number of media outlets and to the creation of sever-
al stronger media players in the ﬁ eld. Only as this phase matures, can one expect the ﬁ rst 
cases of serious media concentration and eventual cases of excessive cross-ownership.
Perhaps one might say that the Avaz publishing company has made the most signiﬁ cant 
progress towards establishing a vertical ownership structure, having under its umbrella 
the most important daily paper, the biggest printing house and the strongest distribution 
system, plus a set of valuable specialised publications such as Azra, Sport and Express. 
Nevertheless, one cannot say that this has established Avaz as a dominant monopoly play-
er on the print-media market, especially when one takes into account the whole variety of 
print media published in the country.
Certainly worth mentioning is that Željko Kopanja owns both the daily newspaper, Ne-
zavisne Novine, and the radio station, Radio , in Banja Luka, Republika Srpska, plus a 
printing press. Nevertheless, this does not place Kopanja’s company anywhere near a mo-
nopoly position, but instead has merely secured the survival of his media business. 
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3 REGULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION
In i, practically all of the relevant legislation and regulation documents have been 
passed as a result of overwhelming pressure from the  and other international com-
munity actors present in i. As a consequence, there was no signiﬁ cant involvement 
of local stakeholders in the process of adopting and passing these laws, nor has it been 
thought through whether such legislation can actually be implemented in an environment 
where key stakeholders have not been consulted and where there are no necessary struc-
tural preconditions that would actually ensure a basis for implementation to happen in 
the ﬁ rst place.
As a consequence, the current legislation and regulatory frameworks and mechanisms 
have largely remained ineﬀ ective in terms of their implementation. Th is has happened to 
the Freedom of Information Act, the Defamation Law, the Press Code, and the  Law – all 
of which on paper represent advanced achievements in the ﬁ eld of media legislation, based 
on the best Western European models, but fail in the actual process of implementation. 
Th e reasons for failure are many: lack of stakeholders’ understanding and support, a 
complex legal environment, and the lack of basic structural preconditions for the success-
ful implementation of legislation and regulation. What often happens is that the legisla-
tion works brilliantly on paper, but in praxis there is no one to implement it.
As Henderson et al. described, “the Freedom of Information legislation came into eﬀ ect 
in . We were unable to ﬁ nd evidence that it has yet made much diﬀ erence to journal-
ists seeking information – institutions do not refuse access to information - they simply 
do not respond to the requests.”⁴⁴
A similar situation exists with the Libel and Defamation legislation that simply does not 
correspond to the actual circumstances in the judiciary system. “Decriminalisation of li-
bel and defamation is greatly welcomed – however the welcome is somewhat tempered by 
the general despair at the irresponsibility of the print media and the regular publication of 
unsubstantiated accusation, gossip, rumor and personal attacks. Th e view too seems to be 
that until the courts are reformed an individual is unlikely to try to seek civil redress since 
it may take three, ﬁ ve or even more, years for the case to be resolved.”⁴⁵
A similar story is that of the European Union funded Press Council, close to the  
model, which did not have much success in its ﬁ rst years of operation. First of all, money 
was a problem. Secondly, the media community did not oﬀ er it the necessary support, and 
the Press Council failed to establish itself as the moral and professional authority. For ex-
ample, of the  adjudications it had made until early , just over  percent were pub-
lished by the outlet concerned.⁴⁶
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And last but not least, the  Law that was imposed by the  in mid , did not 
change much in terms of helping the actual creation of the  system in the country. i 
still awaits a statewide  channel.
All these examples point to the fact that the legislative environment, legal practice, and 
the attitude of stakeholders work in such a way as to impede and not to support the ac-
tual implementation of the legislation in question. It does not matter how good a piece of 
legislation is. What matters is if there is someone who can actually ﬁ nd the way to imple-
ment it in practice. Th e situation is even further complicated if one takes into considera-
tion the complex state structure of the country (state, entities, cantons, municipalities). 
All of these factors also signiﬁ cantly inﬂ uence the whole policy-making process that exists 
around the issue of media ownership and concentration.
3.1 REGULATION ON MEDIA OWNERSHIP AND COMPETITION
In i, there are no regulatory anti-concentration provisions in media legislation or 
other legislation (competition legislation etc.) that impose restrictions/limits on media 
ownership (including provisions on cross ownership). Currently, a draft proposal for such 
regulation, titled Basic Principles on Media Concentration and Pluralism, has been adopt-
ed (hereinafter: the Rule) has been adopted by the Council of the  in early March , 
and is supposed to be oﬃ  cialy introduced on  April . After the regulation is adopted, 
it will become an integral part of the Law on Communications of i.
According to the Rule, i will have rather strict rules preventing concentration of own-
ership in the media market. Th e  considers these rules necessary to promote competi-
tion and diversity, thus ensuring pluralism of content by granting pluralism of ownership. 
Th e Rule treats ﬁ ve key areas: Firstly, the Rule determines that mergers among broadcast-
ers that have entity and/or national coverage are banned. Secondly, it bans local  multi-
ple ownership, especially in cases where  stations cover the same population range. Th e 
 can grant exceptions to this on a case-by-case basis, for example, when stations would 
better serve the local community together. Th irdly, it introduces the local radio ownership 
limit, stipulating that “one () radio station can be owned by one company/individual/
group in the same population range”, the population range being a speciﬁ c part of the pop-
ulation covered. Fourthly, no cross-ownership is permitted for ownership in electronic 
and print media, and the radio-television cross-ownership rule states that one company/
individual/group can own one radio and one  outlet for the population ranges it covers. 
Finally, the Rule allows for the limited radio and  transferability of broadcasting licenses 
in accordance with other provisions of the Rule. 
As it seems now, the new rule will not deﬁ ne any penalty provisions to be imposed on a 
publisher (legal person) if the media law is violated with respect to ownership restrictions 
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and transparency. As Dunja Mijatović said, each instance of violation of the regulation/
legislation will be dealt with on a case-by-case basis, by the .
Th e key institution for the implementation of the provisions of the forthcoming regula-
tion on media ownership and concentration will be the Communication Regulatory Agen-
cy since it is the sole regulator of the broadcasting sector in i. 
Additionally, issues of market concentration and competition are regulated in Th e Law 
on Competition in i, which was adopted in the House of Peoples on  October , 
in the House of Representatives on  April . 
Th e Law on Competition envisions the creation of the Competition Council as an inde-
pendent body at the state level, whereas two entities will establish within the ministries in 
charge of trade their Oﬃ  ce of Competition and Consumer Protection.⁴⁷
BiH was obliged to introduce the Law on Competition, since it is required by the Sta-
bilization and Association Agreement () with the European Union.⁴⁸ But, as in other 
areas, ineﬃ  cient and complex administrative structures have prevented the implementa-
tion of the Competition Law. 
At the moment, there are no regulatory provisions in media legislation that introduce 
state subsidies for media publishers as a means of protecting media pluralism. Moreover, 
the existing Competition Law of i completely lacks any provisions on state subsidies to 
enterprises or sectors.
3.2 TRANSPARENCY OF OWNERSHIP
In accordance with the rules and regulations regarding the issuing of long-term licens-
es, broadcasters are required to report to the  any change in ownership structure that 
exceeds  percent. Moreover, the  keeps its own public register of broadcasters that 
includes the court registration documents of a broadcaster, ownership information, the 
business plan, commercial contracts, etc.
Apart from this provision, in the cantons of the Federation of i as well as in the Repub-
lika Srpska, the respective Laws on Information, i.e. the Laws on the Media, normally re-
quire media publishers to register their media in the Media Register. Th e publishers are re-
quired to provide all necessary information regarding their media, including the ownership 
structure, sources of ﬁ nancing, and other relevant information as presented in the Court 
Register of Companies on the respective state/administrative level. In that context, the me-
dia publishing company is normally obliged to report any changes of information provided 
to the Media Register. For example, the Law on the Media of the Sarajevo Canton requires 
publishers to report any such change within  days after the change has occurred.⁴⁹
Th e same Media Law of the Canton of Sarajevo, in Article  also requires all print me-
dia to publish, in each issue, the key information about the publisher and owner of that 
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media outlet, its address, and other relevant information, including the number under 
which the media outlet is registered in the Media Register of the Canton of Sarajevo. Simi-
lar provisions are also outlined in other Media Laws of cantons of the i as well as re-
spective legislation in the Republika Srpska.
Additionally, the Law on Commercial Enterprises of both the i and the Republika 
Srpska requires that each company/legal person be registered in the Court Register at the 
relevant court, depending on the location of operation of the legal person.
All information stored either in the Court Register or in the Media Register is open to 
the public. Th is is precisely stated in the Laws on Commercial Enterprises of both entities, 
but it also stands as a consequence of the Freedom of Access to Information Act that was 
adopted on the state level in November , and then in Republika Srpska as of Novem-
ber  and the Federation as of February . According to this Act, all information 
available at government and public institutions is available to the citizens, except informa-
tion that has been previously classiﬁ ed as state secret in accordance with speciﬁ c criteria. 
Also, the  register of broadcasters is also accessible to the public, short of information 
on commercial contracts of broadcasters which are considered to be a business secret of 
those companies.
Th us, formally, there is a suﬃ  cient level of public registers and ownership transparency 
provisions, so that all necessary information on media ownership structure can be found. 
Nevertheless, this is not exactly true. Information is primarily stored in hard-copy format 
and is not available in any sort of electronic database, which makes any serious search 
for information, such as possible information on cross-ownership, or complex relations 
between companies on several levels, practically impossible or too costly in terms of the 
money and time needed for such investigation. In other words, from existing registers it is 
possible to extract basic information on a company, but it is extremely hard to try to estab-
lish links between diﬀ erent companies, media owners, individuals, and media outlets.
Th is is more so if one takes into consideration the additional fact that in the Federation 
of i there is neither a central register of companies nor one for the media, because they 
are located in the relevant cantonal ministries across the entity. Hence, there is no cen-
tral register of whatever type on a state level either, except that of the , because of the 
large-scale independence of the two entities.
4.4 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REGULATION
It is exactly the phases of implementation where all those advanced legislative solutions 
are made irrelevant. What is not implemented, does not exist – except on paper. Th e rea-
sons for the failure of implementation are many, but can be reduced to several “usual sus-
pects” - situational variables that characterize contemporary i. 
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Certainly, one of the important aspects is the lack of the policy making capacity that 
results in the imposition of all relevant laws by the . In eﬀ ect, the absence of key do-
mestic players and stakeholders from a policy making process results in a general “lack of 
ownership” which in eﬀ ect makes all those laws fail at the level of implementation. Simply, 
there is no local consensus and understanding necessary for the support of any legal docu-
ment, no matter how advanced, in its implementation. 
Th e legislation on media ownership and concentration is certainly welcomed, and the 
attempt of the  should receive all the support needed. Nevertheless, debate about this 
piece of legislation must be much more intensive, and the  should ﬁ nd a way to make it 
applicable in the speciﬁ c i context. Th is is even more important because of the fact that, 
for the successful implementation of the law, the  will have to rely on largely ineﬃ  cient 
existing structures in terms of control of the information it receives from the media. Here, 
the problem of limited transparency will be one of the crucial issues.
Also, an additional (and possibly the largest) obstacle for the whole initiative is the in-
eﬀ ective Competition Law and still non-existent competition agencies at entity and state 
levels, who are actually supposed to deal with issues of market monopolization and fair 
competition. If the  is going to depend on these legal frameworks and agencies to-be, 
then not much can be done. By the time these start to operate, the media system will not 
be what it is today. 
4 PRIVATISATION
i was not immune to the troublesome privatisation of the state-owned companies. 
Th e ﬁ rst blow was the interruption and the delay caused by the armed conﬂ ict in i. Al-
though privatisation started at the beginning of the s, the war that started in early 
 interrupted it, so that the privatisation process was only restarted after . Th us, 
the process of privatisation, as it unfolded after the war, is based on the relevant legislation 
passed only after , when the state ﬁ nally started to consolidate. 
4.1 LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR PRIVATISATION
Th e most relevant legislation on which the privatisation of media companies depends is 
that passed on the entity level. In the Federation of i, it is primarily the Law on the Pri-
vatisation of Enterprises, published in the Oﬃ  cial Gazette of the Federation of i in , 
the Law on Privatisation Agency, published in , as well as various decisions and by-
law documents. In the Republika Srpska, the key legislation is the Law on the Privatisation 
of the State Capital in Enterprises, published in the Oﬃ  cial Gazette of the Republika Srp-
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ska in . Additionally, there is also state-level legislation that creates an overall frame-
work for the privatisation process: the Law on the Policy of Direct Foreign Investment in 
BiH which was published in the Oﬃ  cial Gazette of i in  and the Framework Law on 
the Privatisation of Enterprises and Banks in i, also published in . 
According to legislation in the Federation i, companies with state (public) ownership 
can be privatised through “small” and (or) “large” privatisation. In order for the company 
to be privatised according to small privatisation, it has to have less than a  ,⁴⁴ 
(approx.  ,) initial value and less than  employees. Otherwise, the company 
is privatised within the large privatisation program. Th is is important to know, since, ac-
cording to these criteria, the majority of the media in i with state/public ownership be-
long to the small privatisation category.⁵⁰
According to the initial experience of privatisation, it seems that the greatest dilemma 
of the directors, editors, governing boards and the owners of such media is the decision on 
the percentage of state/public capital that should be privatised. It is not uncommon that 
founders/owners, such as cantonal of municipal governments, decide to keep the majority 
ownership. Th ere can be many reasons behind such a decision, but two immediately come 
to mind: the ﬁ rst possibility is that in such a way the owners try to ensure that the media 
outlet in question will have at least minimum ﬁ nancial security in diﬃ  cult times. Second-
ly, the decision to keep majority ownership can also be an attempt on the side of cantonal/
municipal authorities to keep at least some form of control over such media.⁵¹
Owing to the rather volatile media environment, privatisation has not made much 
progress even in . Th e delay in the privatisation of broadcasters was caused by the 
speciﬁ c situation in the broadcasting sector, where the process of issuing broadcasting li-
censes took place during the period from  to . Hence, according to the , the 
 previously made a temporary prohibition of the privatisation of small (municipal 
and cantonal) public broadcasters during the licensing period. With the completion of the 
process of awarding long-term licenses to broadcasters in , it has become clear that 
the privatisation of these enterprises is imminent. Nevertheless, even at the end of  
the  has not been approached by any potential buyer or owner of municipal (cantonal) 
broadcasters that are to be privatised. Th e process has reached a stand still.
4.2 MOST IMPORTANT CASES OF MEDIA PRIVATISATION
Th ere are three important cases of media privatisation in post-war i worth men-
tioning, and all three have been widely discussed in terms of their potential irregularities. 
Th ese are the privatisations of the daily papers Oslobođenje and Večernje novine, as well as 
the privatisation of the printing facility, . 
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4.2.1 PRIVATISATION OF DAILY VECˇERNJE NOVINE
Probably the most controversial case is that of Večernje novine. Th is daily paper was 
partially privatised even before the war, when some  percent of the ownership was sold 
to its workers. Nevertheless, after the war, owing to the increasing debt that reached some 
 , (approx.  ,),⁵² the paper was put out to tender and sold to the local 
printing company, Alden Print, on  May . Th e buyer paid  , (approx.  
,) in cash; the debt of the paper was also covered, and an additional  , 
(approx.  ,) has been invested in  equipment. Additionally, the new owner was 
obliged to keep all of the employees for the next three years, as well as to keep the same 
editorial policy for the paper.⁵³
Nevertheless, only six months after the purchase, Večernje novine had simply disap-
peared from the scene – shut down by its new owner – and on  November  a new 
daily paper, Jutarnje novine, was started, published by Alden Print. Th e next day, Alden 
Print asked the Agency for Privatisation for consensual termination of the contract on 
the purchase of Večernje novine. According to Alden Print, the reason for termination of 
the contract was that the new owner, during the process of purchase, did not know about 
some additional debt of Večernje novine towards the readers of that paper that amounted 
to some  . million (approx.  ,). Th e debt was incurred through the lottery 
game run by Večernje novine, which failed to pay the readers prizes won in the game.⁵⁴
Th e publishing company, Večernje novine, was returned to the Agency for Privatisation 
and liquidated, and the daily paper Večernje novine disappeared. A new paper, Jutarnje no-
vine, was established and is still published by Alden Print company. Alden print kept all 
former workers of Večernje novine. 
Th ere have been serious allegations in local media about this speciﬁ c case of privatisa-
tion that was widely seen as an example of how privatisation can be irregular. Alden Print 
and its owners, as well as the Privatisation Agency of i were accused of having set up 
the whole thing in order to enable Alden print to obtain all the workers and property of 
Večernje novine without having to pay anything. Nevertheless, no court proceedings have 
ever been initiated regarding this speciﬁ c case.⁵⁵
4.2.2 PRIVATISATION OF DAILY OSLOBOÐENJE
Th e second important case of privatisation is that of the Oslobođjenje daily paper. Ini-
tially, the paper was privatized on  April  by distributing shares among several of its 
employees. Th e largest individual stockholder was Temin Dedić, with a  percent own-
ership stake; he is the main distributor of Oslobođenje for the international market, who 
is based in Germany. Th e rest was distributed among the director of the company, Salko 
Hasanefendić and  small individual stock holders – employees.⁵⁶ Th e initial price for 
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the company was  . million (approx.  . million), and it was sold to its employ-
ees, who oﬀ ered a total of  . million (approx.  . million). Nevertheless, there 
was no second oﬀ er on the table whatsoever.
After that, on  January  a Slovenian investment group, Kmečka družba, bought 
an additional issue of stocks worth  . million (approx.  . million) and became 
the largest owner, with its ownership stake amounting to  percent, whereas the owner-
ship stake of the employees was reduced to less than  percent.⁵⁷ 
Oslobođenje was also in the focus of the public eye when its privatisation came un-
der scrutiny in early . Th e Oslobođenje management – the then Director Salko 
Hasanefendić and the leader of the privatisation team Emir Hrustanović – were accused 
and investigated on charges that they had misused their positions and power in the proc-
ess of privatisation of Oslobođenje. All charges were dropped in June  and the canton-
al prosecutor refrained from any further investigation.⁵⁸ 
4.2.3 PRIVATISATION OF THE PRINTING COMPANY OKO
And ﬁ nally, an important case was the privatisation of  percent of the state/public in-
terest in the  printing company that was bought on  November , through pub-
lic tender, by the Avaz publishing company. Th e price of the  printing company was 
 . million (approx.  . million). Avaz also made commitment to invest   
million (approx.   million) and to keep all  employees of the .⁵⁹
Th e only competitor to Avaz at this tender was the publishing company, Oslobođenje, 
that was excluded from the tender because of legal obstacles regarding the previous re-
lations between Oslobođenje and the . Th at is, the  has earlier brought charges 
against Oslobođenje for unpaid debt, which prevented Oslobođenje from participating in 
the tender.
Th is case of privatisation provoked a furious public debate, primarily fuelled by the texts 
about this tender published in the competing daily papers, Dnevni Avaz and Oslobođenje. 
It has been debated whether such an outcome of privatisation would place the Avaz pub-
lishing company in a monopoly position. It has been argued that Avaz will dominate the 
print media market by owning the biggest printing company and by publishing the strong-
est daily paper, Dnevni Avaz.⁶⁰. 
4.3 CONCERNS REGARDING MEDIA PRIVATISATION
Privatisation in the media sector was marked by scandals, judicial proceedings and con-
troversial developments. Th is has been proven by the cases of Oslobođenje, Večernje no-
vine and the  printing company. 
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Th ere are special concerns regarding the privatisation of cantonal and municipal radio 
and  stations. Although the process of issuing long-term licenses ended long ago, the 
moratorium put in place until the  licensing round was completed is still valid. It is ex-
pected that the moratorium will be lifted in the immediate future. Th e problem is that it 
is unclear what will happen. Th e cantons have diﬀ erent rules regarding ownership: under 
their present rules, some only allow  percent foreign ownership – others  percent and 
some  percent. Moreover, another great concern is that of transparency of the process 
of privatisation.⁶¹
 5 MEDIA INDEPENDENCE
“In comparison with countries in the region, i takes a good position as far as jour-
nalists’ freedoms are concerned. In the Reporters Without Frontiers Report for  i 
is ranked  in the world, above Spain and Italy and well ahead of its regional neighbors 
Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Serbia and Montenegro,” says Me-
dia Task Force report from November .⁶²
In spite of the generally positive situation with respect to media freedom in the country, 
the media and their journalists are quite vulnerable when dealing with pressure from their 
owners. Currently in i there is no collective agreement on the national or entity level be-
tween journalists’ associations and media publishers. It is only on the level of some individ-
ual media outlets that there are in-house agreements between journalists and publishers. 
Th ere is a large pressure potential from the owners’ side, in the circumstances where be-
ing a journalist means having a low salary and no social and health security, and where un-
employment is rather the rule than the exception. Under such conditions, the owner that 
pays salaries regularly can exercise signiﬁ cant pressure on the media staﬀ . Th e power of the 
owner rise proportionally with the ﬁ nancial dependence of his/her journalists and editors.
Th e conditions under which journalists work are bleak. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
. percent of the journalists working in the media have no contract whatsoever with 
their employers. Th e Independent Union of Professional Journalists conducted a research 
on the labor status of journalists. Out of  participating journalists,  percent were full 
time employees, while  percent work part-time. Journalists with contracts are predomi-
nantly employed in the public broadcasters. About half of the journalists are not paid reg-
ularly and do not have health insurance.⁶³
Th e regulatory provisions in media legislation that regulate editorial independence (from 
owners or publishers) can be primarily found in the information or media laws on cantonal 
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and entity levels. Nevertheless, these laws mostly state that these issues are to be regulated 
by collective and in-house agreements between journalists and publishers or owners.
 It is neither a common nor a frequent practice that journalist’ professional organisa-
tions or media self-regulatory bodies publicly expose problems of pressure on journalists 
and editors, based on the commercial interests of the owners. Th is does not mean that 
such pressures do not exist. Th e truth is that journalist’s professional organisations, self-
regulatory bodies and media watchdog organisations are simply not that eﬃ  cient in un-
covering and publicly exposing such cases. Th is is the direct consequence of the extreme 
fragmentation that exists in the ﬁ eld of professional associations of journalists. Th us, there 
are six existing journalists’ associations in i, and their work and mutual relationships 
are strongly shaped by the rather polarized and ethnically divided political scene, which 
makes any serious cooperation on a national level hardly possible. According to the Media 
Task Force report,⁶⁴ “there are no real media watchdog organisations in i, nor signs of 
such institutions being developed. Th ere is a trend towards increased media monitoring 
capacities, though. Diﬀ erent organisations as well as private companies developed possi-
bilities for monitoring content, editorial policy, brand, statistics and marketing.” 
6 CONCLUSIONS
Th e overall character of visible ownership patterns and regulation in i is character-
ized by several factors that shape the development of the media scene in general. Above 
all, the media market is extremely fragmented, with a large number of media outlets and 
characterized by a general lack of strong and established media companies that could at-
tempt to dominate the market. Nevertheless, one could say that the process of consolida-
tion has started, and some of its future shape can already be recognized, with Avaz having 
an important role in the print sector, followed by Nezavisne novine publishing company. 
In the  broadcasting sector, two networks are emerging as potential market leaders 
–  and Pink  – with Mreža Plus being the potential third player. Additionally,  
Hayat and  seem to have the necessary potential for further development into promi-
nent players in the sector. 
Th e media sector is still radically underdeveloped, owing to the limited advertising 
market and the generally inappropriately high number of the media competing for limited 
advertising revenues. As a result, no single domestic media outlet has reached a level at 
which it can attempt to dominate the speciﬁ c market segment. Moreover, the vast major-
ity of the media are still dependent on foreign donations and state subsidies. 
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Ineﬃ  cient legislative and regulatory mechanisms, as well as the strong administrative 
barriers to businesses, result in the general insecurity with respect to possible foreign in-
vestments in the media sector. Hence the lack of foreign media capital in the country. 
Taking all this into account, in early , there are no cases of signiﬁ cant media con-
centration and cross-ownership that would in any way pose a threat to the fair market 
competition and pluralism of the media scene in general. Th e  document Future of 
Broadcasting in i states that “one of the conclusions from the recently held Council of 
Europe and  Conference was that there are currently no major concentrations of the 
media in i.”⁶⁵ 
Nevertheless, there is a general ineﬃ  ciency of media legislation in the country, which 
makes me wonder about possible results of the forthcoming legislation on media owner-
ship and concentration. It seems that too much in the area of media ownership will depend 
on the still non-existent competition agencies and ineﬀ ective Competition Law, whereas 
the  will have a rather limited role in its implementation. By the time the whole system 
becomes eﬃ  cient, so many things could have happened in the media sector that it might 
even be too late. Unfortunately, all we can do now is to wait and see. 
porocilo.indb   28 22.5.2004, 13:46:04
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 89
 BAGDIKIAN, BEN H. Th e Media Monopoly, Boston: Bea-
con Press, .
 BARENDT, ERIC. Broadcasting Law. A Comparative 
Study, Oxford: Clarendon Press, .
 BAŠIC´-HRVATIN, SANDRA, KUCˇIC´ , LENART. Slovenia: Mo-
nopoly – a social game of trading in media shares, Me-
dia Watch Journal , Ljubljana: Peace Institute, . 
 CRA. Th e Future of Broadcasting in i, Communications 
Regulatory Agency,  March . <http://www.cra.ba/
en/broadcast/reports/default.aspx?cid=> (acessed 
on  December ).
 CRNKOVICˇ , MARKO. What Slovenes Want to Achieve by 
Purchasing Sarajevo’s Oslobodjenje: Gantar’s Sanitary 
Commandos or Cadez Defends Sarajevo, Media On-
line , <http://www.mediaonline.ba>.
 EC, Report from the Commission to the Council on 
the preparedness of Bosnia and Herzegovina to nego-
tiate a Stabilization and Association Agreement with 
the European Union, Commission of the European 
Communities, Brussels,  November . 
 GABRIC´  ROZVITA. Zakoni i podzakonski akti koji se odnose 
na privatizaciju i medije, Irex ProMedia Sarajevo, Bos-
nia and Herzegovina, (Unpublished document).
 HENDERSON, GWYNETH, JASNA KILALIC´ , BORO KONTIC´ . 
Th e Media Environment in Bosnia Herzegovina: An 
Assessment for the  Mission in i, unpublished 
report, January . 
 IREX PROMEDIA SARAJEVO. Tender kao metod proda-
je u programu male privatizacije – Namijenjeno za 
pripremu prijedloga metoda privatizacije kao elemen-
ta programa privatizacije preduzeća,  May .
 JUSIC´  TARIK, BORO KONTIC´ , MEHMED HALILOVIC´ , SAM-
RA LUCˇKIN AND ZINAIDA BABOVIC´  (ed.). Th e Challenge 
of Change: Media in Bosnia-Herzegovina –, 
Media Working Group for Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
.
 JUSIC´ , TARIK. Natjecanje za oglašivače: Implikacije za-
kona o javnom  sustavu na komercijalni  sektor 
u Bosni i Hercegovini, Medijska istraživanja, vol. , 
no. , Zagreb, .
 KRIVIC, MATEVŽ, All that Glitters is not Gold – Critical 
Remarks on the Freedom of Information Act, Media 
Online Selections, Media Plan Institute, Sarajevo, no. 
, October , pp –.
 KURSPAHIC´ , KEMAL. Zločin u devetnaest i trideset: 
Balkanski mediji u ratu i miru, Mediacentar Sarajevo 
and , Sarajevo, . 
 MEDIA TASK FORCE. Media in South Eastern Europe: Leg-
islation, Professionalism and Associations, Media Task 
Force, Amsterdam – Netherlands, November . 
 MEKIC´ , DRAGIŠA. Assistant Minister, Ministry of For-
eign Trade and Economic Relations, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina () - Seminar on the Promotion of For-
eign Direct Investment to Southeastern Europe,  No-
vember , Tokyo,  Ministry of Foreign Aﬀ airs 
of Japan, Th e Japan Institute of International Aﬀ airs, 
web site: <http://www.jiia.or.jp/pdf/russia_centre/_
invest/add_a.pdf>, (accessed on  January ).
 MIB – Mareco Index Bosnia .  Media Market 
Monitor, Mareco Index Bosnia, Sarajevo.
 PERUŠKO, ZRINJKA. Medijska koncentracija: Izazov 
pluralizma medija u Srednjoj i Istočnoj Europi, Medi-
jska istraživanja, vol. , no. , Zagreb, .
 UDOVICˇ IC´ , RADENKO. What is happening With the Old-
est Bosnian-Herzegovinian Daily: Oslobodjenje to be 
Sold for . Million Marks, Media Online , <http:
//www.mediaonline.ba>.
 UDOVICˇ IC´ , RADENKO. Th e End of the Highest Priced 
Media Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Dossi-
er: Th e Case of , Media Online , <http://
www.mediaonline.ba>.
SOURCES
porocilo.indb   29 22.5.2004, 13:46:04
 90 MEDIA OWNERSHIP AND ITS IMPACT ON MEDIA INDEPENDENCE AND PLURALISM
 Bosnia and Herzegovina is a unique country in terms 
of its administrative and political organization: it con-
sists of two entities – the Federation of i and the 
Republika Srpska – which have a strong level of inde-
pendence and autonomy, whereas the state of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina has rather limited powers in com-
parison to those of the two entities. Moreover, the en-
tity of the Federation of i consists of ten cantons, 
each having its own administrative structure and gov-
ernment. And ﬁ nally, there is also a District of Brčko 
that functions as an almost autonomous unit, belong-
ing to neither of the two entities.
 Th e Dayton Peace Accord was initialled in Dayton 
on  November and signed in Paris on  December 
, eﬀ ectively stopping the war that had devastat-
ed the country since . Th e Dayton Peace Accord 
granted broad powers to the Oﬃ  ce of High Represent-
ative for i () which has a mandate to impose 
laws and intervene in any sphere of political and eco-
nomic life of the country, including the media, in order 
to ensure implementation of the peace agreement. 
 Th e war that lasted from early  until December 
 left the country in shambles, with a devastated 
economy and a destroyed society at its core. Approxi-
mately , people were killed, a million displaced 
within the country, and another million refugees scat-
tered throughout the world. Th e consequence of the 
war, apart from human tragedy, was the almost to-
tal destruction of industrial production capacities, so 
that the production level was reduced to a mere  per-
cent of the  level, and the unemployment rate in 
the same regions reached  percent in . 
 I will not deal here with these features in detail, because 
of the limitations in available space for writing this text. 
 See Henderson, Gwyneth, Jasna Kilalić, Boro Kontić. 
Th e Media Environment in Bosnia Herzegovina: An 
Assessment for the  Mission in i, unpublished 
report, January , p. . 
 Ibid, p. .
 See McCann Erikson /. In Henderson, Gwyneth, 
Jasna Kilalić, Boro Kontić, Th e Media Environment in 
Bosnia Herzegovina: An Assessment for the  Mis-
sion in i, unpublished report, January , p. .
 See Henderson, Gwyneth, Jasna Kilalić, Boro Kontić, 
Th e Media Environment in Bosnia Herzegovina: An 
Assessment for the  Mission in i, unpublished 
report, January , p. . Also see Jusic, Tarik, Natje-
canje za oglašivače: Implikacije zakona o javnom  
sustavu na komercijalni  sektor u Bosni i Herce-
govini, Medijska istraživanja, vol. , no. , Zagreb, 
Croatia, .
 In the initial phase of international intervention, regu-
lation of broadcasting was split between two agencies 
– the Telecommunications Regulatory Agency (), 
responsible for telecommunications and frequency 
management, and the Independent Media Commis-
sion (), responsible for the licensing of radio and 
television stations, program monitoring and standard 
setting in terms of establishing codes of practice. Th e 
two agencies were merged in March  by the de-
cision of the High Representative, creating the Com-
munication Regulatory Authority (). Th e  is 
an independent regulatory authority, but concerns 
have been raised whether it will be able to remain so 
owing to the ﬁ nancial pressures faced it ever since it 
went from the  straight under the supervision of 
the Council of Ministers of i. “Unfortunately (...) 
the agency is about to face severe political interfer-
ence due to new budget decisions which make the 
 dependent on decisions of i Council of Min-
isters. Th e  is currently ﬁ nanced from the tech-
nical license fees; hence, it does not spend or relies 
upon State budget allocations. Th e budget set-up of 
the , as it stands, is open to political interference, 
which is against -standards (note the Council of 
Europe’s Recommendation in ). Th e  Budget 
for  was cut by the Council of Ministers. Th ere 
are suﬃ  cient funds on the  account; however, the 
 is not able to use them, due to Council of Min-
isters reduction of budget” (taken from Media Task 
Force -, also see Henderson et al., , pp. –). 
Th e  powers are derived from the decisions of the 
Oﬃ  ce of High Representative as well as from the Law 
on Communications of i. Th e Broadcast Division 
of the  is responsible for the licensing and regu-
lation of the broadcasting sector through the follow-
ing activities: Issuing broadcasting licenses; Setting 
regulations for broadcasters, treating such issues as 
advertising, Program content, and ownership; Apply-
ing and enforcing rules; Monitoring compliance with 
the Rules and Regulations; Acting to prevent illegal 
broadcast operations; Protecting copyrights.
NOTES
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  was a  station under full control of Croat 
nationalist hard-liners and the ruling  party (Hr-
vatska Demokratska Zajednica – Croatian Democrat-
ic Community) that was closed down by order of the 
 (Independent Media Commission) – the prede-
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1 INTRODUCTION
A string of paradoxes. Perhaps that is how the development of the Bulgarian media 
market in the last  years could be described. Th e monopoly positions of the state me-
dia were replaced by the domination of several private media groups. Th e development 
of the country and the market in the last  years “produced” a distinctive media sector. 
Th e publications of the German group Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung () continue 
to have the largest circulations. Bulgaria appears to be the only country in Europe where 
the media tycoon Rupert Murdoch has acquired ownership of a terrestrial  station - the 
ﬁ rst private national channel b. An  media group invested in the only radio network, 
broadcasting exclusively Bulgarian music. Th e political party papers have slowly disap-
peared. Th e Bulgarian editions of magazines such as Playboy, Auto Bild etc. emerged ten 
years after the beginning of the social transition. Th e relatively small amount of advertis-
ing revenue, which is distributed unequally among the media outlets, has generated a new 
kind of dependence among the media – economic dependence.
Petar Emilov Stefanov is a Rom. He is the executive director, the manager and a report-
er at Roma . Th e  station is owned by his father’s company – Nastya--Emil Ste-
fanov sole trader. Th is cable  station is popular because it is the only Roma  station 
in Bulgaria. Th e story about the  station started with a family camera and video player 
which were used by the Stefanov family and their neighbours to watch recorded weddings 
of their friends. Nowadays, the  station oﬀ ers news and even sells reports to the nation-
al broadcaster . “We’ve owned a bakery since , and we used to pour the money 
here, into the  station,” was Petar Stefanov’s explanation of the source of ﬁ nancing for 
his television station.¹
Th e Roma  story is just one example of the incredible ways in which some of the me-
dia in Bulgaria are sustained; it is an instance of how odd a media set up and development 
could be. However, it is not always easy to identify the sources of ﬁ nancing or the owners 
of the Bulgarian media. “Th ere is no transparency of media capital whatsoever and one 
never knows what the real situation is, so one cannot hope to apply any fair regulation in 
this ﬁ eld. You don’t know what you regulate. It is concealed. Th e introduction of the Ac-
cess to Information Act, which, in my opinion, is a binding piece of legislation, represent-
ed an attempt at bringing the media to supply information about the sources of funds. Be-
cause, if you set up a media outlet and sell a product which is directly related to freedom 
of speech, it is normal to be able to track the business from the very beginning, that is, to 
track the genealogy of the message in the business sense.” Th is is a remark made by Associ-
ate Professor Georgi Lozanov, a former member of the Council for Electronic Media.² 
porocilo.indb   2 22.5.2004, 13:46:05
BULGARIA 95
In fact, the lack of clarity regarding the source of capital sustaining the Bulgarian broad-
cast media prevents one from identifying on whom media are dependent or whose inter-
ests are involved, the two issues that signiﬁ cantly inﬂ uence their editorial policies. Th e 
French philosopher Albert Camus described the ideal conditions for the existence of an 
independent media: “Free press exists when it is dependent neither on the power of rulers, 
nor on the power of money.” Th is ideal situation, however, is utopia for Bulgaria – the  
years old media market in Bulgaria could be described as a combination of both kinds of 
dependence: dependence on the politicians in power, and on the power of money. 
2 LEGAL ENVIRONMENT 
Usually it is the legislation that provides the basic rules that ensure the clarity of media 
ownership. In Bulgaria, the only explicit restrictions on ownership are laid down by the 
Law on Radio and Television. In this frequently amended law, which was adopted in  
and which still regulates the operation of Bulgarian broadcasters, the restrictions on own-
ership pertain to applicants for broadcast licenses or those requesting the registration of 
a cable programme. 
According to this Law, the owner of a broadcast medium may be a legal person regis-
tered in Bulgaria exclusively. Several provisions are aimed at protecting the media space 
from the entry of dubious capital. Under Article , ineligible license applicants are “legal 
persons to which an authorisation has been refused or withdrawn for the conduct of in-
surance operations, by virtue of paragraph a of the Law on Insurance” and legal persons 
in which these legal persons or their members or shareholders have interests. Th is pro-
vision is the result of a speciﬁ c feature of the Bulgarian market, where certain insurance 
companies evolved out of structures related to the previous regime (so-called “business 
for security services”), and its aim is to prevent these businesses from entering the me-
dia market. According to another provision that has been introduced for similar reasons, 
also excluded from the category of eligible applicants are legal persons in which there 
are members or shareholders who are also members or shareholders of legal persons in-
volved in security services or carrying on security services. In order to be able to under-
stand this provision, one should know that, following the initial accumulation of capital 
through criminal rackets, the so-called Bulgarian power groups, legalised part of their il-
legal business. So, the idea behind the legislation was to protect the media environment 
from the inﬂ ux of such capital and prevent exploitation of the media for money launder-
ing purposes. However, owing to a weak market unable to sustain the licensed broadcast 
porocilo.indb   3 22.5.2004, 13:46:05
 96 MEDIA OWNERSHIP AND ITS IMPACT ON MEDIA INDEPENDENCE AND PLURALISM
and print media, the opportunities for the entry of suspicious capital into the media space 
have recently increased. 
Other legal persons excluded from the category of eligible applicants for a broadcast li-
cense are as follows: natural persons or companies that are unable to produce evidence of 
ownership of their property or of capital in accordance with the Law on Measures Against 
Money Laundering; legal persons whose members or shareholders are persons included in 
the list under Section , subsection  of the Law on Information Concerning Non-serviced 
Credits (to put it diﬀ erently, the legislator has decided that “credit millionaires” should 
not be allowed to become radio and  stations owners.); telecommunications operators 
placed in a monopoly situation on the market (i.e. the state telecommunications company 
Bulgarian Telecommunications Company (), whose resources are used by all opera-
tors for broadcasting their programmes (in Bulgaria such an organisation is Bulgarian Tel-
ecommunications Company – , a state-run telecommunications company renting re-
sources to all broadcasters.); and advertising agencies or companies including partners or 
shareholders who have interests in other advertising agencies (this provision was included 
to prevent owners of advertising and media agencies from cultivating media ownership 
because this could aﬀ ect the advertising market). However, legal persons who were re-
fused a broadcasting license or registration, or whose license was revoked during the year 
preceding the application, are eligible to apply for the license.
Observing those provisions is important because anyone not complying with these 
conditions cannot be a licensed operator, and also a license could be taken away if irreg-
ularities are found. When applying for a license, a declaration should be submitted with 
an account of the current legal situation, which shows who the owners are and what their 
shares are, including documents stating the origin of the capital for the last three years. In 
addition, the application documentation must include a list of media enterprises in which 
the persons are shareholders or partners. 
If the license is transferred, the new owner should meet the same requirements. Any li-
censed operator should strictly observe these conditions, because a license can be revoked 
if any irregularities in this respect are established at a later stage. Th e Radio and Television 
Act also includes a description of the conditions under which a license may be revoked. 
Th is represents a powerful instrument that can be enforced when gross violations of the 
principles of radio and television activity are discovered. 
Licenses are awarded through a competitive procedure which, according to the Radio 
and Television Act, is initiated when interest is expressed by any person concerned, and 
there are frequencies available for the requested license. However, since August  the 
process of licensing in Bulgaria has been blocked by amendments adopted by the ruling 
coalition National Movement Simeon  () – Movement for Rights and Freedoms 
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(). Th e Radio and Television Act has been amended with a provision that binds the 
Council for Electronic Media () and the Communications Regulation Commission 
() to elaborate a strategy for the development of radio and  activity. On the whole, it 
could be said that the intention was positive – i.e. to “examine” the market and set priori-
ties deﬁ ning whether and when new national broadcasters should be licensed, and wheth-
er local and regional radio and television stations should be licensed ﬁ rst. But it should be 
noted that the initiative was provoked by the unwillingness of the ruling parties to allow 
the  to grant licenses, because it has turned out that its ﬁ ve members appointed from 
the parliamentary quota (the other four  members are appointed by the head of state) 
have been under the inﬂ uence of private lobbies. Th e strategy was written within the dead-
line, but the paper’s status has remained “pending” in Parliament for almost a year. Th ere-
fore, the last licenses were actually awarded in the spring of . 
2.1 LIMITATIONS OF THE LEGISLATION
Th e Radio and Television Act of  was elaborated with the purpose of regulating, or 
rather establishing, a market of broadcast media, which until then had functioned only on 
the basis of various kinds of permissions awarded by a variety of governmental bodies. Five 
years later, the media market is in need of additional provisions that would regulate media 
concentration. In addition, the role of antitrust legislation should be boosted as well. 
Th e current law regulating the broadcast media ﬁ eld includes restrictions on cross-
ownership, pertaining only to national broadcasters. According to this law, licenses may 
not be awarded to legal persons, or persons related to legal persons which already possess 
licenses for local radio or television stations, unless they discontinue the local radio or tel-
evision activity. Th is amendment was introduced after detecting cases of local operators 
acquiring licenses for national broadcasting. Th e provision also stipulates that national 
operators are not allowed to become owners of local and regional stations. Th e Radio and 
 Act further includes a provision that requires applicants to declare that they do not 
hold stakes, shares or other rights of participation in radio and television broadcasters 
above the threshold set by the anti-trust legislation.
Similar provisions are found in the Telecommunications Act. However, the Commu-
nications Regulation Commission (), which monitors its implementation, has only a 
complementary role, because it issues telecommunications licenses to operators already 
holding a broadcast license (also referred to as a “program license”) issued by . It 
should be noted that under Bulgarian law, broadcasters are required to obtain two types of 
licence: broadcast licences and telecommunications licences. Th e Radio and Television Act 
regulates the procedure for the former and the Telecommunications Act for the latter. 
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Anti-trust provisions were not included in the new draft law on broadcast media debat-
ed at the beginning of . So far, anti-trust requirements have been included only in the 
Protection of Competition Act (), which was adopted in  and last amended at the 
beginning of . According to , a company having a dominant position on the mar-
ket is one that has more than a  percent share of the relevant market in its geographic and 
product area. However, the law imposes sanctions (ﬁ nes range from , to , leva 
i.e.  , to , ) for companies that abuse their dominant position. In the context 
of the Bulgarian legislation, “a monopoly position may be authorised by law only where 
such a position is authorised to the state in accordance with Article , paragraph () of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria.”³ Th e anti-trust law regulates some issues related 
to the concentration of business activity, i.e. monitors mergers and joint market power (e.g. 
joint distribution). Th e Competition Protection Commission () is the body responsible 
for enforcing the law. Its current members were appointed at the end of .
Th e Trade Act determines the general terms of the establishment of sole traders, joint-
stock companies (or public limited companies) as well as limited companies. 
Practice has proved that media ownership may be concealed. Usually, real owners hide 
themselves using the bearer shares in the company (as an alternative to registered shares). 
Furthermore, changes in share structure are not always reﬂ ected in the company’s legal 
ﬁ le, which is a publicly accessible document at the Company Department of the City and 
District Court oﬃ  ces, but they are usually noted only in the shareholders’ book. Another 
channel that is used to acquire shares or property appears to be oﬀ -shore companies, be-
cause there are no special requirements in this case. Until now, only one public tender in-
cluded a clearly stated condition that oﬀ -shore companies were not eligible to apply – that 
was the  tender for licensing the ﬁ rst digital  for the Soﬁ a region. Th e Bulgarian 
Telecommunications Company (), still a state-run telecommunications body, won that 
tender, and digital television will be launched in . 
3 ADVERTISING MARKET 
Advertising is a factor that media cannot aﬀ ord to ignore, unless they are sustained by 
other money sources provided by their owners. Th e Bulgarian advertising market is often 
deﬁ ned as a small one, although market data show growth year by year. In practice, precise 
data on advertising expenditures are not available, because information available to the 
public comes only from the market monitoring activities performed by several marketing 
agencies. However, they usually show aggregate revenues for the  market (taking into 
account only nine channels) and for the print media (again not all newspapers and maga-
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zines are included, but only major ones – about  publications). Moreover, these rev-
enue ﬁ gures are calculated on the basis of broadcast or published ads without taking into 
account discounts, commission fees, barters etc. Th erefore, the data should be taken with 
reservations as, according to some analysts, they are inﬂ ated by approximately  per-
cent.⁴ Information about radio advertisements, outdoor, cinema and Internet advertising 
is not available. Another factor that signiﬁ cantly inﬂ uences the advertising market is the 
dominance of a group of companies gathered around the owner of the one of the ﬁ rst ad-
vertising agencies in Bulgaria (Kres Agency) – Krasimir Gergov. During the time when the 
state  (Bulgarian National Television – ) used to be the only market player on the 
national scale, Krasimir Gergov had got hold of  advertising through a series of agree-
ments disadvantageous for .
A look at advertising revenue distribution reveals an interesting piece of information: 
almost two thirds of the total revenue is concentrated in the hands of three national  
stations and a couple of the stronger cable operators. Th e identical situation exists in the 
radio market, where the majority of the advertising revenue is distributed among the radio 
stations with leading audience shares. On the print media market, it is  publications 
that collect the greatest portion of advertising revenues, and have much higher proﬁ ts 
than the competitive newspapers. Th is is mostly due to their common advertising policy. 
Given such disproportionate distribution of advertising revenue, one wonders what kind 
of compromise other media have to make in order to survive, knowing that, apart from a 
few dailies that disappeared over time and the usual ﬂ uctuation in the entertainment print 
media segment, not one broadcast company has yet ﬁ led for bankruptcy. 
Table  ADVERTISING EXPENDITURES IN PRINT MEDIA AND TV (in *)
YEAR PRINT** TV TOTAL***
1998 12,305,882 23,054,731 35,360,613
1999 20,174,448 33,657,800 53,832,248
2000 27,243,478 57,433,248 84,676,726
2001 38,866,496 91,939,641 130,806,137
2002 42,624,040 114,481,329 157,105,369
2003 43,408,205 133,610,256 177,018,461
Source: / Plan advertising monitoring.
Note: *  = . leva.
** Newspapers and magazines.
*** Data are without discounts and special reductions for agencies. 
Th e advertising specialists estimate the net budget for print and  at ,,  in .
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4 MEDIA LANDSCAPE
If the advertising market is assessed as “small,” then the radio and  markets are usually 
considered “overcrowded.” Th e Bulgarian  market has quite a peculiar structure deter-
mined by the late licensing (in ) of the ﬁ rst private television broadcasting on the na-
tional level i.e. , which appears to be a commercial operator including some elements 
of a public service. Th is peculiar feature is a consequence of a decision made by the former 
broadcasting council. Under the assumption that Bulgarian National Television (), 
the national public broadcaster, could not oﬀ er pure public service, it imposed such func-
tions on . On the other hand, the public broadcaster  acts like a commercial op-
erator because it is entitled to sell advertising time, although with some restrictions. 
In , Bulgaria witnessed the raging of the so-called television wars, provoked by the 
peoplemeter survey data on television audience shares (provided by the / Plan agen-
cy). Nova  (the second national private television station) and  claimed that the 
survey ﬁ ndings were distorted in favour of . Th e battle began at the end of , when 
 management appealed to the Competition Protection Commission, stating that , 
secured for itself the dominant position on the advertising market and abused it by oﬀ ering 
advertising options that could be described as unfair competition. After examining ’s 
claims and its competitor’s statements, the  decided that the law had not been violated. 
However,  appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court (), so at the end of  
the case was returned to the  for reconsideration. 
According to  data, currently there are over  radio stations,  national  sta-
tions,  local and regional  stations and over  cable channels in Bulgaria. 
How can we identify the largest media outlets on the market? One approach could be 
the examination of their revenue ﬁ gures (see Table ). Another way is by establishing the 
broadcast media audience shares and the circulation of the newspapers and magazines. 
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Table  BULGARIA’S TOP TEN MEDIA COMPANIES BY ANNUAL REVENUE IN 2001 AND 2002 (in *)
COMPANY ANNUAL REVENUE 
2001
ANNUAL REVENUE 
2002
BALKAN NEWS CORPORATION 19,379,540
MEDIA HOLDING (WAZ) 28,303,325
168 HOURS (WAZ) 16,459,847
MONITOR 1,966,240 4,971,356
NOVA TV – FIRST PRIVATE TV STATION 3,844,501 4,693,095
MEDIA MAGAZINE PUBLISHING HOUSE (WAZ) 3,158,568 3,880,307
STANDART NEWS 3,087,468 3,181,586
DARIK RADIO 2,100,256 2,720,716
AGENCY FOR INVESTMENT INFORMATION (AII) 2,340,665 2,553,453
SEGA 1,536,573 1,553,964
Source: Companies’ annual balance.
Note: *   = . leva.
5 MEDIA PRIVATISATION 
Th e licensing of the ﬁ rst private national  station, b, in  could be considered a 
privatisation deal, although it was not carried out by the Privatisation Agency but accord-
ing to procedures falling within the Radio and  Act and the Telecommunications Act. 
Th e launching of this private channel could be considered a privatisation deal because the 
frequency belonging to the state second television channel, Eﬁ r , was oﬀ ered to b. It 
was diﬀ erent from other privatisation cases in that the owner of this private station did 
not have to pay for the frequency, apart from the initial license fee and annual fees for the 
use of the frequency. 
Th is ﬁ rst private national  station obtained its license through a competitive proce-
dure which comprised two stages. Th e competition attracted the attention of some major 
media corporations – News Corporation, Scandinavian Broadcasting Systems (), Mod-
ern Times Group (), and Central European Media Enterprises (). After review-
ing the programme concepts, the broadcasting council of the time shortlisted the Balkan 
News Corporation (),   (with  participation) and the Media Broadcasting 
Services (a consortium of , Zodiak  and a company with Iranian capital, LogicIn-
vest). Th e ﬁ nal selection was made by the commission set up according to Article  of the 
Telecommunications Act, which used to be appointed by the Prime Minister. Its decision 
had to be approved by the Prime Minister, and after that the Telecommunications Com-
mission could issue a telecommunications license. Th e winner of the competition was the 
Balkan News Corporation (), which pledged an investment of   million.
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Although the procedure comprised a number of steps, it could not avoid raising doubts 
that decisions were inﬂ uenced by politics, nor could it escape criticism of the legal set-up 
of a procedure that actually allowed the Prime Minister to exert inﬂ uence. 
At the beginning of the procedure, it was not clear who was behind the  in the com-
petition. Later  announced that its owner was Rupert Murdoch’s company, News Cor-
poration. During this period it was impossible to check the company legal ﬁ le because 
of the process of legal registration ( had been registered as lawyers’ property, or to 
put it diﬀ erently, the shareholders are lawyers. In Bulgaria it is usual that a foreign com-
pany which is interested in the Bulgarian market or wants to invest in Bulgaria hires law-
yers. So they prepare the documents and “create” a company.). Th e ’s links with News 
Corporation ﬁ rst became evident during the visit of the News Corporation’s Vice Presi-
dent, Martin Pompadour, who came to Bulgaria to present the programming concept of 
the . In a comment for the Capital weekly,⁵ Mr Pompadour noted that after they had 
learned about the competition, he and News Corporation’s Chairman Rupert Murdoch 
sent a letter to the Prime Minister expressing their interest. Even later, during subsequent 
visits to Bulgaria, Martin Pompadour is known to have met the Prime Minister. Addition-
ally, the ﬁ rst managing board of the  included the former spokesperson for the Prime 
Minister, Stoyana Georgieva, and Nelly Ognianova, who was the author of the media law 
adopted at the time when the  party was in power. Th e doubts related to the owner-
ship and the partnerships between the  and Murdoch’s company were provoked by the 
presentation of the television station managers – the Bulgarian television station manager 
and the advertising director came from companies related to Krasimir Gergov, a business-
man involved in advertising. 
6 BROADCAST MEDIA MARKET
6.1 TELEVISION MARKET – WHO OWNS BTV?
A few months after b was licensed, the question of its ownership became the issue 
of the day. Th e Telecommunications Commission Chairman at that time, Veselin Stoykov, 
requested approval from several institutions in order to allow a change in the ownership 
of the Balkan News Corporation () that held licenses for a national program and fre-
quency. It then became clear that a  percent owner of the  had been News Bulgaria 
Inc., registered in the  State of Delaware, a state oﬀ ering tax concessions. 
Th e request by Stoykov referred to the transfer of News Bulgaria’s property in  to 
another company registered in Delaware – News Bulgarian Television . Th e remain-
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ing  percent of  used to belong to Martin Pompadour, but he subsequently sold it and 
 has continued to be the sole property of News Bulgaria Inc. 
It was in the  annual report of News Corporation that the Balkan News Corpo-
ration () was ﬁ rst listed as a company owned by News Corporation. Th e News Cor-
poration’s annual reports for the last two years revealed that the channel had developed 
successfully, and in  it had managed to double its proﬁ ts to  million leva ( 
,,). According to the  revenue data, the national  station even left behind 
 companies with the largest circulation daily in the country. Th e advertising revenue 
(shown under the title “sales of services”) amounted to ,, leva ( ,,), 
which represented growth of over  percent. 
“I cannot imagine us investing in newspapers. We own newspaper business in Aus-
tralia,  and a daily in , but outside the English-speaking world we would really feel 
uncomfortable in press business. In many countries newspapers have political aﬃ  liations, 
but we always insist on  percent independence, and such will be the situation with the 
 channel in your country too,” remarked Vice President Martin Pompadour of the News 
Corporation for Capital weekly just after acquiring the  license.⁶ Th e inﬂ uence of the 
advertising boss Krasimir Gergov still remains controversial; oﬃ  cially, he is presented as a 
consultant to b executive director Albert Parsons. 
b licensing suggested that the state monopoly on the  market was replaced by a mo-
nopoly of the private company. Th erefore, the tender for the licensing of a second national 
television station followed only six months after b obtained its license. Th e reasoning 
behind the decision to launch a competition to license another national service within such 
a short time has never been clariﬁ ed. In view of economic development and competition, 
the decision appeared to be rather favourable for the media market development. 
Most of the applicants in the ﬁ rst competition applied again. One company that was not 
among the applicants was , but its explanation for its absence was ambigious. Th e com-
petition was won by Bulgarian company “Nova Television – First private  station.” 
Nova  is the ﬁ rst private  station in Bulgaria, that broadcasted only in Soﬁ a and the 
Soﬁ a region. Nova  was established in  by a Serbian, Darko Taminjić, but the struc-
ture of ownership was unclear due to the bearer shares. Th e Broadcasting Council’s oﬃ  -
cial explanation of the reason that led it to make Nova  drop out of the ﬁ rst competition 
at its ﬁ rst stage was related to its ambiguous ownership. Soon after the ﬁ rst competition 
started, Nova  was mentioned in the media in relation to the murder of Lyubomir Pe-
nev, whose name was present in the company registration as  and who was described 
in the press as Taminjić’s friend.
In , the Greek company, Antenna Group (through its media company Antenna ) 
bought two media outlets – Nova  (holder of a local license for the Soﬁ a region) and Ex-
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press Radio, reportedly for the amount of  . million.⁷ Th e Greeks announced the deal 
as the ﬁ rst step in their strategy for the neighbouring Balkan countries.
Th e scandal that broke after the competition for the second national television frequen-
cy was related to the fact that the media council listed the consortium Media Broadcasting 
Services in the ﬁ rst position but the commission, that made the ﬁ nal selection for the li-
cense, rated Nova  ﬁ rst. Immediately after the end of the selection procedure, the other 
candidates – Mef Holding and Media Broadcasting Services appealed to the Supreme Ad-
ministrative Court (). Th e legal proceeding went through two  sessions and con-
cluded in the summer of  with the revocation of Nova ’s license. Th e  decided 
that the competition procedure was not suﬃ  ciently transparent and clear. After this deci-
sion Nova  lost the frequency license, but kept the program license for national televi-
sion programming. In the summer of , Nova  received a national license after an-
other trial at the . 
Now there are three national  channels in Bulgaria.. Beside b and Nova  there is 
also the state owned Bulgarian National  ().  still has a strong market posi-
tion; for instance, its news at eight has the biggest audience share. In addition, during the 
last few years  has produced or purchased several commercial programs and series 
strengthening its competitive position with regard to private channels. At the same time 
there is in the state budget for  an amount of  million leva ( ,,)⁸ pro-
vided as a subsidy to . Although  is subject to legal restrictions (speciﬁ ed in the 
Radio and  Act) and can sell only  minutes of advertising time daily, the station is the 
third biggest player (after b and Nova ) on the advertising market. In , accord-
ing to the data of the Marketing Department, the advertising income of  was around 
 million leva ( ,,). 
6.2 RADIO MARKET 
Th e development of the Bulgarian radio market has been quite diﬀ erent and more dy-
namic because it started in . Currently, there are  local radio stations in Soﬁ a ( 
radio stations in Bulgaria altogether). Th e ﬁ rst national private radio – Darik Radio, was 
awarded a national license in . Th ere were only two applicants in the competitive pro-
cedure. In order to get a national frequency, Darik Radio had to give up its previously held 
local frequencies (this requirement has been included as an amendment to the media law). 
Th e provision in the law restricts Darik owners’ investments in other operators. 
Th ere are three stations considered to be aﬃ  liated with the Darik Radio group, because 
among their shareholders is a company owned by a former associate of Darik, Ivaylo Stae-
vski. He quit the radio to become a co-owner of Retro Radio and Tangra Radio, which has 
been transformed into the sports Radio Gong with a programme managed by the Darik 
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sports editor. His company ( .) has shares in the sports cable  station Ring Plus, 
too. Darik’s owner Radosvet Radev has frequently expressed in public his dissatisfaction 
with the media law restrictions, which prohibit radio owners from acquiring property in 
other stations. 
Some big radio networks, such as  Plus, Fresh, Inforadio, and  Radio, have been cre-
ated in the process of licensing. In practice, it has turned out that it is much more cost eﬀ ec-
tive to collect local licenses covering major cities (for which you pay lower fees), because this 
ensures a considerable percentage of the city audience which is the target of advertisers. 
Radio networks can successfully compete with a national radio station. Th e consolida-
tion of the radio market in Bulgaria started in  and continued in  with a greater 
number of deals. Th e former  member, Associate Professor Georgi Lozanov, deﬁ nes 
this process of big networks taking over the smaller stations as “concealed bankruptcy.”⁹ 
Some of the networks tend to ﬁ ll in their frequency gaps in some cities by purchas-
ing the shares of local operators, which are holders of similar radio format licenses, and 
by agreeing to have their programming, and possibly their radio network brand, copied. 
Such an act increases their audience and the scale of opportunities available to advertis-
ers. Apart from buying shares, agreements called “station management” contracts have 
also become a popular way of legitimising the ﬁ nancing of a radio station – by a business 
group or another station (for example, in Soﬁ a Viva Radio was taken over by such a con-
tract from the owners of a chain of luxury restaurants and night clubs). Since most of the 
stations employ music formats, it seems to be diﬃ  cult to obtain funds for their survival by 
serving some particular interest (i.e. sacriﬁ cing independence for money). 
6.2.1 RADIO GROUPS
A large radio group has been formed around the ﬁ rst private radio station in Bulgaria 
–  Plus. Th e station was started in  and currently broadcasts in  cities. Th e British 
 Group owns  percent of  Plus. Th e latter also acquired shares in Fresh radio, but 
for the record, both radio stations prefer to call it a partnership. At the end of , the 
owners of  Plus and Fresh bought shares in another station – Mila, which represented 
the beginning of a third network.¹⁰
Th e Bulgarian company Metroradio,¹¹ holding licenses for  Radio and Radio One, 
also started a third radio station Nova in early December . Metroradio is owned by 
the  Metromedia Group (Metromedia International Telecommunications). In Bulgaria 
it has invested in a radio format that has turned out to be very successful – it broadcasts 
exclusively Bulgarian music. Hristo Grozev, President of the Metromedia International 
Telecommunications, explained their approach by saying: “Our  Radio project was 
started in  simultaneously with a project in Finland, but the return on investment ap-
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peared to be quicker in Bulgaria. Th is relates to the lower costs here, the higher copyright 
fees in Finland and to the fact that the Bulgarian advertising market is much more open 
to new projects. We are interested in consolidating the market. Certainly, it will depend 
on the strategy of the regulating body. We would prefer more liberal regulation, which ac-
counts for the trend towards greater consolidation without eliminating diversity on the 
market. We are not interested in investing in networks of the same radio format. Our goal 
is to oﬀ er one-stop shopping for the advertisers or the so-called shopping at one counter – 
access to various kind of audiences.”¹² Owning a couple of radio stations enables the own-
er to approach advertisers with a syndicated advertisement oﬀ ering. Radosvet Radev¹³ is 
commenting the situation with radio broadcasting in Bulgaria: “I argue that apart from 
the top ﬁ ve radio stations, which invariably appear on each rating list, all the others are 
part of the shadow economy. If an entity representing public good, such as a media outlet, 
is part of the shadow economy, it’s not diﬃ  cult to predict from where allegations in the 
run-up to the elections will come. Advertising potential is low, so there is only one answer 
to the question of how all these stations are sustained – by the shadow economy. I think 
that the easiest way to prevent it is, given the public signiﬁ cance of the media, to make op-
erators publish their balance sheets. And, as soon as you see three negative balance sheets, 
you close down the operator.” 
One station that has been rapidly moving up the audience preferences list – Vesselina 
Radio – is Bulgarian owned. Th e unusual music formula of the radio, whose play list is 
composed of a mixture of pop folk, rock and roll, Greek music and pop music, turned out 
to be very successful, so in November  the owners launched a cable  outlet with 
the same brand name. 
7 PRINT MEDIA MARKET 
7.1 DEATH OF THE POLITICAL PARTY PRESS 
Media that used to be openly dependent on political parties gradually disappeared. 
Th e two major political parties in Bulgaria – the United Democratic Forces () and the 
Bulgarian Socialist Party () – were incapable of funding their newspapers any longer. 
While the  was in power, the ’s sponsored Duma, a left-oriented daily, encountered 
problems. It could not aﬀ ord to pay the price charged by the state-owned printing house, 
which was managed by a board appointed by the Ministry of Economics, i.e. the ruling 
 party. Following the ’s election failure and the victory of the National Movement 
Simeon , the right-wing Demokratsia daily found itself in a similar situation. However, 
although Duma twice disappeared from the market, in both cases the  found the for-
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mula to bring it back to the news-stands – businessmen aﬃ  liated with the party took over 
its funding. On the ﬁ rst occasion it was Dimitar Ivanov, a former chief oﬃ  cer of the State 
Security Service (the secret service during the communist regime), who came to its res-
cue. When he abandoned Duma and started his own newspaper, Republika (another left-
oriented publication that also went bankrupt), Duma was brought back to life by Petar 
Mandzhukov,¹⁴ the former arms trader who had been trying for some time then to get 
hold of this newspaper. Th e take-over of Duma whetted Mandzhukov’s media appetite, so 
he also invested in a cable  station, launched a publication carrying  schedules, and 
became involved in the purchase of the biggest cable network operator in Bulgaria. Ac-
cording to Mandzhukov himself, he was allocating , leva ( ,) on a month-
ly basis to sustain Duma, a newspaper with a small circulation and weak advertising. It is 
very likely that the funds used to sustain Mandzhukov’s media undertakings come from 
his other businesses, which include construction work, the wine trade and so on. Th e , 
on the other hand, either could not ﬁ nd, or refused to accept, a similar sponsorship for 
Demokratsia, which had been the symbol of the democratic press in Bulgaria. Demokrat-
sia folded in , and the era of the party press was over. 
7.2 WAZ AND THE OTHERS
In recent years, the Bulgarian press market has been seen in terms of  and the oth-
ers. In  the German media group, Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, started its in-
vasion of the Bulgarian market, intending “to promote the development of the Bulgarian 
press by uniting the commercial activity of the publishers without aﬀ ecting the editorial 
policy.”¹⁵ Initially, the owners of the media concern announced that they would invest  
million leva ( ,, ) in their Bulgarian project. Today,  owns not only news-
paper publishing companies, but also one of the biggest newspaper distribution compa-
nies and printing houses in Soﬁ a and Varna, where they print other publications in ad-
dition to their own. In past years the group engaged in a series of legal battles with the 
Competition Protection Commission (), but managed to emerge as winner and to car-
ry on its advertising policy that guarantees it the position of market leader. 
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Table  WAZ OWNERSHIP 
TITLE MEDIA TYPE CIRCULATION*
TRUD (LABOUR) DAILY NEWSPAPER 320,000
24 CˇASA (24 HOURS) DAILY NEWSPAPER 150,000
NOŠTEN TRUD (NIGHT LABOUR) DAILY NEWSPAPER 50,000
BULGARIAN FARMER FARMER NEWSPAPER 45,000
168 CˇASA (168 HOURS) WEEKLY 80,000
VESTNIK ZA ŽENATA (WOMEN MAGAZINE) WEEKLY WOMEN MAGAZINE N.A.
SEDMICˇEN TRUD (WEEKLY LABOUR) WEEKLY N.A.
HIGH CLUB WEEKLY 35,000
AUTO TRUD (CAR MAGAZINE) MONTHLY 20,000
IDEALEN DOM (IDEAL HOME) MONTHLY 20,000
MEDIA SVJAT (MEDIA WORLD) MONTHLY N.A.
SAVREMENIK (CONTEMPORARY) MONTHLY N.A.
SPISANIE ZA ŽENATA (WRITING FOR WOMEN) MONTHLY WOMEN MAGAZINE N.A.
STRELA DISTRIBUTION COMPANY
PRINTING HOUSES IN BOTH SOFIA AND VARNA
Note: * Circulation ﬁ gures are based on the  report Eastern Empires, .
¹⁶ actually entered the Bulgarian market in August , when the President of  
Časa Press Group, Petyo Blaskov, signed an agreement with the co-owner of , Erich 
Schumann, for the sale of  percent of his company to . One year later  acquired 
the remaining  percent, so the  Časa Press Group, the publisher of the popular daily 
 Časa and of the weekly  Časa, became entirely German owned. 
In February ,  percent of the Media Holding company, the publisher of one of the 
highest circulation dailies, Trud, was sold to  under the pressure of the severe eco-
nomic crisis. At the beginning of ,  started oﬀ ering simultaneous advertising in 
 Časa and Trud newspapers – the same ads in the same spots. Th e price of the joint of-
fer was higher than that for a separate advertisement in either of the two dailies, but lower 
than the total of two unit prices. Th at move ensured a monopoly position for  in the 
advertising market. 
However, by acquiring interests in the Media Holding, ’s share of the market 
amounted to . percent. Th erefore  initiated a legal proceeding, on the basis that 
they should have requested permission from the commission before ﬁ nalising the deal. 
In order to bring its share of the market in line with the legislation,  had to dispose 
of some of its interests in the Media Holding. In October , one of the shareholders, 
Hansjorg Fondermann (a representative of  in the Media Holding),¹⁷ sold his stake 
( percent) in the Media Holding to Raiﬀ aisen Ost Invest, part of Raiﬀ aisen Centralbank 
– Austria, based in Vienna. Th e information in the Company Register shows that at the 
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same time another shareholder, Ulrich Holscher (other representative of  in the Me-
dia Holding), sold his  percent share to the Swiss  Performance Trading.  still 
retained a  percent stake in the Media Holding, and ﬁ ve Bulgarian natural legal persons 
acquired  percent (the editor in chief of the Trud daily Tosho Toshev owns . percent 
while four other partners are employees of the Media Holding). Th e ’s conclusion, 
once these changes were completed, was as follows: “With its interests in  Časa Press 
Group and Media Holding,  is in control of less than  percent of the press market, 
and therefore it could not be considered a monopolist.” 
However, some of the lawsuits against  have been seen as a tool used by the ruling 
party to exert political pressure on the editorial policy of the newspapers.¹⁸ For instance, 
there was a popular notion that in   decided to divide  publications’ joint ad-
vertising policy (the “small miracle” which involved the introduction of a common price 
list for publishing ads in two dailies – Trud and  Časa) after consultations with the then 
Prime Minister.¹⁹ As an act of protest, the newspapers started criticising the Government. 
Th e German publishers have always been explicit about their strategy: “Every newspa-
per which is interested in getting involved in our publisher’s scheme and retaining edito-
rial freedom, is welcome to join us.”²⁰ It should be noted that, at some point in time, being 
bought by  was seen as the last hope (or the only way out) for some newspapers. At 
the end of , for example, there was a plan to sell the Standart daily to . A request 
for a cross-ownership deal was submitted to the . Th e Bulgarian legislation allows con-
centration even if it leads to a strengthening of the monopoly position as long as it “aims 
at the modernisation of the overall production or economy, enhancement of market struc-
tures, attraction of investment […] and altogether generates more gains than negative in-
ﬂ uence on the competition.” However, this plan was not realised. 
A couple of months after Standart attempted to ﬁ nd shelter within the Bulgarian fam-
ily of , the  rejected a request by the Kontinent daily for joint advertising with  
daily publications –  Časa and Trud. At that time, the anti-trust commission estimated 
that , with its two newspapers, had a . percent market share.²¹ In addition, ’s 
share of the total advertising revenue was . percent.²² Th erefore, the  assumed that 
any commercial beneﬁ t would be reaped by the German group exclusively and that the 
deal could strengthen only . Some time later the Kontinent ceased to exist. 
Many protests could be heard against ’s monopoly. Initially, all publishers seemed 
to be united in criticising . Another severe critic of  was the former  Chair-
man Nikolai Pavlov, who accused it of money laundering. However, the voices protesting 
against ’s monopoly gradually faded away. 
“ is not a monopolist. Th ere will be advertising available for the other newspapers, 
too;  newspapers in Germany will publish positive articles about Bulgaria and no dis-
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credited persons will manage a private company here.” Th is is a statement of the head of the 
anti-trust commission given in  when the war with  was oﬃ  cially terminated. He 
also assured that the battle would be resumed if any of the requirements imposed by the 
legislation was not met. Th e  thus withdrew all legal claims against the media concern. 
In the spring of ,  signed agreements for combined advertising tariﬀ s with six 
dailies.  publications Trud and  Časa oﬀ ered additional discounts if the advertisers 
chose to publish ads in some of the other newspapers – Duma, Zemya, Pari, Standart,  
Dni Sport and Sega. Th e advertising experts recognised this condition more as an indecent 
proposal than as a solution that could save the rest of the dailies. What happened in prac-
tice was that once the  realised that it could not prevent ’s invasion of Bulgaria, 
it almost legalised it.  owners in Bulgaria have always claimed that they were not in-
terested in editorial policy but in circulation (however, there are no oﬃ  cial ﬁ gures about 
 publications’ circulation) and advertising revenue. In fact, the oﬃ  cially announced 
independence of the publications created an opportunity for their policy to be frequently 
guided by the personal bias and interests of their editors in chief. 
7.3 CORNI MEDIA23
Since , Standart daily has been owned by the Russian businessman Michael Cor-
ni, after the publisher, Standart News , was sold to the oﬀ shore company  Holding 
. Corni was expelled from Bulgaria after having been designated as posing a threat to 
national security in the summer of the same year.²⁴  Holding²⁵ is registered in Cyprus, 
and its director is Corni’s ﬁ nancial head, Joseph Carham; his lawyer, Todor Batkov, repre-
sents him in Bulgaria. 
At the time when Corni bought Standart daily, he still used to be the oﬃ  cial owner of 
the ﬁ rst  operator, Mobiltel. Later Corni himself became the head of the publishing 
company. Th e price of the deal has never been revealed, but Corni bought the newspaper 
including some of its debts. At the same time, Corni also bought  percent of the sports 
daily,  Dni Sport. His interest in the sports edition was related to the fact that Corni was 
also the owner of one of the major Bulgarian football teams – Levski. Coincidentally, 
Corni’s ﬁ rst oﬃ  cial media investment was precisely a sports newspaper – Planeta Sport, 
which he had established together with the publisher of the Monitor daily, Petyo Blaskov. 
Corni’s ownership in Planeta Sport was also realised via the Cyprus company. Th e 
newspaper closed down in , when the Russian businessman ceased ﬁ nancing it. Ac-
cording to the Bulgarian press, Corni’s initial media appetites have been related to the  
market and especially to the purchase of Nova  in . Th e change in shareholders’ 
structure (from bearer shares to nominal ones) of the company that used to be the license 
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holder for the Nova  Soﬁ a frequency, led many newspapers to speculate that Corni had 
acquired shares in the channel. Th ese allegations, however, have never been conﬁ rmed. 
Corni’s media ambitions have failed following his expulsion from Bulgaria. It has been 
expected that he would sell his stake in the Standart daily, but so far all speculations about 
the sale have been denied. Corni used the newspaper for his own  in the course of the 
legal battle in which he attempted to reverse the decision on his ban from Bulgaria and 
to refute accusations of occasional unfair competition. In , persons associated with 
Corni companies participated in the privatisation of the state tobacco company, Bulgarta-
bak. In this process Standart headlines were used for daily campaign aimed against the 
main competitor in the privatisation procedure. After Corni’s expulsion from the country, 
he oﬃ  cially disposed of most of the shares in Bulgarian companies, apart from those in 
the football team and the newspapers. Although his stakes in the Bulgarian media are re-
alised via an oﬀ shore company, it is really a paradox that a person expelled from Bulgaria 
under accusation of being a “threat to national security” still continue to control two dai-
lies. Standart circulation during the last two months of  has amounted at , to 
, copies²⁶; Fridays’ circulation even tripled. However, this information is based on 
the number of printed copies – data on the actual sales and the percentage of waste circu-
lation are not available. 
7.4 DAILY MONITOR
Th e circulation of the Monitor daily has gone down considerably according to data for 
: in the period July – December  alone, the number of copies has been reduced 
by nearly  percent. Currently, this newspaper, whose editor in chief is Petyo Blaskov, is 
being printed at a level of , to , copies on average (about , to , cop-
ies in the ﬁ rst half of ), with only Friday circulation being around , copies. On 
the other hand, the revenue data for  classify Monitor among the top print publica-
tions, immediately following those published by .
But it is explained by the fact that in  Monitor maintained high circulation ﬁ g-
ures of over , copies because it used to organise a series of “prize games.” Readers 
were attracted by competitions for luxury cars and other prizes which have required them 
to collect coupons printed in the daily. Th at increased circulation and sale revenues but 
did not really attract more advertising. Such games increased the circulation of Standart, 
Novinar and even of  daily publications. Th e games actually shifted the main function 
of the dailies, which is to inform and analyse, towards an entertainment role with an ele-
ment of gambling. 
Th e ownership structure of the Monitor publishing company has been changed a 
number of times in the course of the last years without making clear how exactly assets 
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and liabilities were transferred. At one time, the newspaper even had a publisher regis-
tered in a Portuguese oﬀ shore zone – Franko De Madeira. 
A survey of its ownership history made by Capital weekly²⁷ showed that it has also been 
owned by other oﬀ shore companies, but it was ambiguous who the owners of these com-
panies were. Later the publisher was changed again, and at present the founders of the 
publication are listed as owners, except for Petyo Blaskov, whose shares are registered in 
the name of his mother’s company. 
In addition, at the end of , Monitor publishers started a second daily, Vizh. It is pro-
duced mainly using Monitor journalistic resources, but it is printed later in the evening, 
while following the tradition of the yellow press with short and scandalous texts. Vizh 
costs . leva (approx.  eurocents) and appears to be the cheapest daily in the country, 
which explains the circulation number of , copies. It is worth to mention that Petyo 
Blaskov stood as a candidate for mayor of Soﬁ a in the  local elections, and he made 
active use of his newspapers in the election campaign. 
7.5 CAPITAL AND DNEVNIK
According to  revenue data for the print media market, the Agency for Invest-
ment Information . (), which publishes the Capital weekly and the Dnevnik daily, 
is ranked in third position. Both publications are business-oriented. AII has Bulgarian 
owners²⁸ – it is divided between Ivo Prokopiev and Philip Harmadzhiev, who founded 
the Capital weekly ten years ago. Th e publication was started with the ﬁ nancial support 
of Reuters, which however has not used the option to acquire any shares in the publish-
ing company. 
Dnevnik daily was started in . In the last years, the two publishers have developed 
interest in the wine business, investment and other sectors. Since , the newspapers 
have been published in alliance with the German media group Georg von Holtzbrinck, the 
publisher of Handelsblatt.²⁹ 
7.6 NOVINAR AND SEGA
Although not among the major media companies, some other interesting examples of 
media ownership can also be noted. Th e owners of the Novinar daily are privatised com-
panies formerly owned by the Soﬁ a municipality, which used to guide its editorial policy 
towards support for the former governance at Soﬁ a Municipality Council. For a long time 
the Sega daily was oﬃ  cially known to be owned by two sociologists, that is, until , 
when an interview with its third owner appeared in the newspaper.³⁰ Th is was Sasho 
Donchev, the head of Overgas – a company dealing with the gasiﬁ cation of Bulgarian 
towns by importing Russian gas. Previously, Sasho Donchev’s involvement in the funding 
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of the publication had been alleged but never indicated in oﬃ  cial documents. Th e inter-
view made it clear that he had acquired the majority stake in the publishing company. 
In , the ﬁ gures for overall newspaper circulation showed a drop estimated at  
percent to  percent.³¹ Th is could generate new risks for the survival of the publications 
as well as more opportunities for pressure on them. 
8 MEDIA INFRASTRUCTURE – DISTRIBUTION 
AND PRINTING CAPACITIES
Apart from the fall in circulation, another problem of the print media market is distri-
bution. Th ere are some big companies and a dozen small ones involved in newspaper dis-
tribution. Two of the distributors are directly aﬃ  liated to publishers – Strela is owned by 
, and Zhak Press includes shares of one of the Monitor publishers. Th e distribution 
companies tend to defer payments to the newspapers; they apply tricks for concealing the 
income from subscription and frequently insist on higher discounts. 
Th e state printing house, Rodina, which currently holds the printing of all non- 
dailies and weeklies, was privatised in . Th e procedure of selling  percent of Rodina, 
carried out by the Privatisation Agency, was completed in November , and the print-
ing house became the property of a consortium of Bulgarian newspapers established espe-
cially for this deal – United Bulgarian Newspapers. Th e group ﬁ nanced the purchase of the 
printing house by a loan obtained from the First Investment Bank (the price was ,, 
leva³² –  ,,). Th e loan contract included the condition that, if the consortium 
does not repay the loan, the bank will become the owner of the printing house. Such a con-
dition makes the newspapers somewhat dependent on the bank, which might eventually 
have certain claims regarding the editorial policy of the publications. Since the remaining 
stake of Rodina has been sold out through the Bulgarian Stock Exchange, the new owner, 
United Bulgarian Newspapers,³³ increased its stake to more than  percent. 
Th e United Bulgarian Newspapers consortium includes the following companies: Mon-
itor . (publisher of the Monitor daily), Novinar . (publisher of the Novinar daily), 
Financial Information Agency . (publisher of the Banker weekly), Pressmarket . 
(publisher of the Vizh daily), Infomedia  (publisher of the Duma daily) and Compact 
Meridian . (publisher of the sports daily Meridian Match). It has been suggested that 
the new structure of ownership might generate problems in serving the other customers 
of the printing house if the new owners began to resort to unfair competition (for example, 
abuse of the printing schedule). Th e privatisation of the state printing house, which is be-
ing considered rather late, has already managed to generate competition on the market. 
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9 LOCAL MARKETS
Th e most interesting example among the local media markets is the market in Varna, 
since it has been entirely monopolised by the local economic group, . Th e group owns 
two cable  channels, a radio station, a newspaper and a cable network employing aﬃ  li-
ated persons and companies. Another strong player in the local market ﬁ eld is Stepan Er-
amyan, who owns shares in the companies that publish the Maritsa daily (a majority stake) 
and the Struma daily (he is among the main associates with a  percent stake, while the 
majority owner, with a  percent stake, is a company, Geosil media,³⁴ belonging to Oхnig 
Kuchukjan; a small share (. percent) is owned by a Serbian company, BBM, licensed for 
activities in the ﬁ eld of commerce and tourism). Th e Maritsa and Struma dailies represent 
the biggest regional dailies in the country, covering Southern and Southwest Bulgaria.
10 PROFESSIONAL JOURNALISM
Th e quality of the media depends not only on the ownership structure and suﬃ  cient 
funds, but on journalists and their responsibility as well. 
Th e dynamic development of the media market stirred up an increased demand for 
journalists, which allowed an inﬂ ow of people without suﬃ  cient professional qualiﬁ cation 
into the ﬁ eld. If journalism is not perceived as a mission and responsibility, it is not possi-
ble to establish a professional guild – one that would stand up for professional standards 
or protect its interests before those of the media owners. At some media outlets the edito-
rial policy regulations are organised on the basis of internal rules. During the past years a 
number of media non-governmental organisations have discussed the necessity for a code 
of ethics as well as various drafts of such codes. At the moment, a project is underway in 
Bulgaria concerned with the elaboration of the code of ethics and the setting up of a com-
plaints commission to establish self-regulation of the media. In fact, only several provi-
sions pertaining to the anonymity of information sources protect journalists’ work. How-
ever, some serious penalties for libel and slander are envisaged within the Penal Code. 
11 CONCLUSIONS
Th e variety of ownership generates a range of opportunities for inﬂ uence on and pres-
sure over media. In a country like Bulgaria, politics, large-scale business and media be-
come entangled in a complicated and twisted circle of controversial relations. Th e media 
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is considered a weapon for personal or “black” ; the market has not yet become a true 
regulator of relations, and media deals are usually provoked by ﬁ nancial problems. 
Rupert Murdoch is present on the Bulgarian media market, but there are no local me-
dia tycoons who would be persistent and consistent in concentrating and expanding their 
investments, and developing networks of radio and  stations, newspapers, magazines, 
and cable networks. Most of the media owners engage in other kinds of business as well, 
which creates a dangerous potential for the media to be dependent on and guided by eco-
nomic and political interests. 
Other owners, in order to avoid bankruptcy of their media companies, ﬁ rst resort to 
selling advertising space or time at dumping prices, a practice which has a negative impact 
on the long-term development of the market, and then they become inclined to bargain 
with editorial positions and policy. 
Th e lack of legal regulation of foreign ownership in the media sector, on the one hand, 
ensured the presence of big media companies that do not work with Bulgarian partners 
(News Corporation, Antena Group, Metromedia Group). However, on the other hand, the 
transparency of the capital structure and ﬁ nancing of media was distorted because some 
media owners were concealed behind oﬀ shore companies. In fact, behind most of the 
companies registered in an oﬀ shore zone, stand Bulgarian companies or natural persons 
that prefer to keep their positions in particular media outlets anonymous. 
In the preceding year,  was the ﬁ rst media player to adopt the Principles for Guar-
anteeing Editorial Independence, elaborated by the  Representative on Freedom of 
the Media, Freimut Duve, at the  Berlin Round Table. Among these principles are 
the following: “Th e ownership structure of all journalistic media, including those that are 
partly or solely owned by foreign investors, must be known by the public”; and: “Any insti-
tutional political aﬃ  liation of a journalistic medium should be clearly and publicly stated”; 
and furthermore: “Where a company holds more than one title, it commits itself to safe-
guarding journalistic independence and plurality as a contribution to democratisation and 
to strengthening freedom of the media.” In , Bulgaria will hold the  chairman-
ship, and this is a good reason for the country to try to apply those principles to its own 
media market before insisting that they are observed in other countries.
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. Radio and Television Act, State Gazette (), issue 
/; amend.  /; amend.  /; 
amend. and suppl.  /; amend. and suppl.  
/; amend. and suppl.  /; amend.  
/, amend.  /, amend.  /, 
suppl.  /
. Telecomunications Act, State Gazette, issue /.
. Protection of Competition Act, State Gazette, issue 
/, as amended, , issues /, /, /
 and /.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Media owners in Croatia live dangerously. Nova  owner, Ivan Ćaleta, was shot in 
the legs in December . Th e police stated that the assassin could have ﬁ nished the 
job, so the shooting had to be understood as a warning. Earlier, the former media tycoon, 
Zdravko Jurak, was beaten up outside his Zagreb apartment. Ninoslav Pavić, co-owner of 
Europa Press Holding, Croatia’s biggest publishing house, had his car bombed. Former 
media mogul Miroslav Kutle’s jeep was shot while he was sitting in a café. Media execu-
tives are exposed to such attacks also. For instance, Andrej Maksimović, editor in chief of 
, a private commercial  station, has been beaten up twice. And, Denis Kuljiš, one of 
the top editors, was attacked and beaten at the entrance to his home.
Th is danger may explain why ownership data is a closely guarded secret. Public access 
is impossible despite legal requirements. Th e Zagreb Commercial Court has the informa-
tion, but its President, Nevenka Marković, refuses to hand it out. Th e Financial Agency 
 will only give out business results, but not ownership data as well. 
Media ownership is one of the most hidden types of data in Croatia. Th e new Law on 
Media and the Law on Electronic Media obliged media companies to publish exact data 
on their ownership structure by  January . But it has not happened. Data were not 
published because the new Law on Media was sent back into the parliamentary procedure. 
Th e Constitutional Court decided that this law was not adopted in accordance with the 
legally prescribed procedure and that the whole procedure should be repeated. Another 
new law, the Law on Croatian Radio Television (, public service broadcasting), has had 
a similar fate. Th e new Government found it deﬁ cient and proposed amendments. 
So, media legislation in Croatia is like a never ending story: laws are introduced one after 
another, but none is really implemented. In the meantime, decisions are made in the legis-
lative vacuum. Much will depend on the new government, elected in November . 
Such mysterious ownership structure aﬀ ects the media environment. Th e resolution of 
many problems, such as the job status of journalists, professional standards, media inde-
pendence, violation of ethical standards, education, etc. depends on owners, but the pub-
lic does not know who the real owners of the media are.
2 REGULATION
In , the Croatian Parliament adopted a whole set of media laws, including Th e Law 
on the Media, Th e Law on Electronic Media, and Th e Law on the Croatian Radio Televi-
sion. Th e Law on the Croatian Information and News Agency was adopted in .
porocilo.indb   2 22.5.2004, 13:46:08
CROATIA 121
Th e former government, which was in power from January  to November , 
decided to change the entire legal environment, pledging to “enable better position of the 
media,” as explained by the Minister of Culture at that time, Antun Vujić.¹ Th e new me-
dia legislation was also adopted under pressure from the international community, which 
criticised the Croatian government for non-democratic media laws and demanded laws 
close to the  standards. 
In addition to these laws, it is necessary to mention the recently adopted Law on the 
Right to Access Information (), and provisions in the Penal Code (), which list 
criminal oﬀ enses related to the media ﬁ eld, or to be more precise, the area of public infor-
mation. Th e media community argued that democratic media laws were useless if there 
was no access to information or if journalists can be prosecuted because of their reports.
2.1 OWNERSHIP TRANSPARENCY
How do the laws mentioned above regulate media ownership? Th e intention of the 
Government was to enable ownership transparency. Antun Vujić, the former Minister of 
Culture responsible for the new media legislation, explained how the Government, at the 
beginning of its term in oﬃ  ce, i.e. in , was afraid to “politically interfere”. Such passiv-
ity of the Government, explains Vujić, “enabled additional enforcing of non-transparent 
agglomeration, owners and other interest groups which presented protection of their in-
terests as media freedom.”² According to Vujić, the new media legislation should prevent 
such concentrations of media power. 
New media legislation lay at the centre of the public debate, especially among journal-
ists and media experts. Th ere were diﬀ erent opinions on the quality of the new legislation. 
Some eminent media law experts, for example Vesna Alaburić,³ strongly opposed the new 
media law, arguing that it was a step backward compared to the previous law, created to 
EU standards. In contrast, the Croatian Journalists’ Association supported the govern-
mental approach, arguing that it protected journalists’ freedom.
Th e real question now is how the law will be implemented. Th e ﬁ rst test was scheduled for 
 January , the date by which each media company should have submitted to the Min-
istry of Culture all relevant data on ownership, including the names of all “who indirectly or 
directly own any shares.”⁴ Th e Ministry should also have been informed of the number of 
shares owned by each owner and have presented it to the general public. Nothing happened, 
because the Constitutional Court sent the law back to the parliamentary procedure. 
Similar demands for ownership transparency are also stipulated in the Law on Elec-
tronic Media, including the article pertaining to “connected persons,”⁵ such as members of 
the family, relatives, wife or husband, having up to  percent voting rights in a company. 
Th is article is intended to prevent concentration of ownership in broadcast media.
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2.2 VISIBLE DATA
Th e new Law on Media obliges media companies to announce, in a visible place or at 
the end of a radio of television show, all data about “editorial policy, ownership structure, 
business results, average circulation or data on audience.”⁶ According to the new law, the 
newspapers have to publish the number of printed copies in each issue. Th is obligation 
will completely change the picture of the media landscape in Croatia, because not one 
newspaper has ever published circulation data on a regular basis. Such data will reveal the 
real market position of the newspapers, especially those having very small circulations, 
defying all market logic. 
A similar article existed in the former law, but nobody respected it. A real shift in im-
plementation of the legislation will occur once the judiciary begins to adhere to legal pro-
visions, including the imposition of penalties which, indeed, are rather high for local cir-
cumstances. 
2.3 ANTI-CONCENTRATION REGULATION
Restricting media ownership was one of the main goals of the new media legislation 
adopted in . In addition, Croatia has the Law on the Protection of Market Competi-
tion,⁷ a general law that in Article  forbids any kind of concentration that can endanger 
market competition. 
According to the Article  of the Law on Media, the publisher of one or more news-
papers with the number of sold copies accounting for more than  percent of the total 
number of newspapers sold on the market, cannot own another general newspaper⁸ or 
have shares in it.⁹ 
Th e Law on Electronic Media regulates cross ownership, preventing the owners of 
broadcast media from owning both a national broadcasting license and a daily newspaper 
having a print circulation of more than , copies.¹⁰ 
Ninoslav Pavić, a co-owner of Europapress Holding publishing company, is very critical 
of these legal provisions, describing them as “retrograde and old-fashioned.” He said: “For 
instance, according to the new law, a person could be an owner of all the newspapers in 
Croatia. Th e law does not forbid one to be the owner of one hundred percent of the print 
media in Croatia, but at the same time it does place restrictions on us as regards expansion 
into other media ﬁ elds, such as the , Internet, television, radio etc.”¹¹
Pavić’s logic is simple: his company is the publisher of the best selling women’s weekly 
magazines on the Croatian market. Th ey are monopolists in this ﬁ eld, and they are in a 
position to control this market. Th ere are no legal obstacles in place. But at the same time, 
his company cannot buy a small, local radio station. 
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Still, the Government’s logic is diﬀ erent. No one can limit the market success of one 
product, but concentration of ownership is something diﬀ erent. According to Tatjana 
Ružić, an oﬃ  cer with the Agency for Protection of Market Competition,¹² there has been 
no case of non-legal concentration in Croatia so far. She presented an overview of the anti-
concentration regulation and three case-studies: the integration of Vjesnik d.d. and Hrvat-
ska Tiskara; Europapress Holding () ... and K. und K., and Večernji list and Styria. 
Th ese three cases are paradigmatic for all concentration stories in Croatia and, accord-
ing to Ružić, there “is no doubt about the regularity of these mergers”¹³ 
In short, Vjesnik is a traditional Croatian daily newspaper, but with a small number 
of sold copies. Hrvatska Tiskara is the biggest printing plant in the country. Under the 
former communist system, both belonged to the giant Vjesnik, a publishing, printing, sales 
and distribution company, which disintegrated in . In the new, independent Croatian 
state, the Government, who owned Vjesnik, and Hrvatska tiskara, decided to re-integrate 
these two companies in . Ever since then, Vjesnik has been receiving ﬁ nancial support 
from the Government. Th e Agency’s conclusion was that the merger was in accordance 
with the general competition law.
Th e merge of Europapress Holding () and K. und K. Medien Beteiligunggesells-
chaft ... was much more complex. Th e  is the biggest private publishing company 
in Croatia, and K. und K. is a member of the  concern, owning newspapers in Ger-
many, Austria, in former Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Hungary etc. Th eir integration was real-
ised in . When analysing this merger, the Agency stated¹⁴ that the  already had a 
dominant position in the market of weekly political magazines, women and family week-
lies, monthly magazines for women and men, and the merging would not have an impact 
on the newspaper market. Was this a proper ruling? It depends on which standpoint one 
takes. Th e  supporters are convinced that it was correct, but some independent media 
experts, such as Zrinka Vrabec Mojzeš, the former editor at Radio , criticise it as cre-
ating a monopoly.¹⁵
Th e third example dates from , when Večernji list, the best selling daily newspaper 
on the market, was bought by the Austrian company Styria. Th e new owner, Styria, had no 
previous role on the Croatian newspaper market. Th erefore, according to the Agency,¹⁶ its 
role could be positive and would not inﬂ uence free market competition. Th e Agency based 
its decision on the “oﬃ  cial sources and ﬁ gures” (circulation, market and audience share) 
and referred only to the general competition law.
So, concentration stories have had happy ends, including the latest case in which the li-
cense for a (privatised)   channel of the public service  (Croatian Television) was 
won by the , a company owned by the German corporation  and several local com-
panies. Th e fact that , having shares in the biggest publishing company in Croatia , 
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has also shares in , was not of any importance to the decision made by Council for Radio 
and Television, a body responsible for the distribution of the license. Members of the Coun-
cil accepted the opinion that a company founded in Croatia by a foreign company should be 
understood as a national company and that “the ownership structure of the mother compa-
ny has no inﬂ uence on the ownership structure of the Croatian company.”¹⁷
2.4 EDITORIAL INDEPENDENCE
Th e new Law on Media regulates the general principles of media freedom in Articles 
 and .
However, Articles - are much more important for editorial independence, regulat-
ing, for the ﬁ rst time in Croatia, the importance of the media statute. “Relationship be-
tween the publisher, editor in chief and journalists and their mutual rights and obligations 
are reinforced by media statute.”¹⁸ Th e statute enables editors and journalists to resign and 
entitles them to ﬁ nancial compensation if the publisher decides to change editorial policy. 
According to Article , the journalist has the right to express his/her opinion, and he/she 
cannot be punished or ﬁ red because of that. Journalists have the right to refuse the assign-
ment if it is against professional and ethical standards (Article ). Journalists have the 
right not to sign the text if it has been changed against their will (Article ). Finally, jour-
nalists have the right to protect their sources (Article ). 
2.5 STATE SUBSIDIES
Th e Government directly owns two daily newspapers, Vjesnik and Slobodna Dalmaci-
ja, and dozens of regional and local media,¹⁹  diﬀ erent media companies altogether. But 
direct subsidies are provided to selected ones only, or to those that act as mouthpieces for 
the Government. Th e Government’s criteria are not known to the public. For instance, in 
December , Vjesnik received . million kunas (approx.  . million) as ﬁ nancial 
support. Th is has been the tenth instance of ﬁ nancial support to Vjesnik since . At the 
same time, Slobodna Dalmacija, also owned by the Government, was not supported at all. 
Th ere is a new institution to support media pluralism - the Fund for Promotion of Plu-
ralism and Diversity of Broadcast Media. Th e Fund will be ﬁ nanced from the state budg-
et and by other sources decided by special law. Th e Fund will support production of local 
and national programs important for ensuring the citizens’ right to information, minority 
reporting, and cultural creativity as well as the development of education, science and art 
(Article , Law on Electronic Media). 
Penalty provisions in the new media legislation are very strict. Responsible persons 
within media companies and companies themselves are to be rigorously punished if they 
fail to respect the law. However, certain legal obligations are already being ignored. As 
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we pointed out earlier in the text, newspapers are required to publish in a visible place 
the number of printed copies of the current issue. Th is has not yet become a practice, 
but no penalty has been imposed either. Th at is why serious media analysts, such as Božo 
Novak, the President of the Council for Media with the Helsinki Committee, and Ante 
Gavranović, the President of the Association of Newspaper Publishers, are very cautious 
when evaluating the new media legislation implementation.²⁰
3 PRIVATISATION
Privatisation is one of the deadly sins of transition. Croatian roots are deeply en-
trenched in socialism, where all property was state- or socially-owned. Democratisation 
implied privatisation, but it was understood in diﬀ erent ways. Th e new rulers saw it as a 
chance to become rich. Th e late President Tuđman encouraged such an understanding, 
stating several times in public that  families should own all of Croatian property. 
Privatisation became a synonym for scandal and crime. Th e media were not any excep-
tion. Media companies are also privatised under circumstances not known to the general 
public. Many of the media companies ( in total) are still partly owned by the Govern-
ment, or by various state agencies.²¹ Media ownership should be transparent, but Marina 
Mučalo, Assistant Professor of radio journalism explains: “Journalists are using the term 
virtual ownership to express their doubts about the accuracy of oﬃ  cial data on ownership. 
/…/ All scandals about media ownership kept the level of journalists’ stories or derogated 
investigative procedures because of the lack of evidence.”²²
In this report we will present three characteristic privatisation stories. Th e one involv-
ing Novi list is a successful, but rare example. Th e cases of privatisation of dailies Večernji 
list and Slobodna Dalmacija are scandalous examples of media privatisation, and the pri-
vatisation of Slobodna Dalamcija is not over yet.
3. 1 SUCCESS STORY: NOVI LIST
Novi list is one of the rare success stories in the Croatian media landscape. From the 
very beginning (founded in ), it was an independent newspaper, well edited by Frano 
Supilo, an eminent journalist. During the socialist era, Novi list became a strong regional 
publishing, printing and sales company from Rijeka. 
Ante Marković, the Prime Minister of Yugoslavia in , initiated a law that enabled 
the privatisation of companies. Novi list management grabbed the opportunity and 
started the process of privatisation. But, it was not an easy process, because Croatian 
porocilo.indb   7 22.5.2004, 13:46:09
 126 MEDIA OWNERSHIP AND ITS IMPACT ON MEDIA INDEPENDENCE AND PLURALISM
President Tuđman understood how dangerous it could be if he were to allow journalists to 
become owners of the media. 
On  October  the Workers’ Council of Novi list decided to transform the socially-
owned company Novi list into the Novi list Shareholding Company. Th e company issued 
, shares and sold these to current, former and retired company employees who had 
worked for the company for a minimum of two years.²³ 
Th e Governmental Agency for Restructuring and Development delayed the whole 
process, because they were waiting for the adoption of the new Law on Privatisation. It 
was adopted on  June . But Novi list employees were unpleasantly surprised on  
August , when the Agency appointed a new Managing Board headed by the Deputy 
Minister of the Police! It was a very clear sign that the Government was not willing to ac-
cept such a model of privatisation. 
Th e whole process had a political background. Th e Rijeka region was not under the con-
trol of Tuđman’s ruling party, who tried to show how strong his power was. Th e journal-
ists and employees of Novi list were under great pressure, but they did not give in. Readers 
supported them too. Over , citizens of the Rijeka region signed a petition in  in 
support of Novi list, local  Adria and Radio Rijeka. Th e Government had no remain-
ing recourse, because the whole process of privatisation was carefully realized according 
to law and was absolutely legal. Finally, on  February , the shareholding company 
Novi list was legalised. Its journalists and employees became owners of . percent of the 
shares, and state funds of . percent. But, the whole process is not over yet. 
In  Novi list continued privatisation by founding a new company together with the 
Media Development Loan Fund (), who is the owner of a majority stake until . 
 is a -based investment fund operating in Central and Eastern Europe, having 
the goal of “protecting their economic and professional independence.”²⁴ According to the 
agreement,  should sell its shares back to Novi list.  agreed that it will have in-
ﬂ uence over business decisions, but not over editorial matters.
3.2 THE BIGGEST SCANDAL: VECˇERNJI LIST
Večernji list was privatised under the Law on Privatisation (), and the major share-
holder became the Pension Fund. Th e employees had the right to buy no more than  
percent of the shares. One employed person could buy shares to a maximum of  
, (today’s equivalent of approx.  ,). As a result, the journalists who man-
aged their newspapers in the time of socialism, lost all control over their product, and the 
new management, appointed by the Government, took over the responsibility.
“Th e Pension Fund was the majority shareowner, and when it ran into ﬁ nancial prob-
lems, management decided to sell the paper for   million (today’s approx.   
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million), a grossly undervalued asking price. Despite the bargain, few local businesses 
made acceptable oﬀ ers, so the Pension fund decided to sell the company to the Caritas 
Limited Fund, an outﬁ t located in the Virgin Islands. Without any public discussion or in-
formation about this oﬀ shore company, Croatia’s best selling daily newspapers changed 
hands. When pushed for answers, oﬃ  cials answered in their typical laconic style, saying 
that in modern capitalism the origin of business owners is not important and, further-
more, that the Croatian public is not entitled to information about the new owners.“²⁵
Th e sale took place over the Christmas holidays in , but the ownership was 
not revealed. However, after the change of government in , an investigation was 
launched, though with little success until  years later when a car dealer and construction 
company boss revealed in an interview for the newspaper who were its owners. 
However, evidence from President Tuđman’s ﬁ les indicated that he was involved in the 
aﬀ air. Th e new government’s solution was to sell Večernji list as soon as possible, with Sty-
ria stepping in December .
3.3 THE AGONY: SLOBODNA DALMACIJA
Slobodna Dalmacija was proclaimed the best edited daily newspaper in the former Yu-
goslavia in .²⁶ Today,  years later, this newspaper is going through a period of agony, 
being only a shadow of the former eminent newspaper. 
“Since the  got the power in  and until the end of , all Croatian media were 
under its direct inﬂ uence with only two exceptions: Novi list and Slobodna Dalmacija,” 
wrote Srđan Kaić, one of those who are ﬁ ghting for media independence.²⁷
Slobodna Dalmacija, like Novi list, used the opportunity provided by Marković’s fa-
mous law and was privatised on  March , becoming a shareholding company. But, 
Zlatko Mateša, at that time Director of the Governmental Agency for Restructuring and 
Development, implemented the same method as the one he chose in the case of Novi list: 
a new managing board of Slobodna Dalmacija was appointed. 
“Miroslav Kutle became one of the newly selected Croatian businesses princes” ex-
plained Kaić.²⁸ And indeed, Kutle became a Croatian media mogul, owning Slobodna Dal-
macija’s newspapers and printing plant, the Tisak distribution company, and Diona chain 
of shops, once a very strong sales network in Croatia. In addition, he had shares in radio 
and television stations, banks, sales companies, hotels and so on. Kutle became a famous 
businessman, a symbol of success in the new Croatia. But easy come, easy go. At a certain 
moment, the same political power that created Kutle’s empire decided that it had to be 
dismantled. Kutle was arrested, imprisoned and put on trial. Th e process is still underway 
and nothing has yet been proven. He is a free citizen now, and the public is not informed 
about his activities related to the media.
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4 OWNERSHIP
4.1 PRINT MEDIA
Th e three best selling daily newspapers in Croatia are Večernji list, Jutarnji list and Slo-
bodna Dalmacija .
Th e Večernji list ownership structure is now known. Th e Austrian media company, Sty-
ria, bought Večernji list and owns the majority of its shares. But this data is not included in 
the oﬃ  cial register, and it is not published on the Oﬃ  cial Gazette’s website (www.nn.hr), 
where you can ﬁ nd only the name of Klaus Schauer as a director. Data on the legal rela-
tions of Večernji list do not mention Styria at all. We have to trust the newspaper article 
published in the Večernji list on  December , where a large typeface headline on 
page  read “Styria is a major shareholder of Večernji list.” Th e lead story says that the 
Commercial Court allowed the transfer of shares to Hrvatska-Styria GmbH from Graz, 
which is a part of the publishing group Styria from Austria.
Th e Slobodna Dalmacija daily has again found its place in the Government portfolio 
whence it started ten years ago. A note in the legal register of companies dated  July  
reveals “that bankruptcy proceeding has been initiated.”²⁹ Eventually, in October , the 
Government decided to privatise this daily, oﬀ ering the following model of privatisation: 
 percent of the shares would be allocated – free of charge – to the employees,  percent 
of the shares from the Governmental portfolio would be kept by the Croatian Fund for 
Privatisation, and the rest of shares from the governmental portfolio would be sold on the 
market under the condition that the buyer re-invest in the company a minimum of  mil-
lion kunas (approx.  . million). Oﬀ ers are being collected and it can be expected that 
in the beginning of  the new owner of Slobodna Dalmacija will be known. 
Globus is one of the most inﬂ uential and best selling political weekly magazines in 
Croatia. Its publisher is Europapress Holding, and the weekly Globus was the nucleus of the 
company. A group of journalists and managers (Ninoslav Pavić, Zdravko Jurak and Denis 
Kuljiš) founded this weekly magazine on  December . A few years later, Pavić bought 
all the shares of Globus from his partners and became the sole owner of the paper. In addi-
tion, he soon started up, or bought, several other magazines and advertising companies.³⁰ 
Europapress Holding is now the biggest publishing company not only in Croatia, but 
probably one of the biggest in the region, publishing three daily newspapers, ﬁ ve weekly 
magazines, two bi-weeklies and eleven monthly magazines, altogether  editions³¹ sold 
in approximately  million copies annually.³²
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Chart  EUROPAPRESS HOLDING (EPH) AND WAZ OWNERSHIP IN CROATIA 
RTL 
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  
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     
 dailies  weeklies  bi-weekly 
magazines
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magazines
TISAK REVIJE D.O.O.
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(general)
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GLOBUS
(news)
GLORIA
(women)
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(women)
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AUTO KLUB
(both motor 
vehicles)
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(horoscope)
COSMPOLITAN, 
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(children)
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(medicine)
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(computer)
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LIFESTYLE
distribution co.
 
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magazines
TENA
(women)
MOJA SUDBINA
(family)
MOJA TAJNA
(family)
TEEN
(teenagers)
Nacional, the second best-selling weekly political magazine, also sprung from Globus. 
Th e ﬁ rst issue of Nacional appeared on  November , after a group of journalists 
left Globus, having been dissatisﬁ ed with its editorial policy. Denis Kuljiš, the ﬁ rst editor 
in chief of Globus, led this group of dissidents. He was also the ﬁ rst editor in chief of Na-
cional. A year later (), this group of journalists split again. Th e magazine was in deep 
ﬁ nancial, editorial and marketing crisis. Th e new owners were ten journalists and editors 
who started a new era, creating an inﬂ uential magazine which became known for its in-
vestigations of major scandals in Croatia. Th e name of their publishing company was Na-
cional, but when faced with a huge penalty decided by the Court because of the label, they 
simply changed the name of the publishing company to Nakladnik ... Th e company 
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was registered on  November  and adjusted on  December . Its sole founder is 
Ivo Pukanić. Its ownership structure today is not known.³³
4.2 BROADCAST MEDIA: IN THE SHADOW OF HRT
For better understanding of the position of private TV and radio stations, it is necessary 
to explain the role of the public service broadcaster Croatian Radio Television ().
Th e Law on the Croatian Radio Television deﬁ nes the  as an independent public in-
stitution practicing journalism according to professional standards.³⁴ Th e  is the most 
important and inﬂ uential media in Croatia. According to a Puls Agency survey published 
in spring , almost  percents of citizens obtain information from the . Each po-
litical party has to count on a good relationship with the  in promoting its activities. 
Th e party in power has a “hereditary right” to control the . Th is right to control has 
been incorporated in past legislation, but it is also part of the new Law on the , where 
this right is secured through the Council for  Programming (shortened to  Coun-
cil). Th e  Council has  members, elected by the Croatian Parliament after a pub-
lic contest open to all citizens and institutions or s. But each parliamentary party 
also has the right to “select” and propose their candidates. Basically, if, for example, the 
Croatian Journalists Association proposes a candidate for the  Council, he or she will 
be accepted only if one of the parliamentary parties includes this person in its list! Th e re-
sult of this appointment system was that the members of the  Council were elected 
on the basis of the following principle: six members from the ruling parties, ﬁ ve from the 
opposition parties. 
Th is is an important detail because the  Council has the right to appoint the Gener-
al Manager, other inﬂ uential managers and editors, and to supervise the programming.³⁵ 
Th ese authorities are enormous and enable the  Council to completely control the 
. We can say, one controlling the  Council also controls the . Th e best exam-
ple of how political parties understand the law and the importance of controlling the  
Council has been an initiative by a little known nongovernmental organization called Juris 
Protecta, proposed on  December .³⁶ Juris Protecta demands the canceling of the 
decision on the appointment of the  Council members and the restarting of the elec-
tion process by the new Parliament. Juris Protecta is not an important , but it is close 
to the ruling party, and its proposal was presented as the “voice of the people.” Th e motive 
behind this initiative is obvious: the election winners would like to elect their  Council 
members and to ensure control over the . And, it is not strange that the new Govern-
ment proposed amendments to the Law on the  in February . 
Knowing that the  is ﬁ nanced from the license fee and that it has the right to sell 
prime time for advertising, which makes it the major advertising medium in Croatia, there 
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can be no mystiﬁ cation as to the importance of this so-called public service, the richest and 
most powerful medium in Croatia. Any private company starting a new program is facing 
extremely strong competition from the  that is protected by law and the Government.
4.2.1 TELEVISION
Eight private  companies have obtained broadcasting licenses and there is one televi-
sion production company. Only one of these stations, Nova , has a national frequency 
license. Nova  was founded on  March  as a shareholding company. Ever since 
its founders have been ﬁ ghting for ownership of the company.³⁷ After one of the owners 
(Ćaleta) was shot, the parties in conﬂ ict seemed to decide to sell the company.³⁸ 
 is a regional  covering Zagreb and having an approximate coverage of ,, 
viewers. Th e journalist, Sergej Abramov, published an article in which he revealed that 
Miroslav Kutle was accused of paying Vinko Grubišić an amount of  , (approx. 
 ,) to take over a  percent stake in , which he shared with several other 
partners including Romano Bolković, a journalist, and two businessmen, Frane Boban and 
Mladen Horvat. In the meantime, in April , the ownership structure changed again: 
Vinko Grubišić transferred his  percent parcel of shares to Željko Pervan, who now 
owns approximately  percent.³⁹ It is not known who owns the rest.
 – Nezavisna Televizija (Independent Television) was founded in  as Televizija 
Moslavina, a shareholding company owned . percent by the City of Kutina and the rest 
by private owners. In   Moslavina faced huge problems concerning the ownership 
and transmitter.  Moslavina became ; it has a regional frequency license and serves 
one million viewers. 
4.2.2 RADIO
According to three radio audience surveys in , Narodni radio from Zagreb has the big-
gest reach.⁴⁰ Its popularity formula is simple: lot of music, fun and brief news items. Th e own-
er of Narodni Radio is Radio Croatia Shareholding Company, founded on  May .⁴¹ 
Obiteljski Radio is also at the top of the popularity list, having a regional frequency li-
cense and reaching over one million listeners. Its owner is Obiteljski Radio, a private lim-
ited liability company.⁴² 
Th ese two completely independent companies according to the accessible legal data 
have only two elements in common: their address and Juraj Hrvačić as a consultant. 
Juraj Hrvačić is a radio editor and manager. He has had a long and very successful ca-
reer and has been the founder or manager of several popular radio stations, including 
Obiteljski Radio and Otvoreni Radio. Commenting on the news stories alleging that he was 
the real owner of Obiteljski Radio, Hrvačić said: “I am employed in Obiteljski Radio as a 
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consultant, and that is a function I fulﬁ ll for ten other radio stations as well. But I cannot 
reveal more details about it, because I have to respect my contract, which says that I am 
not allowed to publish it.”⁴³ 
Radio  is the symbol of independent, open minded and Europe-oriented radio. 
When the late President Tuđman made an attempt to ban Radio  in , over , 
Croatian citizens rallied in Zagreb’s central square to support it. Radio  was always 
ﬁ ghting for media freedom, but always had problems with resolving its legal position, fre-
quency license and ownership structure. Finally, in  it regained its original frequency 
of  megahertz and privatised the company, but the City of Zagreb still owns  percent 
of its shares. 
4.3 THE BIGGEST MEDIA OWNERS
Th e Government does not like private media. Th is is not an emotional statement, but 
a fact based on data about media owners in Croatia. Th e history of privatisation of the 
Croatian media is a long, but not successful story. All Croatian media were socially-owned 
(state) property in the Socialistic Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. Th e ﬁ rst private me-
dium was the newspaper, Oglasnik, in , specializing only in classiﬁ ed ads. Th e privati-
zation process started in , but it proceeded very slowly.
Th e Croatian Mass Media Ownership overview of May ⁴⁴ clearly indicated that the 
Government owned all inﬂ uential media, including printing plants, transmitters, advertis-
ing agencies, and distribution and sales companies.
In December , the situation was better, but the Government still owned  diﬀ er-
ent media companies,⁴⁵ including two daily newspapers, dozens of local or regional print 
media, radio stations, the news agency , the printing plant Vjesnik, the , Trans-
mitters, which is a public company, and so on. Th is is a clear case of cross ownership and 
media concentration. No other publicly known media owner has managed to achieve such 
cross-ownership.
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Table  CROATIAN MEDIA OWNED BY THE GOVERNMENT* (DECEMBER 2003)
MEDIA TITLE MEDIA TYPE OWNER
ABC TEHNIKE MONTHLY TRADE PUBLICATION CROATIAN ASSOCIATION FOR TECHNICAL 
CULTURE
DOBRA KOB MONTHLY, HUNTING SLOBODNA DALMACIJA STATE 
PUBLISHING COMPANY
DUBROVACˇKI VJESNIK WEEKLY, GENERAL DUBROVNIK CITY PUBLISHING COMPANY
EUROCITY QUARTERLY, RAILROADS CROATIAN RAILROAD COMPANY
HGK INFO MONTHLY, ECONOMY CROATIAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
HRVATSKA REVIJA QUARTERLY, CULTURE CROATIAN CULTURAL ASSOCIATION
HRVATSKE ŠUME MONTHLY, FORESTRY CROATIAN FOREST COMPANY
HRVATSKI RADIO NATIONAL RADIO CROATIAN RADIO (PUBLIC SERVICE)
49 STATIONS LOCAL AND REGIONAL RADIO 
STATONS
HRVATSKA TELEVIZIJA NATIONAL TV CROATIAN TELEVISION (PUBLIC SERVICE)
HINA NATIONAL NEWS AGENCY CROATIAN NEWS AGENCY 
HRVATSKE VODE QUARTERLY, TRADE PUBLICATION CROATIAN WATER COMPANY
HRVATSKI VOJNIK MONTHLY, MILITARY MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
INA QUARTERLY, OIL&GAS INA PETROL COMPANY 
INFORMATOR WEEKLY, ECONOMY&LAW AFFAIRS INFORMATOR PUBLIC PUBLISHING 
COMPANY
JASENOVACˇKE NOVINE MONTHLY, GENERAL CITY COUNCIL OF JASENOVAC
KOLO PRESS, QUARTERLY, CULTURE CROATIAN CULTURAL ASSOCIATION
KRONIKA ŽUPANIJE SPLITSKO-
DALMATINSKE
BI-MONTHLY, GENERAL SPLIT-DALMATIAN PROVINCE
LIPICˇKI LIST BI-WEEKLY, GENERAL POŽEGA-SLAVONIAN PROVINCE
MAKARSKO PRIMORJE PRESS, WEEKLY, TOURISM CITY COUNCIL OF MAKARSKA
MALI OGLASNIK WEEKLY, CLASSIFIED ADS SLOBODNA DALMACIJA
MOLVARSKI INFORMATIVNI LIST QUARTERLY, GENERAL MUNICIPALITY COUNCIL OF MOLVE
NARODNI ZDRAVSTVENI LIST BI-MONTHLY, HEALTH PUBLIC HEALTH COMPANY OF 
PRIMORSKO-GORANSKA PROVINCE
NOVLJANSKI VJESNIK BI-MONTHLY, GENERAL PUBLIC SCHOOL, NOVSKA
OBRANA WEEKLY, MILITARY MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
OBRTNICˇKE NOVINE MONTHLY, CRAFTMENSHIP CROATIAN CRAFT CHAMBER
OBZOR QUARTERLY, CULTURE MUNICIPALITY OF ORIOVAC
ODAŠILJACˇI I VEZE TRANSMITTERS TRANSMITTERS AND COMMUNICATIONS 
OPATIJA MONTHLY, TOURISM CITY COUNCIL OF OPATIJA
SLOBODNA DALMACIJA REGIONAL DAILY, PRINTING 
PLANT AND DISTRIBUTION
SLOBODNA DALMACIJA STATE 
PUBLISHING COMPANY
VIJENAC BI-MONTHLY, CULTURE CROATIAN CULTURAL ASSOCIATION
VJESNIK NATIONAL DAILY AND PRINTING 
PLANT
VJESNIK STATE PUBLISHING AND 
PRINTING COMPANY
VUKOVARSKE NOVINE BI-WEEKLY, GENERAL CROATIAN RADIO TELEVISION, VUKOVAR 
OFFICE
Source: Media&Marketing Guide, Lexis, Zagreb . 
Note: *Th e Government ownership in this table includes ministries, associations or chambers dependent on the Govern-
ment, county and city councils, public companies responsible to or owned by the Government (completely or partly). Th e 
media are listed in alphabetical order.
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Why is the Government not privatising the media? If, during the Tuđman era, control 
of media was understood as a characteristically governmental manner of control, why did 
the democratic government, elected on  January , not get rid of media ownership? 
Th e Union of Croatian Journalists warned the former Prime Minister Račan in July  
that it would have a negative inﬂ uence on the media landscape, but to no avail.⁴⁶ Th e new 
Government elected in  is facing a situation of non-transparent media ownership. 
Th e year  will have to provide some answers. 
In the shadow of the governmental and media moguls’ ownership ridden by scandals, 
one strong media owner is quietly developing an impressive media group. Th is owner is 
the Catholic Church. 
Th e Catholic Church media have a long history and an inﬂ uential role in Croatia. Dur-
ing the communist era the only opposition media were those published by the Catho-
lic Church. When Croatia became independent, the Church decided to use the legal op-
portunities and founded new media outlets, such as IKA (Informative Catholic Agency), 
Croatian Catholic Radio with a national frequency,  and video production, new, mod-
ern newsmagazines etc.⁴⁷ 
Th e inﬂ uence of the Catholic Church media is enormous, especially because their 
newspapers are mostly distributed through churches all over the country, and they are un-
derstood by readers as a direct message from the Catholic Church itself. 
Table  CROATIAN MEDIA OWNED BY THE CATHOLIC CHURCH* (DECEMBER 2003)
MEDIA TITLE MEDIA TYPE PUBLISHER
IKA NEWS AGENCY HRVATSKA BISKUPSKA 
KONFERENCIJA
GLAS KONCILA WEEKLY GLAS KONCILA
PULS MONTHLY GLAS KONCILA
MI MONTHLY HRVATSKI KATOLICˇKI ZBOR MI
MALI KONCIL PRESS GLAS KONCILA
KANA MONTHLY KRŠCˇANSKA SADAŠNJOST
MOCˇILE MONTHLY ŽUPA UZNESENJA BLAŽENE DJEVICE 
MARIJE
HRVATSKI KATOLICˇKI RADIO RADIO (NATIONAL COVERAGE) HRVATSKA BISKUPSKA 
KONFERENCIJA
RADIO MARIJA RADIO (REGIONAL COVERAGE) UDRUGA RADIO MARIJA
KRŠCˇANSKA SADAŠNJOST VIDEO, AUDIO AND BOOK PRODUCTION KRŠCˇANSKA SADAŠNJOST
DISTRIBUTION NATIONAL CATHOLIC CHURCH
Note: *Catholic Church ownership is understood in general sense, including ownership of diﬀ erent brotherhoods, bishop, 
parosh or companies owned by or related to the Church.
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4.4 DISTRIBUTION AND PRINTING
Vjesnik, formerly a publishing, printing, sales, distribution and advertising company, 
was a real mammoth in the Socialistic Federative Republic Yugoslavia, remarkable by Eu-
ropean standards as well. Its printing plant was the most advanced in the former Yugo-
slavia. Th e printing plant became an independent company when Vjesnik disintegrated, 
and it continued proﬁ table production. Th e daily newspaper, Vjesnik, was not so proﬁ t-
able. Both companies were owned by the Government. Th e owner’s logical solution was 
to merge the two companies, and Vjesnik, a shareholding company, was founded on  Oc-
tober . Th e state fund owned  percent of the shares, and the rest belonged to small 
shareholders and Tisak.⁴⁸ 
Th e distribution company, Tisak, was also a member of the Vjesnik company in social-
ism, and like many other companies, it was an actor in the long and scandalous story of 
privatization. It was owned by a controversial media mogul Kutle, then went bankrupt, 
then recovered, and now it again faces the legalization of its ownership structure. Th e ma-
jor newspaper publishers, Europa Press Holding and Večernji list, and the Tobacco Facto-
ry Rovinj, claim ownership rights in Tisak based on its huge debt – Tisak was selling their 
products, but never paid for the merchandise. As a result, each of these three companies is 
entitled to a  percent stake in the company. Th e remaining of  percent belongs to small 
publishing companies and private shareholders. 
4.5 POLITICAL AFFILIATION OF THE MEDIA OWNERS
Given that the largest media owners are the Government and the Church, there can be no 
doubts about the political aﬃ  liation of the leading media in Croatia. Th is fact speaks to the 
main problem of Croatian media: the lack of independent, balanced and impartial reporting. 
Journalists are forced to promote the ideas of the owners. Or, at least, they are not expected 
to attack the hand which is feeding them. Small media owners have the privilege of criticis-
ing, and investigate, but they continue to be small, having no chance for development. 
5 MEDIA PLURALISM
Th e media landscape is changing compared to the period –. Th e number of 
daily newspapers in  was nine, and in  it was eight. Basically, this was the same 
number of dailies as existed in the communist era. In  there was one unsuccessful 
project named Zapad, but the daily went bankrupt very quickly because of poor mar-
ket results. Th e real change in the landscape was registered in , when Jutarnji list ap-
peared on the market. In , there were  daily newspapers, and another one has been 
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launched in early . Europapress Holding launched a new ﬁ nancial daily newspaper 
Dnevnik, proving it is strong enough to invest in such a project and take over one addi-
tional portion of the market.⁴⁹ 
Other print media like, for instance, daily Novi list and weekly Feral Tribune, are also 
privately owned and independent from the Government, but they are facing other prob-
lems. Novi list is trying to overcome this situation in the market by integrating similar 
newspapers into a network of local daily newspapers. On  December , the major 
owners of Glas Slavonije, a daily newspaper in Osijek, were Osječki list ... and Riječki 
list ..., whose founders and shareholders are journalists and employees of both news-
papers, i.e. Glas Slavonije and Novi list.⁵⁰ Such an approach can be an answer to media 
concentration. 
From  till , there were only three national  licenses issued - all allocated to 
the . In , Nova  obtained a national  license. Now there are four: beside Nova 
 also two channels of  and privatised  channel belonging now to . Th ere is 
no change expected in near future. 
In , the major news on the media market was exactly the license allocated for a na-
tional frequency that had belonged to the  channel of the public service Croatian Tel-
evision (). On  September , after long and very tense competition, the Council 
for Radio and Television decided that the winner was , a company founded by the 
German giant  and local companies such as Agrokor, Podravka, Atlantic Grupa, /
Splitska banka and Pinta . It is clear that the big German broadcaster joined forces 
with strong local companies from various business ﬁ elds, in founding this multinational 
company.  should have already started to broadcast, but the scheduled beginning was 
delayed until summer . 
Other competitors in the tender for the frequency were also very strong. For example, a 
regional broadcaster - Moslavina, which was among those short-listed, and Rovita, 
backed by Murdoch’s News Corporation, Croatian Telecom and Tobacco Factory Rovinj. 
Slovenian , Hungarian ,  consortium and  did not receive any vote from 
the members of the Council for Radio and Television.
Th e Catholic Church is also developing a publishing section, but its latest project has 
not been successful. Th e new monthly newsmagazine, Puls, appeared on  November 
, but it folded quickly, after the third issue in January . 
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6 MEDIA INDEPENDENCE
Professional associations, such as the Croatian Journalists’ Association () and the 
Union of Croatian Journalists, are trying to ensure a better position for journalists. Th e 
Union is negotiating a collective agreement with publishers. It is a long process that is still 
underway. Some media companies have introduced in-house agreements, for example 
Večernji list, Europapress Holding,  and others, but journalists seem not satisﬁ ed with 
their position. In , the Union thus distributed a questionnaire among its members to 
detect the actual position of journalists in the newsrooms, the level of their independence 
and exposure to pressure. Results of the survey have not been published yet.
Th ere are indicators that journalists are not satisﬁ ed with the level of media ethics 
standards. During the last annual conference of , held in Opatija on – December 
, the participants criticised the Council of Honour’s activities, asking for it to take a 
more active role in solving the ethical problems in media. Th e Council of Honour has no 
real impact, and its decisions have only a moral dimension, but cannot inﬂ uence the me-
dia companies to respect ethical principles. One of the initiatives was to transform the 
Council of Honour to a body similar to the German Presserat, which inludes publishers, 
managers and journalists involved in solving ethical violations. Some media companies 
have adopted their internal codes of conduct, for example Europapress Holding and , 
but nobody is applying such ethical codes.
Th e Croatian Helsinki Committee founded the Council for Media, an independent 
body consisting of eminent media experts. Th e Council for Media reacts to any violation 
of ethical principles, issuing statements or warnings on non-ethical behaviour directly ad-
dressed to media managers.
Croatian journalists are trying to improve the level of professional standards through 
workshops, seminars or conferences on the main problems. Th ey also strive to improve 
their knowledge, but it is very hard to organise such activities, because media managers 
and editors do not support them. For instance, the journalist Saša Leković initiated an in-
vestigative reporting team in Europapress Holding, but after a while they gave up, having 
no real possibilities to develop such teamwork. 
Obviously, the serious improvement of media standards will not be possible before me-
dia ownership becomes transparent and owners begin to participate in the development 
of modern, democratic and free media. 
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7 CONCLUSIONS
Croatian media are undergoing a long, painful and uncertain transition process. Inter-
nalised socialist principles limit the understanding of media freedom, free speech and the 
role of the media in the country. 
Non-transparent ownership is one of the crucial problems of the media landscape. Real 
media owners are not known to the public. Not all legal data are accessible. Huge scandals, 
attacks on media owners, and strange sale transactions are indicative of the many ambigui-
ties in the ownership structure, but the public cannot get the real information.
Even though Croatia has adopted a whole set of new media laws, these are not respected. 
Th e two major laws (the Media Law and the Law on Croatian Radio Television are already 
undergoing the amendment procedure, even before they have begun to be implemented.
Th e Croatian Journalists’ Association, the Trade Union of Journalists and the Council 
for Media within the Helsinki Committee, repeatedly alert the public to the seriousness of 
the situation. However, civil society is not suﬃ  ciently developed, and it seems everything 
depends on the Government. 
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1 INTRODUCTION
All the Czech media, with the exception of the public broadcasting organisations Český 
rozhlas (Czech Radio), Česká televize (Czech Television) and the news agency ČTK, which 
is partly controlled by Parliament, are in private hands. 
The Czech Republic is a country with minimum ownership restrictions in the media in-
dustry. There is no limit on foreign participation in media. The only limit on cross-owner-
ship in the Czech media was enacted by the Broadcasting Act of 2001. The limit pertains 
only to the broadcast media (one company shall hold only one nation-wide television or 
radio broadcasting licence). 
The Czech Office for the Protection of Competition considers all mass media a sin-
gle market. From such a viewpoint no publisher, no broadcaster no media company has a 
dominant position on the “relevant market” defined in such a way.
Only two media sub-markets have individual media owners occupying dominant position. 
First, the commercial television network, TV Nova, has a 45 percent share of the TV au-
dience and a majority portion of television advertising. Moreover, TV Nova coordinates its 
programming and pricing policy with the second largest commercial TV broadcaster, TV 
Prima. Fortunately, pluralism in television has so far been guaranteed by the existence of 
the Czech public service broadcaster Czech Television. TV Nova is owned by the financial 
group PPF, with its strong position in insurance and banking, and without other notable 
media outlets.
Secondly, the publishing house Vltava-Labe-Press, owned by the German Verlags-
gruppe Passau, controls nearly all the regional and local newspapers in the Czech Repub-
lic. Since the regional newspaper market is a part of the larger daily newspaper market, 
some guarantee of pluralism does exist, and it is based on the diversity of other newspa-
per publishers.
Despite the absence of strict rules and limits on media ownership, concentration in 
Czech media has not reached an extent that could endanger media freedom or plural-
ism. Vertical concentration can be detected in the print media, where the main newspa-
per publishers own printing plants and control the press distribution companies PNS and 
Mediaprint & Kapa Presegrosso. The horizontal concentration of media (dominance on a 
single media market, for instance newspaper, TV or radio market) is still at the embryonic 
stage. However, it is slowly developing, and it cannot be ruled out that a menace to media 
pluralism will someday come from this direction.
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2 HISTORY AND POLITICS
Several basic aspects of the history and political background have to be mentioned in 
order to reach a better understanding of the development of the media in the Czech Re-
public, since it is in some respect specific and different from other Central and East Euro-
pean countries.
The former Czechoslovakia was the only one among Central and East European com-
munist states (with the exception of the former GDR) where the ruling Communist Party 
did not attempt to implement any reform of the political and economic system before the 
fall of the regime in 1989. 
 The rejection of the former rigid totalitarian political system by Czech society was 
profound, far-reaching, and led not only to the dismantlement of all of the existing cen-
trally organised structures, but also to the long-lasting support for the concept of political 
and economic reform, where the role of the state is to be limited as much as possible and 
where free market forces are to govern society as a whole, including the mass media.1
That was the political climate in which the mass privatisation of entire industries, in-
cluding the media, took place. That was the frame of mind which led to the rejection of all 
limits to the participation of foreign companies in the media, and created the basis for the 
deregulation of radio and television.
The Czech Republic was the first country in Central and Eastern Europe to award a na-
tion-wide broadcasting licence to a private person, and to allocate a complete network of 
frequencies formerly used by public television to private television, TV Nova, in 1993.
When the Czech Republic became independent in January 1993, there were no state 
media in the country. Three former state media outlets, i.e. Czech Television, Czech Radio 
and the Czech Press Agency (CTK) already operated as independent public service com-
panies. The state kept some controlling shares in only two media-related companies: in 
the former monopolist distribution company První novinová společnost (PNS) and in the 
former largest printing works owned by the Communist Party before 1989, transformed 
into the state stock company Česká typografie. 
All the other media companies were in private hands, privatised either by spontaneous 
(1990–1992) or by state controlled (1992–1994) privatisation. 
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3 MEDIA LEGISLATION 
After the first free election in June 1990, the new Czechoslovak democratic Govern-
ment wanted to introduce a new general media law, which was to govern all three main 
media sectors – press, radio and television. This intention was never accomplished.
In March 1990, the Federal Assembly revised the 1966 press law by formally abolish-
ing censorship and allowing Czech and Slovak individuals and companies, including for-
eign owned ones based in Czechoslovakia, to own and publish periodic publications.2 The 
amendment opened the way to private ownership and foreign participation in publishing 
ventures. The former strict licensing of any publishing activity was turned into a simple 
procedure of mere registration. According to the amended Press Law provisions, a pub-
lisher had to be in conformity with the legal system as such, and no other duties exceeding 
these limits, including any cross-ownership limits, were prescribed. No wonder that the 
media industry did not feel any need to change this state of affairs.
Another reason why the federal lawmakers abandoned the idea of drafting a new com-
prehensive media law, involved the differing opinions on its nature in the Czech and Slo-
vak parts of the Czechoslovak Federation. Thus Parliament, under the pressure of public 
demands regarding private broadcasters, dedicated its main effort to drafting the Broad-
casting Law that was finally adopted on 30 October 1991.3 
The Broadcasting Law was very liberal; it opened a way to broadcasting licences not 
only for legal persons, but for natural persons as well. Foreign investors were not prevent-
ed from applying for a licence, provided that they established a company in Czechoslova-
kia. Broadcasting legislation did not contain any limit on maximum foreign shareholding 
or cross-ownership limits for broadcasters. The licensing procedure of the Broadcasting 
Council should only “take into account” the shareholding of Czech persons, their repre-
sentation in the applicant’s decisive bodies, and the proposed contribution of the appli-
cant to the development of domestic programming.4
The only media ownership limits were determined and regulated by the Economic 
Competition Protection Act (1991).5 The law defined the term “dominant position” as a sit-
uation in which an economic entity controls more than 30 percent of the relevant market. 
If any entity exceeds this limit, it needs to obtain special approval by the Ministry for the 
Protection of Economic Competition.6 The notion of the “relevant market” in the media 
was, however, difficult to define. This was clearly demonstrated by the administrative pro-
cedure in the case of the Vltava and Labe companies, whose owner, Verlagsgruppe Passau, 
began to build up a monopolist position in the Czech regional press in 1991. In 1993, the 
Ministry for the Protection of Economic Competition ended the case, concluding that the 
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position of Verlagsgruppe Passau on the relevant market, comprising both national and 
regional dailies, was not dominant.
In March 2000 the new Press Law7 was finally adopted. It does not contain any restric-
tions concerning the publisher, who can be either a natural or a legal person possessing 
either Czech or foreign citizenship, and who registers the periodical at the Ministry of 
Culture. The new Act defines the rights and duties of the publishers (e.g. right to reply, ob-
ligatory copies etc.), but does not mention any provision regarding ownership.
A year later, the Parliament passed the new Broadcasting Act.8 The Broadcasting Act is 
the only legal norm which limits cross-ownership of media in Section 6, titled The Secur-
ing of Plurality of Information, Articles 55-58. In simple terms: “any legal entity may be a 
holder of only one nation-wide radio or television channel”. The provisions of this law per-
tain only to the broadcast media, but do not mention any cross-ownership between the 
broadcast media and the press. A nation-wide channel is defined as a set of frequencies 
which covers more than 70 percent of the population. The networking of local stations is 
permitted up to this limit. Any merger of radio and television enterprises has to be sub-
mitted for approval by the regulator, i.e. in cases in which a natural or legal person would 
gain “a substantial influence on a broadcaster”. Substantial influence was defined by the 
limit of 34 percent of the voting stock.
In 2001, the new Economic Competition Protection Act9 was adopted. Its provisions 
are more precise and sophisticated when defining the dominant position and the abuse of 
dominance. The basic limit for a non-dominant position on the relevant market was raised 
from 30 to 40 percent. However, this limit serves only as an orientation point, because the 
evaluation of the dominant position proceeds according to many different criteria. The 
dominant position is defined in Article 10 in the following way: “(1) One or more com-
panies jointly (joint dominance) are deemed to have a dominant position on the relevant 
market, if their market power enables them to behave to a significant extent independently 
of other companies or consumers.”
Among the criteria for deciding on dominant position are for instance “ascertained vol-
ume of supplies or purchases on the relevant market for the goods in question (market 
share)” “the economic and financial power of the company”, “vertical integration level of 
the company”, or “market structure and size of the market shares of their immediate com-
petitors.”
From the viewpoint of media policy, the new legislation adopted in the last five years 
has not changed dramatically in the liberal approach to media ownership set by lawmak-
ers in the beginning of the nineties.
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4 CZECH PRIVATISATION STORY
Market economy rules were introduced into the Czech Republic in several steps. On 1 
May 1990, citizens obtained the chance to start a small personal business.10 At the same 
time, the provisional Law on Joint-stock Companies was adopted.11 In October 1990, the 
Parliament passed the Small Privatisation Act,12 which enabled auctioning of state prop-
erty or of the co-op companies in the sectors of services and agriculture. The most impor-
tant Large Privatisation Act, which founded the National Property Fund and set up the 
guidelines for the privatisation of industries, was adopted in February 1991.13
With the new Commercial Code and the Small Business Act passed in 1991,14 private 
business in the Czech Republic was on its way. 
The former Czechoslovakia, later the Czech Republic, differed from its eastern neigh-
bours in that privatisation was undertaken at a fast pace and on a large scale , which ena-
bled every Czech citizen to participate, using the “voucher (or coupon) program”.15 About 
eighty percent of former state property was transferred to private hands in the short pe-
riod 1992–1994.
The initial phase of dispersing the former state ownership into the hands of millions of 
small voucher shareholders was followed by a new phase of ownership concentration that 
began in 1995, in which the most influential actors were hundreds of investment funds and 
dozens of banks.16 Some of these also invested in the media. However, by that time the for-
eign investors had already captured good starting positions in the main press, radio, and 
television companies (in the years 1991–1995).
Economic reform was accompanied by a steep rise in advertising expenditure. Advertis-
ing became an important new source of funding for the media, and advertising money was 
the main available substitute for former state subsidies to the industry, which ended in 1991.
Table 1 ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE 1990–2002 IN MILLIONS EUR*
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
PRINT 9.54 30.2 84.8 106.5 116.9 111.4 132.3 147.7 153.8 156.9 167.7 177.8 176.9
TV 1.23 5.1 32.3 55.4 83.1 95.4 116.9 135.4 163.1 167.1 175.7 186.2 227.7
RADIO N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 18.3 21.8 22.8 26.2 28.0 30.3 32.0 32.3
OUTDOOR N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 22.8 27.1 29.2 29.2 29.5 31.2 32.9 33.8
INTERNET - - - - - - - - 0.8 1.7 3.4 5.2 5.8
OTHER 0.74 7.5 28.5 34.1 43.5 5.5 6.5 7.1 6.0 6.2 6.5 6.5 7.1
TOTAL 11.51 42.8 145.6 196.0 243.5 253.4 304.6 342.2 379.1 389.4 414.8 440.6 483.6
Source: ArboMedia (IP), Strategie weekly, 21 May 2001.  
Notes: Data for 2001 and 2002, published in press releases at the <http://www.arbomedia.cz>.
*Exchange rate of 2003: 1 EUR = 32.5 CZK.
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4.1 SPONTANEOUS PRIVATISATION 1990–1992
The structure of basic Czech newspapers that developed in the sixties did not essential-
ly change for the next three decades until 1989. This structure consisted of six Czech and 
five Slovak national dailies, and ten regional dailies published in seven Czech and three 
Slovak regions. Besides, two thematic national newspapers (sport, army) and several met-
ropolitan evening papers were published daily in Czechoslovakia.
The publishers of the Czech dailies were either political parties – Communist Party: 
Rudé právo (Red Rights), Czechoslovak People’s Party: Lidová demokracie (People’s De-
mocracy), Czechoslovak Socialist Party: Svobodné slovo (The Free Word), or “voluntary 
social organisations” such as Socialist Union of Youth SSM: Mladá fronta (The Young 
Front), the trade union organization ROH: Práce (The Work), or state organs such as (Min-
istry of Agriculture: Zemědělské noviny (The Farmer’s Daily), Defence Ministry: Obrana 
lidu (The Defence of the People).
Immediately after the fall of communism in November 1989, several attempts at launch-
ing new periodicals were made, but the basic structure of daily newspapers remained the 
same for several months, with two memorable exceptions.
The first exception was the daily Lidové noviny (The People’s Paper), with a history of 
photocopied samizdat published monthly by dissidents since 1987, and with reference to a 
leading journal d’opinion before the Second World War of the same name. The first issue 
of Lidové noviny appeared in December 1989. From January 1990, the paper was published 
twice a week, while daily appearance was achieved on 2 April 1990. The original publisher 
“Lidové noviny Society,” founded by dissidents closely connected to Lidové noviny samiz-
dat’s past, subsequently founded the joint stock company Lidové noviny A.S. with a new 
editorial staff.
The second exception was the daily Hospodářské noviny (The Economic Daily), which 
was launched on 21 May 1990 by the joint stock company Economia A.S.. The initial share-
holders of the company were the state and state owned institution (e.g. the wire agency 
CTK), including state owned banks (e.g. Czechoslovak Trade Bank ČSOB). Hospodářské 
noviny used the name of a weekly that specialised in economic issues, and which was pub-
lished until May 1990 by the communist publishing house Rudé právo. 
The institutional owners and publishers of other dailies remained the same for several 
months after November 1989. Political change was manifested only by revolts of editorial 
staff against incumbent publishers and editors in chief, who had been appointed and con-
trolled by the Communist Party officials. At the beginning of 1990, Czech media were man-
aged in a self-government style by editors in chief, elected by the editorial staff. This state of 
affairs produced a situation that enabled the spontaneous privatisation of the media.
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The process was kicked off by the daily Mladá fronta. Its publisher, the Central Com-
mittee of the Socialist Youth Union SSM, perished. Negotiations about the transfer of pub-
lishing rights to the state owned publishing house Mladá fronta did not come to any con-
clusion. The property of the Communist Party had already been nationalised,17 and the 
deputies in the Federal Assembly had already initiated the same nationalisation procedure 
for the SSM property,18 To avoid an uncertain future, the editorial team made use of the 
new law on joint stock companies, and founded the company MAF A.S., which acquired 
publishing rights for a newspaper Mladá fronta Dnes (The Young Front Today). The first 
issue of the new daily appeared on 1 September 1990, with a layout and content very simi-
lar to that of the old Mladá fronta, which ceased to exist.
This model was repeated several times; only the details were different. Soon after, on 
16 September 1990, the editorial team of the Communist Party’s daily Rudé právo, estab-
lished the stock company Borgis A.S., which launched Rudé právo as a “leftist paper” two 
months later, on 16 November 1990. Unlike the editors of Mladá fronta, whose activities 
were coordinated and approved by the new political elite in the Czech Government, and 
who used the opportunity to rent the newsroom equipment from the old publisher, the 
Rudé právo editorial staff left everything behind, with the exception of its know-how.
On 27 February 1991, the editors of Zemědělské noviny set up the stock company ZN 1. 
zemská and on 31 March terminated their job contracts with the publishing house con-
trolled by the Ministry of Agriculture. The Ministry of Agriculture tried to keep the orig-
inal paper alive. The publishing house hired a new group of editors in March. However, 
they were not able to produce the paper on a daily basis; therefore the original Zemědělské 
noviny continued for several weeks as a weekly paper before it returned to periodicity. The 
old paper lost the competition with a new paper České a moravské Zemědělské novin in 
1992, when the Ministry of Agriculture stopped the cash flow subsidising the paper.
Analogous cases, when two newspapers or magazines with the same or similar names 
were published simultaneously, were not rare in the initial period of spontaneous privati-
zation. The winner in such a competition was usually the group of editors with more ex-
tensive experience and with better relations to the printing works or to the company PNS 
A.S., the dominant press distributor in the Czech Republic.
Old political parties and trade unions were able to retain their once popular newspa-
pers (e.g. Lidová demokracie, Práce, Svobodné slovo), but only few of these were able to 
survive in the new competitive free market environment. The Czechoslovak People’s Party 
sold Lidová demokracie to a private company, which stopped the publication as an unprof-
itable business in July 1994. 
The publishing right to the daily Práce was passed to the Association of Trade Unions, 
the heir to the old monopoly communist union organisation ROH. The Association had 
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subsidised the publishing till 1995, when its majority interest in the publisher’s company 
was sold to an entrepreneur, Vladimír Stehlík, who turned the daily into a publicity tool 
for his business interests. In April 1997 Stehlík’s majority stake was acquired by the print-
ing works Česká typografie, which terminated publishing at the end of 1997.
The Czechoslovak Socialist Party lost the majority interest in Svobodné slovo in favour 
of the Czech Investment and Postal Bank (IPB), which provided loans to the loss-mak-
ing publishers operations. IPB later sold the majority stake to a holding company of the 
Chemapol group, which passed the publishing rights to the N-Tisk company of Mittel-
rhein Verlag in 1998. Svobodné slovo changed its name to Slovo in 1997, and perished in 
2001, when it was incorporated into the regional press group organised by German Ver-
lagsgruppe Passau.
The period of spontaneous privatisation ended in approximately 1992, when the real 
privatisation of state property, in compliance with the new privatisation law, began. 
4.2 FOREIGN INVESTORS
Apart from the spontaneous privatisation of existing dailies, Czech and foreign inves-
tors made several attempts at launching a new national daily. Only a few of these survived. 
All the papers with political ambitions perished sooner or later. Among them Občanský 
deník (Civic daily) of the Civic Forum (3 May 1990 – 12 October 1991) and Český deník 
(Czech daily) supporting the right-of-centre Democratic Union DEU (14 October 1991 – 31 
December 1994), or Denní Telegraf (The Daily Telegraph) which was subsidised by Czech 
banks and supported Václav Klaus’ ODS (1 January 1994 – 6 November 1997).
The first foreign publisher to enter the Czech media market was the Ringier publishing 
house from Switzerland. In 1991, Ringier had started the economic weekly Českomoravský 
profit, inspired by the Swiss magazine, Cash. In April 1992 Ringier launched the very first 
Czech colour tabloid, Blesk (Flash), whose model was the Swiss tabloid Blick.
The other foreign publishers mostly seized the opportunity to bring to the Czech magazine 
market clones of their home products (e.g. Burda, Bravo, Tina, Readers’ Digest, Chip, Autotip 
etc.). As for the daily press, foreign investors tried to join the already existing papers.
The new Czech owners of dailies were looking for strategic partners, because they were 
short of capital badly needed for the development and modernisation of outdated equip-
ment and technology in the industry. Most of the new local shareholders were ready to 
abandon their controlling shares, because opportunities to sell shares and stock to foreign 
publishers were very profitable.19
Since Czech capital was not at hand, foreign publishers took control of the spontane-
ously privatised (Mladá fronta, Zemědělské noviny) as well as the newly created (Lidové 
noviny, Hospodářské noviny) newspapers.
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In the beginning, not only German, but also French publishers were active in the Czech 
media market. The Socpress (French Hersant group) came, via a new company, Mafra, 
into the ownership of Mladá fronta Dnes and the French-German-American consortium, 
Eurexpansion, bought the controlling share in Economia A.S.. Owing to the financial prob-
lems of its mother company, Socpress sold its shares in Mafra to the German Rhineland 
group Rheinisch-Bergische Verlagsgesellschaft (RBVG) in 1995. A year later, in 1996, the 
control of Economia A.S. was passed to the publishing group Verlagsgruppe Handesbslatt, 
represented by the HB-DJ Investments B.V. which is connected to the Dow Jones group.20
The initial strategy of foreign investors was expansion. They tried to use any available 
opportunity. The most active of these were, besides the Ringier company, three smaller 
German publishers: Verlagsgruppe Passau VLP (Passauer Neue Presse), Rheinsch-Bergische 
Verlagsgesellschaft RBVG (Dűsseldorf), and Mittelrhein Verlag MRV (Koblenz). None of 
them figures among the top ten media companies in Germany in terms of turnover. 
All of them publish not national, but regional press (Rheinisch Post, Passauer Neue 
Presse, Rhein Post). 
It is interesting that the major German players, like WAZ, Kirchgruppe or Axel Springer 
did not succeed to the same degree as did these smaller players.21 There are manifold rea-
sons for this. The major German publishers were hesitant to enter the Czech media mar-
ket during the initial period of privatisation. They were looking primarily for national me-
dia, which in those days either were unprofitable, or already had an owner. Therefore, they 
were ready to enter only into alliances with the Ringier company, which was fast enough 
to establish itself as a national publisher.22 
The small regional German publishers were ready to invest in regional press and in 
small markets. The Verlagsgruppe Passau was initially interested only in the local press in 
the South Bohemia region neighbouring on Bavaria, and only later seized the opportuni-
ty to expand nationwide. Not all the above-mentioned publishers succeeded. Mittelrhein 
Verlag left the publishing business in the Czech Republic in 2001.
4.3 CZECH REGIONAL PRESS PRIVATISATION  
AND ROLE OF THE GERMAN PUBLISHERS
A special case in Czech media history was the privatisation of seven regional dailies and 
of many other county papers and magazines that were sold to the Verlagsgruppe Passau 
(VGP). The former publisher of regional dailies was the Communist Party of Czechoslo-
vakia (KPC), i.e. its regional committees. The local county papers were published by local 
authorities, Národní výbory, today’s municipalities.
The Czechoslovak Parliament and the Government decided in May 1990 that all KPC 
property should become state property, and that only the state had the right to manage it 
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and to dispose of it.23 The former publishing house Rudé právo of the KPC Central Com-
mittee was turned into two state companies, Delta and Deltapress. A young manager with 
no active communist past Vlastimil Košťál was appointed as its head.
When the privatisation acts were passed in 1991, Košťál teamed up with the publish-
er of the Passauer Neue Presse, the VGP group, and helped them to design privatisation 
projects in such a way that they won the approval of the Fund of National Property and 
of the authorities. The VGP Czech companies, Vltava A.S. and Labe A.S. took control over 
four of seven regional dailies. Vlastimil Košťál became the CEO of these companies. Vltava 
and Labe gradually bought nearly all the local county papers from the municipalities, and 
turned them into supplements of their daily regional newspapers.
VGP gained control over all regional press in the Czech Republic, with the exception of 
the Prague and Moravian regions. Three important papers there were in the possession of 
the Rheinisch-Bergische Verlagsgesellschaft RBVG (Svoboda in Ostrava, Rovnost in Brno) 
and Ringier, and later Mittelrhein Verlag MRV (Moravskoslezský deník Den).
In 2000, the VGP consolidated several of its Czech companies, including the publish-
ers Vltava and Labe, into one big company, Vltava-Labe-Press (VLP). Next year VLP took 
control of all regional press in the Czech Republic thanks, to an arrangement with other 
German publishers.
The VGP case can serve as a perfect example of the investors’ change of strategy. At first, 
all these companies adopted a strategy of expansion and competed fiercely with their ri-
vals trying to grab the largest possible share of the market. Then, at the end of the nine-
ties, the same companies decided to concentrate their activities on specialised fields where 
they had already gained some prominence.
For example, in the years 1994–1995, a new tabloid Expres, published by MRV, became a 
serious rival to a Ringier tabloid Blesk. Ringier bought the paper from MRV in 1996, and in 
return yielded its regional Moravian daily Moravskoslezský den. Later on Ringier got rid of 
the daily Lidové noviny, which was sold to RBVG, the owner of another “mainstream” daily 
Mladá fronta Dnes. 
Around 2000, all the German investors reached a mutual agreement on the future of 
the Czech regional press. RBVG and MRV passed their Moravian dailies Svoboda, Rovnost 
and Den, to the VGP group, which merged all three editorial boards into one. The flag lines 
of the three publications, now called “Moravia dailies”, remained different, but their con-
tent became uniform.
The Mittelrhein group (MRV) sold to the VGP not only Den, but also its ailing national 
newspapers, Zemské noviny and Slovo. (MRV pulled out of the publishing industry in the 
Czech Republic and remained active only in the Czech printing industry.) VGP merged 
these dailies into Pražské slovo (Prague Word), which ceased to exist in December 2001. 
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Since VGP also acquired the local Prague evening paper Večerník Praha, from RBVG, its ex-
pansion to all the Czech regions was now complete. 
The financial details of the above mentioned transactions are not public; the consolida-
tion of ownership and control over Czech business takes place abroad, in Germany, in the 
company POL-Print Medien GMBH. In return for the regional periodical Svoboda, Rovnost 
and Večerník Praha, the Rheinische RBVG group is to receive a twenty percent share in the 
POL-Print Medien company, according to available information.24
5 PRINT MEDIA MARKET
5.1 DAILY NEWSPAPERS
Six national daily newspapers under the control of five owners are now being published 
in the Czech Republic. Only five of these can be considered a part of the full-fledged na-
tional press, because the daily, Haló sobota, is rather a Communist Party bulletin with a 
small readership. From the point of view of ownership, no publisher occupies any monop-
oly or dominant position in the national daily press.
Table 2 CZECH NATIONAL DAILY NEWSPAPERS IN 2003
TITLE PUBLISHER OWNER OWNERSHIP 
SHARE (%)
AVERAGE SOLD 
CIRCULATION
(OCTOBER 2003*)
BLESK RINGIER CˇR A.S. RINGIER NEDERLAND B.V. 100 485,334
MF DNES MAFRA A. S. RBVG - RHEINISCH-BERGISCHE 
VERLAGSGESELLSCHAFT
MAF A.S.
74 
 
26
316,206
PRÁVO BORGIS A.S. ZDENEˇK PORYBNÝ
SMALL SHAREHOLDERS
91.4 
8.6
189,593
LIDOVÉ NOVINY LIDOVÉ NOVINY 
A.S.
PRESSINVEST A.S.  
(OWNED BY THE RBVG)
SMALL SHAREHOLDERS
96.93 
3.07
77,558
HOSPODÁRˇSKÉ NOVINY ECONOMIA A.S. HB-DJ INVESTMENTS
CˇTK
SMALL SHAREHOLDERS
77.5 
10.9 
11.6
74,195
HALÓ NOVINY FUTURA A.S. CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE 
COMMUNIST PARTY KSCˇM
+ SMALL SHAREHOLDERS 
MAJORITY N.A.
CˇESKOSLOVENSKÝ SPORT CˇS.SPORT A.S. RINGIER CˇR A.S. –  
THE COMPLETE CONTROL WAS 
ACQUIRED AT THE END OF 2003 
100 69,274
Note: * Audit Bureau of Circulation ČR.25
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On the other hand, the regional press is fully controlled by the VGP publisher, Vltava-
Labe-Press. VLP’s Bohemia division publishes 45 daily newspapers, and the Moravia di-
vision 9 daily newspapers. In Prague, VLP publishes the evening paper Večerník Praha. 
Besides, VLP prints 17 weekly papers as supplements to individual regional dailies, and 2 
independent regional weeklies.
Table 3 REGIONAL DAILY NEWSPAPERS  
OF THE PUBLISHING HOUSE VLTAVA-LABE-PRESS (VGP)
DAILIES AVERAGE SOLD 
CIRCULATION 
(OCTOBER 2003*)
READERSHIP 
(2nd AND 3rd QUARTER 2003**)
DAILIES MORAVIA 170,860 CENTRAL +EAST 
MORAVIA – 202,000
MORAVSKOSLEZSKÝ 
DENÍK – 145,000
ROVNOST – 98,000
VYSOCˇINA – 78,000 ∑= 523,000
DAILIES EAST BOHEMIA 58,919 248,000
DAILIES NORTH BOHEMIA 53,407 203,000
DAILIES WEST BOHEMIA 61,880 180,000
DAILIES SOUTH BOHEMIA 46,725 150,000
DAILIES CENTRAL BOHEMIA
+ VECˇERNÍK PRAHA
70,856 150,000
TOTAL 462,647 1,454,000
Notes: *Audit Bureau of Circulation ČR.
**Media Projekt 2003.
This state of affairs has been publicly criticised from time to time by patriotic-minded 
intellectuals26 or by politicians who want to present themselves to the electorate as de-
fenders of national interests. For example, VLP has been blamed for being an advocate of 
the Sudeten Germans’ interest in the Czech Republic. However, evidence of any biased re-
porting regarding Czech-German issues is not available. An analysis of the content of the 
VLP Press, made by the Centre for Media Studies at Charles’ University,27 found out only 
that, in comparison with other papers, the VLP is avoiding controversies related to the 
Czech-German past, but never promotes any pro-German agenda.
In 2000 the market position of the Vltava-Labe-Press companies was the subject of an 
administrative procedure by the Office for the Protection of Competition. However, the 
Office decided that the relevant market of the daily press should be taken as a whole and 
not divided into sub-markets of the national and regional press. If the relevant market is 
defined this way, then the VLP has the position of one of many competitors.
 154 MEDIA OWNERSHIP AND ITS IMPACT ON MEDIA INDEPENDENCE AND PLURALISM
The Chairman of the Office, Josef Bednář, has confirmed this opinion several times.28 
The same opinion can be found in recent rulings of the Office, for instance in the case of 
litigation between two press distribution companies, PNS and Mediaprint & Kapa Preseg-
rosso.29 The Office for the Protection of Competition, when deciding about the merger of 
the newspaper, Československý sport, with Ringier two years ago, defined the publisher’s 
shares of the relevant market of the daily press as follows: VLP 29 percent, Mafra 22 per-
cent, Ringier 19 percent, Borgis 12 percent, Lidové noviny 5 percent, and others (Econo-
mia, Haló noviny, Sport) less than 5 percent.30
A description of the features of the Czech daily press can be found in a study on the 
Czech media written by a Czech university researcher living in Glasgow, Jan Čulík.31 The 
data from this study are a little outdated now, and sometimes too subjectively orient-
ed, but the characterisation of particular papers is still valid. The characteristics accord-
ing to Jan Čulík are the following: Blesk (Flash) – nationwide tabloid newspaper, Mladá 
fronta Dnes - a middle-brow daily of centre-right orientation, Právo – a centre-left daily 
with political views close to those of the ruling Social Democratic Party, Lidové noviny 
– moderately right-of-centre struggling to increase its readership by introducing tabloid 
themes while trying to retain its reputation as a newspaper read by the “cultural elite”, 
Hospodářské noviny specialises in economic and business issues.
With the exception of the communist Haló noviny, the daily press is independent of po-
litical parties and of any obvious particular interest group. The newspapers are following 
the policy of their publishers, who are interested in the efficiency and prosperity of their 
papers, in the stability of society, and in maintaining fair conditions for entrepreneurship.
It is paradoxical that the most vulnerable paper in terms of editorial policy is the daily 
Právo, whose publisher Borgis is in Czech hands. (Borgis is controlled by its editor in chief, 
Zdeněk Porybný, who owns a 91.4 percent share in the company.) On the one hand, the 
leftist orientation of the paper produces more critical and oppositional political columns 
and editorials, compared with the other daily press. On the other hand, Právo, not hav-
ing the backing of financially strong owner, is liable to yield to the pressure of advertising 
money. Právo was ready to support newly born Czech capital against international compe-
tition, even in such dubious cases as the dispute of TV Nova with the US company, CME.
5.2 MAGAZINES
The post war Czech Republic did not enjoy a tradition of having an influential political 
magazine. Attempts to revive the respected newsmagazines (Reportér) or influential cul-
tural magazines (Literární noviny) of the sixties, which perished after the Russian inva-
sion in 1968, failed.
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While there is a wealth of lifestyle magazines for women, girls, family or home, only three 
or four magazines, launched after the Velvet Revolution, have some political ambition.
Respekt is the oldest one. It is the successor of an opposition samizdat paper, Informační 
servisI, from 1989. It has a black and white format, which does not attract many advertisers. 
No wonder that the big publishers have lost their initial interest in the magazine, whose 
readership is not large and consists mainly of intellectuals. The 93 percent majority in the 
publishing company, R-PRESSE s.r.o., is owned by Duke Karl Schwarzenberg, a Chancellor 
to the former Czech President, Václav Havel. Schwarzenberg’s investment in the unprof-
itable magazine with a circulation of about 18,000 sold copies is of a political nature: he 
wants to support an independent liberal paper, dedicated to the idea of civil society.
Contrary to Respekt, a weekly with a similar name, Reflex, launched by a group of Czech 
journalists in 1990, won the favour of readers and advertisers, thanks to its format, which 
“stands on the borderline between a current affairs periodical and a ‘society’ glossy.”32 The 
magazine’s founder sold the weekly to Ringier, which keeps the magazine in its portfolio to 
this day. Reflex is not a typical newsmagazine; political topics occupy a minor part of the 
magazine’s content. The average sold circulation varies between 55,000 and 60,000 copies.
The most popular Czech newsmagazine Týden (Week) has changed its publisher sev-
eral times since its beginning in 1994; among its publishers were Axel-Springer-Verlag and 
Ringier. Since Týden was a loss-making venture, Ringier sold the publishing company Me-
diacop, to a Polish entrepreneur with Swiss citizenship, Sebastian Pawlowski. Pawlowski 
invested a reportedly large but undisclosed sum of money in the weekly, and he replaced 
the editorial team with younger, well-motivated editors. Over a period of two years the 
circulation increased threefold, from 20,000 copies to 60,000 sold copies.
Týden has no pronounced political profile. Nevertheless, the business interests of the 
publisher can be tracked down through investigative stories from the world of commerce. 
Pawlowski, whose real-estate business in Prague needs political support, is an example of 
the new trend in media investing, in which the entrepreneurs who come from other indus-
tries than the media are interested in having influential media.
A vested economic interest lies in the background of still another weekly magazine, 
Euro, whose publisher, Euronews A.S., is financed by a mighty Czech financial group PPF 
which recently acquired a majority interest in the television station Nova. Euro tries to 
compete with the conservative business weekly, Ekonom, which belongs to the family of 
periodicals published by Economia A.S. .
With an average circulation of 25,000 sold copies the Ekonom is the most popular busi-
ness periodical. The circulation data of Euro are contested by Euro’s competitors, who 
draw attention to the fact that the PPF subsidised Euro sells a large part of the 21,000 print 
run at discount prices. 
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6 BROADCAST MEDIA MARKET
6.1 TELEVISION MARKET
The Czech Republic introduced a full-fledged mixed public-private system in both ra-
dio and the television broadcasting rather early, in the years 1991–1994. There are four 
nationwide terrestrial television channels available: two public service channels, CT1 and 
CT2, and two private commercial channels, TV Nova and TV Prima. Besides, twelve lo-
cal TV stations in the regions operate mainly as local “window” programmes, sharing fre-
quencies with the overall frame of the TV Prima broadcast system. Only two local stations, 
TV Praha and TV Hradec Králové, operate their own frequencies. The data in Table 4 show 
that the dominant TV broadcaster in the Czech Republic is TV Nova, with the viewership 
share between 40-50 percent.
Apart from five radio programmes broadcast by the public service broadcaster, Český 
rozhlas (Czech Radio), there are 77 other radio stations,33 among them two – Frekvence 1 
and Impuls – with nation-wide coverage.
Table 4 AUDIENCE SHARE OF CZECH TV CHANNELS IN THE YEARS 1994–2002 (in percentages)
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
TV NOVA 68.4 71.2 65.2 52.0 51.3 50.4 46.3 47.7 44.2
CˇT1 24.2 20.6 24.9 27.9 26.7 25.2 23.8 21.5 21.2
CˇT2 2.3 3.0 3.6 7.1 7.3 7.0 7.5 7.6 8.7
PRIMA TV 1.7 2.7 3.7 9.1 11.1 12.4 16.5 17.6 20.3
OTHERS 3.4 2.5 2.6 3.8 3.6 5.0 5.8 5.6 5.6
Source: Media Projekt 94-96, ATO TN Sofres TV Projekt 1997–2002. In: Annual Reports of the Czech Broadcasting 
Council 1994–1997, <http://www.czech-tv.cz>, <http://www.ato.cz>.
The liberal approach to media policy that prevailed in Czech society in the middle of 
the nineties affected the changes in the broadcast legislation and also in the structure of 
ownership in 1995. An amendment to the Broadcasting Law in December 1995 curbed the 
power of the regulator, the Czech Broadcasting Council, to control the ownership rela-
tions of licensed companies.34 This erroneous move was corrected in another amendment 
to the Broadcasting Law eighteen months later.35 However, the regulatory principle, ac-
cording to which the Czech Broadcasting Council should control the ownership of media 
only in licensed companies, and not in other companies, remained unchanged.
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6.1.1 TV NOVA AND TV PRIMA
Television Nova has been and still is a frequent topic of political debates, mainly be-
cause of its negative cultural impact, low common denominator of programming, and be-
cause of its confrontational strategy against public service Czech television. Public criti-
cism of Nova and of its director, Vladimír Železný, increased in 2003, after the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Tribunal decided that the Czech Republic had to pay about USD 355 million 
to Nova’s former partner, Central European Media Enterprises (CME), as a remedy for not 
having protected CME investments in the country. As a consequence of several legal ac-
tions taken by CME against the founder and former TV Nova owner, Vladimír Železný, he 
lost control over the station in 2002. The new owners decided to remove him from the 
CEO position at Nova in May 2003. 
A brief recapitulation of the story of Nova television is as follows: The licence was 
awarded to a limited company, CET 21, which had no necessary capital available. The 
launching of a very successful commercial station was made possible by investments pro-
vided by the Czech Savings Bank (Česká spořitelna) and CME. When CME announced that 
it intended to merge its all-European activities with SBS Broadcasting in 1999, Vladimír 
Železný started a new broadcast project with a new partner, the Czech company Česká 
produkční 2000. Prior to the split, Železný gained control over the licensed CET 21 and left 
the joint venture, ČNTS (Česká nezávislá televizní společnost), owned by CME. The new 
Nova was financed by MEF Holding, a group with a credit link to the Czech Investment 
and Postal Bank (IPB). This move triggered several legal actions, among them three inter-
national arbitration procedures against Vladimír Železný and against the Czech state.
Ronald Lauder, an owner of CME, partly succeeded in his claims, so Vladimír Železný 
had to return USD 29 million to the CME, and the Czech Republic had to pay the above 
mentioned damage claims amounting to USD 355 million in May 2003. These legal actions 
weakened not only Vladimír Železný’s position, but also the position of his new partner, 
MEF Holding, controlled by a young financier, Jiří Šmejc. Television Nova and its compa-
nies became the target of a takeover attack from the mighty Czech financial group, PPF, in 
the summer 2002.
It was the PPF which resolved Nova’s legal problems with the CME. In September 2002, 
the PPF settled Železný’s liabilities to the CME (USD 29 million) in return for his shares in 
the companies of Nova. In September 2003, the PPF bought the Czech CME subsidiary, 
ČNTS, which was a subject of litigation between CET 21 and CME. By these actions the PPF 
secured its leading position within the Nova group of companies. On 19 December 2003, 
the PPF announced that the ownership ratio of the two financial groups, PPF and MEF 
Holding (renamed Nova Holding), in the so-called “Nova group” was 66/34. 
The second commercial channel TV Prima is also controlled by a Czech owner. In the 
years 1994–2000 the controversial Czech Investment and Postal Bank (IPB) was the main 
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investor in TV Prima. When the Government put IPB under forced administration in June 
2000, and IPB was sold to the Czechoslovak Trade Bank (ČSOB), GES Holding, a group with 
close ties to the management of IPB, managed to gain control over IPB’s share in TV Prima. 
Some unconfirmed reports said that the MEF Holding, then the owner of Nova, financially 
assisted this transaction. 
MEF Holding and GES Holding are investors who emerged from the murky waters of pri-
vatisation. In particularly GES, controlled by financier Ivan Zach, consists of an intricate web 
of companies, interconnected among themselves by obscure relations. Such an environ-
ment helps to create loop-holes for non-transparent tax, credit and investment operations.
The PPF, which recently gained control over Nova, is more developed in terms of trans-
parency, despite the fact that its original genesis is also a little ambiguous. The PPF has a 
solid financial background for the time being, thanks to its ownership of the largest Czech 
insurance bank, Česká pojišťovna.
As to the programming of their channels, TV Nova and TV Prima are competitors, but 
they coordinate their activities in fields of common interest, for instance, in purchasing 
foreign programmes and sports, in the pricing policy for advertisement sales, or in build-
ing a united front against the public service broadcaster, Czech Television.
From the political point of view, both TV Nova and TV Prima try to be neutral and bal-
anced in relation to the Government and the opposition. The objectivity of their news-re-
porting has some limits imposed by the business interests of their owners. The owners do 
not openly interfere with the journalistic independence of the editorial staff, nor do they 
try to push through any promotional news to be aired. On the other hand, TV Nova and 
TV Prima have been silent whenever any issues or affairs connected to their business in-
terests were discussed (for instance, an investigation on wasted money in the Government 
project, “Internet for Schools”, or critical comments on manoeuvring of personal data in 
the e-Banka, owned by the PPF).
No doubt, investing in television is primarily a profit making activity for the owners of 
the Czech commercial stations. However, it cannot be ruled out that a large amount of 
money invested by the PPF in Television Nova also has another aim: to gain political influ-
ence to pursue its own vested interests.
6.1.2 GES MEDIA GROUP
The smaller GES group, with ambitions that are not as far reaching, tries to improve its 
portfolio and to build its empire through expansion into other media. GES Media bought 
the local TV station, Galaxie, with two licenses in Hradec Králové and Prague in 2002. A 
GES company, FTV Premiéra, is a publisher of several magazines, and companies close to 
the GES group are developing a network of radio stations, Hey.
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6.2 RADIO MARKET
Among the Czech private radio broadcasters, there is no dominant station with a posi-
tion comparable to that of Nova TV on the television market. The three stations with the 
largest audience share are Čro1-Radiožurnál, operated by the public service Czech Radio, 
and two nationwide commercial radio stations Frekvence 1 and Radio Impuls. All of these 
have nearly the same share of the listening public, between 10 and 12 percent. The rest of 
the audience share is dispersed among seventy other private local stations, some of which 
are interconnected into co-operating mini-networks (e.g. Evropa 2, Radio Kiss).
From the point of view of ownership, the most powerful position in the radio market is 
occupied by a group belonging to a French investor, Lagardere Active Radio International 
SA, which consists of a nation-wide station Frekvence 1, a set of stations Evropa 2 and a 
media sales agency Radio Regie Music (RRM).
The second largest private broadcaster, the nation-wide station Radio Impuls, is control-
led by a joint venture of radio broadcasters from Eastern Germany, the investment consor-
tium Eurocast Rundfunk Beteiligungs GMBH. Eight stations of Radio KISS, owned by a for-
eign investor – the Dutch company Radio Investments N.V., represent the third significant 
group of radio broadcasters, which also operates its own media sales house RadioNet.
Both media sales houses, RRM and RadioNet, offer their services to other radio stations 
not belonging to the group of their owners. For instance, Radio Impuls sells radio broad-
casting time via the RRM sales house of its competitor, Frekvence 1.
The third similar media sales house for radio stations, Media Marketing Service (MMS), 
serves 41 independent stations, among them the Hey stations related to the GES group. 
It cannot be ruled out that, in the background of the recent change of MMS ownership 
(Stamford Co.), lies money and the interests of the GES group.
The licensing policy of the Czech Broadcasting Council tries to maintain a plurality of 
local stations; therefore it has a hostile attitude toward local stations networking in the 
hands of a single owner. On the other hand, the Council does not object to any alliance of 
a local station with another media (e.g. Mafra + Radio Classic), on the condition that it 
conform with the new Broadcasting Act from 2001.
7 MEDIA INDEPENDENCE
The negative influence of economic pressures endangering media independence might 
also be detected in the conciliatory attitudes of the press towards the big ad-spenders. For 
instance, the monopolistic behavior of Czech Telecom before the deregulation of the tel-
ecom market was criticised only in independent weeklies (e.g. Respekt) and in the small 
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thematic periodicals, not in the mainstream press, because Czech Telecom has been and 
still is one of the biggest ad-spenders in the Czech media. The debt problems of the largest 
Czech travel agency, Fischer, which failed in timely payments of insurance fees at the be-
ginning of 2003, were disclosed by the public service television, not by any private media, 
because the Fischer travel agency is a big, and notably regular ad-spender in the media.36
Last but not least, economic pressure has a certain negative impact on the independ-
ence of journalists, who are working in a very competitive labour environment, where 
supply surpasses demand. In general, Czech journalists accept, without any objections, 
the contracts and working conditions set by publishers and broadcasters. Most journalists 
are ready to adopt the position of their employers. The only legal framework for contracts 
is set in the labour legislation; there is no collective agreement on the national level be-
tween the journalists’ association and media publishers.
The Czech journalists’ only association, the Trade Union of Czech Journalists is not a 
very influential organisation. The majority of active journalists in the leading mainstream 
media (national dailies, radio and television) are not members, and the Trade Union vol-
untarily gave up its syndicate role. The Trade Union is focusing its activity on media eth-
ics, on setting and defending professional standards, and on presenting to the public the 
views of the journalistic profession.
Media publishers and broadcasters support investigative journalism only exceptionally, 
not because of its contentious nature, but because it is an expensive, time consuming and 
costly affair. Items of investigative journalism are produced mainly by commercial and 
public service television, and by some information weeklies (Respekt, Reflex). Neverthe-
less, priority is given to scandalous topics with the potential to attract media audience, in-
stead of to socially and politically essential issues.
If there is a barrier to media journalistic pluralism and independence, it is not of insti-
tutional nature.
8 CONCLUSIONS
Freedom of expression and the market economy – these were the two main elements 
that influenced media development in the Czech Republic after November 1989.
The initial stage of development was characterised by the entry of many new media 
players, and by a boom in new media outlets. The consolidation of the media market and 
the concentration of media ownership began in the mid-nineties.
Ownership concentration in the Czech media is still under way; for the time being it 
has not reached an extent that could endanger media freedom or media pluralism. The 
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number of competitors in the field of press and radio broadcasting is still sufficient to 
guarantee an institutional environment favourable to the existence of pluralistic media.
Unlike the press and radio, the Czech television broadcasting sector experienced the 
dominant position of TV Nova, which in the mid-nineties had a 70 percent share of the 
television audience. Since then TV Nova’s market share has dropped below 50 percent, 
among other things because of the better performance of its competitors.
As long as digital technology has not opened new communication channels for new tel-
evision stations, the only defence against the dominance of one or two commercial stations 
on the Czech television market is public service broadcasting supported by the state.
The battlefield for maintaining media pluralism is now the debate about the future of 
the public service broadcaster. Czech Television is facing a shortage of funds, because the 
license fee of 75 Czech crowns monthly (EUR 3.3) has not been increased since 1997. Some 
members of Parliament are tempted to exchange their willingness to approve a higher li-
cence fee for the greater loyalty of Czech Television news and current affairs programmes 
towards politicians.
On the other hand, the Czech media landscape did not experience any brutal attempts 
by politicians to assault free media or to manipulate them in favour of any particular party 
interests. The immunity of the people to political indoctrination through the media, which 
developed during the time of the totalitarian regime, is still high. 
A present menace for media freedom and pluralism in the Czech Republic may result 
more from economic than from political pressures. Not only because of concentration of 
media ownership, but also because of the small size of the Czech media market and be-
cause of the lack of chances to survive in niche markets. Nearly all the Czech media are 
targeting the “majority audience.” The quest for the largest possible audience makes me-
dia content more uniform and less varied. The “tabloidisation” or “boulevardisation” of the 
Czech media are now frequently the subject of discussion.
The Czech media market is still open for new players. However, entry is not as simple 
and easy as ten years ago. All the basic segments of the market are already occupied. The 
launching of a new periodical will cost more time and more money until a new audience 
for the particular product will emerge.
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1. Collection of Laws of the Czech Republic, <http://
www.mvcr.cz>.
2. Czech Parliament – documents, stenos, <http://
www.psp.cz>.
3. Annual reports of the Council for Radio and Televi-
sion Broadcasting, <http://www.rrtv.cz>.
4. Commercial Register, <http://www.justice.cz>.
5. Financial statements in the Commercial Bulletin.
6. Print run data from Audit Bureau of Circulation ABC 
CR. <http://www.abccr.cz>. 
7. Audience data from Association of Television Organi-
zations ATO, <http://www.ato.cz>.
8. Weekly Media & Marketing, <http://www.mam.cz>. 
9. Annual Report of Publishers Union, <http://
www.uvdt.cz>.
1 As to mass media policy, the declaration of the new 
Czech government after the 1992 election said: “... the 
government will promote plurality in the mass media, 
because a free information market is a guarantee of 
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noviny, 23 July 1992.
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er mass information media. For details see: Šmíd, 
Milan. “History of the Czech Press Law: A missing 
definition of public interest - the obstacle to the new 
media legislation in the Czech Republic?”. In: Interna-
tional Journal of Communication Law and Policy. See 
<http://www.digital-law.net/IJCLP/2_1999/ijclp_web-
doc_13_2_1999.htm> (accessed 25 October 2003).
3 Act no. 468/1991 Coll., on radio and television broad-
casting.
4 Article 10, par.6, of the Broadcasting Act no. 468/1991.
5 Act no. 63/1991 Coll., on the protection of economic 
competition.
6 Article 8a of the Act no. 63/1991: “The linking of 
companies which might or could infringe economic 
competition needs the approval of the Ministry. The 
infringing of competition is caused by linking of com-
panies, whose turnover at the national or local market 
of relevant goods will exceed 30 percent.”
7 Act no. 46/2000 Coll., on rights and duties when pub-
lishing periodical press (Press Law).
8 Act no. 231/2001 Coll., on radio and television broad-
casting .
9 Act no. 143/2001 Coll., on the protection of economic 
competition.
10 Act no.105/1990 Coll., on private entrepreneurship.
11 Act no.104/1990 Coll., on stock companies. 
12 Act no. 427/1990 Coll., on the transfer of state proper-
ty of some objects to other legal or natural persons..
13 Act no. 92/1991 Coll., on the conditions of the transfer 
of state property to other persons.
14 The Act no 513/1991 Coll., Commercial Code, and the 
Act no. 455/1991 Coll., on small businesses, invalidate 
the „provisional“ Acts no. 104 and no. 105 from 1990.
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Republic for the time being...”. Excerpts from the Min-
ister of Finance Kočárník’s speech at the trade fair 
FIBEX in Brno, 1 April 1996. In: Lidové noviny, 2 April 
1996, p. 12.
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the Federal Assembly no. 177/1990 Coll., on meas-
ures concerning property of political parties, politi-
cal movements and social organisations. The Regu-
lation of the Federal Government no. 212/1990 Coll., 
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utilized by the Czechoslovak Communist Party.
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no. 497/1990 Coll., on return of the Socialist Youth 
Union’s property to the people of the Czech and Slo-
vak Federative Republic.
19 According to the information published on the In-
ternet during the debate provoked by an essay “The 
Stolen Fronta, the Stolen Právo” in the monthly Listy 
(J.Vančura, Ukradená Fronta, ukradené Právo, in: 
Listy 1/1998, pp. 15–18), the shareholders of the ZN 
1.zemská (Zemědělské noviny) were allegedly sell-
ing at a price that was twelve-times higher than 
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cross-checked by company records in the court reg-
ister. Accessible at the <http://portal.justice.cz/uvod/
JusticeEN.aspx>.
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magazine Týdeník televize. Axel Springer Verlag was 
a partner in and a shareholder of the Czech Ringier 
company in 1996–2000.
23 See: The Legal measure by the presidium of the Fed-
eral Assembly no. 177/1990 Coll., on some measures 
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Federal government ruling no. 212/1990 Coll., on the 
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1 INTRODUCTION
Th e media has played an outstanding role in the transformation and liberalisation proc-
ess of Estonian society. During privatisation, it was mainly the editorial teams who be-
came the owners of the newspapers. No banks or industry participated in media privatisa-
tion during the ﬁ rst years of the privatisation process.
Foreign capital was not interested (with some exceptions) in investments in Estonian 
media companies until . By that time the local companies had grown into big national 
corporations. Estonia is clearly situated inside the interest and inﬂ uence sphere of Scandi-
navian media companies. No German, English or French companies expressed interest in 
the Estonian media companies.
During the ten-year period of strong competition and rapid development, dominant 
major players appeared in every area - in the print media, in radio and . 
Stabilisation of the media market brings about joint ventures and agreements dividing 
the market among competing media companies. A very liberal legal framework has given 
the “green light” for media entrepreneurs to go ahead. 
2 FREE MEDIA MARKET – GIFT FROM RECENT HISTORY
Th ere is no legislation regulating publishing companies ownership or the registration 
of shares in the newspaper industry in Estonia. Th ere are no restrictions on ownership in 
publishing companies applying to foreign companies or to individuals. 
Th e reason why there are so few legislative restrictions and why such a model works in 
Estonia without any major problems can be found in recent history. Th e main historical 
reasons are: very strict regulations during the Soviet time concerning both organisational 
and content issues, and active participation of media in the liberation process in Estonia.
During the last decades of the Soviet period (–), the Estonian media system 
was similar to the Latvian and Lithuanian ones. All publications were  percent state-
owned, and legislation prohibited any kind of private media ownership.
Revenue from advertisements was marginal, mainly limited to that accrued by printing 
cinema, theatre and concert listings or obituaries. Th e advertising department did not ex-
ist. Commercials in general were unimportant because, as a rule, nobody wanted to buy 
the goods that were advertised, and those that the consumers would have liked to buy 
were unavailable anyway.
Naturally, in the Soviet Union the state had complete control over the contents of any 
media. A special censorship system (the so-called ) controlled and checked each 
porocilo.indb   2 22.5.2004, 13:46:14
ESTONIA 167
and every piece of published material. Censorship in the broadcast media was so thorough 
that since  even the prime-time news programme on  (Estonian ) was pre-re-
corded some hours before broadcast.¹ 
Th e editorial oﬃ  ces were controlled just as strictly: Th e Communist Party Central 
Committee in Moscow determined the editorial oﬃ  ce employee lists, the number of and 
payment norms for all papers, including the smallest ones, according to the type of the 
publication. Yet in spite of this very strict frame, journalists tried to use every opportunity 
to provide as objective information as possible.
Sometimes it is very diﬃ  cult for people from the Western world to understand the dou-
ble-faceted character of the Soviet press. On the one hand, the oﬃ  cial press was an impor-
tant part of the totalitarian state apparatus. On the other, the press in individual republics 
was an important part of national culture and a carrier of cultural opposition to the So-
viet system.² It is important to know this background in order to understand why the old 
“communist” newspapers survived the reforms, and to appreciate the role of the media in 
the past – during the struggle for independence – and in present times. 
Th e ﬁ rst opportunity for commercial media opened up with the Soviet Cooperation 
Law in . Th is law permitted private capital to be involved in small service companies 
(catering, taxi, souvenirs, clothing, etc.) Th is form of entrepreneurship also enabled pri-
vate businesses to establish publishing companies. Th e new media market was an excel-
lent chance for emerging entrepreneurship. By the end of the s, censorship did not 
work in practice any more. Many niches were there waiting to be ﬁ lled – there were no 
tabloids, business newspapers, automotive magazines, crosswords, erotic or other publi-
cations on the media market.
Cunning businessmen ﬁ lled the gap and the result was a genuine media boom. During 
the period – more than  periodicals were established!³ Most of them did not 
survive more than two or three years. However, the ﬁ rst (established in ) private “yel-
low” newspaper Nelli Teataja – “publishing the truth and almost the truth” – has survived 
to date, despite its modest circulation. Th ere were no private broadcasting companies 
then. Th e ﬁ rst private radio-station, owned by Trio , was established in . 
Estonian media played a signiﬁ cant role in the liberation movement – the so-called 
singing revolution. Th e ﬁ rst major changes had already taken place four years before Esto-
nia became independent. Th e state-owned Estonian Radio and  aired call-in shows in 
which the public discussed democratic changes. In , the state-owned media provided 
full live coverage of the mass meetings called the “Baltic chain,” dedicated to the anniver-
sary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop (Stalin’s Soviet Union – Hitler’s Germany) pact. Th ese 
mass meetings, which drew together two million people, were held in three Baltic coun-
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tries. Not only did the media broadcast the meeting, but the liberation movement used the 
media actively in preparing and conducting the event. 
Th is process proved that the media understood, shared and supported the goals of the 
nation. Such cooperation would have been dangerous for the media professionals should 
the liberation movement have failed. Th e journalists, nevertheless, actively participated 
and supported the national liberation movement. Public trust was conﬁ rmed by an in-
crease in the circulation of the largest daily that jumped to , copies (currently the 
largest daily’s circulation is ,). 
Hence, once the Republic of Estonia was restored in , people felt that their free-
dom of expression was so precious that any media restrictions were out of the question. 
Th e previous  years had brought nothing but restrictions. Th erefore, during the follow-
ing years when the state-owned media were replaced by private, market-oriented media, 
there was no need to change the initial liberal system. Conﬂ ict between public, personal or 
media interests was almost non-existent. All later attempts to regulate the media industry 
have met with public resistance.
Another reason for the few restrictions were massive changes that swept through Es-
tonian society at large. In the s, while the society in general was going through the 
very basic and the most vital reforms, regulation of the media was understandably not the 
highest priority.
3 MEDIA LEGISLATION
Estonia lacks a general press law, although political and cultural circles have made a 
number of attempts to push one through. Four media laws have been drafted during the 
last  years but none of them has ever been passed. Th ese drafts were made with very dif-
ferent goals in mind. Some of them tried to deﬁ ne information and some to force media to 
be objective and represent the interests of diﬀ erent interest groups equally.
Since the mid s, the introduction of a media law has not been seen as an important 
issue. Th ere are two main reasons for this. Firstly, media is regulated by other laws. Th ere 
are about ten diﬀ erent laws that regulate the media industry. Secondly, editorial oﬃ  ces ad-
here very strictly to the Press Code of Ethics. 
Th e Estonian Press Council, founded in , was actually the bridge between the press 
and the public, and it alleviated tensions between the press and various social groups. As 
an example of the increasing trust, we might point out that in  the Estonian Press 
Council received only  complaints, but in  there were already  of them. Although 
the code of ethics does not have the authority of law, it is very inﬂ uential. It was a joint ef-
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fort of all editorial oﬃ  ces and it was executed with great care. Th e code regulates all vital 
aspects in the work of a journalist. For example, it starts with a statement that a journalist 
keeps promises given to his/her information sources obliging the editorial oﬃ  ce to check 
any critical material and the reliability of the sources. In fact, the editorial oﬃ  ce is respon-
sible for the quality of the printed materials. 
Th e only media-targeted law in Estonia, the Broadcasting Act, was ﬁ nally approved by 
Parliament in , two years after private broadcasting companies were founded. Th e ne-
cessity derived not only from political ambitions but from the need to introduce licences 
in order to regulate and distribute transmission frequencies. Th e Broadcasting Act has 
been amended several times during the s.
3.1 REGULATION OF MEDIA MARKET
Media enterprises do not have a special status; their activities are regulated as in all 
other industries. No licenses or special registrations are necessary for establishing a news-
paper, whether based on national or foreign capital. Also, every person in Estonia can es-
tablish a printing house or order any printed material. Th ere have been some attempts at 
regulating the print media. In  it was a publicly known fact that the Government was 
drafting a decree which would have introduced a licensing system for new publications 
involving foreign ownership. A huge outcry from the press killed the decree and it never 
materialised.⁴
Currently, every Estonian citizen or any foreigner may be involved in the media busi-
ness. Th e most prevalent form of business is a limited-liability company with share capital 
of at least  , (approx.  ,). 
All media businesses are mostly regulated by two laws – the Commercial Code and the 
Law on Competition. Th e Commercial Code regulates the founding, registration, report-
ing and auditing of businesses, and the same regulation applies to media businesses. All 
entrepreneurs and enterprises should be registered in the Business Registry. Th e data in 
the Business Registry is public. Everybody may request short reports regarding the regis-
tered owners and documents of enterprises at a comparatively low price (about  , in 
some cases less).
Th ere is no special registry for the owners of media businesses. It is likely that even if it 
existed, it would not be very eﬃ  cient as there are various possibilities for concealing own-
ership (i.e. oﬀ -shore companies, involvement of law oﬃ  ces etc.).
Th e Law on Competition prohibits agreements between enterprises that harm compe-
tition. Th e same law regulates the mergers of businesses. Th e Competition Oﬃ  ce may pro-
hibit a merger if it signiﬁ cantly damages competition on the market or causes a monopoly. 
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In reality, the Competition Oﬃ  ce has never prohibited any merger of any media business-
es. It did not act when the two largest corporations joined their magazines and tabloids. 
Licenses for  stations are granted by the Ministry of Culture according to the results 
of the public tender. Th e results of the competition are not inﬂ uenced by the source of the 
capital. In  one broadcast license was given to Modern Times Group based on Swed-
ish capital and thus  was born. In January , the state commission decided to ex-
tend current national television licences held by private owners until  October .
Private  stations have to pay a frequency license fee of   million (a little less than 
  million). Th is is basically compensation for the state-owned  for its not show-
ing any commercials (it stopped doing that in ), and the fee will probably increase to 
  million (approx.  . million) during the next few years. Th e state  does not 
receive this money directly.
According to the Broadcasting Act, the state may refuse to grant a broadcasting license. 
Th is may happen when there is a possibility of a press or information monopoly develop-
ing in a certain region or when competition principles are not observed. Th e broadcast-
ing license may also be refused if the same enterprise owns a  station and publishes a 
newspaper. One company that seems to have come close to violating the provisions of this 
law is the largest Estonian media corporation Eesti Meedia whose owner is the Norwegian 
Schibsted-Group.  channel Kanal  is part of Eesti Meedia group and at the same time 
Eesti Meedia owns two national newspapers. But Kanal  is registered as the property of 
the Norwegian company, and Postimees, a national daily, as the property of Eesti Media. 
So, formally, the company is not in contravention of the law. 
4 MEDIA SUBSIDIES 
Th ere are two kinds of subsidies granted to the Estonian press: annual subsidy provided 
by Parliament to important cultural publications, and subsidies provided by the Govern-
ment for the distribution of newspapers in rural regions. Th is enables the rural population 
to buy national and other regional newspapers at the same price as local publications.
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Table  STATE SUBSIDIES TO THE ESTONIAN PRESS (in approx. )
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
CULTURAL
PUBLICATIONS
 575,000  700,000  700,000  700,000  700,000  700,000
DISTRIBUTION  960,000  960,000  960,000  960,000  960,000  960,000
TOTAL 1,535,000 1,660,000 1,660,000 1,660,000 1,660,000 1,660,000
Source: Estonian Newspaper Association, .
To a certain extent, state subsidies to the largest political parties can also be regarded as 
support for the press. During the last three years the amount of subsidies has been   
million (approx.  . million). It will probably increase to   million in  (ap-
prox.   million). Th is subsidy is not given for newspaper publishing, but in some ways 
it could be considered as support for plurality of opinion. Th e largest Estonian party, Kes-
kerakond (Centre Party), publishes its weekly in which they propagate socio-democratic 
ideology. So far, however, it has remained a niche product.
In Estonia there is no subsidy-system under which the state supports smaller competi-
tors on the print media market. And the experience of many county papers (i.e. the region-
al newspapers of Rapla and Saaremaa) shows that good management and good-quality 
contents make it possible to build a newspaper from scratch and to get ahead of the mar-
ket leader without any subsidies. 
5 MEDIA PRIVATISATION
Privatisation of the state-owned periodicals took about ﬁ ve years (–). In , 
only two newspapers (a cultural weekly and a weekly for teachers) and about ten cultural 
magazines were still owned by the state. 
Th e privatisation of newspapers was a natural continuation of the general privatisation 
process in Estonia. Th e fall of the Soviet empire left all enterprises without owners. Th is sit-
uation resulted in a massive wave of bankruptcies, and often the managers of businesses qui-
etly became their owners. Estonia’s was one of the quickest large-scale privatisation process-
es in Eastern Europe, one that ﬁ lled the state treasury and gave enterprises their owners.
Th e privatisation of the newspapers was accelerated by the inactivity of the state struc-
tures at the beginning of the s. At that time, newspapers lacked supply departments; 
the printing paper and inks were distributed centrally during the Soviet era. When the 
state became unable to provide the newspapers with necessary supplies for printing, the 
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state-owned newspapers established commercial departments. Th e purpose of the new 
departments was to earn money from advertising in order to buy supplies on the black 
market. High quality Estonian butter, ham, cheese and vodka were frequently used in these 
exchanges. In fact, all newspapers started to function more or less as private businesses.
For the reasons mentioned above, the editorial oﬃ  ces that already operated as private 
enterprises wished for oﬃ  cial privatisation. Also, journalists were concerned by some at-
tempts by politicians to inﬂ uence the press in the beginning of the s. Th e journalists 
were convinced that the best guarantee of freedom of expression and objectivity of infor-
mation was the sale of a newspaper to the members of its editorial team.
Th ere is one remarkable aspect of the Estonian privatisation process worth mentioning: 
the right of the former “communist” journalists to become the owners of their newspapers 
was never disputed. Th ose who have never lived in the Soviet Union may ﬁ nd it diﬃ  cult to 
understand this phenomenon. Th e truth is that journalists who worked for the “old com-
munist newspapers” were very professional. Th ey managed to establish a trusting relation-
ship with their readers even under those unfavourable conditions. Th ey communicated as 
truthful and as objective information as possible, often writing “between the lines”. Hence 
readers had no reason to turn their back on these newspapers or journalists.
Th e three cases described below illustrate the privatisation of media in Estonia.
5.1 PRIVATISATION OF DAILY POSTIMEES 
Th e privatisation of the Tartu newspaper Postimees in  was the ﬁ rst case of a media 
outlet privatisation in Estonia. Th e price quoted by the Government was , roubles, 
which was paid by a limited company set up by the journalists and other staﬀ  working there.
In reality the privatisation process was long and full of conﬂ icts. By the time the proc-
ess was concluded (nine months after the ﬁ rst announcement in the summer of ), there 
was nothing left to be privatised. As a matter of fact, even before the process was conclud-
ed, the Government abandoned its responsibilities towards the newspaper and left it with-
out essential supplies (paper etc.). Th e state did not invest in a computer system but the new 
times demanded better oﬃ  ce equipment than old-fashioned typewriters. In addition, fear-
ing that the newspaper would be sold to unknown owners, all the journalists left the news-
paper, set up their own limited company and registered the same trademark – Postimees. 
Eesti Meedia, the largest media corporation in Estonia, has grown out of this newspaper.
5.2 PRIVATISATION OF DAILY PÄEVALEHT
Th e journalists of the second largest national daily, Päevaleht, made an oﬀ er to the Min-
istry of Cultural Aﬀ airs to lease the property of the state newspaper. Th e shares of the new 
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limited company were divided between the employees of the editorial oﬃ  ce in accordance 
with the invested money.
Hence, when the Government ﬁ nally decided to sell the newspaper on a public tender 
there was nothing left. Th e state-owned editorial oﬃ  ce owned only old furniture and type-
writers that no one used. Th e know-how and the computer system already belonged to the 
new limited company owned by the employees. 
A similar scheme was used by the rural weekly Maaleht and the tabloid Õhtuleht. All 
their publishing equipment needed a dramatic upgrade. Th e state did not allocate any 
funds. Th erefore, in order to sustain the newspapers, the employees were, in a way, forced 
to establish a new company. 
5.3 PRIVATISATION OF DAILY RAHVA HÄÄL
Th e young Prime Minister Mart Laar, who won the elections in , was deeply an-
noyed by the newspaper Rahva Hääl (Vox Populi), formally belonging to the state. Th e 
newspaper sharply criticised the reforms performed by Laar’s Government, declaring 
that the social sphere had been totally neglected. Th e readers appreciated this approach. 
In , Rahva Hääl had the highest print circulation in the country (as many as , 
copies) and earned a proﬁ t.
In order to end the situation where a government newspaper criticised the Government 
and the Prime Minister, the newspaper became the subject of a privatisation process de-
signed to place the newspaper in the hands of people loyal to the Government; there was 
also a plan to sack the editor in chief.
Th is decision led to an uncontrolled chain of events that culminated in the foundation 
of a new newspaper. In fact, the whole editorial oﬃ  ce left, found new ﬁ nancial support-
ers and founded a new newspaper – Eesti Sõnumid (Estonian Messages) – that quickly be-
came the largest daily in North-Estonia and in the capital, Tallinn.
5.4 PRIVATISATION OF LOCAL NEWSPAPERS
Th e privatisation of local newspapers was somewhat diﬀ erent. Most of the local news-
papers were given to local governments. Th e process of their privatisation was accompa-
nied by various tensions and conﬂ icts until . Local governments were meddlers and 
liked to interfere with the newspapers’ work. In some cases a new editor in chief was ap-
pointed from amongst the local power elite (this was a common practice during Soviet 
times, when active party members were often appointed to these posts). Journalists and 
other editorial staﬀ , as shareholders in the newly established private enterprises, did not 
have enough capital or experience in the press business. A couple of years later privatised 
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newspapers were usually sold to more eﬃ  cient and business-oriented owners, usually 
large media enterprises, often with the participation of foreign capital.⁵
5.5 PRIVATISATION PATTERNS
Only the very ﬁ rst newspaper, Postimees, was privatised according to the law regulat-
ing the privatisation of enterprises. Th is law stipulated that enterprises rendering services 
had to be privatised to their employees. Except for Postimees, all other newspapers were 
planned to be privatised at public tender. Th is caused disappointment and anger among 
journalists, who feared that “their newspaper” would be sold to unknown owners. Th is 
could have meant the loss of freedom of expression. It was quite clear that the journalists 
lacked the capital necessary to participate in tenders. Th erefore, the Association of Newspa-
pers, an independent trade body for the newspaper industry, asked the Government to pro-
ceed from the principle of awarding existing editorial teams a priority right in the privatisa-
tion process. Since the Government did not accept this proposal and no laws or decrees to 
this eﬀ ect were adopted, journalists were forced to ﬁ nd a way to keep “their newspapers.”
Th is kind of privatisation of newspapers was also recommended by the  (Federa-
tion of International Editors of Journals). In , Mart Kadastik, the  of Eesti Meedia, 
who was the editor in chief of the ﬁ rst privatised newspaper, Postimees, participated in 
the meeting “Relations between governments and media in the countries of the former 
Eastern block.” He described the process as follows: “Th is ‘socialist’ approach was recom-
mended to the Estonian Government by the  in Paris. All attempts to privatise news-
papers without the actual involvement of their employees have ended in conﬂ ict. Th e 
newspaper is a product that is very diﬃ  cult to separate from its creators. No sensible new 
owner has ‘cleared’ the editorial oﬃ  ce immediately. If the readers trust the newspaper, ﬁ r-
ing the editor in chief is the same as distrusting the readers.”⁶ 
At the end of the overview of the media privatisation patterns in Estonia during the pe-
riod – we can point out that in most cases renowned titles were taken over by pri-
vate media companies founded by the former employees of state-owned newspaper com-
panies. Since the assets of state companies were meagre and their equipment outdated, in 
many cases there was nothing that could be privatised.
In the ﬁ rst half of the s foreign investors were not interested in obtaining Estonian 
media enterprises. Some Finnish capital tried to enter the Estonian market, but in reality 
these were only weak attempts to probe the market, and no investments followed. Foreign 
investors were probably scared by the minimal revenues from advertising. Also, the ab-
sence of any familiar business environment could have inﬂ uenced their decisions – these 
were only the ﬁ rst modest steps towards the Western world. 
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At that time the local owners of industrial and ﬁ nancial capital did not invest in Esto-
nian media. Estonian entrepreneurs simply lacked the energy and money. For all success-
ful businessmen, the development of their core business was a priority. Th e Russian mar-
ket had disappeared, and in order to survive they had to break out of the local market and 
penetrate Western markets.
People who ventured into the media industry realised that participation in this busi-
ness needed steel nerves and something more than the mere wish to make money. Hannes 
Tamjärv, one of the founders of the most successful weekly, Eesti Ekspess (Estonian Ex-
press), and the largest bank in the Baltic countries, Hansapank, explains: “I am very happy 
that I got the experience in media business so early. I do not regret that I left this business 
and I’ll never go back. People who are interested in media industry must be motivated to 
communicate; mere goal-orientation (proﬁ t-orientation) is not enough.”⁷ 
6 MEDIA MARKET 
According to Hagi Shein, the Dean of the Media Department at Concordia Internation-
al University, Estonia may be considered a ridiculously small market for a lot of media. 
Nevertheless, the press and broadcasting media have become part of the country’s identi-
ty. Th e Estonians are rather ambitious in this respect. Even though the past ten years have 
been quite turbulent, with smaller and bigger players trying their luck in the press, radio 
and television business, it seems that the media sector has settled down. Th e Estonian me-
dia market is dominated by large publishing ﬁ rms that belong to major media groups.⁸
6.1 PRINT MEDIA
Th e national tabloid  Õhtuleht (Evening Paper), born in  after the merger of two 
tabloids, Õhtuleht and Sõnumileht, has the largest print circulation in Estonia – , cop-
ies. However in the spring of , the leading position in the market was taken over by the 
quality-daily Postimees (, copies).
Th ere are two quality national dailies in Estonia: Postimees (Postman) is the descendant 
of the oldest Estonian newspaper, Pärnu Postimees (established in ). In  this news-
paper moved from the economically less developed region of South-Estonia to the capital 
and achieved the largest readership also in the capital Tallinn. 
Th e other quality daily, Eesti Päevaleht (Estonian Daily), has been operating at a loss for 
years, and the new owners have abandoned their ambitions to expand to a national news-
paper. Th eir priority is the readers in the capital Tallinn. Eesti Päevaleht’s print circulation 
is ,.
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Estonia is divided into  regional units (counties), and each county has at least one (in 
some places more than one) local newspaper. Th e local newspaper is always the most pop-
ular one. Th e largest regional newspaper is that of Pärnu, West-Estonia – Pärnu Postimees 
(Pärnu Postman).
Th e largest national weekly is Eesti Ekspress with a print circulation of , copies.
About , Russian-speaking people live in Estonia, and about  newspapers and 
journals are published in Russian. Th e Russian-speaking population prefers television and 
radio to newspapers. Hence the print circulations of these newspapers are comparative-
ly low. Th e most popular newspaper in Russian is the weekly Vesti (News), , copies. 
Th e most popular daily is Molodjozh Estonii (Estonian Youth) with , copies.
Table  NEWSPAPERS CIRCULATION (MARCH 2004)
NATIONAL DAILIES REGIONAL NEWSPAPERS NATIONAL WEEKLIES FREE PAPERS
POSTIMEES 70,300 PÄRNU POSTIMEES 15,600 MAALEHT 52,500 LINNALEHT 
TALLINN
46,700
SL ÕHTULEHT 65,500 SAKALA 11,200 EESTI EKSPRESS 44,700 LINNALEHT TARTU 26,300
EESTI PÄEVALEHT 35,500 NARVA 9,400 MAALEHT 44,600 LINNALEHT PÄRNU 15,300
ÄRIPÄEV 
(BUSINESS 
NEWSPAPER)
24,200 VIRUMAA TEATAJA 8,600 VESTI
(RUSSIAN 
LANGUAGE)
16,800
MOLODJOZH 
ESTONII (RUSSIAN 
LANGUAGE)
7,800 MEIE MAA 8,100 DEN ZA DNJOM 
(RUSSIAN 
LANGUAGE)
15,400
VESTI DNJA 
(TILL APRIL 2004 
NAMED ESTONIJA. 
RUSSIAN 
LANGUAGE)
6,100 PÕHJARANNIK/
SEVERNOJE 
POBEREZIJE
8,100 MOLODJOŽ ESTONII 
SUBBOTA
(RUSSIAN 
LANGUAGE)
10,300
Source: Estonian Newspaper Union ().
6.2 TELEVISION MARKET
After the ﬁ erce competition between the new commercial channels that emerged in the 
nineties, the television market has settled down and become more stable. 
In  the Estonian Government decided to stop translating Russian  channels and 
announced a tender for private channels. Th e Russian-speaking population who lived main-
ly in big cities received the news dispassionately. Large apartment blocks formed consumer 
cooperations, bought satellite dishes and started to watch Russian channels via satellite.
Th ere are three national  channels in Estonia: the state-owned Estonian  () and 
two private channels Kanal  (since ) and  (in its present form since ). Both 
private channels are owned by foreigners, the Norwegian Schibsted Group and the Swed-
ish Modern Times Group respectively.
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Viewers in North-Estonia can also watch Finnish -channels. Th ese were extremely 
popular during the Soviet era as important sources of information and western culture. 
However, they have lost their attraction recently since this function has been taken over 
by the Estonian  channels. Th ey make available most box oﬃ  ce hits. For example, some 
of the ﬁ lms that were broadcast in autumn  were Die Hard , , , Gladiator, Green 
Mile, Chicken Run, Titanic etc. Famous documentaries and news-programmes such as 
“ minutes” are also broadcast. In February ,  viewers spent  percent of their 
time watching , . percent watching Kanal  and . percent watching .⁹
In many Central and Eastern European countries it has been common for public broad-
casters to lose their dominant positions soon after commercial channels appeared on the 
market. Th e same did not happen in Estonia. Public service television was able to keep its 
position as the market leader until . Only recently have insuﬃ  cient budgets, signiﬁ -
cant ﬁ nancial losses in  and , and unstable funding forced public television to cut 
the amount of expensive original broadcasts and the number of staﬀ .¹⁰ In the spring of 
, the Estonian Government established a -member commission to develop a ﬁ rst 
draft strategy how to merge public service radio (Eesti Raadio) and public service televi-
sion (). 
Th ere is a big diﬀ erence between the Estonian and Russian speaking populations. 
Only  percent of non-Estonians watch these news programmes, and the same is true of 
the news in Russian – it is watched by only  percent of viewers. Th is demonstrates that 
the Russian-speaking population in Estonia are very active viewers, but they watch  
(Russian)  channels and not Estonian channels. Hence, the only way to reach the Rus-
sian population is via radio or newspapers.
Table  THREE MOST POPULAR TV CHANNELS IN ESTONIA
TV CHANNEL OWNER
TV 3 MODERN TIMES GROUP
KANAL 2 (CHANNEL 2) SCHIBSTED GROUP
ETV PUBLIC BROADCASTING CHANNEL
Sources:  Emor¹¹ and  Meters Survey.
In , Pervõi Baltiiski Kanal (First Baltic Channel), broadcast via satellite from 
Latvia, plans to provide local news to the Estonian Russian-speaking population.¹² Th e 
news is to be produced in Estonia and broadcast from Latvia. Pervõi Baltiiski Kanal, avail-
able in Estonia via cable, is the Baltic version of the very popular Russian Pervõi Kanal. 
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According to estimates from Telereklaam , more than  percemt of the Russian-
speaking population in Estonia watch this programme and more than  percent of Es-
tonian commercials are sold to this channel. Two private  channels –  and Kanal  
– have strongly objected to this as they have to pay  million Estonian kroons annually 
for the license. Hence Pervõi Baltiiski Kanal is to a certain extent a legal pirate who col-
lects revenue for commercials from the Estonian market but does not pay the broadcast-
ing license fee in Estonia.
6.3 RADIO MARKET
Th ere are  radio stations¹³ run by less than  businesses. Th e state-owned public 
broadcasting radio has, for instance, four diﬀ erent wave-lengths and many private compa-
nies produce a wide variety of programmes. Th ere is a broad range of radio stations – for 
the young, for the not-so-young and also many regional ones. Two of the three biggest ra-
dio groups are owned by foreign capital. 
Table  FOUR BIGGEST RADIO GROUPS
RADIO GROUP RADIO STATIONS OWNERS
TRIO LSL RAADIO KUKU; RAADIO UUNO; RAADIO 
EEVA; RAADIO 100 FM (IN RUSSIAN); 
RAADIO ELMAR; RAADIO UUNO PLUS
METROMEDIA INC. (USA) 66%
EESTI MEEDIA GROUP 34%
SKY MEDIA SKY PLUS; SKY RADIO; RUSSKOJE 
RADIO (IN RUSSIAN); RADIO MANIA; 
ENERGY FM
GROUP OF ESTONIAN
BUSINESSMEN 
EESTI RAADIO RAADIO 2; RAADIO 4 (IN RUSSIAN); 
KLASSIKARAADIO (AD-FREE); 
VIKERRAADIO (AD-FREE)
PUBLIC BROADCASTING
MEDIAINVEST HOLDING STAR FM; POWER HIT RADIO MODERN TIMES GROUP
Source: Special addition Marketing Top Companies , Äripäev, May .
Th e most popular radio channels in Estonian language are Vikerraadio, public service 
broadcasting, then Raadio Elmar, owned by Trio , and the third one is Raadio , again 
public service broadcasting. Th e most popular radio channels in Russian language are 
Raadio , public service broadcasting, Russkoje Radio, owned by Taevaraadio Sky Media, 
and the third is Sky Radio, owned by the same company.¹⁴
Sky Media Group has quietly grown into a large enterprise. Five radio stations are con-
nected to the group. Some of these are the most popular among Estonian and Russian lis-
teners (Radio Sky and Russkoje Radio respectively). Th e owners are local businessmen, 
and complicated ownership schemes are used (diﬀ erent companies owning or renting fre-
quencies and selling ads).
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6.4 DOMINANT MEDIA CORPORATIONS 
An analysis of the situation on the basis of the number of consumers of all media prod-
ucts and of revenues receivable from advertisements, clearly shows that only a small 
number of players dominates the market. Th ere are two dominant media corporations in 
Estonia – Eesti Meedia and Ekspress Grupp.
6.4.1 EESTI MEEDIA
Th e majority stake in Eesti Meedia is owned by the Norwegian media corporation 
Schibsted, and . percent of shares belong to the Tulevik foundation, more speciﬁ cally to 
the son of the pre-Soviet owner of Postimees. Th e corporation grew out of the Postimees 
newspaper in the beginning of the s. Schibsted bought the corporation in .
Eesti Meedia owns the following products: the largest national quality daily Postimees; 
ﬁ ve of ﬁ fteen regional newspapers ( percent of the largest regional newspaper Pärnu 
Postimees, stakes in others), four of these are regional newspapers with the largest print 
circulation in Estonia;  percent of the largest radio group based on private capital (Trio 
LSL); one of two private national TV stations (Kanal ); and the printing house Kroon-
press (the largest in Estonia).
Chart  OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE OF THE EESTI MEEDIA GROUP
EESTI MEEDIA
 of  
and stake 
in the rest  
     
POSTIMEES  regional 
newspapers 
KROONPRESS KANAL 2 TRIO LSL Joint venture 
with Express 
Grupp
(newspaper) (printing 
house)
(TV station) (radio group)
  
SL ÕHTULEHT AJAKIRJADE 
KIRJASTUS
EXPRESS POST
(newspaper) (magazine 
publisher with 
about  titles)
(door-to-
door delivery 
service)
6.4.2 EKSPRESS GRUPP
Ekspress Grupp sprouted from a successful weekly Eesti Ekspress. Hans H. Luik, the 
editor in chief, managed to buy the newspaper soon after it was founded. Subsequently he 
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developed a large media group with himself as the key player. Th e group actually owned 
several businesses ranging from the ﬁ rst private radio station (Trio ) to shares in the 
most popular night club in the capital.
When Eesti Meedia was acquired by a strong foreign investor – Norwegian Schibsted 
– Luik sold  percent of his company’s shares to the largest Scandinavian media corpo-
ration, Bonnier Group. But cooperation between him and the Swedes did not work, and 
the Swedes ousted him. According to the contract, in November  Bonnier became the 
sole owner of the Ekspress Grupp. However, the contract also stipulated a certain period 
during which Luik could buy the whole company back. Luik used this possibility, taking a 
loan from one of the largest Banks in Estonia, Eesti Ühispank, which belongs to the large 
Scandinavian  Bank Corporation. Th at was the ﬁ rst time that Bonnier was forced to 
relinquish ownership in an Eastern European media business. Th e owner of the Ekspress 
Grupp, Hans H. Luik, is also involved in other businesses, including real estate and waste 
management. All his activities are well-known and thoroughly described in other compet-
ing media channels. 
Ekspress Grupp owns the following media: the national weekly with the largest print 
circulation (Eesti Ekspress); half of the second-largest quality daily (Eesti Päevaleht); Eesti 
Päevaleht owns the three largest free newspapers that are distributed on the streets of the 
three largest cities – City paper Tallinn, City paper Tartu, City paper Pärnu; a book publish-
ing department; the printing house, Printall (the second-largest in Estonia by turnover).
Chart  OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE OF THE EKSPRESS GROUP
EKSPRESS GRUPP
 
    
EESTI 
PÄEVALEHT
EESTI 
EXPRESS
PRINTAL Book 
publishing 
departement
Joint venture 
with Eesti 
Meedia
(newspaper 
which also 
owns  free 
newspapers)
(weekly) (printing 
house)
  
SL ÕHTULEHT AJAKIRJADE 
KIRJASTUS
EXPRESS POST
(newspaper) (magazine 
publisher with 
about  titles)
(door-to-
door delivery 
service)
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While the two media corporations mentioned above were bitter competitors through-
out the s, they changed their strategy after  and merged several businesses. 
Th eir joint businesses are: the leading tabloid, one of the newspapers with the largest 
print circulation on the market,  Õhtuleht; the largest magazine publisher in Estonia, 
Ajakirjade Kirjastus, which publishes about  journals (women, youth, leisure etc.); and 
door-to-door delivery – Express Post handles home delivery in the three largest cities in 
Estonia – Tallinn, Tartu and Pärnu.
In anticipation of Estonia’s accession to the  in May , both Estonian largest me-
dia groups - Eesti Meedia and Ekspress Grupp made investments into Lithuania. 
Schibsted Baltics (the  of Eesti Meedia and Scibsted Baltics’ is the same person - 
Mart Kadastik) bought, in March ,  percent of shares of the leading Lithuanian 
journals’ publishing house, Zurnalu Leidibus Grupe ().  is Lithuania’s largest mag-
azine publishing enterprise. Its most important editions are Laima and Edita. 
In March , Ekspress Grupp bought the majority stake in the magazine publishing 
house,  Moteris.  Moteris publishes the magazines Panele, Moteris, Antra Puse 
and Namai Pagal Mus. Both groups conﬁ rmed their intentions of enlarging their activi-
ties in the Baltic region. 
In conclusion, analysis of the largest Estonian media groups suggests both horizontal 
(cross-ownership of diﬀ erent media channels) and vertical concentration (ownership of 
publishing houses and delivery systems). 
6.5 ADVERTISING MARKET
It is necessary to point out why the largest media companies have sprouted from news-
papers. Th e advertising market has been growing rapidly since . Newspapers have al-
ways collected the largest percentage from advertising revenues. In  the total revenue 
of the advertising market was   million (approx.   million.),¹⁵ and in  the 
total revenue was approx.   million. 
Table  ADVERTISING MARKET IN ESTONIA IN 2002–2003
2002 2003
TOTAL REVENUE EUR 52 MILLION EUR 58 MILLION
NEWSPAPERS 45% 44%
MAGAZINES 13% 12%
TV 24% 26%
RADIO 10% 9%
OUTDOOR 5% 6%
INTERNET 2% 3%
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6.6 PRINTING AND DISTRIBUTION
Th e economic circumstances forced companies to establish their own printing houses. 
For example, the establishment of the largest printing house Kroonpress (Eesti Meedia 
Group) was made urgent by the fact that the state was not capable of increasing printing 
capacity to meet the needs of the newspapers. 
Distribution companies were established for the same reason – Eesti Post (the national 
post service) had retained a Soviet mentality. Th e publishers were dissatisﬁ ed with a situ-
ation where newspapers and magazines arrived in readers’ mailboxes only late in the af-
ternoon, not in the morning. And the countryside was even worse oﬀ  – with less than  
km from border to border, newspapers were delivered with a one-day delay!
6.7 SILENCE ON MEDIA CONCENTRATION IN ESTONIA 
Discussions concerning media concentration have not been a priority in Estonia. So 
far, neither politicians nor citizens’ organisations have raised the issue so far. Most of the 
political parties accuse the press of serving the interests of their opponents. Th is could be 
seen as a sign of media objectivity. 
Th e issue of concentration was raised for the ﬁ rst time only recently, in autumn , 
when the largest media corporation, Eesti Meedia, announced that it had acquired a  
percent stake in the largest radio company, Trio . Th e second owner of the company is 
Metromedia International, which has shares in other media businesses in Eastern Europe.
Th e prevalent opinion is that owing to the small size of the Estonian media market, it 
is diﬃ  cult to limit concentration. On the other hand, one of the leading media scientists, 
Marju Lauristin, Professor at Tartu University, has repeatedly pointed out the dangers of 
high media concentration. According to her, Estonia should develop competition legisla-
tion, including speciﬁ c provisions aimed at limiting the dangers of further media concen-
tration. “Th e issue here is not only deviation of the market but, more importantly, defence 
of freedom of information and opinion.”¹⁶ 
Large media corporations have either avoided the subject or justiﬁ ed concentration. 
Mart Kadastik,  of Eesti Meedia, has stated: “Th e smaller the market, the more dif-
ﬁ cult it is to prevent overstepping the borders of diﬀ erent media types. Where and how 
can they [Estonian media enterprises] develop /.../ Politicians are worried about consoli-
dation. A fragmented media is more easily manipulated. In fact, what is the diﬀ erence be-
tween one owner controlling a newspaper and a radio and a single stakeholder in a news-
paper and an Internet portal? Is one more dangerous than the other?”¹⁷
Th ere are two other reasons why discussions concerning media concentration have 
been stagnant. Firstly, there is the prevalent concept of the principle of social responsi-
bility. Th roughout the past (including the Soviet era), the faculty of Journalism at Tartu 
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University has been teaching socially responsible journalism and highlighting the need to 
serve the public interest instead of producing “communist journalism.” Another impor-
tant factor was the inﬂ uence of Scandinavian media traditions. Th is is expressed in two 
ways: ﬁ rst, through the support of Scandinavian, especially Norwegian and Danish me-
dia schools. Th ese schools have long since oﬀ ered student exchange programmes, lectur-
ers and study materials, introducing the Nordic tradition where “media is more than just 
business.” Th is cooperation has had an important social role as a source of information 
and a balancing tool in society. Many journalists received training in Scandinavian media 
schools under these programmes in the early s and are now the followers of the same 
tradition in the positions of editors in chief. Secondly, Estonia is still within the sphere of 
inﬂ uence of Scandinavian media holdings. Th is means that local editors have to follow 
principles of objectivity. When the largest quality daily, Postimees, closed down its cultur-
al supplement without any explanation and without consulting journalists, the Norwegian 
branch of the global PEN Club requested explanations from Schibsted’s (the owner of Pos-
timees) management as to why their publication was so anti-cultural. 
7 MEDIA PLURALISM
Changes in media consumption have been most extensively studied by the media de-
partment of Tartu University, chaired by professors Peeter Vihalemm and Marju Lauris-
tin. Th e consumption of media products has decreased signiﬁ cantly since the end of the 
Soviet regime.
In comparison with  – the best year in terms of print media circulation ﬁ gures – 
by  the circulation of national dailies had decreased more than . times, that of local 
newspapers . times, of magazines  times and of cultural publications  times. Th e pat-
tern of media usage among Estonians has also changed: newspaper reading has become 
more of an elite habit. Many people are not able to subscribe to even one newspaper be-
cause of low income. It should be stressed here that, compared to other products, the price 
of newspapers has increased much more.¹⁸ 
According to the data provided by the National Library, the number of all kinds of pe-
riodicals and newspapers has increased signiﬁ cantly. In  (the last truly “Soviet” year) 
 periodicals were published in Estonia; in  this number was .¹⁹ Periodicals are 
the most varied type of media targeted according to various criteria, for example, social 
groups (women, children, older people) or hobbies/interests (technology, cars, gardening, 
ﬁ shing, home decoration, family etc.).
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In the ﬁ eld of broadcast media, instead of a few channels seen by the majority of peo-
ple (during the Soviet period there were only one Estonian  channel and three radio 
channels), there is now a growing number of channels targeted to narrowly deﬁ ned audi-
ences. Radio channels are diversiﬁ ed according to the style of music (pop, rock, folk, etc.) 
and regions.
Th e entry barriers are quite tough. Th e problem is the production cost of a new news-
paper. In order to break even, it is necessary to reach a number of printed copies of around 
,, which is a ﬁ gure hardly attainable by newcomers. On the other hand, if an existing 
newspaper wants to start a new publication, it may add it to an existing product as a sup-
plement. In this way its print circulation is high from the start. Furthermore, if an existing 
large corporation is interested in introducing a new publication, it may also use its other 
products for free advertising, a possibility unavailable to newcomers. One page of adver-
tisement in a newspaper costs about  ,. It takes at least a year before a publication 
becomes proﬁ table. If you plan to advertise in one newspaper once a week, this sum piles 
up to  , annually. In addition, it is necessary to take into account labour costs, 
rent and other overheads. 
Although new national dailies or new national  channels are unlikely to appear in the 
coming years, a channel for free expression of opinion is still guaranteed thanks to the very 
popular Internet portals: the ﬁ rst portal to publish readers’ comments without censorship 
was Delﬁ  at the beginning of . Recently, even conservative publications have started 
to publish uncensored comments in their on-line editions.
8 MEDIA INDEPENDENCE
Th ere are no known cases of business managers trying to inﬂ uence journalists. To a 
certain extent this problem appeared in connection with certain  companies that oﬀ er 
journalists various beneﬁ ts (usually trips to South European resorts or car exhibitions for 
journalists covering automobile industry or travel news). One of the latest scandals in me-
dia was related to travelling. One of the travel agencies oﬀ ered a trip to Egypt to all jour-
nalists of all the leading media companies. Many of those who travelled to Egypt to explore 
this “new destination” were not regular travel journalists but editors in chief of these pub-
lications. In this case the media preserved its role of watchdog; the business newspaper 
Äripäev published a thorough report on it.
In spite of the presumably high quality of Estonian press, the credibility of the Estonian 
media has decreased. In fact, it hit its lowest recorded level in the summer of  – in 
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June  as many as  percent of the participants in a research claimed that they did not 
trust the media.²⁰
Th is decline in media credibility has been blamed on many reasons, among these politi-
cians’ indiﬀ erence towards disclosures in the press, the absence of professionalism among 
journalists, and discontinuity in journalistic reporting. Other factors can be blamed too: 
“shock-therapy-induced” rapid social diﬀ erentiation divided the Estonian population into 
“losers” and “winners”. Many people participating actively in the restoration of independ-
ence found themselves among the losers: these were the intellectuals, the older genera-
tion, the survivors of Stalinist repression, and people in villages and small towns, far from 
the rapidly prospering capital city. People expected media to become socially active and 
defend their interests or at least to help them understand what was going on in the soci-
ety at large. Th ese expectations were not fulﬁ lled. Media, driven by market forces, clearly 
took the side of the “winners.”²¹
Th erefore, the biggest danger for the Estonian press is not so much its coming under the 
inﬂ uence of politicians or dominating businessmen, but the unprofessional work of jour-
nalists and editors. What should be blamed is their inability to organise and systematise 
the huge amount of available information, and to communicate a complete, realistic pic-
ture to their readers-listeners-viewers .
Censorship by media owners does also exist in one way or another. Th e owners do not 
tend to sway the political or economical positions of the publications, but censorship is 
present when attention is drawn to their business or to the owners themselves. When we 
compare the articles in Postimees and Päevaleht on the price war between the two dailies, 
it is clear that each newspaper defended the position of its own owner and leader. Th e ap-
proach in covering the divorce of the owner of the second largest media corporation was 
totally diﬀ erent in his own publications and in competing publications.²² 
8.1 EMPLOYMENT CONDITIONS
As to the independence of journalists, we can argue against the assumption that collec-
tive job contracts between the organisation and the state and/or staﬀ  and publishers form 
a valid criterion for measuring the independence of journalists. Only one valid contract 
exists between staﬀ  and employers (in public service Eesti Raadio). 
Th e reason that Estonian journalists are not organised is partially historical. – 
was a period of the “invasion” of journalists because tens, even hundreds, of new publica-
tions, as well as TV and radio stations, were in desperate need of new journalists. Fluctua-
tion was high, as the editorial oﬃ  ces bought journalists from each other frequently. Even 
those journalists who had been ﬁ red owing to poor performance or corruption had no dif-
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ﬁ culties ﬁ nding new jobs. Salaries oﬀ ered by private companies were at least twice as big 
as the state average.
Th e situation changed dramatically in  when Estonian business was seriously af-
fected by the Russian crisis. Export to Russia became non-existent, and many Estonian 
businesses ended in bankruptcy. As a consequence, the advertising market decreased by 
 percent during  and by another  percent in .²³
In a situation of decreased income, media companies introduced cost-cutting pro-
grammes and many companies cut the number of journalists by  percent. Many jour-
nalists were left unemployed as a result of two mergers: the merger of the two leading Es-
tonian tabloids and two “high society” magazines. 
Th ere is no special procedure to hire an editor in chief. Th e publishers hire them like 
any other employee and oﬀ er a contract. Th e editor in chief works within the limits of the 
contract, and if the publisher is not satisﬁ ed with his/her work, there are clauses in the 
contract stipulating the terms of its termination. So far, all editors in chief have adhered to 
contractual terms and left as soon as they were asked to do so. Although one can always 
go to court, no such case has yet been recorded. In recent years, the largest Estonian dai-
lies changed editors several times. Th e most recent example is Postimees, whose editor left 
in November . Th is practice enables radical changes if necessary, for example, if the 
business is not good enough, if the number of readers is decreasing or if the editor is not 
in the position to relieve inner tensions.
Monthly salaries in media in Estonia fall into the following range – an editor in chief 
receives approximately  , (inclusive of taxes), and a journalists earns  , 
on average.
8.2 MEDIA PROFESSIONAL ORGANISATIONS
Th ere are two media professional organisations in Estonia. One of these is the Estoni-
an Newspaper Association () that unites all the largest Estonian newspapers and is 
ﬁ nanced by media businesses. Th e other one is the oﬀ spring of the Soviet organisation - 
the Organisation of Estonian Journalists (). It brings together journalists mainly of the 
older generation and the freelancers. Th ese organisations do not cooperate.  tends to 
express the views of publishers, although it claims that it is concerned with the problems 
of both publishers and journalists.  is more like a trade union. Th ey have acquired new 
young members recently and have strengthened their contacts with other journalist or-
ganisations from the Nordic countries. Th is means that they are not giving up.
Th e Estonian media leaders have a very interesting challenge in front of them. With the 
trade unions in parent Scandinavian companies being very strong and exerting profound 
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inﬂ uence, it is only a question of time how long the Estonian media businesses can be kept 
away from trade unions and their inﬂ uence.
Both organisations have bodies that solve problems outside court.  has the Press 
Council and  has its own Press Council (Council of the Public Word). Unfortunately, as 
does frequently happen in Estonia, the two bodies compete rather than co-operate.
8.3 INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM
Th e situation of investigative journalism is not bad, and these skills are taught in jour-
nalism schools and with foreign help. Th e ﬁ rst step forward was made in  when Lisa 
Trei – an expatriate with journalistic experience, published a textbook on investigative 
journalism with the support of the Embassy of the United States. Th is textbook comprises 
theoretical chapters (what is investigative journalism, how to collect information, etc.) as 
well as translations of articles from the foreign press. As an example, it includes descrip-
tions about the conditions in Russian nuclear submarines.
 grants special annual press prizes. Th e special prize was established by the Swed-
ish media corporation, Bonnier . Th ey award a journalist whose article is chosen by a 
committee of editors in chief from all the largest newspapers. Th e prize amounts to ap-
prox.  ,. Th e winning articles so far have covered a wide range of subjects: falsi-
ﬁ ed information given to the stock exchange regarding an already closed factory in Rus-
sia, smuggling of human organs, government’s unlimited thirst for luxury, the weakness of 
regulations on state tenders, activities of a leading lawyer who bought the land his client 
just lost, etc..  provides regular training and publishes materials for investigative jour-
nalists. A public information law textbook was published in .
As a rule, no special investigative units exist, but more and more work is being planned 
a long time ahead. Th is is now possible because the period of rapid change is over, and the 
situation is stable. Th erefore, professional journalists have more time for research. 
9 CONCLUSIONS
Many aspects of the Estonian media market are very controversial. On the one hand, it 
is one of the smallest in the world. In the  to  age group, there are only , peo-
ple who speak Estonian. Considering the number of real purchasers, the realistic size of 
the media market comes down to , consumers.²⁴ On the other hand, Estonians 
are very eager media customers. For example, in November  they set a record for  
watching - the average television viewing time increased to  hours and  minutes dai-
ly.²⁵ At the same time they are still very active readers. Th e ﬁ rst newspaper was published 
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in  and today Estonia holds the  place in the world in the number of newspapers 
purchased per capita.
Th e Estonian media are spreading their activities to other businesses. Media companies 
have already entered new areas (i.e. conference business); development of technology and 
alliances with telecommunications gives new possibilities. Th ey are starting to dissemi-
nate content through diﬀ erent media channels. Big media companies have more and more 
possibilities for providing news through many channels simultaneously: radio, newspa-
pers,  and the Internet. Considering that trend, monitoring media ownership concen-
tration becomes even bigger imperative.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Th is study is an attempt to describe the system of media ownership in Hungary in the 
early s. Th e Hungarian media scene is dominated by market forces: the long march 
towards the media market started in  and, by and large, it took a decade. Strong for-
eign ownership, a declining political press and growing numbers of tabloids, triumphant 
commercial radio and television channels, a weak public service broadcasting sector with 
minimal social prestige and a small market share, plus a deeply divided journalistic com-
munity – these are the main characteristics of the contemporary media scene in the coun-
try. Th is is clearly not the outcome one would have expected from the media transforma-
tion accompanying revolutionary changes in the political system in –, and this 
is not the type of scene media scholars draw as a framework for the so-called democratic 
media, but, unfortunately, this is the state of aﬀ airs. 
For half a century after World War , Central and Eastern European media systems 
were framed in a given political, institutional, economic and legal structure that was shat-
tered in the glorious years –. In Hungary’s case, freedom of the press was guaran-
teed in the Constitution, and a separate press law was passed by the Parliament in , 
but the law was a mere façade. Th e infamous Hungarian press law of  required that 
citizens obtain a license before they were allowed to found a publishing company, while 
the radio and television sector remained de facto a party monopoly supervised by a state 
appointed committee. 
At the very end of the s, the frozen social structures suddenly started to melt in 
Hungary and in other parts of East Central Europe as well. Transition from an authoritar-
ian regime to democracy, from the command economy to the market economy, began to 
look possible, and it seemed more than obvious that the media system would also undergo 
basic changes within a very short period of time. 
Th e print media licensing system was abolished altogether in June of . Th is event, 
together with the provisions of the Business Associations’ Act that had been passed six 
months earlier, cleared the way for new players to enter the publishing industry. Never-
theless the outgoing communist government did not dare to pass a broadcasting law and 
imposed a moratorium on frequency allocation instead. Th is was a political gesture to-
ward emerging opposition forces during the national political roundtable negotiations in 
. Th is moratorium proved to be rather long for various reasons, and no broadcasting 
law was passed until the very end of . Once the President of the Republic signed it into 
law, it was registered as Act  of  on Radio and Television (hereinafter the Broadcast-
ing Act of ).
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2 LEGISLATION – ANTI-CONCENTRATION PROVISIONS 
AND THEIR IMPLEMENTATION
2.1 HOW TO REGULATE MEDIA CONCENTRATION 
Economies of scale and economies of scope, two main factors behind concentrated 
markets, are common in media industries. It is not surprising that most media scholars 
agree that media industries tend to be concentrated (Picard, ; McQuail, ; Doyle, 
), and even the digital revolution has not changed the basic rules of media economics: 
media markets remain concentrated in and dominated by large corporations. 
Media theorists widely assume that media concentration restricts the presentation of 
diﬀ erent viewpoints and is thus inherently antithetical to democracy. In practice there 
exist certain kinds of legislation, detailed or less detailed, on media concentration in de-
mocracies, but it is true that legislation on media concentration is very diﬃ  cult from the 
professional point of view, on both the national and international levels, as failures of dif-
ferent regulatory initiatives on the  level have testiﬁ ed during the last decade (Sánchez-
Tabarnero – Carvajal, ). 
2.2 A HISTORICAL PRELUDE TO 
ANTI-CONCENTRATION LEGISLATION
Th e two round parliamentary elections held in March and April of  brought the ex-
pected result: emerging centre-right parties won, so they could form a coalition and the 
new government. Th ese parties, however, had less than a two-thirds majority in the Par-
liament, so they were not in a position to change the Constitution without the consent of 
opposition parties. Owing to the curious parliamentary arithmetic, the strongest centre-
right party (the winner of the election, called the Hungarian Democratic Forum) and the 
strongest opposition party (the Alliance of Free Democrats, the Hungarian liberal party 
that came second to the Hungarian Democratic Forum) combined had almost two-thirds 
of the parliamentary seats. 
To the great surprise of many people, leaders of the two big parties entered negotia-
tions about the basics of the new Constitution soon after the elections and before the new 
Parliament had been convened. Th ey managed to reach a compromise, called a pact in 
political jargon, at the end of April , and two months later the new Parliament voted 
for the changes prepared ex ante by the leaders of the two parties. As far as media legis-
lation is concerned, the two big parties agreed that the future broadcasting law should be 
passed with a two-thirds majority in the Parliament, and that the legislation on preven-
tion of media monopolies would need a two-thirds majority as well (Constitution, Article 
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()). Th ey agreed to change the press law of , but the changes did not touch upon 
anti-monopoly measures. 
2.3 ANTI-CONCENTRATION PROVISIONS 
IN THE BROADCASTING ACT OF 1996
Th e Broadcasting Act of  has several anti-concentration provisions on market 
share and ownership. Th ey seem a bit old fashioned now, but they are still valid: achiev-
ing a two-thirds majority vote as a precondition needed for changing the law seems rath-
er unlikely in the near future, since Hungary has been deeply divided into two political 
blocks since  (socialist-liberal alliance versus alliance of centre-right parties). Th e only 
relevant changes to the Broadcasting Act of  were legislated in , but they didn’t 
touch upon anti-concentration provisions. Th e changes introduced by Act  of  
were strictly linked to the requirement for harmonisation of the Broadcasting Act of  
to the  broadcasting directives, and both government coalition parties and opposition 
parties voted for them.
According to the provisions in Article (), one market player may not provide more 
than one national broadcasting service, or two regional and four local broadcasting serv-
ices, or twelve local broadcasting services. Specialised (thematic) broadcasters are ex-
empt from these restrictions, but in cases where they operate more channels than detailed 
above, they will have a lower ceiling for advertising time than the standard  per cent (Ar-
ticle ()). Th e terms national, regional and local broadcasting services are well deﬁ ned 
in the Act, and restrictions seem clear, although they appear rather arbitrary. One might 
ask why the ceiling for the holders of two regional licenses is set at four local licenses rath-
er than ﬁ ve or six, etc., and why twelve (and not less or more) local licenses are set as an 
upper limit for one market player in local markets. 
However, these questions do not have too much importance in practice in the Hun-
garian broadcast market, since the two national commercial television channels ( and 
 Klub) combined had almost a  percent audience market share in  (source:  
Hungary) and an even higher share,  percent or so, of the advertising markets (estimate 
based on company announcements, balance sheet ﬁ gures and other industry sources). 
Th e same ﬁ gures for the two national commercial radio channels broadcasting under the 
brand names Danubius and Sláger are somewhat lower (estimated at about  percent of 
audience share, source -, and more than  percent advertising share) so one 
can say that these four commercial channels dominate the Hungarian broadcast market. 
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2.4 ANTI-CONCENTRATION PROVISIONS 
IN THE COMPETITION ACT OF 1996
Oﬃ  cially named Act  of  on the Prohibition of Unfair and Restrictive Market 
Practices, the Competition Act of  contains no speciﬁ c provisions on media indus-
tries. In certain cases, deﬁ ned clearly by law, concentration of undertakings needs the au-
thorisation of the Oﬃ  ce of Economic Competition. Such authorisation shall be sought if 
the aggregate net turnover or net revenues of the undertakings concerned exceed ten bil-
lion Hungarian forints, and they exceed at least half a billion Hungarian forints in the case 
of each undertaking in the preceding business year (for a detailed description of the law, 
see Articles -). As far as the currency rate between Hungarian forint () and the 
euro (, before : ) is concerned, see the ﬁ gures in Table  below.
Table  HUF/EUR YEARLY AVERAGE RATES FROM 1996 TO 2003
YEAR 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
RATE 191 211 241 253 260 257 243 254
Source: National Bank of Hungary
Th e Competition Act of  has been changed and/or amended several times since 
. Legislation on competition seems to be a matter of technocratic procedure, and it 
is not discussed in detail in the media. Th e Oﬃ  ce of Economic Competition is regarded 
as a fairly balanced, politically neutral government organisation, successfully managing 
to keep its distance from day-to-day politics. Its most important body, the Competition 
Council, has been carefully run by technocrats, and its resolutions on competition cases 
are rarely challenged in the Court (and if they are, only a few are overruled by the Court).
2.5 SPECIAL OWNERSHIP RULES 
IN THE BROADCASTING ACT OF 1996
Before we proceed to explain ownership rules, we should stress that leading state of-
ﬁ cials at both the national and local levels, members of the judiciary (judges, state attor-
neys, etc.), party oﬃ  cials, members of regulatory bodies on broadcasting and telecommu-
nications, etc. are excluded by law from being broadcasters. Th e law also stipulates that 
companies in which the state has a controlling interest ( percent or more) and compa-
nies founded by parties, cannot obtain broadcasting license. Th e most important provi-
sions can be summarised as follows:
¶ national (and regional) broadcasters shall operate as companies limited by shares (Ar-
ticle ());
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¶ natural persons with Hungarian citizenship residing in Hungary or legal entities based 
in Hungary shall hold at least  percent of the voting rights in a company limited by 
shares, and the majority of board members shall be Hungarian citizens residing in Hun-
gary (Article (), ()). By the way, these provisions will be repealed after Hunga-
ry’s accession to the European Union;
¶ a single company may hold a maximum of  percent of the voting rights in a national 
terrestrial television broadcaster (Article ()).
2.6 CROSS-MEDIA OWNERSHIP RESTRICTIONS 
IN THE BROADCASTING ACT OF 1996
Generally speaking, there are many restrictions on cross-media ownership in the law, 
and they are taken seriously. Cross-ownership between radio and television broadcasters 
is limited by the provisions detailed earlier in sub-chapter , paragraph , and cross-own-
ership between market players in publishing and broadcasting is strictly limited as well. 
Publishers of national dailies and weeklies (better to say: those undertakings that have 
controlling interest in such a publisher) shall not have controlling interest in broadcasters 
(Article (), ()) and vice versa. Publishers of local and regional dailies with circula-
tions of more than ten thousand copies cannot have a controlling interest in those broad-
casters whose signal area overlaps by more than eighty percent with their distribution area 
and vice versa (Article ()). Th ere are certain kinds of restrictions on cross-ownership 
between broadcasters and cable distributors, as well as broadcasters and newspaper or 
magazine distributors (Article ), but these have less importance in practice and will not 
be discussed in detail. We would like to point out once more that publishing a newspaper 
(or a magazine) needs no license; it is only cross-media ownership that is restricted by law.
3 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LEGISLATION 
3.1 MEDIA CONCENTRATION CASES 
CONSIDERED BY THE REGULATORS
Th e ﬁ rst case to be presented is a rather special one: an acquisition outside Hungary 
eventually led to changes in the ownership structure of the publisher of the largest circu-
lation political daily in Hungary. In , Bertelsmann .., the big German media em-
pire, decided to raise its interest in  Group to . percent, as a part of its global corpo-
rate strategy. -Ufa .., a fully owned subsidiary of  Group, happens to be the main 
shareholder with a  percent interest in - ., the national commercial television 
broadcaster that runs  Klub channel in Hungary. As Bertelsmann raised its interest in 
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 Group, the media giant’s indirect interest through -Ufa .. exceeded the  per-
cent threshold (controlling interest) in - .. 
In , Bertelsmann had a . percent direct interest in Népszabadság ., the pub-
lisher of the largest circulation political daily in Hungary. Th erefore, when the media giant 
raised its interest in  Group to . percent, and consequently Bertelsmann’s indirect in-
terest in the television broadcaster - . exceeded the  percent threshold, the un-
changed ownership structure in -. . (see Table ) suddenly violated cross-ownership 
restrictions laid down by the Broadcasting Act of  (Article ()). Bertelsmann had two 
options: to decrease its interest in Népszabadság . or to do the same in - ..
Th e regulatory body in charge, the National Board on Radio and Television, determined 
the violation of the law by the resolution /. (. .) and asked the broadcaster 
to bring its ownership structure in line with the law within  days. Bertelsmann Co. de 
facto accepted the resolution and decided to reduce its interest to . percent by selling 
a . percent share in Népszabadság . to another publishing group, the Ringier .. 
(more precisely to the .. Tabora holding company, a  percent Ringier .. interest, 
registered in the Netherlands). Finally, Bertelsmann’s decision was accepted by the Board 
as a solution to the case (Resolution of /. (. .)). 
Apparently unhappy with its new position as a minority shareholder in Népszabadság 
., Bertelsmann later headed toward a new anti-concentration case, but this time the com-
pany ran into diﬃ  culties stemming from competition legislation. Tabora and Bertelsmann 
made a deal on  February , linked to an international share transaction, and as a re-
sult of the deal, Tabora acquired the remaining . percent Bertelsmann interest in Nép-
szabadság . Having done so, it became a majority shareholder with a controlling interest 
in the publisher. Taking into account that in  the aggregate net turnover of Ringier Ki-
adó . (a  percent Ringier .. interest, the leading national daily newspaper publish-
er, registered in Hungary) and Népszabadság . exceeded the ten billion forint ( . 
million) threshold, and both undertakings’ net turnover exceeded half a billion forints ( 
. million), under the Competition Act of  (Article ()() and Article ()()), the 
parties were required to obtain the authorisation of the Oﬃ  ce of Economic Competition.
Th e Competition Council of the Oﬃ  ce of Economic Competition rejected Tabora’s ap-
plication and did not authorise the deal (Resolution no. Vj-//.). Competition 
judges, as the members of the Competition Council are called, argued that the acquisi-
tion of a controlling interest in Népszabadság . secured excessive power for Ringier .. 
in the market of national political dailies, and this was clearly an outcome that should be 
prevented by denying authorisation to the acquisition. .. Tabora and Népszabadság . 
threatened to ﬁ le a suit against the resolution of the Competition Council, and, according 
to the latest information, they did so at the end of . 
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Th e third case was widely discussed in the Hungarian media in . It involved the sale 
of a  percent stake in  ., the publisher of the largest circulation political weekly 
magazine named , with a very strong position in the advertising market as well.  
. was fully owned by the members of the magazine’s editorial staﬀ  and the employees of 
the publishing company, staﬀ  members and managers alike, and they decided to sell three 
fourths of their interest in . Th e company’s net turnover amounted to . billion for-
ints ( . million) in . After time consuming negotiations with would-be buyers, 
they made a deal with Ost Holding Gmbh that belongs to the large Westdeutsche Allge-
meine Zeitungsverlag Gmbh () group. Th e price  paid for the shares has never 
been disclosed.
 entered the Hungarian regional daily newspaper market in , buying four 
strong county papers in West Hungary in an open tender. Th e Hungarian subsidiaries of 
 are regarded as successful, and they have been extending their activity in the Hungar-
ian market, continuously generating a net turnover of . billion forints ( . million) 
in . Th e acquisition was approved by the Competition Council at the end of Septem-
ber . Competition judges reasoned that the two companies are present in two diﬀ er-
ent markets (regional dailies and political news magazines), and the  percent acquisition 
of  . did not create excessive market power in either market.
4 TRANSPARENCY OF MEDIA OWNERSHIP
Not a single media outlet registered in Hungary is a public company; none of them is 
listed on any stock exchange. Th ey are less transparent in every sense than public compa-
nies, but a certain degree of ownership transparency is guaranteed by a set of laws. 
First, all business associations have to be registered at one of the Court of Registers, and 
all of them have to report to the Court their ownership structure and changes in ownership 
structure. Th ese ﬁ les are open to the public at no charge. Th ere are online commercial serv-
ices that oﬀ er some relevant data on registered companies on a case by case basis, but they 
are rather expensive and do not provide full description of ownership structure – a visit 
to the Court of Registers is inevitable in most cases if one wants to have a detailed picture.
All broadcasters are obliged by law to report changes of ownership structure to the Of-
ﬁ ce of the National Board on Radio and Television as well. Th e Board itself passes a reso-
lution on the acceptance of changes in ownership structure if regional and national broad-
casters are concerned, and this topic is also discussed in detail in the Annual Report of the 
Board submitted to the Parliament. Th e Annual Report is public by the nature of the law 
itself, but it is not available on the Board’s website, and it is rather diﬃ  cult to get a copy. 
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Although this kind of treatment of the Annual Report is subject to criticism, the Board 
sticks to this practice arguing that it is not their duty to make the Annual Report public or 
to inform the public about ownership changes of broadcasters. 
Obtaining adequate information on local broadcasters seems to be extremely diﬃ  cult in 
many cases. Many local broadcasters neglect to report ownership changes to the Oﬃ  ce of 
the Board and/or to the Court of Registers and, being out of sight, they can get away with it. 
Th e Oﬃ  ce of Economic Competition pursues a fair policy of making their resolutions 
available to the public: all of these have been available online since  at no charge. Th e 
economic analysis of mergers and acquisition cases forms a part of such resolutions and 
provides valuable help to the members of the public (journalists, academic media profes-
sionals and other interested persons) in understanding the standpoint taken by competi-
tion judges when ruling on applications.
5 STATE SUBSIDIES TO THE MEDIA
Th ere are three important state funds that provide support to cultural industries in gen-
eral, and the broadcasting sector in particular, on an application basis, but none of them 
subsidises newspaper publishing as a matter of policy.
Th e National Cultural Fund supports the publication of various periodicals (monthlies 
and quarterlies) on arts, literature, history, theatre, etc. and a couple of monthlies carrying 
general socio-political content. Th e Hungarian Motion Picture Foundation has a narrow 
focus – in the centre of its activity is the Hungarian ﬁ lm industry. 
Th e Broadcasting Fund was set up by the Broadcasting Act of  as a special fund 
outside the system of the general state budget (Articles  and ) in order to support 
public service broadcasting, public broadcasters, non-proﬁ t oriented broadcasters, public 
service programmes and programme items. Its main purpose is to ensure the preserva-
tion and further development of culture, and programming diversity, as well as to promote 
some speciﬁ c goals deﬁ ned in the Act (e.g. upgrading cable systems). Various fees paid by 
broadcasters and a part of the license fee serve as sources of ﬁ nance for the Broadcasting 
Fund. During the six years from the middle of  to the middle of , the Broadcast-
ing Fund provided  billion forints support (it is about  . million if we take a  
/ exchange rate as an unweighted average for the six year time period) and admin-
istered  application procedures (Csányi, ). 
Th e National Board on Radio and Television has the power to make decisions on the 
genres and the amounts of grants within the limits laid down by law. As far as supporting 
the production of audiovisual programmes is concerned, drama, children’s programmes, 
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news and current aﬀ airs and ﬁ lms (documentary, animation, drama) lead the list of genres 
(. billion forints or  . million in –). Other rather important segments tar-
geted within the framework of Th e Broadcasting Fund are upgrading and/or building cable 
systems in small villages and towns (. billion forints, i.e.  . million in –). 
Members of the Board designate experts in order to examine and evaluate applications on 
an ad hoc basis. Th e Committee experts select the solution by a simple majority vote and 
recommend it to the Board, which makes the ﬁ nal decision about the application.
Th e overall sum of support (or their annual average, i.e.  . million) does not seem 
too high, if compared with the  billion forints ( . million) of state support provid-
ed in  to the Hungarian Television Co., the main public service television broadcaster. 
Nevertheless, Th e Broadcasting Fund’s grants have played an important role in the indus-
try. As the incumbent government de facto abolished the license fee in , the Fund’s 
sources guaranteed by law have decreased signiﬁ cantly.
Of course, besides formal state subsidies to media outlets, there exists another, less 
transparent form of state support. Th is might be called the grey zone of subsidies in the 
form of advertising spending in the media by government organisations, state owned 
companies, municipalities etc., and support from public foundations with board members 
appointed by the incumbent government. It is not easy to estimate these sums, but most 
experts agree that  to  percent of the aggregate advertising spending (approximately 
  million in ) might be labelled as “driven by non-market forces” (Gálik, ). 
If this estimate is correct, the grey zone of media subsidies has greater weight than the of-
ﬁ cial, by and large transparent, state subsidies in Hungary. 
6 MEDIA LEGISLATION AND EDITORIAL INDEPENDENCE
Media legislation does not deal with editorial independence directly. However, the 
Broadcasting Act of  stipulates (Article ) that public service broadcasters shall for-
mulate and apply special in-house programme making regulations (set of guidelines in 
practice). For instance, the “Public service operational rules of the Hungarian Radio Co.” 
devote one chapter to provisions ensuring journalistic independence within the organisa-
tion: this is Chapter  on the “Independence of programme makers.” Below are several 
provisions from this document:
 “() Th e programme maker (journalist) pursues his obligations independently, in ac-
cordance with law and the regulations of the Hungarian Radio. Th e authorised editor 
and the management of the Hungarian Radio may only instruct him.
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 () Th e programme maker shall not be forced to produce or co-operate in the produc-
tion of a programme which is against his conviction. 
 () In every such case when there is an attempt to violate the programme maker’s inde-
pendence, he or she is obliged to report on this to his or her supervisor. In case it is jus-
tiﬁ ed, the programme maker may also report such cases to the board of Trustees of the 
Hungarian Radio Public Foundation (“Board of Trustees”). If the management of the 
Hungarian Radio learns about such cases, it shall immediately report on the case to the 
Board of Trustees.” 
Th ese codes of operation provide rules that can be regarded as a framework for edito-
rial independence. In addition, both large commercial television channels have adopted 
some kind of guidelines for factual programmes (news and current aﬀ airs). Th e most we 
can say about these rules is that they are not discussed among professionals. 
7 MEDIA MARKET, PRIVATISATION 
AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 
7.1 EMERGING MEDIA MARKET
Applying the term privatisation to the Hungarian media market is somewhat mislead-
ing as far as content production is concerned. In the newspaper and magazine sector, 
new players appeared on the stage in . Th e four big state-, or party–owned, publish-
ing houses were not privatised - they simply collapsed and disappeared from the market. 
Th e exceptional circumstances of the political transition from the authoritarian political 
regime to democracy made an extraordinary method of privatisation possible on a mass 
scale: the journalists themselves and not the representatives of the state set the speed and 
terms of the privatisation process (“spontaneous privatisation”). Th e journalists entered 
into negotiations with would-be investors and managed to persuade them to invest in the 
publishing of newspapers that had been already on the scene (Jakab – Gálik, ). In ad-
dition, many new titles were introduced within a short period of time. Th ese were mostly 
tabloid newspapers and consumer magazines, since foreign professional investors were 
rather quick to enter the liberalized publishing industry and they soon ﬁ lled the gap be-
tween supply and demand for such a publications. 
Th e monopoly of the two state broadcasters was de iure broken in , when some 
small private channels managed to get broadcasting licenses in various ways, but these 
small channels were not able to break the de facto monopoly of state broadcasters. Th e li-
censing procedure for national and regional commercial broadcasters (all of them domi-
nated by foreign professional investors) took more than one year, so they could enter the 
scene only in October . 
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7.2 OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE OF 
THE LARGEST MEDIA OUTLETS
7.2.1 PRINT MEDIA MARKET
Th e three largest circulation dailies in Hungary come from three diﬀ erent segments i.e. 
free daily newspaper, political daily and tabloid daily sectors, to apply the widely used and 
commonly accepted subdivisions of the newspaper industry. Circulation ﬁ gures are meas-
ured and audited by the Magyar Terjesztés Ellenőrző Szövetség (Hungarian Audit Bureau 
of Circulation), abbreviated as , a joint venture of leading publishers and advertis-
ing agencies in Hungary. 
 circulation ﬁ gures are accepted by all market players as a yardstick of market 
position, and they are available both in some professional periodicals and online (free reg-
istration). Th e three largest circulation national dailies are published by diﬀ erent media 
companies, but foreign professional investors dominate all of these. Nevertheless, in the 
case of the largest circulation political daily, Népszabadság, a Hungarian legal person, Free 
Press Foundation, which is, by the way, close to the Hungarian Socialist Party, has a con-
trolling interest in the publisher, as shown in Table .
Table  THREE LARGEST CIRCULATION 
DAILY NEWSPAPERS IN HUNGARY IN 2003
TITLE TYPE DAILY 
CIRCULATION
PUBLISHER
METRO FREE  317,000 MTG METRO GRATIS KFT.
BLIKK TABLOID  242,000 RINGIER KIADÓI KFT. 
(RINGIER A.G.)
NÉPSZABADSÁG POLITICAL  181,000 NÉPSZABADSÁG RT.
Source: .
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Table  OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE OF PUBLISHERS 
OF THE LARGEST CIRCULATION DAILIES AT THE END OF 2003
TITLE OWNER OWNERSHIP 
SHARE (%)
METRO METRO INTERNATIONAL (MTG) 90
ONE NATURAL PERSON 10
BLIKK RINGIER KIADÓ KFT. 100
NÉPSZABADSÁG B.V. TABORA (RINGIER A.G.) 49.97
BERTELSMANN A.G. 17.68
FREE PRESS FOUNDATION 26.50
NÉPSZABADSÁG ASSOCIATION 5.50
EDITORIAL STAFF 0.40
Sources: Court of Registers, Oﬃ  ce of Economic Competition.
Th e overall number of national daily titles amounts to twelve: there were four political 
dailies, three tabloids, one sports daily, two business dailies, one daily with classiﬁ ed ads 
and one free circulation daily on the market at the end of . 
Table  CIRCULATION OF PAID NATIONAL DAILY NEWSPAPERS 
BY SUBMARKETS AND PUBLISHERS IN 2003
PUBLISHER CONTENT
GENERAL SPECIALISED
POLITICAL TABLOID SPORTS BUSINESS CLASS. 
ADS
TOTAL
RINGIER KFT.  35,000 242,000 92,000 369,000
NÉPSZABADSÁG RT. 181,000 181,000
NEMZET KFT. 81,000 81,000
HÍD RÁDIÓ RT. 66,000 66,000
SOM MÉDIA RT.. 45,000A 45,000
EDITORIAL KFT. 28,000 28,000
EXPRESSZ RT. 22,000 22,000
ZÖLD ÚJSÁG RT. 12,000 A 12,000
NAPI GAZDASÁG KFT. 9,000 A 9,000
TOTAL 325,000 353,000 92,000 21,000 22,000 813,000
Source:  and estimates for titles with mark .
 It is worth mentioning that the titles of the four political dailies on the market are the 
same as those that existed in . Of course, every other feature of the four political dai-
lies – their publisher, content, size, design, printing, circulation, market position, etc. – 
has changed considerably since then, but the titles, which serve as brand names in news-
paper publishing, are the same. It is a widely held belief among industry analysts that the 
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submarket of national political dailies is overcrowded, and market forces provide support 
for only two titles: the centre-left Népszabadság and the centre-right Magyar Nemzet (Gá-
lik – James, ). 
Th e centre-right political daily newspaper is published by Nemzet Publishing Company 
., and owned mainly by a Hungarian natural person who also happens to be the editor 
in chief of Magyar Nemzet. Th e weakest daily, the leftist Népszava, is owned by its editorial 
staﬀ , and the fourth title, the centre-left Magyar Hírlap, belongs to the Ringier group. Th is 
submarket is de facto closed – all the three market entries during the s have failed, 
and no one expects that a new title will appear here in the near future. 
A look at the circulation ﬁ gures of national dailies during the last four years shows (see 
Table ) that political dailies have been losing ground slowly but surely. Tabloid circulation 
is soaring, thanks to the delicate, carefully designed cooperation (called media partner-
ship) between their publishers and the two big commercial television channels. Th e free 
daily launched in  seems to be stabilising its market position. 
Table  CIRCULATION OF NATIONAL DAILIES FROM 1999 TO 2003
TYPE 2000 2001 2002 2003
POLITICAL 356,000 341,000 335,000 325,000
TABLOID 178,000 264,000 326,000 353,000
FREE CIRCULATION 220,000 280,000 321,000 317,000
Source:  and estimates.
As far as the largest circulation weekly newspapers and/or news magazines (Sunday 
editions of daily titles excluded) are concerned, the data on the leading two titles and the 
ownership structure of their publishers are shown in Table  and Table .
Table  TWO LARGEST CIRCULATION POLITICAL WEEKLIES IN 2003
TITLE TYPE WEEKLY 
CIRCULATION
PUBLISHER
SZABAD FÖLD NEWSPAPER 160,000 GEOMÉDIA RT.
HVG NEWS MAGAZINE 108,000 HVG RT.
Source: .
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Table  OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE OF THE PUBLISHERS 
OF THE LEADING WEEKLIES AT THE END OF 2003
PUBLISHER OWNER OWNERSHIP SHARE
GEOMÉDIA RT. LÁNG HOLDING RT. 1442 SHARES
PROMEDIA 58 SHARES
HVG RT. WAZ 75%
EMPLOYEES ALTOGETHER 25%
Source: Court of Registers.
Th e two weekly titles have clearly diﬀ erent audiences and market values. Szabad Föld 
is targeted at the low income rural population and has been going down in circulation 
during the last decade.  has an up-market audience and stable circulation and en-
joys a privileged position on the advertising market: it is certainly the most proﬁ table title 
among political dailies and weeklies.
Regional newspaper markets are very strong in Hungary. In , the overall circu-
lation of regional daily newspapers was close to the circulation of national dailies if we 
exclude Metro, the free national daily. Th e audited circulation ﬁ gures of regional dailies 
amounted to  thousand in this time period, and the  regional newspaper titles be-
longed to four publishers, as data in Table  demonstrate.
Table  NUMBER OF TITLES AND COMBINED DAILY CIRCULATION 
OF REGIONAL DAILIES BY PUBLISHERS IN 2003 (in thousand copies)
PUBLISHER NUMBER 
OF TITLES
COMBINED 
CIRCULATION
AXEL SPRINGER MAGYARORSZÁG KFT. 8,000 247,000
WAZ 4,000 219,000
VORALBELGER MEDIENHOUSE 3,000 157,000
DAILY MAIL GROUP TRUST 3,000 132,000
TOTAL 18,000 755,000
Source: , Court of Registers.
Axel Springer Magyarország . is owned by Axel Springer Verlag . (. percent 
majority interest) and Vinton . which is fully owned by two Hungarian natural persons. 
Th ere exists a small county daily outside this circle and there was an ailing Budapest 
daily as well (it went out of business at the end of January ). Th ere are no circulation 
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ﬁ gures for these dailies, but they might be around  thousand and  thousand respec-
tively, according to estimates.
Th e regional markets form monopolies on a “one county one daily” basis (there is only 
one exception where the same publisher kept both titles dating from the period before 
privatisation). Th e four big publishers of regional dailies are vertically integrated, and at 
the moment they all have their own printing houses and distribution divisions. Th ere have 
been a dozen or so attempts to enter the regional daily market since  when the priva-
tisation of regional dailies took place, but all of these ended in failure: new entrants had to 
leave the market soon, owing to heavy ﬁ nancial losses. Th is result corresponds to the very 
nature of local newspaper markets that tend to be monopolies where incumbents enjoy 
all the advantages over contenders. Of course, all markets are contestable in theory, but 
many of them not so in practice, and in Hungary regional daily markets seemingly belong 
to the latter category.
7.2.2 TELEVISION BROADCAST MARKET
Television viewing market shares are measured in diﬀ erent ways.  Hungary . 
provides audience ﬁ gures, measured by the well-known peoplemeter method, and these 
ﬁ gures are regarded as industry standards. Oddly enough, television channels, which are 
the main subscribers to this service, allow  Hungary to publish only aggregate audi-
ence ﬁ gures, but not viewership data on individual channels as well: they do this them-
selves, cherry picking among data in accordance with their business interests. Of course, 
reliable audience ﬁ gures do exist, and these are deﬁ nitely the data provided by  Hun-
gary, but getting them, if you are not a subscriber, seems a bit diﬃ  cult. Even the two public 
service television broadcasters claim that audience ﬁ gures are not for the general public! 
Two commercial channels,  and -Klub, compete for ﬁ rst place in the television 
market. As far as audience share ﬁ gures are concerned, this seems to be a neck-and-neck 
race, since both channels had close to  percent audience share (+ population) in . 
At the same time, -Klub clearly has a better position in the advertising market than 
, thanks to the composition of its overall audience: the channel is a market leader in 
the - age group. 
Th e third commercial channel, , with satellite and cable distribution, lags far 
behind the two market leaders with its . percent audience share, but it is catching up: 
the broadcaster’s management seems to be rather ambitious and wants to boost the chan-
nel’s audience share by securing the broadcasting rights for some up-market programmes 
(e.g. Sex in the City, live coverage of  Champions’ League).
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Table  OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE OF THE THREE LARGEST 
TELEVISION BROADCASTERS AT THE END OF 2003
BROADCASTER 
AND CHANNEL
OWNER OWNERSHIP 
SHARE (%)
MTM-SBS RT.
(TV2)
SBS BROADCASTING S.A 81.51
MTM-TV2 BEFEKTETÉSI KFT. 16.00
TELE-MÜNCHEN FERNS. GMBH 2.49
M-RTL RT. 
(RTL-KLUB)
CLT-UFA S.A. (BERTELSMANN A.G.) 49.00
MATÁV RT. 25.00
PEARSON NETHERLANDS B.V. 20.00
IKO GROUP 6.00
VIASAT HUNGÁRIA RT. 
(VIASAT3)
MTG GROUP 95.00
TWO NATURAL PERSONS 5.00
Source: National Radio and Television Board, Court of Registers.
Owing to the provisions of the Broadcasting Act of ,  Broadcasting .. can have 
a  percent voting right (Article ()), so in this case ownership shares and voting rights 
are diﬀ erent (voting rights are ., . and . percent, respectively). 
7.2.3 RADIO BROADCAST MARKET
Data on radio audience shares are measured in diﬀ erent ways as well. A consortium 
composed of the two leading market and opinion research companies,   and 
, provides the data that are accepted as standard and used by advertisers. Th e so-called 
National Media Survey data are not public, as the survey itself is a commodity sold to any-
one who is willing to pay for it. Radio broadcasters follow the same policy as do television 
broadcasters in making audience data public. It is worth mentioning, however, that Gallup 
Hungary .’s data on listenership are public and available online on its free homepage 
(Gallup Hungary does audience surveys for the public service radio, Magyar Rádió .).
According to the information we have received courtesy of Sláger Rádió Műsorsz ol-
gáltató . management, the two big commercial radio channels with national cover-
age have very similar audience share ﬁ gures (+ population): the Danubius channel has 
slightly more than  percent and the Sláger channel slightly less than  percent (by the 
way, these ﬁ gures do not diﬀ er signiﬁ cantly from Gallup audience share data). Th e biggest 
regional radio channel, Juventus, comes in third with its . percent share, but Juventus 
leads a network of local stations, and if we take this into account, they might have a ten 
percent or so audience share in the market. As far as ownership data are concerned, these 
are shown in Table .
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Table  OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE OF THE THREE LARGEST 
RADIO BROADCASTERS AT THE END OF 2003 
BROADCASTER AND CHANNEL OWNER OWNERSHIP 
SHARE (%)
ORSZÁGOS KERESKEDELMI RÁDIÓ RT. 
(DANUBIUS RÁDIÓ)
ADVENT INTERNATIONAL 100.00
SLÁGER RÁDIÓ MU˝SORSZOLG. RT. 
(SLÁGER RÁDIÓ)
EMMIS BROADCASTING INTERNATIONAL 
CORPORATION
54.00
CREDIT SUISSE FIRST BOSTON RADIO 
OPERATING B.V.
20.00
SZUPER EXPRESSZ KFT. 15.00
MAGYAR KOMMUNIKÁCIÓS BEFEKTETÉSI KFT. 5.50
CSFB RÁDIÓ (HUNGARY) BEFEKTETÉSI KFT. 5.50
JUVENTUS KERESKEDELMI, SZOLGÁLTATÓ ÉS 
ÜGYNÖKI KFT. (JUVENTUS RÁDIÓ)
METROMEDIA INTERNATIONAL INC. 53.00
METROMEDIA INTERNATIONAL CONSULTING 
SERVICES INC.
47.00
Source: National Radio and Television Board, Court of Registers.
7.2.4 RADIO AND TELEVISION BROADCASTING NETWORKS 
From a technical point of view, national commercial terrestrial broadcasters are net-
works in themselves, and, given the characteristics of the Hungarian broadcast market, 
they leave little room for networks composed of and organised by regional and/or local 
broadcasters. Th ere are eight radio networks and one television network in function, but 
we shall not go into details on their market role, which is rather limited. 
We do not cover either local/regional television markets (these are monopolies, and 
most of the channels are owned indirectly by local councils) or local/regional radio mar-
kets (these are private monopolies in small and oligopolies in medium size markets) in 
this paper. Local television markets cannot support commercial channels in Hungary be-
cause of the lack of available advertising revenue in these markets. In contrast to televi-
sion broadcasting, local and regional markets can support local and regional commercial 
radio channels, but, as we said earlier, national channels are clearly dominating the radio 
industry in the country.
7.2.5 PUBLIC SERVICE BROADCASTING – 
WHY DOES IT SEEMS TO BE A WASTELAND? 
As far as public service radio and television are concerned, their main mission is to cor-
rect market failures in a multichannel broadcasting area. Unfortunately, Hungarian public 
service broadcasters have not been able to fulﬁ l this mission. Th is topic is so hot and so 
complex that it is almost impossible to discuss it in a few paragraphs. 
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Th e ﬁ rst half of the s brought little change in the legal status of the former state 
radio and television. Although in July  government coalition parties and opposition 
parties came to an agreement on the nomination of two persons with high social prestige 
to the posts of president of Hungarian Radio and president of Hungarian Television, and 
they were appointed consequently by the President of the Hungarian Republic, they had 
no legal power to carry out the transformation from state to public service broadcaster. It 
is true that the new, democratically-elected government could not resist the temptation to 
interfere with the day-to-day operation of the two broadcasters, and the good old excuse 
used to legitimize this eﬀ ort sounded rather familiar: the country faced a long process of 
transition and complete democracy was not yet possible. 
According to most politicians that took oﬃ  ce in , the media in general, and radio 
and television in particular, had been expected to serve the interests of transition – at least, 
this is how the democratically-elected government interpreted their mission. However, 
neither opposition parties nor the newly appointed presidents of the two state broadcasters 
shared this idea, so the Government soon tried to get rid of these two independent-minded 
intellectuals. All of this inevitably led to the so-called ”media war” in Hungary (Hankiss, 
), which is a development similar to that in other countries in East Central Europe. 
Th e former state broadcasters were transformed into public service broadcasters by 
law in , but political pressure on them did continue in the new legal environment. Of 
course, methods have changed, and political interference became institutionalised, but 
the outcome seems to be just about the same. Since , each election has brought a gov-
ernment change, and purges have become regular practice among leading journalists after 
elections. Th e main public service broadcaster, Hungarian Television Co., has “consumed” 
ﬁ ve presidents since . In addition to regular political interference, other factors like 
inherent weaknesses in legislation, mismanagement, lack of employee loyalty, partisan 
editorialising, and the never-ending ﬁ ghts between journalists, etc. have also contributed 
their share to the failure of the public broadcasting sector. 
It is fashionable to talk about the crisis worldwide of public service broadcasting in the 
multichannel era, but there is no more appropriate word to choose than crisis when ana-
lysing the performance of the Hungarian Television Co. and Hungarian Radio Co. (Sükösd 
– Bajomi-Lázár, ). Hungarian public service media have been regarded as politically 
biased, economically weak, depending on state subsidies and internally divided: they pro-
mote particular rather than universal values and interests. Th e overwhelming market suc-
cess of commercial broadcasters has been made easy by the failure of the public service 
sector, regardless of the values commercial broadcasters promote. Nevertheless, as far as 
news and current aﬀ airs are concerned, you cannot blame people if they prefer infotain-
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ment over state propaganda: this choice seems rational. Th e sad thing is that this is the 
only, pre-deﬁ ned choice the audience has to face. 
Th ere is little hope that things will improve in the near future, because government and 
opposition parties’ mutual distrust runs deep: for the time being there is no room for com-
promise that could lead to changes in the Broadcasting Act (it would need a two-thirds 
majority of support in the Parliament). “Whatever the laws might say, the political and 
economic conditions for the ﬂ ourishing of a recognisable ‘public-service broadcasting’ do 
not really exist in Central and Eastern Europe. Th e idea that if one established ‘the rule of 
law’, with a freely elected parliament and an independent judiciary, one had reached a state 
when the collective will could be formulated democratically and administered impartially, 
was clearly naïve. Irrespective of legal frameworks, political realities have been such as to 
ensure that the control of broadcasting remains a highly politicised question throughout 
the region.“ (Sparks, , p. ). Th is quotation has not lost its relevance and actuality, al-
though ﬁ ve years have passed since Spark’s book was published.
7.2.6 THE LARGEST PRINTING HOUSE IN THE NEWSPAPER INDUSTRY
Th e largest printing house, Szikra Lapnyomda . was privatised in two steps in the 
s (in  and ) in two open tenders. Th e ownership structure of the company at 
the end of  is shown below:
Table  OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 
OF SZIKRA LAPNYOMDA RT. AT THE END OF 2003 
OWNER OWNERSHIP 
SHARE (%)
LÁNG HOLDING ÉS KIADÓI RT. 55.74
EUROPEAN BANK OF RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT 19.15
ÁPV RT. (STATE PROPERTY CO.) 13.74
NATURAL PERSONS 1.37
SZIKRA LAPNYOMDA RT. (NON VOTING SHARES) 10.00
Source: Court of Registers.
Although Szikra Lapnyomda . is really the biggest player in the industry, the market 
position of the company is not as favourable as it looks from outside: the printing house 
was in the red in , and it had been squeezed out of the regional dailies’ market. Ring-
ier, as the biggest newspaper publisher and the buyer of printing services on a mass scale, 
seems to enjoy a very good bargaining position against the printing house. Th e formation 
of a kind of strategic alliance between the two outlets seems likely, if one can believe ru-
mours circulating among industry experts. 
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7.2.7 THE LARGEST DISTRIBUTOR IN PUBLISHING
Newspaper distribution is partly privatised, since the big French professional investor 
Hachette bought from Magyar Posta . the single-copy sales division in  for . bil-
lion forints ( . million) and acquired a majority share in the new distribution com-
pany, as is shown below:
Table  OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 
OF MAGYAR LAPTERJESZTO˝ RT. AT THE END OF 2003
OWNER OWNERSHIP 
SHARE (%)
HACHETTE DISTRIBUTION SERVICE S.A. 80
KVK KFT. 15
NEWCO KFT. 5
Source: Court of Registers.
It is worth mentioning that consumer magazines rather than newspapers account for 
the majority of single copy sales; consequently newspaper distribution can be regarded as 
rather fragmented: regional markets belong to the four big vertically integrated publish-
ers, single copy sales are handled by Magyar Lapterjesztő ., and home delivery of na-
tional papers remained in the hands of Magyar Posta .. 
7.2.8 THE LARGEST MEDIA OWNERS
Th ere is not a perfect yardstick for determining the three largest media outlets in Hun-
gary. Axel Springer Verlag .. is clearly one of them, as combined annual revenues of the 
ﬁ ve media companies they dominate were close to  billion forints ( . million) in 
. Th e annual revenue of - Klub . was . billion forints ( . million) in 
the same year, so Bertelsmann .., the main shareholder in the company and the holder 
of an interest in Népszabadság . (. billion forints, i.e.  . million net revenue in 
), might be regarded as second on the list.  Broadcasting .., the main sharehold-
er in the other national commercial television broadcaster might be ranked as the third 
biggest player (. billion forints,  . million net revenue in ). Other relevant 
players from the European media scene, like the Swiss newspaper publisher Ringier ., 
the Finnish consumer magazine publisher Sanoma  and the German newspaper pub-
lisher , trail after the big three.
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7.2.9 MEDIA PRIVATISATION AND POLITICAL ORIENTATION 
Privatisation in the media can be divided into two phases. At the very beginning a kind 
of spontaneous privatisation prevailed (Jakab-Gálik, ) in publishing, and this was fol-
lowed by privatisation based on the law. Some spontaneous privatisations were called 
scandalous in their time in –, and with reason, especially the privatisation of re-
gional dailies, but it is an irony of history that they could not be compared to the biggest 
media privatisation scandal in Hungary, where the procedure was fully based on the law. 
Allocating frequencies to national commercial television broadcasters was adminis-
tered by the powerful broadcasting regulatory body, the National Radio and Television 
Board. According to the application terms, the minimum ﬁ gure (the lowest bid) to get 
one of the two licenses for ten years was set at eight billion Hungarian forints (  mil-
lion), and some qualitative criteria connected to programming had to be also met. Th ree 
contenders led by foreign professional investors – all three were multinational television 
companies, namely ,  and  – entered the two-phase race, and the Board ﬁ nally 
awarded the licenses to the consortia led by  and  groups. 
Although the consortium named  , led by , oﬀ ered by far the highest sum 
(  million, far above ’s bid which was kept to the minimum of   million), it 
lost. Th is was obviously too much to stomach, and the consortium ﬁ led a lawsuit against 
the Board’s decision in  (Gálik, ).
Later, the Supreme Court of Hungary ruled that the Board had violated the procedure 
rules, but before the next trial was concluded  relinquished its claim on the very last 
day (Vrannai, ) and sold its Hungarian interests to  (and indirectly to ). Th e 
Hungarian state was freed of paying a very high compensation to , but the Board’s rep-
utation had been seriously tarnished.
As far as the licensing of national commercial radio channels and the privatisation of 
printing houses and distribution companies are concerned, they were by and large trans-
parent and did not stir emotions in the country. 
Big media outlets are trying to avoid becoming involved in politics as a matter of busi-
ness policy. Th ey are powerful enough not to bow to politicians, and, at the same time, 
they are cautious enough not to interfere with politics: they regard the media as business 
ﬁ rst of all. News and current aﬀ air programmes on commercial television are increasing-
ly turning into infotainment, and the political press has been losing ground to tabloids as 
well: Friedman’s famous saying that “the business of business is business” is coming true 
in the Hungarian media.
porocilo.indb   22 22.5.2004, 13:46:19
HUNGARY 213
8 EDITORIAL INDEPENDENCE AND 
INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM 
As far as we know, a collective agreement on the national level does not exist between 
the three journalists’ associations and media publishers. One of the main reasons is that 
the journalists’ associations were busy participating in political ﬁ ghts, instead of repre-
senting the journalists’ interests according to the new, transformed environment after the 
collapse of communism. 
Collective agreements between employees and management, and agreements with in-
dustry trade unions covering the basic terms of employment (wages, workload, etc.) are 
common at big media outlets. Nevertheless, there are very few media outlets with an in-
house agreement between journalists and publishers on editorial policy, and even fewer 
enforce these agreements. At both the highest circulation political daily, Népszabadság, 
and the leading weekly news magazine, , editorial staﬀ  have their statutum. Th is spe-
cial agreement clearly states the independence of journalists from the publishers’ business 
interests, and in accordance with the provisions of the statutum, journalists themselves 
elect the editor in chief for both newspapers. However, as far as we know, self-censorship 
is stronger at  than the pressure from the publisher’s side. Since  was fully owned 
by a group of employees themselves, self-censorship was sometimes driven by the business 
interests of journalists. At the same time,  has a reputation as an independent liberal 
political magazine, and the publisher’s management keeps saying that editorial work and 
advertising activity are clearly separated. Népszabadság has a centre-left editorial policy 
and has less of a reputation than  as far as editorial independence is concerned. 
As far as we know, journalists’ professional organisations or media self-regulatory bod-
ies do not publicly expose problems of pressure on journalists and editors based on com-
mercial interests of the owners. In the same way, signiﬁ cant problems related to  articles 
and hidden advertising are not exposed by professional organisations or media monitor-
ing and research institutions. Th is does not mean that there are no signiﬁ cant problems 
in that area or that one can not hear rumours about paid journalists (journalists ‘for sale’) 
who write articles to order and whose journalistic products are not real journalistic prod-
ucts but hidden  articles or covert advertisements. 
It also happens regularly that newspapers run special sections on speciﬁ c industries 
(chemical, banking, energy etc.) sponsored by the major actors in the industry. While 
these are good for generating extra revenue for the paper, the articles appearing in the spe-
cial sections are written by the same journalists who normally cover the area. Th us they 
ﬁ nd themselves in a situation where they do  interviews with the people they normally 
use as sources for news articles. And this phenomenon is the least harmful, not to mention 
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when journalists themselves give  advice in their free time – when they do not work as 
journalists, in order to generate extra income. 
A consensus on how investigative journalism should be deﬁ ned does not exist in Hun-
garian journalism. In the last decade, political debates and ﬁ ghts have supplanted profes-
sional debate. Questions such as what kind of professional rules journalists must follow 
when they write investigative pieces, what an investigative piece looks like, and what kinds 
of requirements both the editors and the audience should have of an investigative article, 
remain unclear. 
However, in the past few years it became fashionable to mention investigative journal-
ism whenever a controversial case emerged, or when any kind of scandal erupted. Unfor-
tunately, such events are related to the phenomenon journalists call among themselves 
“dossier-journalism”: whenever any journalist obtains a secret or conﬁ dential document 
from any authority – regardless of who leaked the papers and what kind of intentions lay 
behind the act of leaking information – both the representatives of the profession and the 
public start to say that this was a journalistic investigation. It is harmful for all the actors 
involved and for democracy overall, because investigative journalism – based on the An-
glo-Saxon methodology and practice – should contain the journalist’s original work and 
investigation instead of relying on somebody else’s work (even if the source is an authority 
that has been established to reveal corruption or abuse of power). 
Th e phenomenon described here is the result of Hungary’s lack of the “guild” traditions 
of modern journalism. Because of this, media publishers – even if most Hungarian media 
are owned by Western professional investors – do not encourage investigative journal-
ism through special budgets or special units in the papers or television stations. In cases 
of isolated attempts to create an investigative section in a newsroom, or at least grant the 
opportunity to some privileged journalists to work on an important topic, the rest of the 
newsroom tended to react with jealousy toward the so-called investigative colleague. Of-
ten the piece was not published in the end, either because it was never completed, or be-
cause the publisher or the editor opted to avoid the unnecessary conﬂ ict that would have 
likely ensued. 
Since , a Pulitzer Prize Committee has existed in Hungary. Th e awards they hand 
out also include ones for investigative journalism each year. However, the lack of profes-
sional consensus about what investigative journalism is makes it diﬃ  cult to ﬁ nd any con-
sistency in the logic of the committee in awarding journalists in the last  years. Similarly, 
a new foundation was set up two years ago by three individuals to commemorate a Hun-
garian journalist who died of cancer at the age of . Th e foundation awards a prize (includ-
ing a considerable amount of money) every year for the best investigative piece, but again, 
the lack of generally agreed norms destroys the credibility of their original intention. 
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9 CONCLUSIONS
Media ownership is fairly concentrated in Hungary, and most media industries are dom-
inated by foreign companies. Th e high share of foreign ownership in the media is partly 
explained by the global nature of many media industries, primarily commercial television 
and consumer magazine publishing, but some special factors had their inﬂ uence, too. 
Looking back to the privatisation of political daily newspapers, it is true that there was 
a certain trade-oﬀ  between the penetration of foreign ownership and the speed of privati-
sation. At the dawn of the change in political regime, it seemed more and more clear that 
some newly emerging political forces did want to keep political newspapers previously 
owned by the state/communist party in order to secure their support during transition. 
Th is eﬀ ort was blocked by the phenomenon called spontaneous privatisation, assisted by 
the journalists themselves. 
Th ere is no sign that foreign owners of political dailies want to set an editorial line or 
that they interfere with the day-to-day practice of making a political daily. It might sound 
ironic, but it is true to say that the two national political dailies in Hungarian hands are 
regarded as party papers by professionals and by the man-on-the-street alike. Of course, 
there is nothing wrong with party newspapers in themselves, but the link between edito-
rial line and ownership is clearly much stronger here, compared to the independent news-
papers with foreign majority ownership.
What is wrong with party newspapers in Hungary is the unwillingness of their editors 
to accept professional journalistic standards and to show due respect for colleagues work-
ing for other titles. Th e deep political divide between the “two worlds” in Hungary is mir-
rored in the political press, and opinion leader journalists are not able to set standards to 
be followed.
Tabloid and consumer magazine publishers followed diﬀ erent lines. Most of the titles 
on the market are new, and have been brought to the scene by foreign publishers relying 
on the experience of developed media markets: saturated markets at home drove them to 
the emerging market economies in East Central Europe, including Hungary, and the lack 
in supply was ﬁ lled quickly. Th e role of the journalist at these publications is seemingly not 
more than to provide entertainment to the general public.
As far as the broadcast media are concerned, commercial television has conquered the 
media scene in ﬁ ve years. Th eir programmes favour mainstream commercial values and 
consumer culture. Th ey do it eﬃ  ciently, capitalising on the heavy investment owners have 
made since . Th ey do not care too much about politics: the news and current aﬀ airs 
programmes they provide do represent the infotainment genre. Self-regulation does not 
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seem their corporate strength, and they do not show suﬃ  cient signs of the social respon-
sibility they really ought to bear in contemporary Hungary.
Th e owners and managers of the largest media outlets are clearly not members of the 
previous nomenclature in the fallen communist regime. Th e state interventions in the 
media market, practiced with zeal by every government since , have had very lim-
ited success compared to the social costs involved. Th e media scene in Hungary is domi-
nated by the market, regardless of whether one likes it or not. Media markets are media 
markets, and expectations related to their output must remain within the limits deﬁ ned 
by this structure. 
Th e mission of the public service sector is mainly to correct market failures and imper-
fections, and to provide audiovisual merit goods to the audience, but this has proved to be 
a kind of “mission impossible” in Hungary so far. It is rather sad, but the blame lies entirely 
on us. Conversely, no one can change this situation but us. Th is might sound like either a 
hopeful conclusion or a dark one. Th ink of the metaphor of the bottle ﬁ lled exactly to  
percent: is it half empty or half full? Take your choice!
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1 INTRODUCTION
Probably no other field of Kosovar society went through more dynamic postwar devel-
opment than the media scene. Only one year after the end of the 1999 war in Kosovo/a, 
there were around 100 broadcasters, some ten newspapers, several weeklies and tens of 
biweeklies, monthly publications and other journals.
This unprecedented development boom should be attributed to circumstances created 
with the ending of the repressive Serbian regime, and support for new media from govern-
mental and non-governmental donors that arrived in Kosovo/a after the war.
These are impressive figures if we bear in mind that Kosovo/a is a small country with 
around 2 million people, and especially if we recall the fact that systematic persecution by 
Serb authorities of the few Albanian language media that existed during the 1990s had re-
sulted in their complete closure before the war.
Today the Kosovar media market is overcrowded – there are 112 broadcasters (89 radio 
and 23 TV stations), 5 dailies, 5 weeklies and tens of other journals. A temporary media 
regulatory regime that was established in Kosovo/a after the war is expected to end dur-
ing 2004 with approval of the new law on broadcasting and the establishment of an Inde-
pendent Media Commission.
2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The Kosovar media scene cannot be explained without referring to the pre-war situa-
tion in Kosovo/a, i.e. the period of media development at the time when Kosovo/a was un-
der control of the former Yugoslav Federation, or Serbia (1944–1999). Throughout these 
years, the media in Yugoslavia, including Kosovo/a, were controlled by the one-party to-
talitarian system. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the period in which party con-
trol over the media in Yugoslavia as a whole was brought to an end, Kosovo/a was forcibly 
stripped of its autonomy and subject to political persecution and a widespread campaign 
aimed against the media in Albanian.
The first media in Kosovo/a after the Second World War were established at the begin-
ning of 1945. On 12 February 1945, the Yugoslav Communist Party’s local committee for 
Kosovo/a launched the newspapers Rilindja in Albanian and Jedinstvo in Serbian to meet 
the needs of agitprop. Until 1948, Rilindja was an occasional publication. Afterwards, it 
started to be published twice a week, until 1957. For about one year it was published three 
times a week, and in 1958 it became a daily newspaper.1 Over time, Rilindja became the 
core of print media development and publishing activities in Albanian.2 The Jedinstvo 
KOSOVO/A 221
newspaper went through the same process of development. It became a newspaper and 
book publishing enterprise, whose output included a number of magazines in Serbian.3
At the end of the Second World War, there were two low power local radio stations in 
Kosovo/a: Radio Prizreni, established in 1941, and Radio Kosovo, which started broadcast-
ing in 1942 in Prishtina.4 On 5 February 1945, by a decision of the new communist author-
ities, Radio Prizreni resumed broadcasting, and was later supported with the technical 
equipment of Radio Kosovo. One year later, when Prishtina became the new political and 
administrative center of Kosovo/a, the technical equipment of Radio Prizreni was trans-
ferred to Prishtina, where it continued to broadcast as Radio Prishtina.5 Initially it had 
broadcast programs in Serbian and Albanian, later adding programs in Turkish (1951)6 and 
Romany (1986).7 Over time, Radio Prishtina increased its transmitter power and became 
a nation-wide broadcaster. By installing a 1000 KW transmitter in 1978, this initially small 
radio station grew into a powerful broadcaster that could be heard beyond Kosovo/a.8 Tel-
evision Prishtina began to broadcast in 1975, operating with the staff that previously pro-
duced the program in Albanian broadcast by TV Belgrade during 1966–1974.9 TV Prishtina 
and Radio Prishtina established Radio Television Prishtina (TVP). TVP began to broadcast 
programs in Albanian, Serbian and Turkish, and, from, 1986 in Romany.10
After Kosovo/a was violently stripped of its autonomy in 1989, the Serb authorities im-
posed administration in all of the socially-owned enterprises and public institutions of 
Kosovo/a, ranging from the National Theatre and University Library to the Kosovo/a Red 
Cross and sports clubs. On 5 July 1990, the day Serbia decided to dissolve forcibly the Par-
liament and the Government of Kosovo/a, Serbian special police forces invaded the build-
ing of Radio Television Prishtina, expelling and beating journalists and workers who were 
at their workplaces. Local radio stations went through the same experience. TVP employed 
1,260 people at the time when the Serb police violently banned it.11 On the same day, the 
Serb authorities took the decision to put the socially owned enterprise Rilindja under im-
posed administration.12 Two weeks later, Serbia decided that the Rilindja daily should 
come under the authority of the Republic of Serbia Assembly.13 On 7 August 1990, follow-
ing journalists’ opposition to this decision, the Serb authorities banned the publishing of 
Rilindja, which at that time was the only daily newspaper in Albanian in Kosovo/a and the 
entire former Yugoslavia.14
In reaction to this, throughout the 1990s Albanian journalists made persistent efforts 
to break this media blackout. On 18 January 1991, Rilindja journalists began to publish a 
semi-underground daily newspaper, Bujku (Farmer), borrowing the name from a month-
ly magazine on agriculture, which was registered but which had not then been published 
for many years.15 At the end of 1993, the weekly, Zeri (Voice), was resumed, this time as a 
private company. In 1994, the Koha Company, which was registered in Zagreb, launched 
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a weekly with the same name, which three years later became a daily newspaper. Another 
daily, Kosova Sot (Kosova Today), appeared at the end of 1998. However, having been ex-
posed to systematic pressure exerted by Serbian authorities, Bujku and Zeri were discon-
tinued in 1998, and the same fate befell Koha (Time) and Kosova Sot, which were closed 
down by the police on the eve of the 1999 NATO bombing campaign. During this interven-
tion, Serbian police destroyed or burned down the offices and printing plants of Koha and 
Kosova Sot, killing one worker of the Koha Company.16 
3 REGULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION
3.1 APPLICABLE LAWS
The UN administration mission which took over Kosovo/a following the end of the war 
in 1999, lacked appropriate strategies and policies for the further development of Koso-
var society. In an attempt to bring under control the vigorous and chaotic post-war envi-
ronment, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) initially 
decided to declare applicable those laws that had been in force prior to the beginning of 
NATO bombing on 24 March 1999. 
Following strong opposition from Kosovars, who argued that the laws were discrimina-
tory in nature and were imposed after Kosovo/a was violently deprived of its autonomy by 
Serbia on 23 March 1989, Bernard Kouchner, then Special Representative of the Secretary 
General (SRSG) to Kosovo/a, decided to declare applicable those laws that were effective 
until 22 March 1989. These laws were to be applied in addition to other UNMIK regula-
tions.17 This legislation, applicable before Kosovo/a was stripped of its autonomy in 1989, 
consisted of eight laws that regulated the field of public information, including the laws of 
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, was applied in Kosovo/a.18 
Since these laws dated from the period of the totalitarian system, meaning that they 
were designed to ensure control for the Communist Party over the media, they were not 
suitable to regulate the development of free media in a democratic society. 
3.2 UNMIK REGULATIONS 
For the purpose of filling the legal gap, and in response to vigorous developments in 
the Kosovar media scene, the UN authorities made persistent efforts to place the Kosovar 
media under temporary legislation. These efforts were widely criticised by both local and 
international journalists’ associations. The main reason was the approach taken by the 
OSCE, which was scheduled to have a leading role in this field, as provided by the UNSC 
Resolution 1244. As a result, the OSCE was forced to drop the plan to regulate the Kosovar 
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media through a Media Policy Board based on the Bosnian model. The OSCE’s initiative 
to establish a new, independent association of journalists as an instrument of self-regula-
tion also failed.
On 17 June 2000, Chief Administrator Bernard Kouchner announced Regulation no. 
2000/36, On the licensing and regulation of broadcast media in Kosovo/a, and Regulation 
no. 2000/37 On the code of conduct for the print media in Kosovo/a. 
3.2.1 BROADCAST REGULATION 
Regulation no. 2000/36 addresses the urgent issue of broadcast media licensing. Based 
on the first section of this regulation, the Temporary Media Commissioner (TMC) is re-
sponsible for the development and promotion of independent and professional media 
in Kosovo/a and the implementation of a temporary regulatory regime for all media in 
Kosovo/a.19 Section 2 defines the criteria that should be met by radio and television opera-
tors, in order for them to obtain a license and be able to broadcast. Section 3, starting with 
the requirements to broadcast a correction or apology, specifies sanctions that may be im-
posed by the TMC, ranging from fines to the termination of the broadcast license. Based on 
Section 4, media can appeal against any of the decisions made by the TMC, and the Media 
Appeals Board (MAB) is the body that decides on appeals.20 According to section 5, radio 
and television operators must refrain from broadcasting personal details of any person, if 
the broadcast of such details would pose a serious threat to the life, safety or security of 
any such person through vigilante violence or otherwise.
Four months after the announcement of Regulation no. 2000/36, The Code of Conduct 
for the Broadcast Media was announced on September 8, 2000, as an annex to Regula-
tion 2000/36.21 Article 1 specifies that broadcast license allocation is conditional on com-
pliance with this code. The first paragraph of Article 2 reads: “All programming will meet 
generally accepted international standards of civility and respect the ethnic, cultural, and 
religious diversity of Kosovo.” The second paragraph of this article stipulates that “broad-
casters will not broadcast any material that encourages crime or criminal activities or 
which carries imminent risk of causing harm, such harm being defined as death, or injury, 
or damage to property or other violence.” The third paragraph says that “broadcasters will 
not broadcast any material that denigrates an ethnic or religious group or implies that an 
ethnic or religious group is responsible for criminal activity.” Articles 3-11 define the man-
datory conduct of broadcasters, concerning privacy, fairness and impartiality, separation 
of news and opinion, false and deceptive material, language, right of reply, complaints by 
the public and archives.22 
Neither Regulation no. 2000/36, nor the Code of Conduct for the Broadcast Media, in-
clude any provisions pertaining to the concentration of media ownership. Therefore, the 
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Temporary Media Commissioner decided to address this issue through a list of six quali-
fying criteria to be met by the applicants for broadcasting licenses. This document, pub-
lished in June 2000 and titled Qualifications, was later included as part of the application 
form.23 The first condition on this list reads as follows: “Applicants who are not owners of 
or investors in any newspapers published and/or distributed within Kosovo may apply for 
a maximum of one local radio and one local television station.” The second condition stip-
ulates that “applicants who are owners of or investors in any newspapers published and/or 
distributed within Kosovo may apply for a maximum of one local radio or one local tel-
evision station within the territory of Kosovo.” This document also addresses the issue of 
family ownership in the media sector. According to the third condition, “any close family 
relation to an applicant or legal entity with a financial interest, directly or indirectly, in the 
operation of a proposed television or radio station may not apply for an additional license.” 
Meanwhile, based on the fourth condition, “all legal entities listed in the applications must 
be registered to do business within Kosovo or be certified as a local NGO within Kosovo”. 
The fifth condition prohibits any individual who has been convicted of violent crimes 
and/or crimes of dishonesty and theft from having a senior managerial role and/or finan-
cial interest in any radio or television station within the territory of Kosovo/a.
And finally, based on the sixth condition, “applicants who wish to operate a satellite up-
link /…/ or a microwave-link as part of their broadcast operations shall be subject to ad-
ditional licensing requirements.”24
3.2.2 PRINT MEDIA REGULATION 
Based on the first section of Regulation no. 2000/37 On the conduct of the print media 
in Kosovo, the Temporary Media Commissioner, under special circumstances, may issue 
temporary codes of conduct, which, by the decision of the SRSG, may be promulgated into 
law. Section 2 gives the TMC the mandate to impose various sanctions on media owners 
who operate in violation of the applicable law, or codes of conduct, including a warning, 
the requirement to publish a reply, a fine of up to DM 100,000, and suspension or closing 
down of operations.25
Based on Section 3, a person or entity affected by a decision of the TMC to impose sanc-
tions may appeal to the Media Appeals Board, while under the provisions of Section 4, 
publishers should refrain from publishing personal details of any person, if the publication 
of such details would pose a serious threat to the life, safety or security of any such person 
through vigilante violence or otherwise.26 Based on the mandate given to it by Regulation 
no. 2000/37, Article 1, the TMC announced The Temporary Code of Conduct for the Print 
Media in Kosovo.27 This code, similar to the temporary code of conduct for the broadcast 
media, prohibits publishers from publishing or distributing any material that encourages 
KOSOVO/A 225
crime or criminal activities or which carries imminent risk of causing harm, such harm 
being defined as death, or injury, or damage to property or other violence. In addition, the 
distribution of any material that denigrates an ethnic or religious group or implies that an 
ethnic or religious group is responsible for criminal activity, is forbidden. The Code also 
defines the mandatory conduct of print media publishers, concerning the privacy of ac-
cused persons, separation of news and opinion, false and deceptive material, right of reply, 
complaints by the public, and media archives.28
3.2.3 PROHIBITION AGAINST INCITING TO ETHNIC HATRED 
UNMIK Regulation no. 2000/4, on the Prohibition Against Inciting to National, Racial, 
Religious or Ethnic Hatred, Discord or Intolerance, which came into force on 1 February 
2000, is part of the legal package on media regulation. According to this regulation, “who-
ever publicly incites or publicly spreads hatred, discord or intolerance between national, 
racial, religious, ethnic or other such groups living in Kosovo”, will be punished by a fine or 
sentenced to up to ten years in prison.29 During election campaigns, the media are obliged 
to operate in conformity with electoral rule set out by the OSCE and the Central Election 
Commission (CEC). 
3.3 NEW MEDIA REGULATION PENDING
The Temporary Media Commissioner (TMC) was meant to be a temporary solution. Ac-
cording to Regulation no. 2000/36 on TMC establishment, the TMC is responsible for the 
implementation of the temporary regulatory regime for all media in Kosovo/a, until the 
Independent Media Commission is established.30 A Law on the Independent Media Com-
mission was drafted in 2001 and had reached the final phase of approval and signing by the 
Chief Administrator of Kosovo. But some problems that appeared at that time between 
UNMIK and the Interim Administration Council (IAC) after the Čović-Hækkerup agree-
ment was signed,31 as well as changes within UNMIK, postponed the signing of the regula-
tion. In the meantime, the independent broadcasters used this delay to reopen the debate 
on the quality of this law. After discussion and amendments to the law, the last version of 
the Law on the Independent Media Commission and Broadcasting was submitted to the 
Government by the TMC at the end of 2003 and is expected to be approved by the Parlia-
ment of Kosovo/a in 2004.32 
According to Article 1 of the proposed law, the Independent Media Commission (IMC) 
is authorised to regulate and supervise the civil broadcasting system within Kosovo/a, in-
cluding the implementation of the broadcasting policy, which is to be determined by the 
Commission.33 IMC will have a council, made up of seven members, who will define the 
broadcasting policy, and also an office of the executive director, who will be in charge of im-
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plementation of broadcast policies determined by the council.34 Article 2 anticipates the def-
inition of clear provisions of broadcast policies which would prevent monopoly in the broad-
casting sector in Kosovo/a and promote fair and just competition among broadcasters. 
According to Article 10, radio broadcasting licenses would be valid for five years, and 
television licenses for 7 years. According to the same article, a license will not be issued to: 
a) a political party, a group or organisation substantially controlled by a political party, or 
an entity substantially controlled by an individual in an elected post, or a member of a po-
litical party executive body, or b) an individual, or an entity substantially controlled by an 
individual who has been convicted of a violent crime or fraud.
According to Article 16, advertising is the main source of revenue for private broad-
casters, and a supplementary source for public broadcasters. The TMC also supervises the 
transitional phase of elimination of financing by the Consolidated Budget of Kosovo/a 
and the reduction, and if possible elimination, of advertising as a source of revenue for the 
public broadcaster.
As expected, this law does not address the supervision of the print media. It is foreseen 
that the print media will be self-regulated, in accordance with the Code of Ethics and that 
its implementation will be supervised by the Press Council. Article 29 on transitional pro-
visions in the Law on Independent Media Commissioner and Broadcasting foresees that 
the function and competencies of the TMC, in accordance with UNMIK Regulation 2000/37 
on conduct of print media in Kosovo/a, will be implemented by the IMC until professional 
self-regulation of print media in Kosovo/a is established.35 
3.4 IMPLEMENTATION 
Although formally the temporary media regulatory regime was widely based on ap-
plicable laws, during its implementation the TMC de facto restricted its actions to UN-
MIK regulations and related codes of conduct. The overall results of the implementation 
of this temporary regulatory regime have been positive. This particularly holds true for 
the broadcasting media sector, where the TMC introduced order into the licensing proc-
ess and implementation of the code of conduct for broadcasters. The TMC has so far ef-
fected three rounds of licensing, which before its establishment was an ad hoc and unco-
ordinated process.36
Yet, in the print media sector, the implementation of this temporary regulatory regime 
has been much more problematic ever since its beginning. First of all, both Kosovar and 
international journalists and media associations strongly opposed the regulation of the 
print media, perceiving it as an undemocratic undertaking.37 However, UNMIK and TMC 
argued that, given the absence of self–regulation, some kind of regulation of the print me-
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dia had to be implemented, among other things in order to prevent “vigilante journalism” 
in the environment of a post-conflict society.38 
The introduction of print media regulation, coupled with a heavy-handed approach 
by both UNMIK and the TMC at the beginning of its implementation, produced additional 
problems. On 3 June 2000, SRSG Bernard Kouchner passed an executive order, closing the 
offices of the Dita newspaper for 8 days, after it featured an article about a Serb employee 
of UNMIK who allegedly committed crimes during the war in Kosova, and who was found 
dead some 20 days later.39 In addition, after Dita published an article titled “Crime and 
Criminals Have Names; The Life Undisturbed” (4 July 2000), TMC punished it with a fine 
of DM 25,000. Subsequently, when Dita failed to pay the fine, TMC ordered an immediate 
suspension of the newspaper’s operation on 27 July. This kind of heavy handed approach 
worked as a catalyst to turn local journalists and editors against the international admin-
istration.40 The Media Appeals Board (MAB) later “voided the entire TMC decision for fail-
ure to satisfy internationally guaranteed standards of the due process”,41 but damage had 
already been done, since Dita had ceased publication in the meantime. After that the TMC 
became more careful in its implementation of the temporary regulatory regime. However, 
the frustrations of Kosovar journalists with temporary media regulation remain.42
Since it was established on 17 June 2000, the TMC has received and processed 115 media 
complaints. In the first year it received two complaints, one against the Dita newspaper 
mentioned above, and another one against the daily newspaper, Bota Sot. The TMC fined 
Bota Sot DEM 50,000. MAB upheld TMC’s decision but reduced the fine to DEM 45,000. 
During the following year, the TMC received 23 complaints. Most of these were related to 
politically biased newspapers. 
The number of complaints during 2002 rose to 44, of which 14 were against Bota Sot, 
and 14 against the 24 Ore newspaper, an AAK (The Aliance for the Future of Kosova) sup-
porter. Seven complaints were against Epoka e Re, three against Koha Ditore, one against 
Zeri, one against RTK, etc.43 According to TMC data, during 2003 there were 46 media com-
plaints, mainly against print media. Half of the 44 complaints that were made during 2003 
were dismissed (22); 14 ended in reply or clarification, and in 5 cases a letter of warning was 
issued. Only in two cases was the newspaper fined, in both cases the Bota Sot daily.44
One can notice that all media complaints were filed against Albanian language media, 
although the TMC admits that “Serb-language media continued its destabilizing propagan-
da”45 during the post-war period. For example, for several weeks during 2003 and 2004, 
the weekly Jedistvo, which continued its pre-war editorial policy, had been publishing a 
serial of “dossiers” on Kosovo/a Albanian public figures and lesser known people, includ-
ing personal data and photographs under the title “Criminals,” and there was no reaction 
by the TMC.46
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4 MEDIA OWNERSHIP 
The media scene experienced an extraordinary development after the 1999 war. Only 
a few months after the NATO forces entered Kosovo/a in June 1999, there emerged eight 
daily newspapers, ten TV stations and 72 radio stations.47 All these radio and TV stations 
were newly established, because before the war Kosovo/a had only one TV station – Radio 
Television Prishtina (RTP) – which was closed down in 1990, when the Albanian journal-
ists were expelled by the Serb police. 
The development pace later slowed down. However, in 2001 there were 145 broadcast-
ers including KFOR and international broadcasters in Kosovo/a. One year later, in 2002, 
there were 118 licensed civil broadcasters. 
Currently, five daily newspapers are published in Kosovo/a. According to the TMC, there 
are 112 broadcasters – 89 radio stations and 23 TV stations. Four radio stations and three TV 
stations broadcast Kosovo/a wide. As regards local broadcasters, there are 74 radio stations 
and 17 TV stations. There are also 14 low-power stations – 11 radio and 3 TV stations.48 
4.1 PRINT MEDIA
Twelve daily newspapers could be found on the Kosovar media scene after the war. 
Only three of these, Rilindja (1945 – 1990), Koha Ditore (1997–1999) and Kosova Sot 
(1998–1999), had also been published before the war, while the others were newly estab-
lished dailies. Of these newspapers, eleven were published in Albanian, while the Kosova 
Times was published in English. 
Currently, Koha Ditore, Kosova Sot, Zeri, Bota Sot and Epoka e Re are still published. 
Rilindja, Kosova Times, Dardania Press, Gazeta e Dukagjinit, and Gazeta e Re were dis-
continued, mainly owing to fierce competition in the small market of Kosovo/a. 
The Dita daily newspaper effectively ceased to exist after its office was closed down by 
decision of the SRSG in June 2000, and it was fined DM 25,000 by the TMC because it pub-
lished the personal data of individuals who allegedly committed crimes during the war in 
Kosovo/a.49 The daily newspaper, 24 Ore, ceased to be published after the murder of the 
former UCK commander, Tahir Zemaj, against whom the newspaper published harsh ac-
cusations of treason.50
Koha Ditore, Bota Sot and Zeri are the three most popular newspapers currently pub-
lished in Kosova. 
By contrast, nine weeklies could be found on the Kosova media market after the war. Two 
of these, Zeri and Fjala Jone, were also published before the war, while Pasqyra, Dukagjini, 
Java, Jedinstvo, Srpski Nedeljnik, Alem and Yeni Donem emerged after the war. It is worth 
mentioning that during the same period about ten biweekly and monthly magazines ap-
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peared, such as Kombi, The Forum, Eksklusive, Çlirimi, Glas Juga, Kosovarja, Albi, Demokra-
cia, etc. Currently the following weeklies are still published: Zeri, Java, Jedinstvo, Alem, and 
Yeni Donem. Pasqyra was discontinued two years ago and is now available only online.
Zeri and Java are the most popular Albanian language weeklies published in Kosovo/a. 
Jedinstvo is the only weekly in Serbian, Alem in Bosniak and Yeni Donem in Turkish. 
4.1.1 KOHA DITORE DAILY
Koha Ditore (Daily Time) is the newspaper with the largest circulation in Kosova. It was 
launched in March 1997, then discontinued two years later in March 1999, when Serbian 
forces destroyed its offices and the printing house, and finally resumed on 20 June 1999. 
The newspaper is published by the Koha Group, a private company owned by Veton 
Surroi which, in addition to the newspaper, also includes the Koha Print printing house, 
the Koha Vision Television (KTV), and the Koha Net Internet Provider.51 It was financially 
supported by various governmental and non-governmental donor organisations. Current-
ly it covers its publishing costs from sales and advertising revenue. 
According to its representatives, Koha Ditore’s daily print circulation is 16,000 copies (it 
is printed by the Koha Print printing house), and 12,000 copies are sold. Half of these cop-
ies are delivered by the distribution network of the newspaper and the rest by the Rilindja 
Sales distribution company. Koha Ditore is an independent newspaper. It has criticised all 
political parties, especially the LDK, the largest party, and its leader Ibrahim Rugova. It has 
also criticized UNMIK and the new institutions of Kosovo/a. 
4.1.2 BOTA SOT DAILY
Bota Sot (World Today) was established in Switzerland in 1995. It was printed in Swit-
zerland, Germany and the US and was distributed in the Western countries with sizeable 
Albanian diaspora. In 1999, it was also published in Macedonia, from where it was distrib-
uted to Kosovo/a and Macedonia.52 Currently, it is also registered in Prishtina. 
Since 2003 it has also been printed in Prishtina at its new printing house. According 
to its representatives, about 10,000 copies of the newspaper are printed in Kosovo/a, and 
about 7,000 to 8,000 of these are sold.53 
The owner of Bota Sot is Xhevdet Mazrekaj. He defines it as a national independent 
newspaper with a pro-western stance. However, he explains, unlike other Kosovo/a Alba-
nian language newspapers, Bota Sot has no ties with any political group. Even before the 
war, he says, Bota Sot had followed an independent nationalistic policy.54 Still, Bota Sot is 
rightly seen as supporting the LDK. Asked by the author of this report to comment on this, 
the new Executive Director of Bota Sot, Agim Gjakova, stated that this conviction arises 
from the fact that the newspaper has been positioned as a right wing publication and be-
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cause some of its journalists are LDK supporters. According to him, this party militancy 
has damaged the newspaper’s reputation and its sales. According to Gjakova, last year’s 
daily circulation of Bota Sot amounted to 26,000 copies.55
4.1.3 ZERI DAILY
Zeri (Voice) daily newspaper was launched in 1999, by the Private Informative Publish-
ing Enterprise (PIE) Zeri, which since 1993 has also published the weekly with the same 
name. Zeri also publishes the monthly art and culture magazine, Sheshi, while also carry-
ing out additional publishing activities. Zeri is owned by Blerim Shala, Halil Matoshi and 
Bardh Hamzaj. Some 9,000 copies of the daily newspaper are printed by the Koha Print 
printing house and about 73 percent of these are sold. It is distributed by the Rilindja Sales 
and Distribution Network. 
About 75 percent of the newspaper’s revenues come from advertising, and only 25 per-
cent from sales. The newspaper covers almost all of its expenses, and only 6 percent of the 
2003 budget is planned to be covered from donations.56 So far it has been supported by 
various governmental and non-governmental donor organisations. Zeri is an independent 
newspaper, although more moderate in its criticism of UNMIK and Kosovo/a institutions 
than Koha Ditore. 
Table 1 MAIN DAILIES IN KOSOVO/A57 
DAILY CIRCULATION
(PRINTED)
CIRCULATION 
(SOLD)
OWNER
KOHA DITORE 16,000 12,000 VETON SURROI
BOTA SOT 10,000 7,000 XH. MAZREKAJ
ZERI 9,200 7,000 BLERIM SHALA
BARDH HAMZAJ
HALIL MATOSHI
EPOKA E RE 7,000 4,000 M.MAVRAJ
KOSOVA SOT - 1,000 RUZHDI KADRIU
Source: Publishers and APJK.
4.1.4 ZERI WEEKLY 
Zeri first appeared on May 15, 1945, initially as a monthly, Zani i Rinise Shqiptare, later 
renamed Zani i Rinise. It was the newspaper of the official youth organisation. Zeri was 
part of the Rilindja Socially Owned Combined Enterprise until 1993, when the latter was 
put under administration of the Panorama Enterprise, established by Serb authorities es-
pecially for the purpose of taking control over Rilindja. In December 1993, Zeri was reg-
istered as a private enterprise, taking only the name from the previous enterprise. It is 
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owned by Blerim Shala, Bardh Hamzaj and Ali Hajdini, and it continues to publish Zeri as 
an independent news weekly. After the war, Zeri restarted publishing in June 1999, and in 
2000 it was registered by UNMIK as a private news publishing enterprise.58
7,000 copies of the weekly Zeri are printed by the Koha Print printing house in Prishtina 
and distributed by the Rilindja distribution company. 70 percent of the copies are sold.59 
4.1.5 JAVA WEEKLY
Java (The Week) appeared in December 2001 as an independent newspaper. Until Sep-
tember 2002 it was published on a bimonthly basis, and since then as a weekly. It is pub-
lished by the Private Publishing Enterprise, Kelmendi, owned by Migjen Kelmendi. Its 
print circulation is 1,700 copies, while the number of sold copies amounts to 1,000 to 
1,100. It is distributed by the Rilindja Sales network in Kosovo/aa, partly through sub-
scription sales. The Kosova Foundation for Open Society (KFOS), OSI, Press Now and 
OSCE have so far supported the newspaper. About 75 percent of its costs are covered from 
sales and advertising revenue, and the rest from donations.60 Promotion and development 
of investigative journalism was the main promised goal of the newspaper when it started. 
But after two years of its existence, one can say that it has not fulfilled this promise. Only 
at the beginning did it make efforts to treat some current issues through investigative jour-
nalism. But this enthusiasm soon diminished, so Java continued to address current issues 
through editorials and interviews. On the other hand, it is worth mentioning that Java has 
made efforts, partly successful, to encourage public dialogue on sensitive issues, such as 
Kosovar identity, the problems of the Standard Albanian language, religious tolerance, the 
wearing of head scarves by Muslim women in public institutions, etc. Although its edito-
rials, stories and main interviews cover current issues of political life, cultural topics at-
tract most of Java’s attention. 
Table 2 MAIN WEEKLIES IN KOSOVO/A
WEEKLY CIRCULATION 
(PRINTED) 
CIRCULATION
(SOLD)
OWNER
ZERI 7,000 5,000 BLERIM SHALA
BARDH HAMZAJ
HALIL MATOSHI
JEDINSTVO 2,000 - PJPE PANORAMA
ALEM 2,000 1,500 NGO KOSOVSKI 
AVAZ
YENI DONEM 2,000 1,400 MEHMET BUTUC
JAVA 1,700 1,100 MIGJEN KELMENDI
Source: Publishers.
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4.2 BROADCAST MEDIA 
The main radio and TV stations of Kosova are Radio Television Kosova (RTK), Radio Tel-
evision 21 (RTV 21) and KohaVision Television (KTV). 
4.2.1 RADIO TELEVISION KOSOVA (RTK)
Radio Television Kosova (RTK) is a public broadcaster. According to a survey conducted 
by Index Kosova, RTK is the most watched and trusted TV station in Kosovo/a.61 It con-
sists of Television Kosova and two radio stations, Radio Kosova and Radio Blue Sky. Radio 
Prishtina, later renamed Radio Kosova, was the first to begin broadcasting, on 28 July 1999. 
Television Kosova began broadcasting in September 1999, and in October of the same year, 
together with Radio Kosova, it merged into one entity – Radio Television Kosova (RTK). 
It was established by the OSCE with the assistance of the European Broadcasting Union 
(EBU). In 2000, RTK also integrated the UNMIK radio station, Radio Blue Sky.62 To date, RTK 
has been financed from donations provided by EAR and the governments of Switzerland, 
Japan, Sweden, etc., and from a reserved part of the Kosovo/a budget and commercial rev-
enues. According to the RTK 2002 annual report, its budget structure was as follows: 40 
percent from the reserved part of the Kosovo/a budget, 31 percent from donations and 29 
percent from other sources of revenue, mainly commercials.63
In accordance with the Administrative Directive of the SRSG no. 2003/5, a mandatory 
license fee for RTK, EUR 3.5 per month, will be introduced in 2004. It will be included in 
electricity bills and collected by the Electric Corporation of Kosovo/a (KEK).64 According 
to Article 11 of UNMIK regulation no. 2001/13, RTK will be financed from the license fee 
plus other revenues. In addition, in accordance with point 3 of this article, the RTK Board 
may also ask funds from the Consolidated Budget of Kosovo/a.65 RTK broadcasts program-
ming 24 hours per day through the Kosova Terrestrial Broadcast Network and via satellite, 
in Albanian, Serbian, Bosniak, Turkish and Romany. At the end of 2003, RTK had 336 em-
ployees, 231 of these working in television and 105 in radio stations.66 
4.2.2 RADIO TELEVISION 21 (RTV 21)
Radio Television 21 (RTV 21) is a private multimedia company, comprising Television 
21, Radio 21 and the Internet broadcast Radio 21.net. The core of the company is Radio 
21, which began broadcasting on the Internet in May 1998. In April 1999, Radio 21 started 
broadcasting on short wave of Radio Holland from Macedonia, where part of the staff had 
been deported by Serb forces after NATO bombing started. After the withdrawal of Serb 
forces from Kosovo/a in June 1999, Radio 21 resumed broadcasting in July from Prishtina. 
It broadcasts on the Internet and on the FM band. In September 2000, Radio 21 received a 
license for television broadcasting Kosovo/a wide and became RTV 21.67 
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RTV 21 broadcasts a radio program 24 hours a day on the FM band and on the Internet, 
as well as a 24-hour TV program through the Kosova Terrestrial Broadcast Network and 
via satellite in Europe and North America. 
RTV 21 is a shareholding company, the vast majority of which belongs to the Saracini-
Kelmendi family (Aferdita Saracini-Kelmendi, General Director owns 60 percent of the 
shares, Eugen Saracini, Director of the News Program owns 20 percent, Florin Kelmendi, 
Director of the Cultural Programming – 10 percent, and Xheraldina Vula, Deputy Direc-
tor General – 10 percent of the shares).68
RTV 21 currently covers 80 percent of its operational costs from revenues, and 20 per-
cent from donations. Since it was established, RTV 21 has been substantially supported by 
USAID and OSI.69 
4.2.3 KOHA VISION (KTV)
Koha Vision (KTV) is an independent TV station which started broadcasting in Septem-
ber 2000, initially a two-hour program on a daily basis, i.e. before it received a Kosovo/a 
wide broadcast license. KTV is part of the Koha Group, which consists of the daily newspa-
per, Koha Ditore, the Koha Print printing house and the Koha Net Internet Provider. 
The owner of the Koha Group is Veton Surroi. KTV has been broadcasting its program-
ming 18 hours a day since January 2003. Since August 2003, it also broadcasts via the Al-
banicaSat platform. KTV started operating with only 35 employees, but today it has 96 
employees, including journalists, technical personnel and other staff.70 Ever since its foun-
dation, KTV has been substantially supported by USAID and OSI.
Table 3 MAIN TV STATIONS IN KOSOVO/A
TV STATION OWNER % TYPE OF 
BROADCASTER
STARTING 
YEAR
TELEVISION KOSOVA
(RTK)
RTK (PUBLIC) PUBLIC SERVICE 1999
TELEVISION 21
(RTV 21)
AFERDITA SARACINI KELMENDI
EUGEN SARACINI
FLORIN KELMENDI
XHERALDINA VULA
60
20
10
10
PRIVATE 2000
KOHA VISION
TELEVISION 
VETON SURROI PRIVATE 2000
Source: Broadcasters.
4.2.4 RTV DUKAGJINI
Radio Dukagjini is the most popular radio station in Kosova.71 It started broadcasting 
on 16 September 1999. Since December 2001, it has had a Kosovo/a wide broadcasting li-
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cense. Advertising revenues account for 70 percent of its budget, while 30 percent is cov-
ered by the Dukagjini Corporation. Its 24-hour program includes 14 editions of 3-minute 
flash news, and it also retransmits news programs by Radio Deutche Welle, BBC, and Ra-
dio Free Europe.72 TV Dukagjini is a local TV station that started broadcasting in June 2002 
and covers Kosovo/a’s south-west region of Peja with a 12-hour program.
RTV Dukagjini is part of the Dukagjini Corporation, owned by Ekrem Lluka.
Table 4 THE MAIN RADIO STATIONS IN KOSOVO/A
RADIO STATION OWNER % TYPE OF 
BROADCASTER
STARTING 
YEAR
RADIO DUKAGJINI EKREM LLUKA, DUKAGJINI
CORPORATION
PRIVATE 1999
RADIO KOSOVA
(RTK)
RTK (PUBLIC) PUBLIC SERVICE 1999
RADIO 21
(RTV 21)
AFERDITA SARACINI KELMENDI
EUGEN SARACINI
FLORIN KELMENDI
XHERALDINA VULA
60
20
10
10
PRIVATE 1999
BLUE SKY RADIO
(RTK)
RTK (PUBLIC) PUBLIC SERVICE 1999
4.2.4 RADIO NETWORKS
Main radio networks in Kosova are PROFM and Kosovo Media Association (KMA). The 
PROFM network was established in 2001 by the five most popular local radio stations in 
Albanian: Radio Plus (Prishtina), Radio Tema (Ferizaj), Radio Helix (Prizreni), Radio En-
ergjia (Gjilan), Radio Amadeus (Gjakova). Members exchange news and other programs 
among them through the Internet and FTP. PROFM is currently working on establish-
ing communication among its members through links. One of the main activities of the 
PROFM network is promotion of the role of radio within the community. PROFM organises 
public service campaigns that are financed by the network itself on issues relevant to the 
public, like voters turnout, voter education, public health (AIDS, smoking, etc.).73
The Kosovo Media Association (KMA, or, in Serbian, Kosovska Medijska Mreža, KOSMA) 
is a network of 27 radio stations in Serbian that is expected to start operating at the begin-
ning of 2004. The aim of KMA is to help the networked stations to resolve their main prob-
lems, among these the lack of news programming, since very few of them produce their 
own news. The technical set up of the network started in May 2003 and involved the link-
ing of stations using repeater sites so that all can receive shared programming. The five 
main regional stations that produce their own news have installed capacities to receive 
and send materials, while other smaller stations will be able only to receive material. The 
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KMA has been established with financial support from the European Agency for Recon-
struction and help from OSCE.74
4.3 MINORITY MEDIA
Minority media in Kosovo/a also experienced very dynamic development after the 1999 
war. Thanks to the special attention paid to these media by donors, and support provided 
by OSCE, tens of minority media outlets were introduced during the postwar period, most 
of these in Serbian. However, there are also media in Bosniak, Turkish, Romani and Gora-
ni that were launched after the war.
The minority media scene is dominated by broadcasters, while the print media have 
been less attractive or successful. The Serbian language daily, Jedinstvo, that had been pub-
lished in Prishtina until 1999, was restarted after the war as a weekly. We should also men-
tion the Serbian magazine, Glas Juga, that has been published by the NGO, Srpsko slovo, 
since 2001 in Laplje Selo, Prishtina. However, the needs of the Serbian readership have 
been addressed by OSCE, which has been providing distribution of some Belgrade dailies 
and other print media to the Kosovo/a Serbs.75
Much more attractive for Serbs and donors have been broadcasting media. Today there 
are 33 broadcasters, 27 radio and 6 TV stations broadcasting in Serbian. There are also 4 
radio stations in Bosniak and 2 in Turkish. It should also be mentioned that 16 radio and 2 
TV stations broadcast in more than one language.76 One of these is RTK which, apart from 
programs in Albanian, broadcasts programs in Serbian, Bosniak, Turkish and Romany. Ef-
forts to launch a radio station in Romany based in Prizreni are underway.
Table 5 MINORITY LANGUAGE BROADCAST MEDIA 
ALBANIAN
LANGUAGE 
SERBIAN 
LANGUAGE
BOSNIAK
LANGUAGE
TURKISH
LANGUAGE
RADIO STATIONS 53 27 4 2
TV STATIONS 17 6 - -
TOTAL 70 33 4 2
Source: TMC, Operational Framework of TMC and Preparation of IMC.
Speaking of the print minority media, we should mention Alem, a magazine in Bosniak, 
and the Yeni Donem weekly, the only remaining newspaper among a few outlets in Turk-
ish that appeared during the postwar period. The Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian (RAE) com-
munities also made efforts to establish their own print media. Two magazines that were 
launched by Ashkali NGOs , Zeri i Popollit Ashkali by a Ferizaj based NGO with the same 
name, and Jehona by the Podujovo NGO, Shpresa Demokratike, have not been published 
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regularly for some time now, while the cultural journal, Romano Alav, in Romani is still 
being published in Prizreni by the NGO, Durmish Aslano. Romano Alav is planned to be 
transformed in 2004 into the magazine, Yekhipe.77
4.3.1 JEDINSTVO WEEKLY 
The Jedinstvo newspaper first appeared in 1945. It later became a publishing enterprise, 
which, in addition to daily newspapers, also published books in Serbian. Until the 1980s, 
Jedinstvo was mainly a newspaper of the political protocol in Kosovo/a, and it was not 
popular among the Kosovo/a Serbs, who preferred newspapers of better quality published 
in Belgrade and distributed in Kosovo/a. In the mid 1980s, after Slobodan Milošević took 
power and launched a campaign to abolish Kosovo/a’s autonomy, Jedinstvo intrigued the 
public by articulating requests of the political circles such as the Serb Resistance Move-
ment, which asked for the radicalisation of Serbia’s new policy towards Kosovo/a. Jedin-
stvo was discontinued in June 1999, when most of its journalists left Kosovo/a along with 
the withdrawing Serb forces. Its publication was resumed on August 1999 on a weekly ba-
sis. Since then Jedinstvo has been printed in Belgrade, where its head office is based. It also 
has offices in Mitrovica and Gračanica near Prishtina. Jedistvo is published by the Public 
Publishing Enterprise Panorama.78 According to estimates from Radio Contact Plus, the 
circulation of the weekly Jedinstvo is around 2,000.79
4.3.2 ALEM WEEKLY
Alem is an independent magazine in Bosniak. It was launched as a weekly newspaper 
in 2001, and was a successor to Kosovski Avaz, which had been published since 1999. It is 
published by the Bosniak NGO, Kosovki Avaz. Its editorial offices are located in Prishtina 
and Prizreni. Alem provides information on current developments in Kosova and the re-
integration of the Bosniac community into a post-war Kosovar society. It also provides re-
gional and world news. It is printed at the Koha Print printing house, and its circulation is 
around 2,000 copies. Alem is distributed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia 
(Novi Pazar), Turkey, Italy, Germany and Switzerland. About 1,000 copies are sold in Ko-
sova by the Rilindja distribution network. Alem is published with the support of non-gov-
ernmental and governmental organisations, the US Office in Prishtina, KFOS, etc., because 
its sales, subscription and advertising revenues do not cover the costs of publishing. On 
several occasions its publication has been delayed because of the lack of funds.80
4.3.3 RADIO CONTACT PLUS
Radio Contact Plus, based in Mitrovica, is the main news radio station in Serbian that 
broadcasts in Kosovo/a. It started broadcasting in April 2000, as a part of the Prishtina 
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based Contact Radio. A year later it was registered as a broadcasting company, and its sole 
owner was Snežana Pejčić Tarle. Its aim was to provide news programs for the Serbian 
population in the northern part of Kosovo/a, Mitrovica, Zvečan, Leposavić and Zubin 
Potok. Owing to problems caused by poor management, at the beginning of 2003 it was 
reregistered as a NGO with Valentina Cukić as a director.
Radio Contact Plus broadcasts 24 hours a day, with in-house production accounting 
for fifteen hours of its programming. Radio Contact Plus also broadcasts news in Serbian 
from the BBC World Service, Deutsche Welle and Radio B92. Since its marketing revenues 
are very low, Radio Contact Plus has been financed by donors – SHC, OSI, Press Now, Me-
dianhilfe and others – in the amount of EUR 1,750 in 2003. It has 11 editors and journalists, 
and 7 technical and other staff members.81
4.3.4 RADIO KIM
Radio KIM, based in Čaglavica, Prishtina, began to broadcast its experimental program-
ming on 3 December 2000, supported by the governments of the US, UK, Canada, Germa-
ny and France. Its signal covers most of the territory of Kosovo/a, namely Prishtina, Fushe 
Kosove/Kosovo Polje, Lipjan, Stime/Štimlje, Obilić, Vučitrn and part of the municipalities 
of Ferizaj/Uroševac, Theranda/Suva Reka, Prizreni, Peje/Peć, Mitrovica, Gjilan/Gnjilane, 
Novo Brdo and Podujevo. According to Radio KIM, the size of the Serb population in the 
area that is covered by its signal is 60,000. Radio KIM broadcasts a 24-hour program, with 
around 7 hours of programming being its own production. It has 20 journalists, speakers 
and technicians, and 10 correspondents.82 
4.3.5 TV MOST
TV Most (TV Bridge), based in Zvečan, is the main Serbian language TV station in 
Kosovo/a and has broadcast since 2002 when it was licensed by the Temporary Media 
Commissioner. It is registered as a private business owned by Zvonimir Miladinović. TV 
Most is a regional broadcaster that covers most of Kosovo/a’s territory. It has 80 journalists 
and other staff, mainly people who worked before the war for Radio Television Prishtina. 
It broadcasts a whole day program which, apart from news programs, includes sports, en-
tertainment, film, children’s and educational programs. TV Most is financed mainly from 
revenues generated from marketing.83
4.3.6 TV SILOVO
TV Silovo (DTV), based in Silovo, was established at the beginning of 2001 with support 
from KFOS. It is registered as an NGO, with Zlata Milenković as its director. DTV employs 
15 journalists and other staff. Its signal covers the eastern part of Kosovo/a, namely the 
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municipalities of Gjilan/Gnjilane, Kamenica, Novo Brdo, Viti/Vitina and neighbouring ar-
eas of southern Serbia that altogether have some 300,000 potential viewers, since DTV, 
according to its representative, is also watched by Albanians.84 The main components of 
its programming broadcast from 12.00 to 24.00, are children’s programs, film, music, and 
news. It retransmits two 30-minute news programs from Radio Television Serbia/RTS. Af-
ter 24.00 it broadcasts the satellite program of RTS. From the beginning it has been sup-
ported substantially by various donors, such as KFOS, OSCE, UNICEF, UNHCR, IOM, etc.
4.4 MAIN MEDIA OWNERS 
The selection and ranking of the major media owners in Kosovo/a can be done only ap-
proximately, because there is a lack of precise information on the value of the media they 
own. However, based on rough estimates, the major media owners in Kosovo/a are Veton 
Surroi, Aferdita Saracini-Kelmendi and Ekrem Lluka. 
Veton Surroi could be ranked as the biggest media owner, because he owns the Koha Group 
(Koha Ditore daily newspaper, Koha Vision Television/KTV, Koha Print and Koha Net).
Ekrem Lluka, who owns the most popular radio station in Kosova, Radio Dukagjini, 
with national coverage, TV Dukagjini which is broadcast in the south-west of Kosova, 
Dukagjini Publishing House and Dukagjini Printing Plant, competes for the second po-
sition with Aferdita Saracini-Kelmendi, a member of the Saracini-Kelmendi family, who 
owns 90 percent of the shares in RTV 21. But, given the fact that the Dukagjini Corpora-
tion also owns an insurance company, a basketball team, a tobacco company, a construc-
tion company, etc., Ekrem Lluka can be considered economically the strongest. However, 
one should bear in mind that the most powerful Kosovar in terms of wealth, Behxhet Pa-
colli, the owner of the Mabetex Group, has so far been rather shy in the media field, where 
he owns just one monthly magazine, Ekskluzive, launched at the beginning of 2000. Yet it 
should be noticed that the publisher of Ekskluzive, ATV Media Company, which is a part 
of the Mabetex Group, has broadcasting activity listed among many other activities in its 
registration ID.85 
Table 6 MAIN MEDIA OWNERS IN KOSOVO/A
OWNER PRINT MEDIA RADIO TV STATION OTHER MEDIA FIELD 
PROPERTY
PROPERTY 
OUTSIDE MEDIA 
FIELD
VETON SURROI KOHA DITORE - KOHA VISION/KTV KOHA PRINT
KOHANET
EKREM LLUKA - RADIO 
DUKAGJINI
TV DUKAGJINI PRINTING PLANT
PUBLISHING HOUSE
DUKAGJINI 
CORPORATION
AFERDITA SARACINI-
KELMENDI
- RADIO 21
60 %
TV 21
60 %
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5 PRIVATISATION 
Privatisation is not a major issue on the Kosovar media scene. Almost all broadcasters 
that started operating in Kosovo/a after the war have been newly established. They are ei-
ther private businesses or registered as NGOs. According to an OSCE list of the property 
structure of 75 radio and TV stations in Kosovo/a, 52 are registered as private businesses 
and 22 as NGOs. The situation on the print media market is similar. The vast majority of the 
print media outlets were established after the war and registered as private companies. 
When talking about media privatisation in Kosovo/a, we should mention the social-
ly owned newspaper publishing enterprise Rilindja, Radio Television Prishtina (RTP) and 
the socially owned printing enterprise Kosova (formerly Ramiz Sadiku, based in Prizre-
ni). The issue of the current municipal radio stations, which were also part of the RTP, has 
been solved in a way, because all have been transformed either into NGOs (Radio Gjakova, 
Radio Gjilani, Radio Ferizaj, Radio Prizreni) or into private enterprises (Radio Peja). It is 
possible to predict that this outcome will be challenged by RTP. Indeed, thanks to persist-
ent efforts, RTP at last managed to be re-registered with UNMIK on 30 January 2001 as a 
socially owned enterprise providing public information – Radio Television Prishtina. At 
the moment, it is demanding the return of its buildings and other assets that were used by 
RTP before the war. Since 1999 all these assets have been used by RTK. RTP claims to have 
documentation proving its ownership of all these assets.86
Before falling under the control of the Serbian regime on 5 July 1990,87 which was effect-
ed through the imposed administration, Rilindja consisted of seven units:88 Rilindja Dai-
ly; Magazines (11 journals and magazines); Publishing House; Printing House; Wholesale, 
Retail, Export and Import; Sales and Advertising; and the Zeri weekly. In 1993, the Serbian 
authorities transferred all Rilindija’s assets to Jedinstvo, which for this purpose was re-
named Panorama (Panorama is a public media publishing enterprise). 
The main element of Rilindja’s privatisation is the Rilindja Media House (a build-
ing), where Rilindja had its offices. Rilindja was recognised by the municipal authorities 
of Prishtina as an investor in the Media House,89 and consequently, as the owner (user) 
of most of the space of Media House, while the remaining part of the building was given 
for use to the Jedinstvo company, Tan company, Enti Per Botimin e Teksteve (a textbooks 
publishing company), and to the newspaper, Komunist.90 Rilindja and other media organi-
sations that used Media House after the war were evicted from this building by UNMIK at 
the beginning of 2002.91 
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6 MEDIA PLURALISM AND INDEPENDENCE
Today one can certainly talk about media pluralism in Kosovo/a. And this is true for 
both print and broadcast media. As pointed out earlier, there are 5 dailies on the mar-
ket today, i.e. fewer than during the first two post-war years, when there were around ten 
newspapers. However, compared to 1990, when, following the closure of the daily Rilind-
ja, only Jedinstvo remained on the scene, or to 1995, when Bujku, the semi-underground 
newspaper, was added to Jedinstvo, the number of dailies increased significantly.
It should be mentioned that efforts to restart the Rilindja newspaper are still in 
progress. Since its eviction from its offices and effective closure, it has published several 
special issues. Yet it is hard to believe that in the given circumstances of an overcrowded 
market Rilindja could survive without substantial support from some source. Today, the 
launching of a new daily in Kosovo/a would require initial capital of around EUR 120,000 
for office equipment, while monthly operating costs would be around EUR 85,000.
Table 7 NUMBER OF DAILIES AND TV STATIONS - 1990, 1995 AND 2003
MEDIA 1990 1995 2003
DAILIES RILINDJA*
JEDINSTVO
JEDINSTVO
BUJKU***
KOHA DITORE
BOTA SOT
ZERI
EPOKA ERE
KOSOVA SOT
KOSOVO/A WIDE
TV STATIONS
RADIO TELEVISION
PRISHTINA (RTP)**
RTP**** RTK
RTV 21
KTV
Notes: *Rilindja was banned in 1990.
** RTP was closed down by the Serbian police on 15 July 1990.
*** Bujku was semi-underground newspaper.
**** RTP restarted its broadcasting under Serbian imposed administration in 1990 without Albanian staff.
Two of the five dailies currently published in Kosova openly support the two main po-
litical parties - Bota Sot supports the LDK (Democratic League of Kosova), and Epoka e 
Re is a PDK (Democratic Party of Kosova) supporter, whereas three others are self-defined 
as independent. Ever since its beginning, Koha Ditore has maintained its editorial inde-
pendence in relation to the authorities and political forces. Before the war it was critical of 
Milošević’s regime, and also of the main Kosovar political party, LDK. After the war, Koha 
Ditore continued with this critical attitude, now aimed at UNMIK, new Kosovar democrat-
ic institutions and political parties. Zeri is also critical of the authorities and political par-
ties, although its criticism is more moderate than that of Koha Ditore.
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According to the UNMIK regulation on its establishment, Radio Television Kosova (RTK) 
is “independent and impartial,”92 and is managed by a Director General who reports to 
the apolitical Board of Directors. This regulation obliges RTK Board members not to seek 
or accept any instruction in the performance of their duties from any authority, except as 
provided by law.93 This is why RTK claims to have editorial independence. However this 
claim has sometimes been questioned, bearing in mind that Board members are appoint-
ed by UNMIK.94 However, RTK remains the most often watched national TV station. Within 
the 24-hour programming structure, the central place is accorded to news and informa-
tion, with significant air time reserved for educational and children’s programs, sport, mu-
sic, film, and also news programming in minority languages.
Having in mind that the majority of Kosovars are young people, KTV’s target audience is 
youth. This is why its 18 hours of programming – i.e. the total air time excluding the news 
programs that occupy the central place – special attention is paid to sports, music and 
films programs. KTV has adopted the editorial formula of the Koha Ditore daily, and has 
been critical of the Kosovar authorities and political parties.
The programming schedule of TV 21 is heavily dominated by telenovelas. During 
evening and night hours this TV station that is supported by USAID and OSI currently 
broadcasts some 10 telenovelas - 8 per day. Five or six of these telenovelas are broadcast 
twice a day.95 Between two telenovelas, TV 21 broadcasts 3-minute flash news, in addition 
to the two 30-minute news programs during evening hours. Among other things, once per 
week TV 21 broadcasts “Stories from the courts”, a telenovela of its own production.
Most of the Kosovar media do not cultivate investigative journalism. This issue has 
been addressed again and again since 1999, through workshops, seminars, roundtables, 
and efforts that have been organised by donors and journalists’ organisations to encour-
age media support for investigative journalism. However, the results have been quite mod-
est so far. For example, the Java weekly started with the promise to promote investigative 
journalism, only to abandon this undertaking after two or three initial attempts.
One encouraging exception is the Koha Ditore daily, which lately has been addressing 
some corruption cases through investigative reporting. These cases are usually reported 
by KTV as well. 
The reasons for this reluctance of the Kosovar media to engage in investigative journal-
ism, should be sought not only in the non-existence of a tradition and experience in this 
field but also in the lack of trust in newly emerging institutions and the justice system. One 
can add to this the fact that journalists have not yet succeeded in creating instruments for 
defense of their professional rights.
For example, there is still no collective contract on the national level between journal-
ists’ associations and media owners. Also there are no in-house collective contracts. Only 
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lately have professional associations started monitoring cases of pressure on journalists or 
violation of journalists’ rights. 
7 CONCLUSIONS
Within a year of the end of the 1999 war in Kosovo/a, there were some 100 broadcasters, 
about 10 newspapers, several weeklies and tens of biweeklies, monthly publications and 
other journals. In 2001, the number of radio/TV stations, including KFOR and internation-
al broadcasters, rose to 145. These are impressive figures if we bear in mind that Kosovo/a 
is a small country with around 2 million people, and especially if we recall the fact that the 
systematic persecution of the few Albanian language media that existed in the 1990 ended 
with their closure before the war.
This unprecedented development boom can be attributed to the circumstances cre-
ated by liberation from the repressive Serbian regime, and to the support for new media 
that came from governmental and non-governmental donors that arrived in Kosovo/a af-
ter the war. As a result of the harsh competition of so many media within the small mar-
ket of Kosovo/a, a significant number of postwar outlets that did not enjoy support from 
donors disappeared soon after they were launched. This has been particularly true in the 
print media field, where around half the dailies and weeklies disappeared soon after they 
were launched.
Today, the Kosovar media market is still overcrowded, with 112 broadcasters (89 radio 
and 23 TV stations), 5 dailies, 5 weeklies and tens of other journals. The struggle for sur-
vival will become even more difficult with the current tendency among the donors to de-
crease media support. It is expected that the number of media will further decrease, and 
the first to be affected will be those NGOs or private media that have not achieved self-sus-
tainability.
Within the Kosovar print media market today there is room for a maximum of 3 dai-
lies. Today there are 5 daily newspapers. Apart from the Koha Ditore daily that is self-sus-
tainable, Bota Sot and Zeri can nearly cover their publishing costs, and therefore have a 
chance to survive. Two other dailies can stay in the market only as long as they continue 
to be financed by their publishers, Kosova Sot by Interpress Company, and Epoka e Re by 
Muhamet Mavraj. None of the weeklies currently on the media scene, i.e. Zeri, Java, Jed-
insto, Alem and Yeni Donem, is self-sustainable, and with the exception of Zeri, none has 
the potential of achieving that in the near future.
Less clear is the situation in the field of the broadcasting media. Within a group of 
broadcasters with Kosovo/a wide coverage, only Radio Dukagjini is self-sustainable and 
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enjoys stable financial backing from the Dukagjini Corporation. And while, for the time 
being, the public service RTK has secured funding from different sources, including do-
nors, marketing, license fees and, if need be, from Kosovo/a’s Consolidated Budget, two 
other private broadcasters, RTV 21 and KTV, still need support from USAID and OSI. 
Under the new law on the Independent Media Commission and Broadcasting that is ex-
pected to be approved during 2004, the Temporary Media Commissioner that was estab-
lished to implement the temporary regulatory regime will be replaced by the Independent 
Media Commission. This new authority will regulate all aspects of the civil broadcasting 
system in Kosovo/a, whereas the print media are expected to be self-regulated by means 
of the Press Council.
Further media market development in Kosovo/a mainly depends on donors’ policy. It 
seems that their support should aim not at further expansion but consolidation of the me-
dia scene. Also, it would contribute to the consolidation of the media market if the present 
15 percent VAT on media and 10 percent customs rate for newsprint were reduced, since 
it would increase the self-sustainability of the media that now depend on donors’ support 
and are struggling to survive. On the other hand, it is crucial for media pluralism and inde-
pendence in Kosovo/a that Radio Television Kosova is further developed as a public serv-
ice broadcaster with an independent editorial policy, which would enable it to eliminate as 
soon as possible the need for government financing.
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1 INTRODUCTION1
Latvian media ownership patterns have evolved in close correlation with general devel-
opments in the political, economic and social domains. Th e collapse of the Soviet regime at 
the end of the s triggered the multidimensional processes of a post-communist tran-
sition. In addition to the transition from a totalitarian to a democratic system, and from a 
planned to a free market economy, Latvia also experienced the process of decolonisation, 
or in other words – a break away from the  and rebuilding of the Latvian state that had 
already existed between  and  and was discontinued by the Soviet occupation. 
Th ose three interlinked transition processes produced a number of speciﬁ c constraints 
and circumstances and aﬀ ected the formation of the media system and media owner-
ship structures. For one thing, it brought about a cleavage along ethnic lines – between 
Latvians, on the one hand, and, on the other, Russians and other non-Latvian residents of 
Latvia, who had quietly coexisted through all totalitarian regimes. Th e ethno-linguistic 
cleavage is mirrored in the existence of two parallel information spaces and two markets 
for media products. Since Latvia has only . million residents, this market split has gen-
erated extra constraints on the media industry because it has limited the size of the avail-
able market. Th is constraint distinguishes the Latvian media market from those of other 
post-communist countries, as it is trying to accommodate the communication needs of 
two linguistic groups, somewhat similar in size.
Th e present extent of media ownership concentration in Latvia cannot be seen as a 
threat to pluralism. However, the lack of transparency in the patterns of media ownership 
in Latvia, in both the Latvian and the Russian media, is rather serious, and the situation 
has not signiﬁ cantly improved since the period of predominantly grey economy of the ear-
ly s. A lack of publicly available and updated information about the real owners of dif-
ferent media companies is the main drawback to the Latvian media market.
2 REGULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION
Th e laws regulating the media and media ownership in particular do not form an elab-
orate or clear system in Latvia. Th e ﬁ rst and foremost problem is a lack of transparency 
about media ownership structures and a lack of regulation to ensure that. In the early 
s, Brikse, Duze and Sulmane claimed: “It is not only readers, but sometimes journalists 
themselves do not know who owns a particular publication, who publishes it and what its 
sources of income are. Th e question of the availability of such information is very important 
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for a nation which wants to create a democratic and lawful society in which the mass media 
are regarded as the ‘fourth estate.”²
At the end of , the situation on the media market remains largely unchanged in 
terms of the transparency of media ownership structures, although the media system has 
developed and stabilised. In Latvia, in some cases, it is very diﬃ  cult to determine the real 
owners of a media company, even though there is no shortage of rumour and speculation 
in the media about who owns what. Th ere is still an absence of public information about 
the various ownership structures because there is no currently available register of media 
owners. Partial information on the owners of media companies can be obtained from the 
Company Register, which is also accessible through the on-line database of Lursoft for a 
certain fee.³ However, the Company Register’s record does not invariably include informa-
tion about the real media owners. For one thing, the law on the Company Register of the 
Republic of Latvia (Article ) does not require mandatory disclosure of shareholders in a 
joint stock company if a company has its own internal register, which it may choose not 
to disclose to the public.
In addition, there are diﬀ erent types of corporate interaction that lead to powerful re-
lationships (corporate partnerships, strategic alliances, merchandising arrangements and 
other forms of synergy) without actually merging businesses.⁴ Such teaming arrange-
ments do not have to be disclosed and do not have to be registered at the Company Regis-
ter, as they do not produce changes in the formal structure of ownership, meaning that the 
integrity and formal independence of the relevant media company are preserved.
In Latvia, the secrecy surrounding media ownership structures has been attributed to 
two major factors – secrecy helps to ensure personal security of the actual owners, and it 
also prevents accusations of possible conﬂ icts of interest. Yet it is precisely the latter ar-
gument about conﬂ ict of interest that makes transparency in media ownership structures 
very important. 
Th e current legal framework regulating the media in Latvia does not include special 
regulations targeted at insuring better transparency of media ownership structures, nei-
ther does it stipulate any institution responsible for the supervision of this process. Th e 
current media-related legislation consists of the  Law on the Press and Other Media, 
the  Law on Radio and Television, the decisions that have been issued by the National 
Radio and Television Council, plus other general laws such as the Competition Law, the 
Law on Disclosure of Information, the Law on Copyrights, etc. 
Th e press in Latvia is still regulated by a press law which was adopted in December  
and came into force in . It was the ﬁ rst media law passed during Latvia’s post-commu-
nist transition. Th e Press Law oﬃ  cially abolished censorship of the media and prohibited 
monopolisation of the media. However, it did not address the issue of the level of owner-
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ship concentration that is to be regarded as monopolisation. Th us, press owners are re-
stricted only by the general Competition Law, which does not include special provisions 
for media companies. 
Th e Competition Law speciﬁ es that one or more market participants achieve a position 
of dominance when they take over at least  percent of the market share in the relevant 
market and when they have the capacity to hinder, restrict or distort competition in a sig-
niﬁ cant way. Th e law prohibits any market participant who is in a dominant position from 
abusing that dominant position in any way. In general, the law is designed to prevent dom-
inant market positions in the economic sense and to maintain competition, but it does 
not deal with the social and pluralistic aspects that are part of the mix in the case of me-
dia concentration.⁵ Under general regulations on concentration, for instance, a merger or 
acquisition cannot be prevented on the basis of media-related considerations alone. Also, 
the internal growth of a media company cannot be restricted by law as long as the com-
pany does not abuse its dominant position. Another important issue that is not addressed 
by law is the dominant inﬂ uence on public opinion that results from internal growth or 
acquisitions but is not classiﬁ ed as an abuse of a dominant position.⁶
Th e broadcast media are currently regulated by the  Radio and Television Law, 
which has been amended several times. In this law, the norms of structural control of me-
dia ownership and concentration are mainly stipulated by Article , which forbids the net-
working of regional or local electronic mass media outlets unless such networking is in 
compliance with the national concept of electronic mass media development. Th e law also 
stipulates program development. No broadcasters other than public service broadcasters 
are allowed to establish more than three broadcasting organisations. Any individual who 
is a sole founder of a broadcasting organisation, or who holds a controlling stake in one, 
may not own more than  percent of the shares in another broadcasting organisation, 
and this norm also applies to the respective individual’s spouse. Th is, it might be added, 
is a provision that can easily be circumvented, for instance, through the establishment of 
an oﬀ shore company. 
Political parties and establishments, including companies that are founded or control-
led by political parties, are not allowed to establish electronic mass media outlets (as op-
posed to press outlets, which can be owned by parties). People who hold elected positions 
in the administrative structures of parties and who also own, have shares in, or control an 
electronic media organisation, may not have voting rights on the board of a media organi-
sation. It should be noted that this restriction does not cover all the possible situations, 
and there have been some visible cases of conﬂ ict of interest that, nevertheless fall within 
the limits of the law. 
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When it comes to implementation of the media laws, one shortcoming is the powerless-
ness of the National Radio and Television Council, even though “in the course of , the 
role of the National Radio and Television Council was enhanced, but its monitoring and 
disciplinary authorities need to be further reinforced. Since June , this body has been 
able to issue administrative ﬁ nes. Its administrative capacity needs to be increased.”⁷
3 PRIVATISATION 
In Latvia privatisation in the press sector was rather chaotic and was carried out at a 
very early stage of the transition process. Some media outlets freed themselves from their 
former party – aﬃ  liated owners as early as . At the same time, privatisation in the 
broadcast media sector did not take place at all. Th e formerly state owned broadcast me-
dia remained state regulated and owned, while new commercial broadcasters were found-
ed and entered the broadcast media market. 
Th e press in Latvia underwent two rounds of privatisation – the so-called “spontane-
ous privatisation” by management and employees, as well as regular privatisation. Th e ﬁ rst 
round of privatisation was very rapid, and some market participants argued that it was not 
proper privatisation at all. Many newspapers and magazines were appropriated by their em-
ployees and management, who managed eﬀ ectively to seize them from their former owners 
and treated them as their own property during a period of unregulated privatisation in the 
late s and early s. None of these seizures was ever challenged in the courts. 
Th e spontaneous privatisation of the press in Latvia was facilitated by legal confusion 
about property rights. Th e Government claimed legal ownership of all-union enterprises 
immediately after the declaration of independence, but in addition to state property, there 
was also the property of the Communist Party and its subsidiary organisations. In Latvia, 
the Communist Party was collapsing and splitting up, and this complicated the question of 
ownership of the party’s property. Th e print media, which had once belonged to the Com-
munist Party, simply followed their own path, without waiting for the new government to 
decide what to do with the property of the party. 
Th e two most visible examples of this spontaneous privatisation were those of Latvia’s 
largest newspaper, Lauku Avize, and of a successor to the Latvian Communist Party’s 
newspaper, Cina. In both cases the majority of employees walked away from their previ-
ous publishers and started to publish the newspaper on their own. In the case of Lauku 
Avize, a new publishing company was founded by all employees, while in the case of Cina, 
in , three representatives of the new management took everything into their own 
hands and became sole owners of the newspaper. 
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Th e second round of privatisation took place after , when the ﬁ rst laws on privati-
sation were already in place. Th e most signiﬁ cant case in this round was the denationali-
sation of the Government daily, Diena. Th e reason that Diena could not take advantage 
of the previous spontaneous denationalisation was that it was not owned by the collaps-
ing Communist Party. Rather, in , the new Latvian government had established Diena 
as the Government’s oﬃ  cial mouthpiece. Th e newspaper was privatised to a joint-venture 
company with  shareholders – employees of the newspaper and Sweden’s daily, Exs-
pressen. 
Th e privatisation method of some of these newspapers might be vulnerable to certain le-
gal objections, but the fact is that the process was an important step in the de-sovietisation 
of the press. Since , all press in Latvia has been in private hands.⁸ Some newspapers at-
tained this state through privatisation, while others were founded as private enterprises. 
In spite of that, privatisation of the press industry had not been completed by the mid-
s. Th e state had withdrawn from production, but it still kept control over paper sup-
ply and distribution, as well as the printing industry. Th e state-run printing facilities were 
sold much later, when private printing houses were already in full operation. Th e privati-
sation of the largest printing facility, Preses Nams, took place only in . Another exam-
ple of delayed privatisation was the national news agency, , which was privatised only 
in , when it had lost most of its clients and employees because of bad management 
and a lack of investment. Th e delayed privatisation of  allowed for the emergence of 
the pan-Baltic news agency, Baltic News Service (), in the early s. It dominated the 
news market throughout the s.
Th e press distribution network was partly privatised in the late s. Subscription 
services were a monopoly of the state until  and were operated by the country’s post 
oﬃ  ces. In , the joint stock company, Diena, launched its own subscription centre, and 
this was seen as a countermeasure to the national postal service’s inability to modernise its 
operations in response to new market demands – some people cancelled their subscrip-
tions to morning papers after they realised that the papers were being delivered around 
midday or even later.
Th e largest newsstand network owner, Preses Apvieniba, was put up for privatisation 
only in  and was acquired ( percent) by the Norwegian-owned Narvesen Baltija, . 
which already had a strong presence in the newsstand market. Th us the distribution stage 
gradually became more concentrated without ever having been properly de-concentrated.
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4 CURRENT MEDIA OWNERSHIP 
Latvia’s economic situation has a signiﬁ cant eﬀ ect on the formation of media owner-
ship patterns, as most media companies are highly sensitive to the ups and downs of the 
overall economy, because the performance of the economy aﬀ ects the level of advertising 
– the primary source of income for most media companies.⁹ Also of importance are the 
amount of disposable income and the level of consumer conﬁ dence, which are especially 
important in the case of the press. Th e state of the Latvian economy was characterised by 
uneven growth throughout the s, which pushed many publications to look for outside 
ﬁ nancial support. Th is unevenness constrained the development of the media system and 
shaped media ownership patterns into their current form. 
We shall now proceed to give a brief overview of the biggest media outlets in Latvia’s 
media market and their owners. 
4.1. PRINT MEDIA 
Th e three largest dailies in Latvia in terms of circulation¹⁰ at the end of  are Diena 
(,), Latvijas Avize (,) and Neatkariga Rita Avize (,). Th e largest daily in 
Latvian, Diena, is published by  Diena, which is owned by the Swedish media compa-
ny Tidnings  Marieberg International (. percent), belonging to the Bonnier Group. 
Other owners are  private persons whose identity the management of the company is 
not willing to disclose. It is interesting that information provided by the company itself 
diﬀ ers from data about the structure of shareholders in the Company Register, according 
to which  Diena belongs to the newspaper publisher, Exspressen  ( percent), and 
former and current employees ( percent). Taking into account the lack of requirements 
for mandatory disclosure of shareholder structure to the Company Register, the informa-
tion provided by the company itself is believed to be more accurate. 
Until  December , the present Latvijas Avize daily was a triweekly newspaper 
called Lauku Avize. Th is predecessor of Latvijas Avize used to focus on rural concerns and 
has managed to keep its market share over the years, mostly by competing with small lo-
cal newspapers. It seems that Latvijas Avize has inherited both the tone of and subscrib-
ers from its predecessor.  Lauku Avize, which publishes Latvijas Avize, is owned by a 
single shareholder, Viesturs Serdans, the Chairman of the newspaper’s managing board. 
Th e ownership structure of this company also raises some questions and doubts that will 
be addressed later in this study.
Th e third biggest daily, Neatkariga Rita Avize, is published by  Mediju Nams, which 
belongs to the Latvian oil transhipment company,  Ventspils Nafta (. percent), and 
 Preses Nams (. percent), which is also owned by Ventspils Nafta. In addition to 
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these dailies there is also a number of smaller dailies published in Russian. At the end of 
, there were ﬁ ve dailies in Russian – Vesti Segodnya, Chas, Komersant Baltic Daily, 
Telegraf, and Bizness&Baltiya, and only three dailies in Latvian which had higher circula-
tion ﬁ gures than the Russian ones.
Table  OWNERSHIP OF THREE BIGGEST DAILIES IN LATVIA
TITLE PUBLISHER OWNER OWNERSHIP
SHARE (%)
CIRCULATION
DIENA JSC DIENA TDNINGS AB MARIEBERG 
INTERNATIONAL 
(BONNIER GROUP)
PRIVATE PERSONS
83.5
16.5
65,000
LATVIJAS AVIZE JSC LAUKU AVIZE VIESTURS SERDANS 100 57,550
NEATKARIGA RITA AVIZE JSC MEDIJU NAMS JSC VENTSPILS NAFTA
JSC PRESES NAMS
90
10
36,000
Source: Data gathered by the news agency , Autumn .
To sum up, in the market of Latvia’s national daily press there are three national dailies in 
Latvian and ﬁ ve in Russian, a number of evening tabloids in Latvian (Vakara Avize Vakara 
Zinas, Rigas Balss) and in Russian (Vechernaya Riga), as well as business and sports press.
In contrast to the press market in Central and Eastern Europe, the Latvian press market 
has not attracted major foreign investment, and only one international media concern has 
appeared on the scene. Th e reasons why there has been little ﬂ ow of foreign capital into the 
Latvian press market, except for the investments of the Swedish Bonnier Group, can be at-
tributed to the rather limited size of the market. Another reason has been put forward by 
Humphreys, who argues that countries that do not share a language with a large neighbour 
are somewhat more protected from the entrance of large foreign media concerns.¹¹ Giv-
en this context it is somewhat paradoxical that none of the Russian media concerns have 
made any serious attempt to enter the market of the Russian language press in Latvia.
Concentration in the press market has taken place along the lines of language and 
spheres of inﬂ uence. Th e Latvian national daily press market is concentrated in the hands 
of two major publishers – the Swedish media concern, Bonnier Group, and companies as-
sociated with the Ventspils political economic group. Th is, of course, makes it diﬃ  cult for 
new publications to enter the market and to compete with existing media concerns. 
Th e Swedish media concern, Bonnier Group, directly or indirectly owns a signiﬁ cant 
share of Latvian media companies –  Diena, which publishes the largest Latvian daily 
and owns one third of all regional newspapers; Diena-Bonnier, . which publishes the 
only business daily in Latvian; and indirectly (via the Finish media company, Alma Me-
porocilo.indb   8 22.5.2004, 13:46:25
LATVIA 257
dia), it owns the pan-Baltic news agency, Baltic News Service. Bonnier Group in Latvia is 
an example of horizontal concentration, having interests in a number of newspapers, as 
well as vertical concentration, since  Diena has printing facilities and a distribution and 
subscription company.
Chart  BONNIER GROUP OWNERSHIP IN LATVIA
BONNIER GROUP
.  
  
JSC DIENA DIENA 
BONNIER LTD
ALMA MEDIA
     
DIENA ⅓ of Latvian 
regional 
newspapers
Distribution 
and 
subscription 
company
Printing 
facilities
DIENAS 
BIZNESS
BALTIC NEWS 
SERVICE
(newspaper) (business daily) (news agency)
Another group of big media owners comprises companies associated with a political-
economic group called Ventspils Group. Clemens described this group as follows: “First, 
there was a powerful business clan in Ventspils, headed in the late s by Aivars Lem-
bergs, mayor of the port city. Hungry for Russian oil and oil revenues, it favoured closer 
ties with Russia than with the .”
One of the Group’s companies – the oil transhipment company, Ventspils Nafta, owns 
Mediju Nams, which publishes the third largest daily in Latvian and a number of smaller 
evening newspapers and magazines, thus representing an example of horizontal concen-
tration. Horizontal concentration has allowed Mediju Nams to streamline various back-
oﬃ  ce activities such as accounting, administration, etc. Th ere have even been attempts 
to consolidate resources by creating a joint unit for research and analysis, one that would 
produce analytical articles for any of the publisher’s newspapers. 
Th ere have also been other concentration developments in the press market, associated 
with companies believed to belong to the Ventspils political-economic group. According 
to information based on accessible sources and a number of newspaper reports, it is likely 
that the change in ownership of  Lauku Avize (the publisher of the second largest dai-
ly, Latvijas Avize) at the end of , increased the share of companies belonging to the 
Ventspils political economic group. It seems that  Ventbunkers has acquired  per-
cent of  Lauku Avize, even though the formal holder of the shares is Viesturs Serdans, 
the former editor of the newspaper that was published by  Lauku Avize.
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Chart  MEDIA OWNERSHIP OF VENTSPILS GROUP (UNOFFICIAL)
VENTBUNKERS
. 

LATVIJAS NAFTAS 
TRANZITS


JSC VENTSPILS NATFA VIESTURS SERDANS
(private person)
. .  
   
JSC PRESES NAMS JSC MEDIJU NAMS
Publisher of 
Neatkariga Rita Avize
JCS LAUKU AVIZE
Publisher of 
Latvijas Avize
V. S. IZDEVNIECIBA LTD
 
. 
Sources: Company Register and press materials.
Th ere are no legal documents to prove the acquisition of  Lauku Avize by the indi-
rect owners of Mediju Nams, but the owners and managers of competing publications 
have claimed this.¹³ Also, the amount of dividends received by  Ventbunkers in  
from an unidentiﬁ ed publishing company coincides precisely with the amount of divi-
dends paid by  Lauku Avize to its owners.¹⁴ Th is leads one to assume that there is a 
proprietary relationship between the two, even though the nature of this relationship is 
not clear. If allegations about the teaming arrangements (see chart above) between the as-
sumed owners of  Lauku Avize and the indirect owners of Mediju Nams prove to be 
correct, then that would mean further horizontal concentration of media outlets that are 
directly and indirectly owned by companies belonging to the Ventspils political economic 
group. In such a case, its market share in national newspapers has been increased as it has 
control of the second and the third largest dailies. 
Th e Russian press market, by contrast, is less stable and less concentrated, and it ex-
periences the emergence of new dailies and bankruptcy of others on a yearly basis. Th e 
number of Russian dailies and publishers has increased, which is a trend that is in con-
trast to the consolidation in the Latvian press.¹⁵ Along with some smaller publishers of 
one or two titles, there are also two larger publishing houses, each having a national daily 
in Russian. One of the publishing companies, Fenster, is owned by Andrey Kozolv and his 
mother. Fenster publishes the largest daily in Russian, Vesti, as well as the Komersant Bal-
tic daily in Russian and a number of weeklies and magazines. However, according to pub-
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licly available information in the Company Register, the assets of Fenster are mortgaged at 
the Parex bank, thus allowing for speculation about its dependence on the bank, which is 
regarded as one of the inﬂ uential players among the Latvian political economic elite hav-
ing certain political interests. Another large publisher of the mainly Russian press is Petits, 
owned by its manager, Aleksey Sheinin.
It is interesting that the Latvian and Russian press sectors give a somewhat diﬀ erent pic-
ture and that corporate ownership of the Latvian daily press diﬀ ers from the still diverse and 
privately owned Russian press. Even though, in terms of diversity of media suppliers, the 
Russian market seems to be a better example of media pluralism, we must, however, note 
that economic constraints prevent many of the Russian language dailies from enjoying edito-
rial autonomy. Either they depend on support from a media concern, or they depend on aid 
from various outside sources, including large corporations and political economic groups. 
Th e two biggest weeklies in terms of circulation are the women’s magazine, Ieva 
(,), and the weekly celebrity tabloid, Privata Dzive (,). Both are published by 
the same media concern - Zurnals Santa, . which is owned by two individuals closely 
involved in the management of the company – Santa Anca ( percent) and Ivars Zarins 
( percent). It should be mentioned, however, that in terms of circulation, weekly  
guides tend to exceed the circulation of any daily newspaper or other type of weekly. In 
general, the magazine market in Latvia can be seen as less concentrated compared to the 
Latvian daily press market, as the number of media outlets is relatively high, but the fact is 
that in terms of market share, according to Baltic Media Book , the publishing house, 
Zurnals Santa, ., dominates the market with , readers and  titles. According to 
subscription data at the end of , of the  magazines with the largest number of sub-
scribers, six were published by Zurnals Santa, .¹⁶
4.3 TELEVISION MARKET
Th e two largest private television stations in Latvia are  ( percent audience share) 
and  ( percent audience share). Until mid , the  was directly and indirectly 
owned by the Polish television concern Polsat ( percent) and by three private individu-
als – Janis Azis ( percent), Haralds Apogs and Edvins Inkens, both having indirect own-
ership via Bete, . ( percent). In the summer of , there appeared information in 
the press about possible changes in the structure of  shareholders as, according to the 
information in the Company Register, shares of Bete . were sold to Baltic Media Hold-
ings .. (), which is registered in the Netherlands. According to speculation in the 
press,  represents the interests of Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation.¹⁷ Th e Rus-
sian daily, Telegraf, has even speculated that  percent of Polsat (which owns  percent 
of ) belongs to News Corporation, which would mean that Murdoch’s share of the 
Latvian  is even bigger. 
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Th e second largest private television station,  , is owned by the Swedish media con-
cern, Modern Times Group ( percent). Th us, both commercial television stations with 
nation-wide coverage are owned by foreign media conglomerates, the two biggest media 
owners in the broadcast media market in general.
Table  OWNERSHIP OF THE MAIN TV STATIONS IN LATVIA
TITLE OWNER OWNERSHIP 
SHARE (%)
AUDIENCE 
SHARE (%)
LNT POLSAT
JANIS AZIS
BETE LTD. (owned by Baltic 
Media Holdings B.V.)
60
14
26
25
TV3 MODERN TIMES GROUP (MTG) 100 15
4.4 RADIO MARKET
Th e three biggest private radio stations in terms of audience share are Radio  ( per-
cent), + ( percent) and Star  ( percent). Th e program of the ﬁ rst two is produced 
by  Radio , which is owned by private individuals represented in the company’s 
management (Zigmars Liepins ( percent), Guntars Krumins (. percent) and Janis Sip-
kevics (. percent)) and by the largest Latvian private television station,  ( percent). 
Th e third most popular private radio station, Star , belongs to the Swedish media 
concern, Modern Times Group ( percent), which also owns . Even though this study 
does not include the analysis of public broadcasters, it must be mentioned that public serv-
ice radio also has a very signiﬁ cant share of the radio audience, with Latvian Radio  having 
 percent and Latvian Radio  holding  percent of the radio audience. Th is is a unique 
situation, where public service radio programs have managed to attract and sustain in the 
long term larger audience shares than private broadcasters. 
Table  OWNERSHIP OF THE MAIN PRIVATE RADIO STATIONS IN LATVIA
NAME OWNER OWNERSHIP 
SHARE (%)
AUDIENCE 
SHARE (%)
RADIO SWH LNT
ZIGMARS LIEPINS
GUNTARS KRUMINS
JANIS SIPKEVICS
50
35
8.5
6.5
9
SWH+ LNT
ZIGMARS LIEPINS
GUNTARS KRUMINS
JANIS SIPKEVICS
50
35
8.5
6.5
8
STAR FM MODERN TIMES GROUP (MTG) 100 5
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5 MEDIA PLURALISM
Th e main political concern linked to the concentration of media ownership is its threat 
to pluralism. Although the Bonnier Group and Ventspils political-economic group, as me-
dia owners, dominate the daily press market, they do not hold as considerable a share in 
the overall press market, including the daily press in Latvian and Russian. Th e guidelines 
of the European Union suggest that a supplier with a market share of more than  per-
cent in terms of readership should be seen as a threat against pluralism.¹⁸ In relation to 
this norm, Latvia’s press market has a very diverse pattern of media suppliers, and there 
should be no concern about any threat to pluralism. 
In the context of evaluating pluralism of the Latvian media, it is also important to con-
sider the consolidation of editorial functions, which can occur irrespective of separate or 
joint ownership, but can lead to homogeneous output and thus endanger pluralism. Com-
panies in Latvia which are partly, and some also indirectly, owned by the Bonnier Group, 
such as  Diena, regional newspapers, Diena-Bonnier and Baltic News Service, do not 
share their editorial or any other resources, and in the domestic marketplace they function 
as completely separate companies. Th is means that the Bonnier Group’s holdings in Latvia 
do not represent a threat to pluralism. Mediju Nams, by contrast, consolidates resources 
and is more likely to limit diversity of output.
Another way to evaluate media pluralism is to analyse the number of media outlets. As 
can be seen from the table below, Latvia represents a very pluralistic media system, with 
a high number of diﬀ erent media outlets, especially taking into account that the popula-
tion of Latvia is . million.
Table  NUMBER OF NEWSPAPERS IN LATVIA 1990–1999 
1990 1995 1997 1998 1999
TOTAL NUMBER OF NEWSPAPERS 172 286 229 226 235
NUMBER OF DAILIES N/A N/A 21 24 23
NUMBER OF NEWSPAPERS IN LATVIAN N/A 193 161 155 161
NUMBER OF NEWSPAPERS IN OTHER LANGUAGES N/A 93 68 71 74
Source: Baltic Media Book .
Th e number of dailies and television programs with national coverage has actually in-
creased at a time when consolidation of publishers has been the major trend in the Latvian 
press market. Entrance barriers, it must be said, are signiﬁ cantly lower in the Russian press, 
but the fragmentation of the market for Russian language dailies has made it very diﬃ  cult 
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for publishers to achieve ﬁ nancial success. Gillian Doyle has argued that a media industry 
in which ownership is too fragmented is susceptible to ineﬃ  ciency.¹⁹ Th is has clearly been 
demonstrated by the rather poor ﬁ nancial performance of most Russian press publishers.
However, the proportion between the number of media outlets – an area in which 
Latvia performs rather well – and the number of autonomous media suppliers which are 
not associated with any political economic group, is not very comforting, at least in the 
sector of the national daily press. Th e politicised nature of some media companies and 
their aﬃ  liation with political economic groups is closely linked to the very nature of the 
post-communist transition. Th e transition from a state-regulated economy to a market 
economy involves politically motivated privatisation. Th is fosters greater linkage between 
the political and economic domains, leading to the merger of the political and economic 
elites. Links between some media companies and the political economic elite, therefore, 
are a natural by-product of the post-communist transition or, as Colin Sparks puts it, the 
highly politicised nature of commercial broadcasters and some press outlets is “a function 
of the nature of the transition.”²⁰
When it comes to state subsidies to diﬀ erent media companies in order to promote 
pluralism and support certain media outlets, it has to be noted that there is no consistent 
state policy regarding subsidies to such media outlets in Latvia. On the national press level, 
there have been scattered instances when a cultural publication has received state aid, but 
it is no longer the case at the end of . Th e situation is diﬀ erent in the public broadcast-
ing sector, where public broadcasters receive a state subsidy in addition to advertising in-
come, but those state subsidies do not apply to privately owned broadcasting companies. 
6 MEDIA INDEPENDENCE
Th e situation regarding editorial independence of media outlets has improved in recent 
years, but during the ﬁ rst half of the s economic constraints forced many media com-
panies and their owners to accept ﬁ nancing from major non-media concerns in exchange 
for positive publicity, or to become the object of a take-over. Th ose who did not want to ac-
cept, or did not manage to secure, one of these two options, often went bankrupt. Another 
factor was that most of the newspapers had been denationalised by their employees, which 
meant no inﬂ ow of investment or know-how about newspaper management in the new 
conditions of a market economy. Th e undeveloped advertising market could not improve 
the situation. Until the late s, few media companies managed to survive without giv-
ing up their editorial independence under the severe economic constraints that prevailed. 
As a rule, these were either those newspapers that were the ﬁ rst to appreciate and utilise 
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the beneﬁ ts of the emerging advertising market as a source of revenue (Diena), or those 
with very high circulations (the then weekly Lauku Avize and the afternoon tabloid Vakara 
Zinas, which quickly reached a circulation of , in the ﬁ rst half of the s).
But even at the end of , there is much space for various types of inﬂ uence and 
breaches of editorial independence. In Latvia, there is neither a collective agreement on 
the national level between the journalists’ association and media publishers, nor in-house 
agreements between journalists and publishers. Th e journalists’ professional organisation, 
Union of Journalists, is very weak and inactive, which means that there is no mechanism 
or institution to expose publicly the problems of pressure on journalists and editors based 
on commercial interests of the owners. Th is allows media ownership to be the dominant 
power in the market, since counter institutions are non-existent or too weak (or unwilling) 
to act. Th erefore in Latvia, media owners have a rather large space for manoeuvring and 
inﬂ uencing their media, in so far as it does not have a negative eﬀ ect on their circulation 
and subsequently ﬁ nancial performance.
In Latvia there has been a variety of public discussions regarding the editorial independ-
ence of media and some media analysts view current media outlets as belonging to diﬀ er-
ent competing political economic groups. Such preferences for political and/or economic 
groups are also characteristic of the Russian language press in Latvia. Panorama Latvii (dis-
continued in ), for instance, strongly favoured a left-wing Russian political group and 
was believed to receive ﬁ nancial support from it. Telegraf belongs to Belokon and promotes 
his economic and political interests. Vesti Segodnya, as a result of Fenster’s dependence on 
the Parex Bank where its assets, according to the information available in the Company 
Register, are mortgaged, supports the political and economic interests of the Parex group.
Since the broadcast media market is state regulated, it is often more inﬂ uenced by re-
lationships between the political economic elite and media owners/media outlets, than is 
the press. Some media owners use their media as a commodity in the market of political 
inﬂ uence. Some have personal ambitions, while others represent the political interests of 
someone else in exchange for political support in such areas as regulation and competition. 
Radio , for instance, was accused of supporting the liberal Latvia’s Way political party 
before the elections, but the station’s co-owner and president, Zigmars Liepins, claims that 
in his radio station he can “do whatever he wants,” unless it scares away the audience.²¹
Th e above mentioned example can also be described as hidden advertising. In Latvia 
this term refers to cases where a political party’s program or views are published during 
the election campaign without specifying that it is advertising. In , the Soros Foun-
dation and the  Delna, which is a local representative of Transparency International, 
sponsored research in the Latvia’s media in order to determine the level and amount of 
hidden advertising. Th e results of this research have been widely disputed, and the authors 
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have been accused of bias and lobbying for various interests. However, research showed 
that the problem exists of a rather large amount of hidden political advertising, which be-
came particularly pronounced before the elections. 
In addition to ownership and business connections not always revealed in the formal 
structures of companies, there is also a personal aspect. If we take into account the rela-
tively small size of the Latvian population, we must acknowledge that there are diﬀ er-
ent kinds of family relations, friendships and relations among former colleagues or class-
mates. Th e fact that the former head of the broadcasting council was once a very close 
colleague of one of the shareholders in  – a shareholder who was also an  – and 
also of one of the shareholders in Radio , is something that may point to a special re-
lationship. Th is does not necessarily mean preferential treatment for anyone, but it does 
mean that outsiders – and especially foreigners – may ﬁ nd it diﬃ  cult to join the ranks of 
the “media people” in Latvia. Th e fact that ’s  proved unable to ensure suﬃ  cient 
political backing by attracting inﬂ uential local partners while its competitor  obvious-
ly had more political credibility, delayed the process of  receiving its national coverage 
license for two years until February .
When it comes to the strength and development of investigative reporting in Latvia, 
which can be seen as a sign of media independence, the situation is not reassuring. Inves-
tigative journalism is rarely encouraged by media publishers through allocation of special 
budgets or creation of special units. Th roughout the s, there existed an independent 
media company of freelancers (called  Birojs) specialising in investigative journalism 
and oﬀ ering its research ﬁ ndings and articles to diﬀ erent media outlets. However, ow-
ing to pressure and to ﬁ nancially weak demand for its investigative reports, is was closed 
down. Since then there have not been systematic and sustained attempts at serious inves-
tigative reporting, even though some publications are trying to encourage their journalists 
to work in this area of journalism.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Th e changes Lithuania experienced during the last ﬁ ve years allow us to talk about an 
increasing market concentration of the Lithuanian mass media. One of the peculiarities of 
this market is the prevalence of national capital. Th is is particularly obvious in the periodi-
cal press. At the same time, one can observe a tendency for Lithuanian industrial concerns 
to enter the mass media business. 
When a media system operates in market conditions, information becomes a commod-
ity. Th e question that arises in this connection is whether the media serve the interests of 
society or if their goal is primarily commercial? When analysing the media market and 
its development trends from this perspective, it is necessary to take into account chang-
es in capital concentration and competition in the Lithuanian media sector (–). 
Furthermore, there are two aspects of the Lithuanian media market that should always 
be kept in mind when assessing the mass media market and comparing it with European 
markets. Th e ﬁ rst aspect is historical market relations, the regulatory systems and legisla-
tion; the other is the expansion of new technologies and new possibilities for the provision 
of information to the public, and the extent to which they ﬁ t into, expand or modify the 
old legislative frameworks.
2 REGULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION 
Th e Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, adopted by referendum in , lays 
down the main provisions safeguarding freedom of speech and freedom of information, as 
well as basic human rights and guarantees. Article  of the Constitution says “Censorship 
of mass media shall be prohibited. Th e State, political parties, political and public organi-
sations, and other institutions or persons may not monopolise means of mass media.”¹ Ar-
ticle  of the Constitution provides for the terms and conditions of joint ownership and 
competition. “Th e law shall prohibit monopolisation of production and the market, and 
shall protect freedom of fair competition.”² Th is provision is also applicable to the mass 
media. In the Law on the Press and other Mass Media, adopted by the Supreme Soviet of 
the Lithuanian Socialist Republic in , only freedom of the press and the abolition of 
censorship were highlighted. 
Th e Seimas (Parliament) of the Republic of Lithuania adopted the new Law on the Pro-
vision of Information to the Public in . It was in this law that the provisions regulating 
mass media competition were introduced for the ﬁ rst time. Article  (“Honest Compe-
tition in the Sphere of Provision of Information to the Public”) says: “State and local gov-
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ernment institutions, as well as other enterprises, institutions and organisations or natural 
persons, may not monopolise mass media. A dominant position in the sphere of provision 
of information to the public, shall be determined based upon the Law on Competition.”³
2.1 COMPETITION LEGISLATION
So far there have been no special laws regulating concentration and competition of me-
dia in Lithuania. Th e Law on Competition, adopted in , regulates relations concerning 
competition.⁴ It prohibits actions that restrict or may restrict competition, regardless of 
the form of economic activity, with the exception of activities exempt by this law or other 
laws governing separate areas of economic activity. According to the Law on Competi-
tion, an economic entity or a group of entities is considered to have a dominant position 
if it faces no direct competition in the relevant market or is in a position to exercise de-
cisive, biased inﬂ uence in that speciﬁ c market by eﬀ ectively restricting competition. Un-
less proved otherwise, an economic entity is considered to have a dominant position in a 
market when its market share amounts to  percent. Unless proved otherwise, it is con-
sidered that any company that is a member of a group that holds a  percent or higher 
market share has a dominant position. In cases when it is proved otherwise, the economic 
entity is not considered to have a dominant position, even though its market share cor-
responds to that indicated in the Law. Th e law prohibits abuse of the dominant position 
without exception.
2.2 BROADCASTING REGULATION
According to the current Law on the Provision of Information to the Public, all radio 
stations,  stations, and cable  stations registered in Lithuania are required to ob-
tain a broadcasting license. Lithuanian national radio and television services are exempt. 
Broadcasting licenses for the broadcasting and re-broadcasting of programs are awarded 
through tenders organised by the Radio and Television Commission. Th e establishment of 
the Commission is regulated by Article  of the Law on the Provision of Information to 
the Public.⁵ Th e executive institution is the Radio Frequency Service with the Ministry of 
Communication and Informatics. 
Certain requirements applying to the broadcast media are related to the fact that fre-
quencies are the property of the state of Lithuania. Accordingly, the state, acting through 
the Radio and Television Commission, grants to a station only a temporary permit to use 
a speciﬁ c frequency. 
Until , all radio and television stations registered before the establishment of the 
Radio and  Commission were operating only on the basis of foundation certiﬁ cates, 
which, however, did not regulate their broadcasting activity. According to Article  stipu-
porocilo.indb   3 22.5.2004, 13:46:27
 270 MEDIA OWNERSHIP AND ITS IMPACT ON MEDIA INDEPENDENCE AND PLURALISM
lating the method of implementation of the Law on the Provision of Information to the 
Public, these stations were allowed to operate until  January . After that date they 
were required to obtain broadcasting licenses. Th is involved meeting certain conditions, 
for example, observation of the norms of the Lithuanian language as provided by law, an 
obligation to broadcast a certain percentage of children’s programming, etc. Th e licensing 
of broadcasting activity helps not only to regulate the media market, but also to evaluate 
quantitative and qualitative program parameters. According to Article  of the Law on 
the Provision of Information to the Public, the Radio and Television Commission adopts 
program content and production requirements by a two-third majority. State transmitters 
and antenna masts belong to the Lithuanian Radio and Television Centre. 
2.3 REGULATION AND SELF-REGULATION OF MEDIA ETHICS
Under the Law on the Provision of Information to the Public, a new institution, the In-
spector of Journalist Ethics was established. Th e Inspector is a state oﬃ  cer appointed (and 
approved since the middle of ) by the Seimas of the Lithuanian Republic. Th e Inspec-
tor investigates the complaints of natural persons concerning violations of their honour 
and dignity in the mass media, and professional claims of the subjects of mass media. Th e 
Inspector of Journalist Ethics, being a state oﬃ  cer, reports on his work to the Seimas and 
the Government. Another similar institution is the Ethics Commission of Journalists and 
Publishers ﬁ nanced from the Fund for the Support of the Press, Radio and Television, 
which, in turn, is ﬁ nanced from the budget. Th is means that both institutions of the me-
dia self-regulating system are slightly dependent on the authorities, although neither the 
Seimas nor the Government can directly inﬂ uence their activity. However, owing to eco-
nomic and ﬁ nancial diﬃ  culties, the mass media of the country are not able to maintain 
these two institutions on their own. 
In fulﬁ lling their legally prescribed functions, media self-regulation institutions have so 
far been concerned merely with content and the protection of freedom of the press. Th e 
absence of speciﬁ c legislation that would regulate media competition predetermined the 
peculiarities of development in the Lithuanian media market, the speciﬁ c features of con-
centration and monopolisation of this market. 
2.4 STATE SUPPORT TO MEDIA PLURALISM
Owing to competition, only those publications that cater to the taste of the mass con-
sumer are able to make suﬃ  cient proﬁ t and survive on the mass media market. With the 
competition intensifying, the Government became concerned about the pluralism of the 
media. Th e media operating in the spheres of culture, children and youth, as well as me-
dia catering for ethnic minorities, were unable to secure their due share of the market. 
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Th is led to the decision to set up an institution whose function is to maintain the equilib-
rium, not merely by satisfying the needs of diﬀ erent groups of readers but by facilitating 
the maintenance of cultural values in the country. Th e Fund for the Support of the Press, 
Radio and Television was established on  September  on the basis of the Law on the 
Provision of Information to the Public, and it is ﬁ nanced from the state budget. Th e Fund 
provides ﬁ nancial assistance to those media that submit adequate cultural and educational 
activity programming. It is an independent public institution promoting cultural and edu-
cational activity of the producers of public information. Th e Fund allocates ﬁ nancial sup-
port by means of annual tenders. 
Table  STATE SUPPORT FOR THE MEDIA (IN EUR)⁶
YEAR 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
BUDGET FINANCING 1,321,739 1,341,202 1,091,884 812,170 577,790 824,348
Over the last ﬁ ve years, press-related projects were awarded the largest amounts of 
funding. However, funds awarded to audiovisual projects have been increasing. For in-
stance, in  such projects accounted for only . percent of the total sum of support, 
whereas in  their share amounted to . percent. In  the Fund granted support 
to  projects –  press projects,  audiovisual projects and  Internet projects. 
3 MEDIA MARKET DEVELOPMENT
In  the changes occurring in the spheres of policy, economy and public life evoked 
new tendencies in the media system of the country. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the 
process of de-concentration was very intense. All state press companies were privatised; 
independent periodicals, private radio stations and a bit later private television channels 
appeared. Publishing companies often added “independent” to their ﬂ ag line to indicate 
that their publication was no longer under state control. Between  and , nearly  
new periodicals were launched in Lithuania.⁷ 
Th e creation of the new media system was facilitated by one of the last acts passed by 
the Supreme Council of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Lithuania: the Law on the Press 
and other Mass Media was accepted in February  and entered into force a month 
later.⁸ It abolished censorship and prohibited the Government from interfering with the 
work of the media; in addition, it promulgated freedom of the press. Th is law not only lib-
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erated the old and new media from the ownership of the party, but also provided them 
with the possibility of changing their status.
According to the Law On the Initial Privatisation of State Property, passed by Restora-
tive Seimas of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania on  April , the or-
der of privatisation of the state-owned property was established.⁹ 
In July , the Government of the Republic of Lithuania established the rules for 
privatising state capital, describing them in Resolution no. . According to this resolu-
tion, it was possible to purchase state shares when they made up more than  percent 
of the value of authorized capital. In the same year, the Central Privatisation Commis-
sion stressed in its report (Protocol no. ,  August ) that “Publishing companies, 
having accepted into their balance the premises belonging to the state, must re-register 
the capital of publishers of periodicals and editorial departments and any changes to the 
capital structure”. Th e majority of editorial departments became , “uždaroji akcinė 
bendrovė” (private limited liability company).¹⁰ Th ese companies appropriated the former 
periodical’s property, including all the oﬃ  ces and equipment. Th ese laws did not include 
any provision regulating concentration of the media. 
Newspaper privatisation took place in the early s with the Government agreeing 
that it should no longer be involved in newspaper and magazine publishing. In most cases, 
privatisation of newspapers took the form of a journalist and/or staﬀ  buy-out. A few years 
later, however, most of these original shareholders sold their shares to local or foreign pub-
lishers. Th us, the end of the s brought a considerable reduction in the number of jour-
nalists as shareholders in their own newspapers. 
3.1 PRINT MEDIA MARKET 
Generally, we can divide the print media in Lithuania into two distinct groups: the 
former oﬃ  cial dailies, magazines and many of the regional newspapers which were estab-
lished in the Soviet era and which have since been privatised. Th e second group comprises 
the new titles that came into existence during or after the change of the system. 
Th e largest Lithuanian dailies are the leaders on the print media market, greatly con-
tributing towards concentration. At the moment, Lithuania has ﬁ ve daily newspapers. 
Th ese are Lietuvos rytas (Lithuanian Morning), Vakaro žinios (Evening News), Respubli-
ka (Republic), Lietuvos zinios (News of Lithuania), and Kauno diena (Kaunas Day). Th eir 
daily circulation, excluding Sunday editions, amounts to , in total. Lietuvos rytas is 
the largest newspaper in the country. Th e tabloid paper, Vakaro žinios, is next in line. Re-
spublika, which had been the second largest daily for a long time, closely follows. All these 
papers are published in the capital of Vilnius, except Kauno diena .
porocilo.indb   6 22.5.2004, 13:46:27
LITHUANIA 273
Table  MAIN DAILIES IN LITHUANIA (2003)11
NO. TITLE COVER* COVER 
MAXIMUM**
OWNER
1 LIETUVOS RYTAS 23.2% 51.5% UAB LIETUVOS RYTAS
 owned by the Editor in Chief, G. 
Vainauskas, most of the remainder 
divided among employees
2 VAKARO ŽINIOS 15.7% 34.1% UAB NAUJASIS AITVARAS
 legal persons and  natural persons
3 RESPUBLIKA 9.5% 24.2% UAB RESPUBLIKOS LEIDINIAI
owned by  of the editors
4 LIETUVOS ŽINIOS 6% 13.8% ACHEMA GROUP
5 KAUNO DIENA 5.8% 10.7% ORKLA
Source on coverage:  Gallup, December .
Notes: * Percent of people who have read or looked over one issue of edition.
** Percent of people who had a chance to read or look over one issue of edition.
Th e main daily, Lietuvos rytas, experienced a fascinating course of transition. It was es-
tablished during the Soviet era and owned by the communist youth organization (Kom-
somol). In  it became the ﬁ rst daily to be privatised. According to the Law On the 
Initial Privatisation of State Property, shares were divided among all journalists and Kom-
somol leaders. Journalists later bought out their shares. Now Lietuvos rytas is a private 
limited liability company and one of the market leaders. Th e structure of Lietuvos rytas is 
becoming similar to that of a classic big concern. Th e shares are divided as follows: Edi-
tor in Chief G. Vainauskas –  percent, two deputies V. Strimaitis – . percent, and A. 
Budrys – . percent; the other  shareholders (most of them are journalists) –  per-
cent.¹² Lietuvos rytas publishes two regional newspapers, Panevezio rytas and Laikinoji 
sostine, and the weekly magazines, Kompiuterija, Ekstra, and Stilius plius. It has its own 
subscription and delivery service. 
Th e publishers, who started their business in market conditions and following the expe-
rience of other countries, understood the necessity of a private printing house. On  De-
cember , the printing house of Lietuvos rytas was opened. It oﬀ ers printing services to 
other publishers as well. So, not only does a private printing house help reduce the costs of 
publishing in the competitive struggle, but in the long run it also becomes a source of in-
come. On  October , Lietuvos rytas launched a one-hour TV program “Lietuvos ryto 
televizija” that was broadcast by one of the commercial channels. Th is undertaking later 
evolved into a private limited liability company, Spaudos televizija. 
Th e Respublika daily, which was founded in  by the movement Sajudis, is one 
among the new publications on the market. In  this daily was privatised into an inde-
pendent, private, limited liability company, Respublikos leidiniai, which publishes, in ad-
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dition to Respublika (in Lithuanian and Russian), a regional newspaper, Vakarų ekpresas. 
Respublikos leidiniai also has its own printing-house, subscription and delivery service. It 
diﬀ ers from Lietuvos rytas in that it is owned by three members of the editorial board: the 
Editor in Chief V. Tomkus and his two deputies.
Lietuvos rytas and Respublika include daily supplements on diﬀ erent topics: culture, 
life style, etc., all of which are very popular. Th is strategy has enabled daily papers to ﬁ ght 
more eﬀ ectively for audience share and generate more advertising revenue.
Th e Vakaro žinios daily was founded in  by the private limited company Naujasis 
aitvaras. It can be classiﬁ ed as a large circulation newspaper for a mass audience. It is the 
cheapest daily newspaper in Lithuania. Naujasis aitvaras is owned by legal persons ( per-
cent) and natural persons ( percent) who are not obliged to disclose public information 
about investors and shares. 
Th e newspaper Lietuvos žinios, re-established during the nineties (), was among 
the ﬁ rst dailies to be purchased by representatives of the national industrial capital from 
the Achema Group. One could claim that this publication paved the way for a series of in-
vestments through which the major Lithuanian industrial concerns penetrated the mass 
media market. 
All four daily papers are owned by local shareholders, and only the Kauno diena daily 
is owned by foreigners.
City newspapers are published in the largest Lithuanian cities, such as Vilnius, Kaunas, 
and Klaipėda. Th e majority of these newspapers date from Soviet times, with only their 
names having been changed. For example, the Kauno tiesa (Kaunas Truth) was renamed 
Kauno diena (Kaunas Day) and the Tarybinė Klaipėda (Soviet Klaipėda) was changed into 
the Klaipėda. All these city newspapers are published by private limited liability com-
panies, owned by members of their editorial staﬀ s. New publications on the market are 
mainly supplements to the largest dailies. 
Th e case of the city daily newspaper, Kauno diena, published in the second largest city 
in Lithuania, Kaunas, is exceptional. For several years now it has been successfully com-
peting with the national dailies. Foreign capital could help the Kauno diena become one 
of the leading national dailies within a short time. 
Much like the city newspapers, two thirds of the regional newspapers are publications 
founded in the Soviet period and privatised to the people employed by those newspapers. 
In most cases the editor of the newspaper manages the stock portfolio.  regional publi-
cations are published in Lithuania, most of them twice or three times a week. Th e circula-
tion depends on the population of the region and varies between , and , copies. 
Th e situation of the Lithuanian national weeklies is somewhat peculiar. Th e weeklies 
that have survived from the Soviet era or the newly established ones (during the nine-
ties) lost popularity or simply went bankrupt. Among the most popular now is the weekly 
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newspaper Akistata (Identiﬁ cation), covering crime (established in ). At the begin-
ning it came out once a week, but now it is published twice a week by Kriminalistika. 
Th e number of publications in Russian has decreased. Among those remaining, the 
weekly newspaper, Ekspres nedelia (Weekly Express), a publication started in , ranks 
as the most popular. 
3.1.1 PRESS DISTRIBUTION
Th e only press distribution company in Soviet Lithuania was the state-run post oﬃ  ce 
which used to accept subscriptions and deliver products to subscribers and press kiosks. 
In  there were  post oﬃ  ces in Lithuania. Th e post oﬃ  ce was under the author-
ity of the Ministry of Communications and Informatics. After the declaration of inde-
pendence in Lithuania and with the implementation of the laws of market economy, the 
situation changed. Th e post oﬃ  ce split into two state enterprises in : Lietuvos paštas 
(Lithuanian Post) and Lietuvos spauda (Lithuanian Press). Th e latter distributes the press 
only to kiosks. 
Lithuanian Post accepts subscriptions, delivers newspapers to subscribers and, accord-
ing to the orders of the Lithuanian Press, delivers the press to the press outlets in small 
towns and villages. Th e Lithuanian Press was reorganised into a state-owned, public lim-
ited liability company () in .
As already mentioned, since  when independent publications started to appear, the 
distribution terms oﬀ ered by the Lithuanian Press were not satisfactory for publishers, 
who wanted to sell as many of their products as possible while earning the biggest possible 
proﬁ t. Th e ﬁ rst publication to ﬁ nd alternative ways of distribution was the weekly Pirma-
dienis (Monday). In  it published advertisements inviting private persons to sell peri-
odicals in the streets. Th ese ads were mainly targeted at children on vacation. Th e interest 
shown was beyond expectations. Children who were selling newspapers in the streets re-
ceived - percent of each copy sold, and the circulation of Pirmadienis increased. Th e 
editorial staﬀ s of the biggest Lithuanian dailies Lietuvos rytas and Respublika, which soon 
after started their own street sales networks, introduced still another innovation. Owing 
to unfavourable weather conditions, publishers were compelled to seek opportunities to 
sell periodicals in shopping centres. However, shop owners resisted at ﬁ rst, because peri-
odicals used to be sold only in kiosks. Th is new service would have to prove itself useful 
for both sides. Th e argument was that such a practice is normal in Western Europe. So it 
was only in , when the ﬁ rst huge shopping centres were opened and self-service was 
re-introduced, that periodicals found their place in such locations. 
Alternative distribution and subscription services have been appearing as well. Th e 
subscription department of Lietuvos rytas was opened in . Th is was an alternative 
porocilo.indb   9 22.5.2004, 13:46:27
 276 MEDIA OWNERSHIP AND ITS IMPACT ON MEDIA INDEPENDENCE AND PLURALISM
to the state enterprise, Lithuanian Post service, which, being the monopolist in Lithua-
nia, started increasing the delivery price for subscribers. Th e subscription department of 
Lietuvos rytas not only oﬀ ered smaller prices but also enhanced service: they deliver the 
newspaper before  a.m., while the Lithuanian Post managed to deliver the newspaper 
only by  a.m. Subscribers welcomed this improvement, and the majority switched to Li-
etuvos rytas’s subscriber service.
Th e editorial departments of the other biggest dailies – Respublika, Kauno diena, etc.– 
followed this example: they opened their own subscription and delivery services. In some 
of these companies (e.g. Lietuvos rytas, Kauno diena, Respublika) subscriptions are col-
lected by the editorial departments. Th is form of subscription service is the cheapest. 
According to the type of delivery, press distribution companies can be divided into two 
groups. One group comprises enterprises engaged in subscription and delivery of publica-
tions (e.g. Lithuanian Post, the delivery services of editorial departments) in various towns 
of the country. Th e other group is composed of enterprises engaged in press distribution 
only to shops and big supermarkets.
At present there are a few dozen private enterprises - Vaskota –  selling points, 
PenBas –  selling points, Teva –  selling points, Spreka and others, in addition to the 
above mentioned state enterprises, Lithuanian Post and the joint-stock company, Lithua-
nian Press. Th is range provides the subscriber with the possibility of choosing the most 
convenient way of acquiring a publication. 
3.2 BROADCAST MEDIA MARKET
Commercial radio and television stations broadcasting nationwide are privately owned 
and proﬁ t-driven ventures. Th e owners of commercial television and radio stations in 
Lithuania are private persons or private limited liability companies with national and for-
eign capital. Th e Lithuanian Radio and Television Company () is a national broadcast-
er ﬁ nanced from the state budget and from advertising. Th e management of the  is 
accountable to the Parliament via a Board selected by public organisations and state insti-
tutions. Th e LRT runs two television and two radio channels. 
3.2.1 RADIO
Th e Lithuanian radio market is dominated by two owners – Hubertas Grušnys with pri-
vate capital, and the Achema Group concern, whose investment was the ﬁ rst case of local 
industrial capital investing in the media business. 
On  December , the ﬁ rst non-state radio station -, which was broadcast in So-
viet Lithuania, irrevocably destroyed the monopoly of the state owned radio. Th is was 
the beginning of private initiative in the broadcast media. - was founded by a decision 
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of the Central Committee of the Young Communist League of Lithuania () as a sta-
tion for young people. At that time  had its newspaper. During perestroika, when the 
mood of society was clearly changing, in order to maintain contact with young people, 
the Komsomol Committee favourably accepted initiatives from a few people, Hubertas 
Grušnys, and journalists Rimantas Pleikys and Gintautas Babravicius, to launch a radio 
station. Th e launching of the station was enabled by support of few German organisations, 
among them the Suddeutche Rundfunk radio and the chocolate manufacturer Ritter sport 
who provided , German marks. - was neither a state-run nor a commercial radio 
station. Th is means that legally the station belonged to the Young Communist League, but 
according to the Statute of the Radio Station - it was allowed to “acquire income from 
commercials, paid concerts, advertisements, its branches, contracts with foreign compa-
nies, etc.”¹³ Th e musical format and call-in shows were an absolutely new experience. Th e 
abbreviation - meant:  – music,  – the ﬁ rst station of such type. It is important to add 
that -, being a youth station, and its branches, were exempt from income and proﬁ t tax 
on the basis of the Decision of the Council of Ministers of the  (from ), “Concern-
ing development of economic activity of the Young Communist League of Lithuania”.
On  May , after the restoration of independence in Lithuania and changes in the 
legislation, H. Grušnys registered the independent radio station -. Th ere were four share-
holders of the station. Later, having bought all the shares from other partners, H. Grušnys 
became the sole owner of the station. In , he found a new radio station - Plius which 
later became one of the market leaders. - and - Plius signed long term contracts with 
, the Swedish owner of digital broadcast satellites Sirius in . Now H. Grušnys is 
one of the biggest media owners, owning national radio stations -, - Plius, and Lietus, 
and several regional radio stations, including Raduga in Russian language.¹⁴ 
Dramatic events in Lithuania on  January  radically changed the situation of me-
dia companies. Th e Soviet Army occupied the  tower, the Press Palace and the Radio 
and Television Committee’s headquarters. Political tension in the country created a par-
adoxical situation. Th e commercial radio station, Radiocentras, started to broadcast on 
January  using the frequency of the second channel of the state broadcaster National 
Lithuanian Radio. R. Pleikys, the founder of Radiocentras, said that it was “an unusual 
and rare event that a private company could broadcast on the frequency of a state radio 
station”.¹⁵ Now Radiocentras (authorized capital Lt ,, or approx.  ,) is 
owned by the Achema Group concern ( percent).¹⁶ 
Achema Group was established in , and at present it manages more than  enter-
prises that do business in the ﬁ elds of chemistry, pharmaceuticals and mining, food indus-
try, trade, energy, construction and maintenance, logistics, transportation and cargo han-
dling, ﬁ nancial operations, hotel management, health care and entertainment, education 
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and vocational training, mass media (national daily newspaper Lietuvos žinios (authorized 
capital Lt ,, or approx.  ,), regional newspaper Naujienos (authorized 
capital Lt , or approx.  ,), two private limited liability companies dealing 
with the radio business – popular radio stations  (owned by Muzikos Topai) and Russko-
je Radio Baltija ( owned by Rimtas Radijas). Th ese radio stations have over  percent of the 
country’s audience. Achema Group is also involved in publishing (two printing houses in 
Kaunas and Šiauliai) and advertising (the radio advertising company Tango reklama). 
Radiocentras (authorized capital Lt ,, or approx.  ,) was the ﬁ rst to 
start round-the-clock broadcasting and the ﬁ rst radio station that started broadcasting on 
the  broadcast band in May of . Th e music format of the Radiocentras channel is 
based on the most popular European standard –  (European Hit Radio). Th e audience 
for the three radio stations keeps growing; accordingly, the number of advertising orders in-
creases every year, largely thanks to Tango Reklama, another subsidiary company of Radio-
centras, which owns exclusive rights to sell the advertising time of Radiocentras,  and 
Russkoje Radio Baltija. Coordinated activities of Tango Reklama and the popular radio sta-
tions allow the provision of high quality advertising services to clients. At the moment Radi-
ocentras has the largest network of transmitters among private broadcasters in Lithuania.¹⁷
According to the latest research ﬁ ndings by  Gallup, the absolute leader among all 
radio stations in Lithuania is the radio station -. In the ﬁ fteen years of its existence, the 
radio station - has become the top commercial station – not only did its popularity ex-
ceed that of all other commercial stations, but it is also more popular than the national 
Lithuanian radio programme, a long-time leader in the market.¹⁸
Table  RADIO AUDIENCE – DAILY AND WEEKLY REACH (AUTUMN 2003)
TITLE DAILY 
REACH
WEEKLY 
REACH
OWNER
M1 14.8% 30.5% HUBERTAS GRUŠNYS
RADIOCENTRAS 12.7% 25.9% ACHEMA GROUP
PÜKAS 11.3% 20.7% -
RUSSKOJE RADIO 
BALTIJA
11.2% 19.2% ACHEMA GROUP
LIETUS 10.1% 19.8% HUBERTAS GRUŠNYS
Source:  Gallup, December .
3.2.2 TELEVISION
Unlike the press, the Lithuanian audiovisual media market is dominated by foreign cap-
ital, mostly from the Nordic countries (Norway and Sweden). 
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Th e year  was very important in the history of Lithuanian commercial television, 
since it marks the beginning of the privatisation of television stations. Th e ﬁ rst Lithua-
nian commercial channel, Tele-, launched its pilot programs in May . It re-broadcast 
popular Russian  programs. In the same year regional Eastern Lithuania television was 
privatised, and in June it became Baltijos . On  January , the new television chan-
nel Litpoliinter was launched, based in the second biggest Lithuanian town, and occupy-
ing the premises of the former palace of Soviet culture. It broadcast from . to .. 
Later, it won the license for the frequency previously used by the Russian channel Ostanki-
no. Owing to bad marketing and management, the monthly expenditures of the channel 
exceeded its revenue. Advertising was not enough to keep up the channel. Accordingly, 
in December  its property was conﬁ scated (because of its debts, the television build-
ing and the equipment were mortgaged to the then Lithuanian Agricultural Bank,¹⁹ and in 
February  the Radio and Television Centre closed down the Litpoliinter television be-
cause of its debts. In March , the Lithuanian Agricultural Bank, which was in posses-
sion of the mortgaged property of the Litpoliinter television station, opened a new, private 
limited liability company, Free and Independent Channel ( ).
Th e shares were distributed among Lithuanian Agricultural Bank ( percent), joint 
stock company Vilniaus vingis ( percent), Litpoliinter depositors’ association ( per-
cent), Lithuanian workers’ union ( percent) and Griaustinių aidas ( percent).²⁰
Th e  started to broadcast in spring . At that time  journalists of the former 
television station Litpoliinter worked there. A loan of  . million was taken for the 
acquisition of equipment and programs. Th e rent for the transmitters was  . million 
per year. In the beginning  broadcasted  hours per week, later increasing its air time 
to  hours per week. In , the  already had  percent of the Lithuanian television 
market, and for the ﬁ rst time it outran the state television, which until then had been the 
absolute leader among television channels. In March , the  stopped broadcast-
ing Russian television’s news programme Vremia, and launched its own news programme 
Vakaro žinios (Evening News). In , the main owners of the portfolio started looking 
for a strategic investor because, according to the Law on the Provision of Information to 
the Public, banks may not own television shares. In October , British Paciﬁ c Media 
Management () bought  pecent of  shares. However, it did not buy this stake 
from the Lithuanian Agricultural Bank, but from other owners.²¹ In January , it was 
announced that H. Grušnys had acquired a controlling block ( percent) of  shares 
from  and other smaller shareholders.²² 
In September ,  percent of  shares were acquired by Marieberg Media, a 
subdivision of the Swedish company, Bonnier Media Group.²³ Th e Swedish company had 
long expressed a wish to buy the  channel. It acquired  percent of the shares from 
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the Lithuanian Agricultural Bank and  percent from H. Grušnys. Having acquired the 
controlling interest, the Swedish company secured for itself the management and control. 
Th e Lithuanian Agricultural Bank did not disclose the price of the shares, but, according 
to earlier reports, it expected  . million.²⁴ 
In February  H. Grušnys sold the remaining shares in . Th e Swedish company 
became a  percent owner of the portfolio. In addition, the  company is the owner 
of several other media outlets in Latvia and Estonia.
At the end of  Bonnier sold its shares in  television ( percent) to the MG 
Baltic concern. Th e purchase contract was signed between  Baltic’s daughter compa-
ny  Baltic Investment and Bonnier. In January ,  Baltic Investment was given 
permission to take over and operate the . Th e main reason that led Bonnier to sell its 
shares was the changed strategy of the company: “We decided to allot all investment to 
Nordic countries.  was the only company belonging to and acting beyond the bound-
ary of Nordic countries.”²⁵
 is the second investment in the media by the industrial concern,  Baltic Invest-
ment. In April  it already possessed . percent of  (Lithuanian news agency, 
previously state-owned) shares. Th e parent company,  Baltic concern, owns  enter-
prises in the Baltic countries, including such companies as Stumbras, Mineraliniai vande-
nys, Apranga, Birštono mineraliniai vandenys and others, which employed . thousand 
people as of  December . 
According to non-oﬃ  cial sources,  Baltic paid   million for the shares in the 
commercial Lithuanian  station .²⁶
At the end of  legal bankruptcy proceedings were started against Tele-. Tele- 
channel was bought by Swedish Modern Time Group () and renamed .  In-
ternational is a media subdivision of the Swedish concern Kinnevik. It is the owner of ten 
television and radio stations, advertising agencies, manufacturing and other companies in 
Scandinavia and the Baltic countries.  reorganised a couple of channels - Free  and 
Pay  - into the international satellite network for Scandinavian countries, Viasat Broad-
casting Group. , having successfully joined Viasat Broadcasting Group more than two 
years ago, became part of a huge international television network in Scandinavian and 
Baltic countries.  is expanding its activity in the Baltic region. It has acquired televi-
sion stations in both Latvia and Estonia. Viewers of  have already noticed changes in 
the channel, since  has quite a range of possibilities for acquiring quality ﬁ lms and im-
proving its programme in other ways. But the company treats the television business as 
local business, and  is remaining a Lithuanian channel.
According to ﬁ gures from  Gallup for February ,  is the most popular chan-
nel, with an audience share of . percent.  follows close behind with . percent, 
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while the third spot is occupied by the state-owned , with a . percent share, and sev-
eral other channels following with lower ratings. 
3.3 MEDIA OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION
Th ere is a growing tendency towards concentration of ownership. Publishing compa-
nies owning just one newspaper or magazine are being forced to sell out to bigger publish-
ing concerns or go out of business. Local media concerns have began to emerge, and for-
eign capital owners express interest in the media business in Lithuania.
When considering city and town newspapers, it is necessary to mention foreign invest-
ment in these publications. Th e ﬁ rst case is Kauno diena, fully owned by the Norwegian 
Industrial Financial Group Orkla since . Th e foreign owner is likely to turn Kauno di-
ena into one of the widely acclaimed national dailies.
Th e expanding national and local media market has become the “promised land” for the 
big industrial and media companies, such as Alga group, - and others, who began to in-
vest in local and regional media businesses in order to build their own chains. 
Meanwhile, the regional press market leaders have started buying smaller regional and 
local newspapers, securing future proﬁ ts from the growth of this sector. However, small 
local publishers are making joint eﬀ orts to defend their position, which may result in a 
structured partition of the regional and local market.
Th e degree of concentration of various kinds of media is diﬀ erent. Much depends on the 
number of competitors participating in a speciﬁ c market: television, radio and dailies.
Th e analysis of the available data allows us to state that there is no monopoly over one 
speciﬁ c kind of media, but the clear predominance of a certain type of media is noticeable. 
It is also possible to speak about local media concerns and the inﬂ uence of foreign capital 
on the Lithuanian media market. 
All these processes are extremely obvious in audiovisual media. Lithuania is one among 
few European countries where a public channel competes with three commercial chan-
nels with national coverage. For nearly  years, only the national public broadcaster was 
regulated, while commercial channels were vaguely regulated and controlled, which is the 
reason why the commercial sector in Lithuania is very strong. 
Commercial income of broadcasting companies more than twice doubled during the 
period  –.²⁷ Having this in mind, it is possible to predict that the Lithuanian ad-
vertising market will grow even more in future. Th is expansion will be related to compe-
tition and concentration. How many television channels, radio networks or both types of 
media is it necessary to have in order to avoid the danger that one owner will start to shape 
the ideas of our society? What is the maximum market share of a single owner that is still 
acceptable as not posing a threat to the pluralism of ideas? At present, discussion about 
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amendments to the Law on the Provision of Information to the Public related to mass me-
dia concentration is underway in the Seimas. 
In , annual ﬁ nancial reports of registered enterprises in Lithuania will be public 
– this possibility will be available when the register of legal persons comes into force. Fi-
nancial reports must be submitted to it within a month of their conﬁ rmation. Th e new 
provisions in compliance with  legislation have met with mixed reactions on the part of 
businessmen: some appreciate a more transparent business practice that will make deci-
sions easier, while others are afraid of the more attentive scrutiny from competitors and 
still tend to see ﬁ nancial accountability as a “business secret”. However, according to the 
 Directive, it is not a business secret. In , when the Register of Legal Persons will 
be introduced, the Register of Enterprises and separate registration systems, such as reg-
istration of public organizations, associations, budget institutions, trade unions and their 
alliances, credit unions and their associations, etc., will be abolished.
4 MEDIA INDEPENDENCE 
Th e legal status of journalists in Lithuania is an acute problem. Employees of only a few 
editorial departments have signed collective agreements. Th e ﬁ rst to do this was the Kau-
no diena daily where the employees signed a collective agreement with their employer, the 
Norwegian Orkla concern. Nevertheless, it often happens that before the termination of 
the agreement employees experience great pressure exerted by the owners of the publi-
cation to change the conditions provided in the collective agreement in a way prejudicial 
for the employees. 
Th e Lithuanian Union of Journalists provides a constant reminder of the importance of 
a collective agreement in guaranteeing journalists’ rights. Th e media business is consid-
ered a business like any other. Th at is why the wish of an owner of a newspaper or radio or 
television station to earn as much as possible is only natural. It is true that in such a case 
it is increasingly diﬃ  cult to speak about the special mission of the press and journalists - 
i.e. to inform society about the important issues of life. Th e employers do not want to in-
cur additional expenses because of journalists, so it seems that it is the task of journalists 
themselves to take care of their social rights and status through actively participating in 
trade union activities. One of the most important elements guaranteeing the independ-
ence of journalists, as well as other professionals, is social and economic security. After 
the liberalisation of work relations in Lithuania, it provided an instrument to the media 
owners for inﬂ uence on journalists. As a result, at the moment most media employees re-
ceive fees rather than salaries, with these fees being subject to frequent changes. Absolute 
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ﬁ nancial dependence is one of the biggest problems in establishing the status of an inde-
pendent journalist in Lithuania today. 
5 CONCLUSIONS
Th e Lithuanian media market is facing rapid change. Since the end of  the nation-
al publishing and industrial groups have become important owners and players on the 
Lithuanian mass media market. Up to the mid nineties (), the press saw a prevalence 
of small shareholders. However, during recent years, Lithuanian legal persons have start-
ed to acquire a portfolio of shares. Ownership concentration has taken place in the press 
sector and played an increasing role in the privatisation of radio,  and telecommunica-
tions at the end of the nineties. 
Existing media companies in Lithuania are currently focusing on securing their place 
on the market and developing strategies for the future. But this process leads to the con-
centration of media ownership – the big media companies buying the weaker titles or sta-
tions, thereby strengthening their own position.
Th e repurchasing of the media during recent years shows an increasing tendency of in-
dustrial capital to enter the media business. Th is trend is most obvious in the television 
business.
Th e Lithuanian media market has seen more investment from local capital than from 
foreign investors.
International companies from Norway and Sweden target the Lithuanian media land-
scape. Foreign companies are supporting a policy of investment in television rather than in 
the daily press or magazines. Even though the relevant legislation is in place, media do not 
comply with the provisions of the legislation. However, no sanctions have been imposed 
on them for these infringements. It is the independence of journalists and editorial oﬃ  ces 
that can provide guarantee that a society will have both a free press and media deserving 
the status of fourth estate. In order to create the chance for the media to fulﬁ l their mission 
and avoid potential inﬂ uence, it would be absolutely necessary to separate the position of 
the media owner from the position of an editor in chief. And, in order to avoid media mo-
nopolies in Lithuania it would be necessary to revise legislative framework and implemen-
tation mechanisms, and to establish institution to monitor media concentration.
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1 INTRODUCTION
 This endeavour to map the patterns of media ownership is the first of its kind in Mac-
edonia. We can safely assert that media concentration and its influence on the content and 
pluralism of the media were of secondary importance during the first formative years of 
the new media system. The main emphasis in the course of this period was on the creation 
and consolidation of the pluralistic media space seen as an antipode to the previous me-
dia system, which was dominated by the Makedonska Radiotelevizija (state broadcaster) 
and the state-run newspaper publishing company Nova Makedonija. In addition, the new, 
democratic political environment established by the new Constitution in 1991 was not 
supplemented with new legislation, so the creation of media pluralism took place in the 
absence of a legislative framework.
Broadcast media, particularly radio stations, sprouted on every corner, so by 1997, 
when the Law on Broadcasting Activity was adopted, there were more than 250 radio and 
TV stations. Introduced after almost seven years of “spontaneous,” or to be more precise, 
chaotic development of the broadcasting field (Kolar-Panov, 1997:76), this law formally le-
galised the already existing pluralism by constituting a dual broadcasting model; i.e. along-
side the public, it standardised the existence of the private sector, through a system of con-
cessions1 allocated by an independent regulatory authority.
Legally, the founding of the privately-owned print media was enabled in December 
1990, in the former SFR Yugoslavia, by the Law on the Basis of the Public Information Sys-
tem, according to which all natural and legal persons gained a right to found and publish 
mass media under equal terms. At the beginning of 1991 the first privately-owned print 
media2 appeared. During this early stage, new daily newspapers were appearing at a some-
what slow pace, primarily owing to problems with printing and distribution (the state mo-
nopoly over the only major printing house and over distribution). Even today, there is still 
no law on mass media, although the Government has made several attempts to draft an 
act that would primarily regulate the field of the print media. 
Given these facts, anyone charting the forms of media ownership in Macedonia neces-
sarily has to take into account the specific social-historical circumstances and norms that 
formed the framework within which the process of media democratisation and liberalisa-
tion has been taking place during the past 13 years. This process has resulted in a situation 
that is marked by several distinctive characteristics: the fragmentation of the media mar-
ket (the great number of media), the existence of parallel markets due to linguistic diver-
sity, affiliation of the biggest and the most influential media with powerful local businesses 
and with political parties, and a very weak development of any form of concentration (pri-
marily owing to the legal limitations). 
MACEDONIA 287
2 MEDIA AND COMPETITION LEGISLATION  
AND ITS IMPACT ON MEDIA CONCENTRATION 
2.1 OWNERSHIP RESTRICTIONS IN MEDIA LEGISLATION 
The purpose of introducing the Law on Broadcasting Activity was to standardise and 
legally regulate media pluralism that, by the time this law was adopted in 1997, had already 
been established in practice. Therefore, its content, primarily the part prescribing limita-
tions on ownership, was mostly oriented towards the guaranteeing and protection of plu-
ralism and prevention of all forms of concentration that could endanger it. 
For example, cross ownership within one sector is very narrowly restricted – the law 
stipulates that a legal or natural person may be the founder of only one broadcasting com-
pany, and the co-founder of just one more broadcasting company, in which it may have a 
maximum of 25 percent of the founding capital (Article 10). In addition, a broadcasting 
company may be allotted only one radio or television station concession for a national serv-
ice, while for a local service, at most two concessions may be allotted for non-neighbouring 
areas, one for a radio and one for a television station. (Article 17). Cross ownership between 
broadcasting and print media fields is completely restricted – a legal or a natural person 
who performs activity in the field of the press may not found a broadcasting organisation 
and perform a broadcasting activity, and vice versa, a broadcasting organisation may not 
found an organisation and perform an activity in the field of the press (Article 11). Cross-
ownership among broadcasters and Internet service providers is not regulated at all.
In addition, a broadcasting concession may not be transferred to a third person (Arti-
cle 21). In practice, this has proved to be a very restrictive provision, actually presenting an 
obstacle not only for all types of media concentration, but for the free circulation of capital 
in the field of broadcasting media as well. There are also limits on the entry of foreign capi-
tal into Macedonian broadcasting companies. A foreign legal or natural person may be a 
cofounder of a broadcasting company, with a maximum of 25 percent stake in the share 
capital of the company, while the assets of several foreign legal and natural persons who 
are co-founders of a single broadcasting company may not exceed 49 percent of the share 
capital of the company. This has also presented an obstacle to the entry of foreign capital 
into the media sphere; thus, during the seven years of the implementation of this law, not 
a single foreign investment in the broadcasting field has been realized.3
Article 35 of the Broadcasting Concession Agreement prohibits any changes in the 
ownership structure, founding shares and managerial rights, or change of founders and 
cofounders, without the Government’s consent. The Law on Broadcasting Activity, Ar-
ticle 19, determines that the Government, on the proposal of the Broadcasting Council, 
can revoke the concession if the broadcaster does not respect the provisions regarding the 
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changes in ownership structure. Furthermore, under Article 85(1)(4) of this Act, a transfer 
of concession to a third party is an offense subject to a penalty of 100,000 to 300,000 de-
nars (EUR 1,630 to 4,900).
The Law on Broadcasting Activity does not contain provisions establishing an obligation 
of the media to publish either data on the ownership structure or other information relat-
ed to their work. According to the Broadcasting Concession Agreement (Article 33), the 
concessionaire is obliged to submit to the Broadcasting Council, upon its request, all data 
related to its work, including those concerning the ownership structure. This information 
is available to the Broadcasting Council for all commercial broadcasters, because they are 
obliged to submit the ownership data as part of the application procedure for the broadcast 
concession. The Council is also allowed to inspect the Court Register to check the data. 
In December 2002, activities began for drafting a new law on broadcasting activity,4 
on the initiative and under coordination of the National Media Task Force of the Stabil-
ity Pact for SEE. It is expected that the bill will enter the parliamentary process during the 
first quarter of 2004. The working text incorporates several provisions that, if adopted, 
would mean a far more liberal regime for cross-ownership and for the circulation of capi-
tal in the field. However, cross-ownership in the broadcasting and other sectors would re-
main strictly limited, and would even extend to several additional fields. Cross-ownership 
of television and radio would be allowed (Working Text of the New Law on Broadcasting 
Activity, 2003).
The instances of unlawful media concentration would be established by the Broadcast-
ing Council, which would have the authority to impose on the broadcasting company an 
obligation to bring its ownership structure into line with the Council’s decision within a 
period of three months. If not, the Council could initiate a license revocation procedure. 
For each increase in ownership stake exceeding five percent, the broadcasting company 
would be obliged to ask for approval from the Broadcasting Council, which would be is-
sued upon a prior opinion from the Monopoly Authority. However, experts in the field are 
of the opinion that this part of the law is not based on a well-grounded analysis of the legal 
and economic circumstances and that the provisions are still not fully elaborated, particu-
larly as regards the thresholds to which the influence of one commercial company in the 
media market could be limited. These thresholds would serve as the basis upon which the 
Broadcasting Council would make decisions about specific instances of merger requests.
As far as the print media are concerned, they are not regulated by any media law. The 
only provisions related to the limitations of media ownership that apply to the print me-
dia, although only indirectly, are those in the Law on Broadcasting Activity regulating the 
prevention of the ownership and capital integration of the broadcast and print media and 
the provisions in the competition legislation. 
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2.2 ANTI-CONCENTRATION RESTRICTIONS  
AND OWNERSHIP TRANSPARENCY PROVISIONS IN COMPETITION LEGISLATION 
In the Law Against Limitation of Competition, adopted on 14 December 1999, there are 
several provisions pertaining to the measures aimed at preventing the limitation of com-
petition among all legal entities, print and broadcast media included. Chapter III of this 
law refers to enterprises having a dominant position on the market, to their obligation to 
report on mergers as well as to control over mergers performed by the Monopoly Author-
ity. According to Article 25(4), it is considered that an enterprise has a dominant position 
if it has a one-third share of the market for a certain type of products or services. Two or 
three enterprises have a dominant position if their joint share of the market amounts to 50 
percent or more, while four or five enterprises have dominant a position when their share 
of the market is two thirds or more. 
The Monopoly Authority has to be notified about every merger between enterprises 
that may lead to their gaining a dominant position on the market (Article 26). The Monop-
oly Authority, on the basis of the legal provisions, determines whether the merger would 
lead to the creation of a dominant position or would result in reinforcing the already ex-
isting dominant position of the merging enterprises (Article 27). In cases where it is de-
termined that a dominant position on the market, or abuse of that position by a certain 
enterprise, exists, the Monopoly Authority can ban the merger, immediately after it learns 
about the proposed merger or after the merger has been carried out. Any merger that has 
been effectuated in spite of the Monopoly Authority’s ban, is annulled, except in cases 
when it has been authorised by the Trade Minister. The Trade Minister can issue a merger 
permit only if the effects of the resulting limitation of competition do not endanger the 
market economy system, in cases when the competition limitation is balanced by the ad-
vantages which that particular merger produces for the overall economy of the country, as 
well as in those cases when the merger is justified by a prevailing public interest, upon a 
prior opinion of the Commission for Monopolies.
Under Article 47(2) of the Infringements and Penalty Provisions section, any person 
that implements contracts or decisions that were nullified by the Monopoly Authority 
will be held responsible. For committing this offence, a legal person is liable to a fine of 
100,000 to 600,000 denars (EUR 1,630 to 9,800), and the responsible person within the 
company to a fine of 30,000 to 100,000 denars (EUR 500 to 1,630). The infringement law-
suit is filed by the Monopoly Authority. 
2.3 REGULATORY PROVISIONS ON STATE SUBSIDIES  
AND MEDIA PLURALISM STIMULATION 
According to the existing Law on Broadcasting Activity (Article 77), 10 percent of the 
funds gathered from the license fee5 are to be allocated for radio and television programs 
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of public interest produced by independent producers and broadcasting companies. The 
intention of this provision is to stimulate the production of new and original programs, 
which would not be under editorial control of the public broadcasting service, and to de-
velop and strengthen the program output of domestic independent producers. The alloca-
tion of these funds, following a proposal by the Broadcasting Council (based on a previous 
public announcement), is effected by the Government of the Republic of Macedonia.
Practice has proved this solution to be an efficient mechanism for the preservation and 
promotion of pluralism in the broadcasting sphere, because these funds were an impor-
tant source of support for programs produced by a large number of local broadcasters and 
helped their survival amidst the strong competition on the broadcast market. This is par-
ticularly true of commercial broadcasters that air programs in the languages of various 
ethnic communities in the Republic of Macedonia, since their programs cannot attract 
enough advertising revenue.
As far as the print media are concerned, although there is no special legal act that pre-
cisely regulates this field, the state, in past years, showed a certain care for the protection 
and stimulation of pluralism in the print media field.6 Until 1992, the Government allo-
cated financial aid only to the state-owned print media. Afterwards, as a result of many 
reactions from the newly launched private media, the Government began to grant subsi-
dies to a certain number of independent print media as well. The main objection from the 
media was that throughout this period the biggest portion of the means was distributed to 
the state-owned print media (publishing company Nova Makedonija) and to the pro-gov-
ernmental private media, while the independent and the opposition media were granted 
only minimal amounts. It was in 1999 when, for the first time, the publications of Nova 
Makedonija received only half of the cake, while the other half was divided between sev-
eral other print media, among which were the independent dailies Dnevnik, Makedonija 
Denes and Fakti.
The funds are allocated by the Government at the end of the year, following a proposal 
by the Agency for Information and without a public competition. In general, this measure 
was considered as “outdated” by the Association of Print Media (APM), which suggested 
that subventions should be abolished and instead, the media should be exempt from the 
five percent tax. If the Government continue to grant subsidies, APM suggested that the 
granting process should be made transparent and based on unified and relevant crite-
ria. The latter option was implemented in the 2003 budget, where the criteria serving as 
grounds for allocating the funds were defined. These include the character and the basic 
concept of the newspaper/magazine, the employee structure, the circulation, the organi-
sation of distribution and other elements. During 2003, the Government did not reply to 
APM’s demand to introduce general tax alleviations for all media. On the contrary, a deci-
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sion was brought to abolish the budget subsidies for the media in 2004. This spurred pub-
lic reaction on the part of the APM, which, in an open letter to the Government, warned 
that abolishing subsidies while not introducing any other economic incentives for the me-
dia would further aggravate their economic situation.
3 MEDIA PLURALISM AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE MEDIA MARKET
3.1 BROADCAST MEDIA 
The first private broadcast media appeared in 1991, soon after the new Constitution 
was adopted.7 In the beginning, the appearance of private media proceeded at a slow pace, 
because the general conditions for the development of the media business were still dis-
advantageous (no possibility of importing equipment, the high cost of equipment, insuf-
ficient knowledge about the specifics of the business or opportunities to make a profit). 
In 1995, a real boom in the development of private broadcast media occurred, described 
by theoreticians as a kind of “media and sociological phenomenon,” particularly if one has 
in mind the size of Macedonia’s territory (25,713 km2) and its population (1,945,932, ac-
cording to the 1994 Census) (Šopar, 2001: 4). Thus, by 1997, when the Law on Broadcast-
ing Activity was adopted, there were 250 private broadcast media on the market. Most 
of these submitted applications on the first invitation by the Broadcasting Council to ap-
ply for broadcast concessions, in 1998. A total of 140 concessions were allocated, three of 
them for national services, of these two for television and one for radio, and 137 for local 
services, 57 for television and 80 for radio (Broadcasting Council Bulletin Vol. 1, 1998: 14). 
Although it was clear that this number was too large for the economic potential of the 
market, the notion prevailed that most of the already operating media should be given 
equal opportunity. The following five years were exceptionally unfavourable for the devel-
opment of Macedonia’s economy (especially during the periods of war crisis in 2000 and 
2001), and this situation affected the functioning of the private media. Nevertheless, their 
number had not substantially decreased by 2003, and expectations that the market would 
be the main corrective of this non-realistically created pluralism were not fulfilled. Thus, 
in December 2003, there were 126 commercial broadcast media operating on the mar-
ket, five of them providing national services (two television and three radio stations) and 
121 local services (67 radio and 54 TV stations). Besides the commercial media, the public 
broadcasting service - Makedonska Radiotelevizija (with three television and three radio 
channels) and 29 local public radio stations (12 of which also have TV studios and broad-
cast TV programming) operate on the market too. 
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Table 1 TV MARKET IN 1991
MTV 1 50%
MTV 2 27%
MTV 3 18%
OTHER 5%
Table 2 TV MARKET IN 2003
A1 33.93%
MTV 1 15.07%
SITEL 12.08%
MTV 3 3.99%
MTV 2 3.59%
MREZˇA + 3.09%
54 LOCAL  
TV CHANNELS
13.07%
INTERNATIONAL  
TV CHANNELS
15.17%
Media professionals8 locate the reasons for continuing market fragmentation in several 
factors. The main problem, from the outset, has been that the commercial media were not 
treated as businesses but rather as a means of achieving political, economic or other in-
fluence. Real market relations in this sphere were not established in the initial period, nor 
do they exist today, and the reason is that the media cannot carry out their market opera-
tions on the basis of an objective and valid media currency – data about the audience they 
reach. Only in the last few years, following the entry of several larger foreign companies 
and the introduction of regular audience research, has market logic in the selling of adver-
tising time in broadcast media started to function. Today, about 80 percent of the money 
from the advertising cake is controlled by the advertising agencies. The broadcast media, 
with rare exceptions, are inferior when selling their advertising time, because they are still 
not well acquainted with marketing principles of operation. The second reason for the 
fragmented market is that in the past few years there have been many financial interven-
tions by the Government – the media were continually receiving various kinds of subven-
tions and grants. Furthermore, an additional reason was the legal ban on broadcast con-
cession transfer, which resulted in pressure on the Broadcasting Council to allocate new 
frequencies, because whoever wanted to engage in the media business could not realise 
that intention by buying an existing medium, but only by founding a new one.9 
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Table 3 GROSS ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE IN 2002
(total 30 million Euro)
TV 67.6%
RADIO 4.9%
MAGAZINES 5.4%
DAILIES 7.9%
BILBOARDS 14.2%
Source: Analitica/Media&Advertising, 2002.
Table 4 TV ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE IN 2002
(total 20,28 million Euro)
A1 40%
MTV 1 21%
SITEL 16%
TELMA 8%
MTV 2 6%
CANAL 5 3%
OTHER TV 
STATIONS
6%
Source: Analitica/Media&Advertising, 2002.
The situation on the market is further complicated by the fact that the public broad-
casting service also takes a part of the advertising cake, which is already very small for 
the existing number of commercial media. In the past several years, this has been a cause 
of major discontent among and reactions from commercial broadcasters, which accused 
Makedonska Televizija and the local public television stations of monopolising the mar-
ket. The accusation mostly referred to public service broadcasters, and the argument was 
that they were financed by money from the license fee and were selling their advertising 
time at lower prices, thus creating unfair competition. 
The Government’s latest public announcement for granting new concessions opened 
on 9 February 2004 on a proposal by the Broadcasting Council. It will certainly lead to-
wards further fragmentation of the market. There will be announced 4 new concessions 
for television at the national level, 15 concessions for radio at the local level and 8 conces-
sions for television at the local level. The announcement sparked strong reactions, espe-
cially among the existing commercial national TV stations, which argue that the market 
is already too fragmented and cannot sustain an even greater number of broadcasters, i.e. 
that this will certainly have a negative influence on the work of existing broadcasters. The 
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arguments of the Broadcasting Council are that the main intention of the Announcement 
is to enrich pluralism and the program offering, especially at the national level.
Macedonia is distinctive because of its so-called parallel markets that arise from its lin-
guistically and culturally diverse communities. In addition to programs in Macedonian, 
the public broadcasting service airs programs in the languages of the ethnic communities 
living in Macedonia (Albanian, Turkish, Romany, Serbian, Vlach and Bosniak). Along with 
the public service, a certain number of commercial radio and TV stations broadcast pro-
grams in the languages of these ethnic communities. Of the 54 local commercial TV sta-
tions, 13 air programs in Albanian and two in Romany; of the 67 local commercial radio 
stations, ten air programs in Albanian, three in Romany and one in Turkish. One radio sta-
tion in Skopje broadcasts a bilingual program (in Macedonian and Albanian).
The data taken from an audience survey confirm that linguistic preferences, i.e. linguis-
tic barriers, are a factor in the audience segmentation on a linguistic basis. An approximate 
picture of how the parallel markets function can be indirectly derived from these data. 
Table 5 AUDIENCE SHARE OF TV CHANNELS – MACEDONIAN AUDIENCE
A1 37%
MTV 1 18%
SITEL 14%
MTV 2 4%
MTV 3 0%
MREZA + 4%
LOCAL  
TV CHANNELS
8%
INTERNATIONAL  
TV CHANNELS
15%
Source: BrIMA Gallup, Day After Recall, September/October/November 2003.
For example, Macedonians mostly watch TV stations that broadcast Macedonian lan-
guage programs at the national level (A1, MTV1, Sitel and MTV2). Macedonians do not 
watch at all the third channel of the public service (MTV3) that airs programs in the lan-
guages of other ethnic communities. As far as local TV stations are concerned, Macedo-
nians watch only those that broadcast in the Macedonian language (a total of 31 local TV 
stations), and among the foreign channels (these are mainly obtained through cable op-
erators), they watch mostly those that air programs in the Serbian and Croatian languages 
(TV Pink Plus being the one with the highest rating, followed by HRT1, BK TV and RTV Sr-
bija). Among the channels that broadcast in English or other languages, the ones with the 
highest ratings are MTV, Canal+, Hallmark, Eurosport and Discovery Channel.
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Table 6 AUDIENCE SHARE OF TV CHANNELS – ALBANIAN AUDIENCE
MTV 3 25%
A1 19%
MTV 1 2%
MTV 2 2%
SITEL 1%
MREZˇA + 1%
LOCAL  
TV CHANNELS
34%
INTERNATIONAL  
TV CHANNELS
16%
Source: BrIMA Gallup, Day After Recall, September/October/November 2003.
The Albanian ethnic community mostly watches TV stations that broadcast programs 
in Albanian, but they also watch TV stations that air programs in Macedonian and in oth-
er languages that they understand. Among the national television services, they mostly 
watch MTV 3, which airs about ten hours of Albanian language programming. As far as 
other national service networks that broadcast in Macedonian are concerned, they mainly 
watch A1 Televizija, while they watch almost none of MTV1 and Sitel. Among the local TV 
stations, they mostly watch TV stations with Albanian language programs (30 percent au-
dience share), but they also watch TV stations that broadcast in Macedonian (4 percent 
audience share). As for foreign TV channels, received through cable or individual satel-
lite dishes, the most often watched are TV Kosovo, TV Albania, Show (a Turkish entertain-
ment channel), Alsat (an Albanian satellite channel) and ATV (a Turkish channel). Among 
the foreign channels that air programs in other languages, the Albanians from Macedonia 
watch RTL, Premiere, SAT1, MTV, PRO7, Canal+ etc.. 
3.2 PRINT MEDIA MARKET
During the first half of 1991, the only dailies on the market were those published by the 
publishing company NIP Nova Makedonija, i.e. Nova Makedonija and Večer.10 The first 
attempt to found a private daily newspaper was Republika (launched on 2 August 1991), 
which ceased to exist after only a few months owing to lack of finance. Until 1996, or more 
precisely, until Dnevnik appeared, the market conditions for publishing a daily newspaper 
were exceptionally disadvantageous, primarily because of the monopoly that NIP Nova 
Makedonija had over the only major printing house in Macedonia and over distribution. 
The success of Dnevnik, the first daily that had a circulation relatively large for Macedonian 
circumstances (at that time over 30,000 copies), can be attributed to several factors. With 
the help of foreign donations, the first major privately owned printing house in Macedo-
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nia was opened, which had the capacity to meet the needs of printing a daily newspaper. 
On the other hand, Dnevnik made several successful marketing moves: its price was dras-
tically lower than that of the newspapers published by NIP Nova Makedonija; it organised 
its own street sale distribution network, and it made its content more attractive to readers. 
What was particularly important, from the point of view of pluralism, was that the content 
of this newspaper offered a real alternative to the existing publications of the NIP. After 
two years, in 1998, two other privately owned dailies appeared – one in Albanian (Fakti) 
and one in Macedonian (Makedonija Denes), as well as the first sports daily (Makedonski 
Sport). In 1999, the third private newspaper in Macedonian appeared (Utrinski Vesnik), 
different in character from the existing ones in that it adopted an investigative-analytical 
approach to the subject treatment. In 2000, the market was enriched with a fourth daily 
newspaper in Macedonian (Vest), conceptually closest to the political tabloid. 
In 2003, 11 daily newspapers, 21 weeklies, 10 biweeklies and 20 monthlies were pub-
lished in Macedonia. In addition, there were about 21 periodicals and 21 children’s maga-
zines. By languages used, seven of the dailies were in Macedonian, two in Albanian, one in 
Turkish and one in Romany. Of the weeklies, 7 were magazines focused on news and polit-
ical affairs. Six of these are published in Macedonian and one in the Albanian language. 
Table 7 CIRCULATION OF SOME OF THE DAILY NEWSPAPERS
TITLE FIRST HALF  
OF 2002
(TOTAL)
AVERAGE 
DAILY
SECOND HALF  
OF 2002
(TOTAL)
AVERAGE 
DAILY
FIRST HALF  
OF 2003
(TOTAL)
AVERAGE 
DAILY
DNEVNIK 6,757,843 43,044 7,406,878 46,879 8,135,668 52,488
VEST 3,536,500 22,525 3,536,500 22,383 4,297,000 27,723
UTRINSKI VESNIK 2,864,356 18,244 3,172,843 20,081 3,489,664 22,514
VECˇER 2,910,500 18,538 3,231,225 20,451 683,100 4,407
NOVA MAKEDONIJA 725,550 4,009 654,094 3,555 330,183 1,824
FAKTI (ALBANIAN) 801,659 5,106 781,898 4,949 742,479 4,790
FLAKA (ALBANIAN) 116,112 740 185,878 1,176 116,112 749
BIRLIK (TURKISH) 73,110 937 71,874 921 54,179 695
Source: Monopoly Authority.
In contrast to the period before 1996, when only one major printing house and one dis-
tribution company existed on the market, today conditions for the publishing of dailies are 
more favourable. However, the situation in the market is still very discouraging, primari-
ly because of the general crisis affecting the whole Macedonian economy, low advertising 
income, and the monopoly of the three newspapers with the largest circulation that were 
bought by WAZ. It is estimated that, at the end of 2003, these three newspapers account-
MACEDONIA 297
ed for nearly 90 percent of the dailies’ market in Macedonia. Nevertheless, some media 
owners think that the potential success of a new daily on the market primarily depends on 
the editorial inventiveness of the publisher in attracting an audience with new and inter-
estingly specialised content, as well as on its marketing approach.11 Although it is hard to 
make a precise estimate of the financial means necessary to launch a new daily newspaper, 
it might be said that, given the circumstances in Macedonia, the amount would be from 
EUR 200,000 to 400,000. 
On 4 February 2003, a new privately owned daily newspaper, Vreme, appeared on the 
market. Its printing started in the printing house of NIP Nova Makedonija, and it organ-
ised its own street sale distribution. This daily started with a circulation of 40,000 copies, 
which soon rose to between 80,000 and 100,000 copies, and it has a very strong and smart 
marketing campaign. The newspaper’s content is advertised on the national commercial 
TV station, A1 Televizija on a daily basis. In return, Vreme publishes advertisements for 
and short content features on the most popular soap operas aired on A1, as well as posters 
with the “heroes” of these shows. Formally, there are no indications of cross-ownership 
between Vreme and A1 Televizija.
In addition, printing of Nova Makedonija and Večer (publications of NIP Nova Make-
donija) continued in 2004, although in small circulation (between 5,000 and 7,000 cop-
ies). Nova Makedonija has already been redesigned and has a new editorial concept with 
the primary intention of profiling itself as an independent and professional daily news-
paper that will abide by a serious, analytical approach towards the topics.12 On the other 
hand, the Večer management announced that the newspaper will be fully redesigned, that 
a new editorial approach will be implemented and a strong marketing campaign aimed at 
gaining readership and a market share.13 
As far as the parallel markets are concerned, the situation is similar to the one in the 
broadcast media field. It is a fact that, owing to the audience’s linguistic preferences and 
language barriers, the relevant markets of the print media differ. This influences the 
number of advertisements, indeed a relatively small one, that flow into these media. How-
ever, the situation with media published in the languages of ethnic communities is quite 
specific. They receive considerable funds from foreign donors, and the Albanian language 
media are supported by the strong diaspora, so the publishing of these media does not 
present a problem for their publishers. In the market of the Albanian language media, 
there is a monopoly of one daily newspaper (Fakti) and one weekly (Lobi), but this is be-
cause there are no other dailies or weeklies in Albanian.
One specific problem that applies to all print media, irrespective of the linguistic divi-
sion, is that they virtually do not employ market logic. The advertising space in the me-
dia is not priced on the basis of relevant indicators about the public that reads them, but 
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mostly on the basis of a specific medium’s affiliation with one or another political or busi-
ness group. Companies close to the Government or to certain political parties, acting on a 
recommendation, give money to the media close to their orientation in order to keep them 
alive. Consequently, market mechanisms are undermined. What is true for the broadcast-
ing media market, is true for the print media as well. Until several years ago, the adver-
tising money came from about 15 domestic companies, which allocated their advertising 
budgets mainly according to the orientation of the media. However, the recent arrival of 
large foreign companies imposed new market criteria on agencies that sell space in the 
print media. They insist on taking audience survey data as the basis for media planning, 
i.e. for the allocation of advertising money to the media. 
4 MEDIA OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE OF THE MACEDONIAN MEDIA
4.1 OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE OF THE PRINT MEDIA
In this chapter we will describe the ownership structure of the media that are selected 
according to circulation, regularity of appearance and the editorial content.14 These are as 
follows: 
¶ the three largest daily newspapers in Macedonian: Dnevnik, Utrinski Vesnik and Vest; 
¶ the only daily newspaper in Albanian: Fakti;
¶ the two biggest Macedonian language weeklies: Fokus and Kapital;
¶ the only Albanian language weekly: Lobi;
¶ the joint distribution company of Utrinski Vesnik, Dnevnik and Vest; 
¶ one of the biggest private printing houses: Grafički Centar.
The first substantial change in the ownership structure of Izdavaštvo Krug DOO15 from 
Skopje, which is the publisher of the daily newspaper Dnevnik, after 1996 when it was es-
tablished, occurred on 16 June 2003, when OST Holding Vienna (WAZ) became the owner 
of 93.8 percent of its assets. Five other natural persons16 appear as founders of the compa-
ny, with a total share amounting to 6.2 percent. The company has a managing board con-
sisting of three managers, two of them representing OST Holding Vienna (Srđan Kerim 
and Peter Jankovski), and one representing Izdavaštvo Krug (Vladimir Bogoev). 
The publishing company Most from Skopje17 publishes the daily Utrinski Vesnik. The 
ownership structure of this trade company was changed on 24 July 2003, when OST Hold-
ing Vienna entered with a majority stake of 51.16 percent. The second major owner of the 
company, with a 24.33 percent stake, is the Trade and Services Company GOFI DOOEL18 
Skopje, which is known to be owned by the Macedonian businessman Trifun Kostovski.19 
Five more natural persons20 appear as other founders, with a total stake of 24.51 percent. 
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The managing board of the company comprises three managers, two of them representing 
OST Holding Vienna (Srđan Kerim and Peter Jankovski), and the third representing DOO 
Most (Todor Kostadinov).
Table 8 OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE – DAILIES
DAILY PUBLISHING COMPANY MAIN OWNER
(%)
OTHER OWNERS
(%)
DNEVNIK IZDAVAŠTVO KRUG DOO OST HOLDING - 93.8 FIVE INDIVUDUALS - 6.2
(Branislav Geroski, Vladimir Bogoev, Zlate 
Loza nov ski, Bojan Kicurovski and Milorad 
Stojma nov ski)
UTRINSKI VESNIK DID MOST BRANKO  
EROL I DR. DOO 
OST HOLDING - 51.16
GOFI DOOEL - 24.33
FIVE INDIVUDUALS - 24.51
(Mančo Mitevski, Branko Tričkovski, Vasil 
Mickovski, Erol Rizaov and Ljupčo Popovski)
VEST DOO OGLEDALO SKOPJE OST HOLDING - 51.06
GOFI DOOEL - 24.05
JOINT STOCK KOMPANY FERŠPED - 14.83
TWO INDIVIDUALS - 10.06
(Dončo Mirčev and Goran Mihajlovski)
FAKTI
(Albanian)
NIK EREBARA ŠKUP INDIVIDUAL - 100
(Emin Azemi)
The newspaper publishing company Ogledalo DOO Skopje, has published the daily Vest 
since July 2000. On 24 July 2003, this company passed into the ownership of OST Hold-
ing Vienna, which entered with a stake of 51.06 percent. The second major owner of Vest, 
with 24.05 percent of the stocks, is the company GOFI, while the third largest owner (14.83 
percent) is the joint stock company Feršped. The other owners are two natural persons21 
that have a total share of 10.06 percent. The managing board of Vest, just as in the case of 
the other two newspapers, consists of three managers, two representing OST Holding Vi-
enna (Srđan Kerim and Peter Jankovski), and one representing DOO Ogledalo (Todor Ko-
stadinov).22
The only Albanian language daily – Fakti, is published by the trade company NIK ER-
EBARA-Škup. The owner of this company is Emin Azemi, formerly a journalist with Nova 
Makedonija. 
The weekly Fokus is published by the newspaper publishing company Fokus DOO Sko-
pje, owned by two natural persons.23 The weekly Kapital is a publication of the publishing 
company Ekonomist Artun i Ljupčo DOO, owned by two natural persons.24 The Albanian 
language weekly Lobi is a publication of the trade company Lobi DOOEL from Skopje, the 
sole owner of which is Iso Rusi. None of these trade companies appears as a founder, or 
shareholder in other media. The same applies for the natural persons that appear as their 
founders, i.e. owners.
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Table 9 OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE – WEEKLIES
WEEKLY PUBLISHING COMPANY OWNER
(%)
FOKUS FOKUS DOO SKOPJE TWO INDIVUDUALS - 100
(Nikola Mladenov and Biljana Mladenova)
KAPITAL EKONOMIST ARTUN I LJUPCˇO DOO TWO INDIVUDUALS - 100
(Ljupčo Zikov and Artun Usein)
LOBI
(Albanian)
LOBI DOOEL ONE INDIVIDUAL - 100
(Iso Rusi)
The distributions of Utrinski Vesnik, Dnevnik and Vest have, de facto, started function-
ing jointly, although, de jure, their merge has not yet happened. Thus, the existing distri-
bution of the three dailies is the largest at the moment. The other dailies use the distri-
bution networks of other companies or organise their own distribution, which is a rather 
expensive and difficult task. The new daily newspaper Vreme has successfully organised its 
own distribution network, through which Nova Makedonija and Večer are currently dis-
tributed as well. There is no other bigger, independent distribution company. 
The largest printing company in the country is that owned by NIP Nova Makedonia. 
However, owing to the process of liquidation of the whole enterprise, this printing com-
pany is currently for sale i.e. an international tender is to be announced. One of the two 
biggest private printing companies is Grafički Centar from Skopje, where Utrinski Vesnik 
is printed. It is registered as a company for newspaper-publishing activity and graphic pro-
duction Grafički Centar KM Kreativ DOOEL Skopje. The founders of this printing company 
are: GOFI (the same company that owns shares in Utrinski Vesnik and Vest), KM Kreativ 
and four natural persons.25 The manager of the printing company is Todor Kostadinov.
4.2 OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE OF THE BROADCAST MEDIA
The broadcast media included in the description of the ownership structure are select-
ed on the basis of their audience share and signal area:26
¶ the two national TV channels: A1 and Sitel;
¶ the largest national radio network: Kanal 77;
¶ two larger local TV channels that broadcast programming in Macedonian: Telma and 
Kanal 5; 
¶ one larger local TV channels that broadcasts programming in Albanian: TV Era;
¶ two larger Macedonian language local radio channels: Radio Fortuna and Radio Plus 
Forte;
¶ one bigger local radio channel in Albanian: Radio Vati.
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On the basis of the station license issued, A1 Televizija was registered on 29 July 1998. 
The sole founder of A1 Televizija is Velija Ramkovski, with one hundred percent of the own-
ership. The other national television channel, TV Sitel was registered on 11 June 1998. The 
sole founder and owner of Sitel Televizija is the industrial mining company RIK SILEKS.
Table 10 OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE – NATIONAL COMMERCIAL BROADCAST MEDIA
NATIONAL BROADCAST MEDIA OWNER
(%)
A1 TELEVIZIJA ONE INDIVUDUAL - 100
(Velija Ramkovski)
SITEL JOINT STOCK COMPANY 
RIK SILEKS - 100
KANAL 77 DT MAKKOOP DOOEL ŠTIP - 100
(owner: Goran Gavrilov 100%)
The largest national radio network, Kanal 77, was founded as a broadcasting compa-
ny on 17 July 1998. Its sole founder is DT Makkoop DOOEL Štip, the sole owner of which 
is Goran Gavrilov, who is also Manager of Kanal 77. Neither Kanal 77, nor the legal per-
son that is its founder, have shares in other broadcasting companies. Nor does Goran Ga-
vrilov, the sole owner of DT Makkoop, have shares in other broadcasting companies or in 
print media. 
The sole founder and owner of Televizija Telma, the local TV channel covering the Sko-
pje area, is the joint stock company Makpetrol, a trade company whose basic activities are 
the import and sale of oil and its derivatives. AD Makpetrol appears as a founder of six oth-
er trade companies,27 none of which is involved in the broadcast or print media. 
Table 11 OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE – LARGEST LOCAL COMMERCIAL BROADCAST MEDIA
LOCAL BROADCAST MEDIA OWNER
(%)
TELEVIZIJA TELMA JOINT STOCK COMPANY 
MAKPETROL - 100
KANAL 5 PECˇATNICA BS - 100
Printing Company for Professional Rehabilitation and 
Employment of Disabled Persons
TV ERA TWO INDIVIDUALS - 100
Agron Memedi and Abdula Memedi
RADIO FORTUNA ONE INDIVIDUAL - 100
Violeta Božinovska
RADIO PLUS FORTE THREE INDIVIDUALS (EACH 33,3)
Nebojša Karapejovski, Tošo Markoski and Denis Lazoski 
RADIO VATI (ALBANIAN) VAT-INOS DOO EKSPORT-IMPORT SKOPJE - 100
Enterprise for Production and Trade.  
(owner: Ekrem Kadri)
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The sole founder of Kanal 5, a local TV channel based in Skopje, is the Pečatnica BS. This 
legal person was founded by the Holding Company BS. Neither the legal person that is the 
founder of Kanal 5, nor the Holding Company that appears as its founder have shares in 
other broadcasting companies or in print media. TV ERA is the largest local TV channel that 
airs Albanian language programs in the area of Skopje. Its sole founder is the Enterprise for 
Broadcasting, Trade and Services Era DOO from Skopje, whose founders are two natural 
persons.28 One of them is also the manager of the TV channel (Abdula Memedi). Neither 
the enterprise that is the founder of TV Era, nor the natural persons who are the founders 
of the enterprise have shares in another broadcasting company or in print media. 
Radio Fortuna from Skopje is one of the local radio channel with the widest reach. Its 
sole founder is a natural person, Violeta Božinovska, who does not have shares in any oth-
er broadcasting or print media. Radio Plus Forte is a radio station that airs programming 
in the Tetovo area. Its founders are three natural persons,29 each of them having a share 
of 33.3 percent of the company ownership. On 21 October 2003, a request for approval of 
a change in the ownership structure of the local channel, TV Menada from Tetovo, was 
submitted to the Broadcasting Council. The submitters asked permission for two natural 
persons, the founders of Radio Plus Forte, to acquire interests in TV Menada amounting 
to 50 percent.30 The Broadcasting Council rejected the request with an explanation that 
the provisions of the existing Law on Broadcasting Activity do not allow the creation of 
monopolies in one local area. 
Radio Vati is one of the two radio stations that air Albanian language programs in the 
Skopje area. Its founder is the Enterprise for Production, Trade, Mediation and Represen-
tation, Vat-Inos DOO Eksport-Import Skopje. The sole founder of this enterprise is Ekrem 
Kadri. Neither Vat-Inos, nor its owner have shares in other broadcast or print media.
From the data presented, it can be noticed that in the sphere of the broadcast media, 
there has been almost no media concentration so far. The dominant patterns of ownership 
in the broadcast media are: (1) for the most influential media, ownership by individuals, 
with powerful industrial or trade companies behind them, and (2) for smaller local me-
dia, predominantly ownership by individual owners. Although the existing Law on Broad-
casting Activity has until now allowed for a certain level of concentration, this has not oc-
cured in practice. 
4.3 THE BIGGEST MEDIA OWNERS
At the moment, information about the ownership structure, either of the print or of the 
broadcast media, can be obtained only from the Court Register of Broadcasting Compa-
nies. The Register is a public book that can be accessed for free, upon written request. It is 
a problem to obtain data about the ownership structure of the joint stock companies (me-
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dia founders) that issue securities. According to the Securities Law (Article 56), they are 
obliged to publish, among other things, data about the changes in their ownership struc-
ture, in at least one daily newspaper and on the Macedonian Stock Exchange WEB site. 
However, they usually do not comply with this requirement, even though they are liable 
to fines – 100,000 to 300,000 denars (EUR 1,600 to 4,800). The Central Securities Deposi-
tory does store these data, but according to the Securities Law, they can be obtained only 
by institutions authorised by law. 
It is widely known that one of the biggest Macedonian businessmen and owner of a 
large number of companies, Ljubisav Ivanov – Dzingo is behind Sitel Televizija. Officially, 
the founder of Sitel Televizija is the Mining Industrial Company RIK SILEKS from Kratovo 
(see Chart 1), a joint stock company where the dominant share is in the hands of Ljubisav 
Ivanov - Dzingo, who is the Chairman of the Steering Board and the General Manager of 
this company.31 RIK SILEKS itself appears as a founder of 11 companies in different sectors: 
mining, industry, agriculture, trade, banking etc. 
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Chart 1 OWNER OF SITEL TELEVIZIJA
LJUBISAV IVANOV - DZINGO
Chairman of the Steering 
Board and General Manager 
of RIK Sileks
dominant shareholder of:
↓
RIK SILEKS
founder of
↓ ↓
SILMAS ← TV SITEL ← GORAN IVANOV
hydraullic oils and 
lubricates
(Ljubisav Ivanov’s son)
Manager of TV Sitel
founder of
SILMOGRADBA ← → BERGMAN
construction trade and services
FUKS MAK ← → BRAUNBERG
motor oils and lubricants commercial and 
telecommunication services
SILPEN ← → MG TANJA I DRUGI
plastic materials and 
chemicals
trade with textile and shoes
MGS TRADE ← → MATRIKS
trade trade, production and 
services
SILEKS NEMETALI ← → MEKS
mining commercial services
DV DOBRA VODA ←
mineral water and 
beverages
ZEMSIL ←
agriculture and butchery
SIL-SPORT ←
sport services and 
professional sports
SILEKS BANKA ←
bank
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On the other hand, the Manager of Sitel Televizija is Goran Ivanov, Ljubisav Ivanov - 
Dzingo’s son, who is himself the founder of five companies, all in the field of trade. Ljubisav 
Ivanov - Dzingo is the leader of the Socialist Party and its sole representative in Parliament. 
In November 2003, together with the leaders of two other political parties – Democratic 
Alliance (Pavle Trajanov) and Democratic Alternative (Vasil Tupurkovski), Ljubisav Ivanov 
- Dzingo promoted the new political option – The Third Route, which is expected to par-
ticipate as a coalition partner in the local and presidential elections to be held in 2004. 
The owner of the other national TV channel, A1 Televizija, is Velija Ramkovski, a well-
known businessman and owner of a large trading company that deals with a variety of 
products. Besides A1 Televizija, Velija Ramkovski appears as a founder of two more trade 
companies: Company for Film Production, Distribution and Marketing B1 PRODUKCI-
JA DOO Skopje and Company for Production, Trade and Services STRATUS DOO Skopje 
(see Chart 2). The first case is an example of cross ownership of a TV station and a produc-
tion and distribution company, which is not in collision with the provisions of the exist-
ing Law on Broadcasting Activity because this type of cross-ownership is not regulated at 
all. Ramkovski’s spouse appears as a co-founder of B1. She is also the founder of the trade 
company UNIPROKOM VEMAKS Eksport-Import DOO. Stratus’s products are extensively 
advertised on A1 Televizija. 
Chart 2 OWNER OF A1 TELEVIZIJA
VELIJA RAMKOVSKI
founder of
→ A1 TELEVIZIJA MAZES RAMKOVSKA
spouse of Velija Ramkovski
co-founder 
→ B1 PRODUKCIJA ←
film production, 
distribution and marketing
co-founder 
→ STRATUS ←
production, trade and 
services
founder of
→ UNIPROKOM VEMAKS ←
trade
The third characteristic example of a big businessman standing behind an influential 
medium is Boris Stojmenov, the former Minister of Finance in the Government of the now 
oppositional VMRO-DPMNE and the founder and leader of VMRO-VMRO (a political party 
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which evolved from VMRO-DPMNE). Kanal 5 Televizija, one of the largest local TV stations, 
is founded by the printing company Pečatnica BS, the founder of which is the Joint Stock 
Company for Financial Consulting, Media, Trade and Production HOLDING BS. Boris Sto-
jmenov’s son, Emil Stojmenov appears as a founder of Holding BS. Emil Stojmenov also 
appears as founder or co-founder of other trade companies: BS DOO Skopje, a consulting 
company, C DOOEL, a company dealing in trade and providing economic, legal and con-
sulting services, and MDS Predrag i dr. DOO, a company for marketing, trade and services, 
and multimedia distribution systems (see Chart 3). Kanal 5 is an example of cross-own-
ership of a TV station and a printing house, which is also not regulated by law. In January 
2004, Kanal 5 submitted a request to change its ownership structure, i.e. to sell a 50 per-
cent stake to a trade company Metalsivas Export-Import DOO Skopje.32 The Broadcasting 
Council approved the requested change and submitted a proposal to the Government, 
which made the final decision on 19 January 2004. This is one rare example of a change in 
the ownership structure of a major broadcast medium. 
 
Chart 3 OWNER OF KANAL 5 TELEVIZIJA
BORIS STOJMENOV
↓
BS ← EMIL STOJMENOV → HOLDING BS
consulting Boris Stojmenov’s son financial consulting, 
media, trade and 
production
founder of
C ← → MDS PREDRAG I DRUGI
trade, economic, legal 
and consulting service
marketing, trade and 
services, multimedia 
distribution services
PECATNICA BS ← METAL SIVAS
printing company export-import trade 
company
founder of ↓ 50% stake
→ KANAL 5 ←
None of the three biggest media owners possesses shares in other media companies, be 
it broadcast or print media. The reason, as explained by some of the media owners,33 is 
that the 25 percent share, which is the upper limit according to the law, is not enough to 
ensure a dominant business interest for the investor. Macedonia seems rather specific re-
garding co-ownership. Business partnerships are still rare, and it seems difficult to estab-
lish fair business cooperation and necessary business confidence. 
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4.4 WAZ IN MACEDONIA 
The entry of the German media giant WAZ is the first case of a bigger concentration 
of print media in 13 years of the development of media pluralism in Macedonia. Accord-
ing to the ownership structure, the print media in Macedonia were predominantly in the 
hands of individuals, one or two founders who, as journalists, were mainly recruited from 
the state owned newspaper publishing company. Before WAZ came, there was almost no 
attempt at a domestic merger or purchase of a printed medium, which is mostly explained 
as resulting from the fact that the media, with rare exceptions, were not treated as busi-
nesses, but as means to achieve political influence or to “cover” suspicious deals. Thus, 
from the media business point of view, WAZ probably represents a new impulse towards 
development of the market and competition; on the other hand, it also aroused all the 
controversies related to the issue of media concentration and its possible implications for 
competition and pluralism.
WAZ entered Macedonia by buying a controlling interest in the three biggest daily 
newspapers: Dnevnik, Utrinski Vesnik and Vest. According to the ownership structure 
data, WAZ has the biggest share in Dnevnik – 93.8 percent, while in the other two newspa-
pers it has controlling shares – 51.16 percent in Utrinski Vesnik and 51.06 percent in Vest. 
The record of the change in the ownership of Dnevnik was entered into the Court Register 
in June, and for Utrinski Vesnik and Vest in July 2003. The three publishers did not inform 
the Monopoly Authority about the takeover, although that was their responsibility. When 
the Monopoly Authority requested data about the ownership structure, the three news-
papers first responded by publishing reactions and articles that criticised the Authority. 
However, after a warning that an infringement proceeding had been started against the 
three publishers, these data were submitted to the Monopoly Authority. In accordance 
with the legislation, the Monopoly Authority is conducting activities in order to determine 
whether this takeover led to the dominant market position of the companies and whether 
there has been an abuse of that position. In case it establishes such a situation, the Author-
ity could ban the merger. 
According to information from the Monopoly Authority, the decision-making proce-
dure in the case of this takeover was still underway at the end of January 2004. What had 
already been determined is the dominant position of the three newspapers, established on 
the basis of data concerning their sales on the daily newspaper market during the year pre-
ceding the takeover – 2002. These data show that, in determining their market share, the 
Monopoly Authority took into account eight dailies, four of which are the publications of 
NIP Nova Makedonija (in Macedonian, Albanian and Turkish language) and one privately 
owned newspaper in Albanian (Fakti). According to the explanation, it is considered that 
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the notion of the relevant market should also include newspapers in Albanian, because 
readers of newspapers in Albanian are also able to read newspapers in Macedonian. 
Table 12 THE SHARE OF THE THREE NEWSPAPERS  
IN THE DAILY NEWSPAPERS MARKET IN 2002
DNEVNIK 38.46%
VECˇER 16.68%
VEST 19.21%
UTRINSKI VESNIK 16.39%
FAKTI 4.30%
NOVA MAKEDONIJA 3.75%
FLAKA AND BIRLIK 1.21%
Source: Monopoly Authority of rM.
As the data show, in 2002 these three newspapers accounted for 74.06 percent of the 
dailies market. In the first six months of 2003, the market share of the three newspapers 
following the take over was 89.21 percent, which is due to the fact that the Nova Make-
donija publications had low circulation. 
Table 13 THE SHARE OF THE THREE NEWSPAPERS IN THE DAILY NEWSPAPERS MARKET  
IN THE FIRST SIX MONTHS OF 2003
DNEVNIK 45.58%
VEST 24.08%
UTRINSKI VESNIK 19.55%
FAKTI 4.16%
VECˇER 3.83%
NOVA MAKEDONIJA 1.85%
FLAKA AND BIRLIK 0.95%
Source: Monopoly Authority of rM.
Besides the evidently dominant position (monopoly) on the market, there was an ongo-
ing procedure for determining abuse, i.e. conduct that limits the competition of the other 
subjects on the market. The problem was that, in December 2003 and January 2004, there 
were almost no other daily newspapers on the market. The new developments concerning 
Nova Makedonija and Večer were yet to be seen (these brands were sold on 23 December 
2003).34 It was announced that their publication would continue with renewed editorial 
content. On the other hand, in January 2004, a new daily newspaper was expected to ap-
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pear on the market, so the issues referring to the possible hindrance of the competition 
were yet to be determined. In this view, especially indicative could have been the future 
conduct of WAZ, bearing in mind that the marketing of the three dailies has already been 
merged35 and that there was an intention to merge their distribution as well. It was expect-
ed that WAZ would offer bigger benefits to advertisers when creating their media plans 
and the potential to reach a broader readership.36 On the other hand, WAZ negotiated to 
buy the two biggest printing companies in Macedonia (Evropa 92 and Grafički Centar). If 
this had happened, it might have served as a serious indication of possible monopoly con-
duct. However, the final decision of the Authority was that the dominant market position 
achieved through these three newspapers was not abused. The argumentation given by 
the Authority is that the monopoly position of the WAZ publications did not prevent com-
petition in the market, since the new private daily newspaper, Vreme, successfully start-
ed publication, and the other two dailies, Nova Makedonija and Večer, continued regular 
publishing in 2004.37
What makes WAZ’s entry into Macedonia especially controversial is the fact that, for the 
first time in a country in this region, WAZ appointed a former politician as its head man. 
WAZ’S manager in Macedonia, who is the manager of the boards of all three newspapers, is 
Srđan Kerim, a diplomat and former Foreign Affairs Minister in the coalition government 
of the VMRO-DPMNE and the Liberal Party. On the other hand, the second biggest owner in 
Utrinski Vesnik and in Vest, by way of the trade company GOFI, is the businessman Trifun 
Kostovski, a member of Parliament who, in the 2002 parliamentary elections, headed one 
of the lists of candidates of the ruling SDSM. The second problem is that the three news-
papers also received money from the budget allocated for media subsidies in 2003. The 
decisions to grant the means were brought at the end of June and in July, meaning at the 
time of the merger. In the case of Utrinski Vesnik and Vest, the decision was made 20 days 
before the formal acquisition, but in the case of Dnevnik, it happened after the agreement 
with WAZ was signed. The explanation that the Government gave, after a series of public 
reactions relating to the decisions, was that it had not been informed about the merger.
Among the print media, there is a belief that initially WAZ will not undertake steps that 
would lead to a monopoly or limitation of competition. However, they fear that in the long 
run WAZ will attract most of the advertising money, meaning that it will slowly exhaust 
all the other print media, predominantly the dailies, but weeklies and biweeklies as well.38 
The WAZ representatives, however, give completely opposite information and opinions 
about their participation in the Macedonian market. When asked why WAZ bought the 
three main newspapers in Macedonia, Bodo Hombach, in a media statement during his 
last visit to Macedonia in November 2003, stated that “the presence of the media group 
WAZ on the Macedonian market is a result of initiatives by the Macedonian partners, that 
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were expressed on several occasions in the last few years, and that coincided with WAZ 
business interests and strategy/.../ it is true that the investment risk in Macedonia is higher 
than in other European countries,/.../ but WAZ puts itself in a flexible position regarding 
that risk, because it believes in Macedonia’s future, as part of the European Union.”39 In 
the same interview, Bodo Hombach also stated that WAZ has signed the OSCE Charter for 
Media Freedom and that WAZ guarantees independence to the editors in chief and to the 
journalists in the newspapers in Macedonia. “The situation with the media in Southeast 
Europe is rather hard, but wherever we are, the media are stable. We watch journalists’ 
backs, so they can concentrate on their job.”40 He also stated that WAZ has no intention of 
creating new monopolies in any sector, including prices, and, as far as WAZ’s share of the 
newspapers’ market is concerned, it can only be a result of successful business policy and 
good acceptance among the readers, who sovereignly make the decision on which news-
papers will find a place in their homes.
 
5 PRIVATISATION –  
CASE OF NOVA MAKEDONIJA PUBLISHING COMPANY 
The privatisation process of the publishing company NIP Nova Makedonija started in 
1990, in accordance with the legislation adopted by the former SFR Yugoslavia. These regu-
lations continued to be implemented after Macedonia gained independence, during 1990 
and 1991, and the effects of the privatisation, begun on the basis of this regulation, were 
built into the Law on the Privatisation of Enterprises with Social Capital,41 adopted in 
1993. According to this law, enterprises had an opportunity to independently choose their 
privatisation model until the end of 1999. Such a decision was taken for NIP Nova Make-
donija on 3 March 1995, which chose the employee buyout model. The privatisation proc-
ess of the publishing company NIP Nova Makedonija officially started in December 1995. 
According to the first estimates, the value of the NIP was EUR 14 million. The ownership 
structure of the NIP at the time when privatisation started was as follows: 22.45 percent of 
the stock was owned by the employees (which they had obtained on the basis of the pre-
viously valid federal legislation of the SFR Yugoslavia); 32.9 percent of the stock belonged 
to the state; 37.95 percent of the stock was owned by the Privatisation Agency (socially-
owned capital), and 6.7 percent of the stock to the Disablement and Retirement Insurance 
Fund.42 The NIP employees were given a period of three years to buy additional stock in or-
der to reach the controlling interest (51 percent of the share capital), in three installments. 
However, only two installments were paid by the specified deadline, so the privatisation 
model was not realised, which resulted in a situation in which the state acquired a 69.76 
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percent share, i.e. it gained managerial control over the NIP. According to the opinions of 
some of the leading people from the NIP,43 the years from 1995 to 1998 were decisive for 
the company’s transformation and reorganisation to enable it to function in the new mar-
ket economy conditions. The lack of vision and of transformation concept, the lack of in-
ner vitality on the part of the management teams and employees, the wrong moves while 
realising the privatisation, and especially the fact that privatisation was not completed fol-
lowing the chosen model, as well as various external factors, were the reasons for the fail-
ure of this publishing enterprise to adjust to the new conditions. 
The events that followed were the beginning of the end of NIP Nova Makedonija. Since 
it had already accumulated enormous debt, and continued to produce debt, the NIP was 
put on the list of “loss-makers”. The Government had to solve the status of these compa-
nies as a precondition for obtaining the FESAL 2 arrangement, negotiated with the World 
Bank and IMF. The World Bank insisted that the stock of the enterprises with socially-
owned capital should not be sold on the Macedonian Stock Exchange, but through a pub-
lic tender, upon a prior analysis (economic, cost benefit etc.) by an authorized consultant, 
who had the task of evaluating whether the stocks of the enterprise were to be sold or if it 
would be liquidated. Based on such an analysis, the Government made the decision to sell 
the NIP in April/May 2002, i.e. part of the stock that comprised the socially-owned and 
state capital (69.76 percent). A tender was published, and only one company applied - Jug-
storitve from Slovenia. The decision was brought by the Government in August 2002. The 
price was EUR 2.3 million, and Jugstoritve undertook the obligation to pay back the NIP’s 
debts to all trustees (EUR 10.5 milion), to keep the employees and to make investments of 
EUR 6 million, while the overdue salaries of the employees were to be paid by the Privati-
sation Agency. The deadline by which Jugstoritve was to pay the money was 12 Septem-
ber 2002, later extended to 18 September 2002. After the Government’s conclusion, and 
on NIP’s request, it was demanded that the Agency should transfer the funds for overdue 
salaries to the account of NIP Nova Makedonija. However, on 18 September, the Agency, 
acting upon the governmental conclusion, transferred the 134 million denars (EUR 2.3 mil-
lion) to a different account – one belonging to the newly founded company Nova Make-
donija Press DOOEL. The problem with this transfer is that the employees have never re-
ceived their salaries.
There was a change of Government after the elections in autumn 2002. The employees 
of the NIP went on strike in December 2002 because of the illegal execution of NIP’s buy-
out and because their overdue salaries had not been paid. The new government conclud-
ed that the buyout was unlawful, and the Privatisation Agency and the Public Attorney 
started court proceedings for the annulment of the purchase agreement. In June 2003, the 
Government made the decision to start the bankruptcy procedure, and on 22 October, the 
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majority of the trustees, during the Trustees Assembly, held in the First Instance Court 
Skopje 1, decided to liquidate Nova Makedonija. The main reason for this decision were 
the enormous debts of the company. It was decided that the real-estate of Nova Make-
donija and its media brands would be the subjects of separate sale undertakings. More 
than 1,300 employees were left unemployed. Some of these returned to the company, sign-
ing service contracts, because it was decided that the publishing of NIP’s newspapers and 
magazines would continue. On 23 December 2003, the Board of Trustees decided to sell 
part of the NIP’s brands. The Marketing Agency Idea Plus is the new owner of Večer, the 
company Zonik bought Nova Makedonija, Evroazija-tehnika bought Birlik (a Turkish lan-
guage newspaper), and the Publishing House Prosvetno delo bought Detska Radost. The 
representatives of the companies that bought Nova Makedonija and Večer publicly stated 
that they planned to redesign the newspapers and to publish them on a regular basis. On 
26 December, a second tender was announced for the sale of those brands for which there 
had been no offers at the first one (Skok, Osten, Puls, Flaka, Ekran and the archives of the 
publishing company). The two buildings of the publishing company will also be auctioned 
off. The starting price for the smaller building is EUR 3.5 million, and for the bigger one 
EUR 13.5 million. An international tender will be announced for the printing company, and 
there is a plan to auction the 180 kiosks in Skopje. 
The controversial involvement of the Slovenian company Jugstoritve provoked a spe-
cial interest in the domestic as well as in the Slovenian media. According to information 
published in the Slovenian media, Jugstoritve is a consortium founded with the sole pur-
pose of buying Nova Makedonija.44 What still remains unclear are the real reasons that led 
Jugstoritve to decide to make such a big investment in Macedonia, which was, and still is, 
viewed as a risk country. According to the official statements of the Jugstoritve’s represent-
ative, they considered it to be a good business opportunity. However, there was a series 
of articles in the Slovenian and Macedonian print media45 about the possible intention of 
the companies gathered in this consortium of engaging in suspicious businesses in Mac-
edonia, as well as about an alleged connection between Jugstoritve and individuals close 
to the then ruling party VMRO-DPMNE. These claims were reinforced by the information 
about the manner of the buyout, i.e. the transfer of EUR 2.3 million intended for paying off 
the overdue salaries. After the initial transfer to the account of NIP Nova Makedonija Press 
DOOEL, there were several other bank transactions: the money was first moved to an ac-
count at Tutunska Banka, then most of it to another account at Rado Banka and the rest 
to the account of the Zoom Promotion company.46 The representatives of the Nova Make-
donija Trade Union stated that the an audit of the purchase of Nova Makedonija will show 
that the company was bought using this money. 
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6 MEDIA INDEPENDENCE
The review of the legislation shows that in Macedonia only the broadcasting media sec-
tor is subject to regulation, while the print media are only bound by the general provisions 
laid down in Article 16 of the Constitution. Therefore, issues related to editorial independ-
ence of the media i.e. independence from media owners, are, to some extent, treated only 
by the Law on Broadcasting Activity, while as regarded the print media, this issue is gener-
ally covered by self-regulation i.e. in the Code of the Journalists of Macedonia.
The Law on Broadcasting Activity does not contain provisions that directly regulate the 
editorial independence of the broadcaster from the owner. However, in the general pro-
visions (Article 8), it is stipulated that broadcasting activity is based upon the principles 
of independence and autonomy of the broadcasting orga ni sations, prevention of a mo-
nopoly of individuals and groups having influence in the broadcasting organisation, and 
prohibition of censorship. These provisions also incorporate measures that guarantee and 
promote “internal pluralism” within the media, i.e. each medium is committed to keep its 
programming open to different points of view and opinions that circulate in society. Ac-
cordingly, all broadcast media are obliged to present different options and standpoints in a 
“balanced” manner. Thus, Article 8 of the Law stipulates that broadcasting activity should 
be based on the principles of truthful and timely information, open to free competition 
and different political ideas, cultural and other tendencies and opinions, and should pro-
vide appropriate and impartial treatment of political subjects, and programs that would 
not serve one-sidedly any political subject, group or individual (especially during election 
campaigns). Besides, Article 32 stipulates that the entire program output of the broadcast-
er must not one-sidedly serve any particular political party or interest, as well as that (Ar-
ticle 33) the broadcaster’s programming must depict events truthfully, with equal treat-
ment of different approaches and opinions. 
Despite these extensive and detailed mechanisms, the intention of which is to ensure 
the independence of the editorial policy of the broadcast media from the influence of po-
litical parties, business groups and individuals, in past years the broadcast media, televi-
sion in particular, have shown “tacit inclination towards particular political views, rec-
ognisable through the more extensive presentation of their standpoints, activities and 
initiatives” (Šopar, 2002: 52). Numerous media analyses, conducted by scientific-research 
institutions and organisations47 that monitored the election campaigns, confirm the thesis 
that the broadcast media were primarily used as a means for achieving political goals and 
for the articulation of political, economic and other interests (Broadcasting Council Bul-
letin Vol. 3, 6, 8 and 13).48 This was cha rac teristic of the programming of the public broad-
casting service (Makedonska televizija), as well as of the commercial television stations. 
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The fact that the public broadcasting service did not manage to guard its independence 
from the influence of the ruling structures, was probably one of the main reasons for the 
continuous efforts of the opposition parties to establish “political balance” by influencing 
commercial media. In this way, broadcast media (and their owners and journalists work-
ing for them) were continuously at the centre of the political struggle between the Govern-
ment and the opposition, not succeeding in winning autonomy for the media sphere i.e. 
its independence from politics (Andrevski, 2001: 81). If this issue is looked upon from the 
point of view of ownership and its impact on pluralism, then the thesis could be formulat-
ed differently: the political protagonists and large business groups needed media (prima-
rily television) to fulfill their long-term political or commercial goals. This is clearly prov-
en by the cases of the biggest TV stations dealt within the section on ownership structure. 
The trade or industrial companies that own TV stations use them continually as a space for 
advertising products that they sell or produce. On the other hand, the individuals behind 
these media, who belong to various political groups, use them as a space for personal po-
litical promotion, especially at the time of the election campaigns.
As far as the print media and their editorial independence from politics is concerned, 
one must keep in mind that the print media sector, unlike broadcasting, is subject to loos-
er regulation, and that a certain political preference is allowed to the print media even ac-
cording to the European standards.49 However, the issue of guarding the professional and 
editorial independence of journalists from media owners has not been considered or dis-
cussed within the journalists’ associations so far. This, according to the representatives of 
the journalists’ association,50 is a result of the insecure social and economic position of 
the journalists (low and irregular salaries, the owners do not pay for pensions or health 
insurance), so they are objectively not motivated to raise the issues of professional inde-
pendence. To our knowledge there have been several instances of pressure on journalists 
by the media owners. One recent example is a “quarrel” between the owner of a TV station 
and its editor in chief provoked by the owner’s attempt to influence the manner of report-
ing the news, which led to the journalist’s transfer to another TV station.51 However, these 
cases, although well known to journalists, were not discussed either in the public or in the 
journalists’ association. There are no collective agreements between journalists’ associa-
tion and media owners, nor in-house agreements between the journalists employed by a 
medium and its owner. 
On the other hand, what is really not missing in journalistic practice in Macedonia are 
training and seminars related to the rules of performing the journalistic profession, in-
vestigative journalism, professional ethics and the need for editorial independence. These 
kinds of training have been organised in the course of the past ten years, by various for-
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eign and domestic organisations and foundations, which grant scholarships, prizes and 
other types of support.
7 CONCLUSIONS
Media pluralism, as a precondition for the creation of the new democratic society, was 
established, legally and in practice, during the 1991–2003 period. Today, in contrast to 13 
years ago, the public has at its disposal a wide variety of public and private media that mir-
ror the multiplicity of political views and cultural pluralism in the Republic of Macedonia. 
However, the commercial media, predominantly television and the print media, were treat-
ed during this period more as means of achieving political and commercial goals, and less 
as business ventures. Market relations in this sphere were hard to introduce because the 
advertising space in the media was not sold according to market criteria but mainly on the 
basis of a medium’s links with specific political or business groups. It has been only recent-
ly, and thanks to the entry of several larger foreign companies, that market criteria began 
to be imposed. Nevertheless, the situation on the market is still exceptionally unfavourable, 
owing to the general crisis in the Macedonian economy and the small advertising income 
(about EUR 30 million annually), which is mostly controlled by the advertising agencies. 
In the past period, media concentration in the broadcast media sector was virtually 
non-existent. The main reasons were the absence of market logistics in the media business 
and the rigid provisions of the Law on Broadcasting Activity. The transfer of concessions 
was prohibited, and the forms of cross-ownership that were allowed did not offer sufficient 
economic motive to invest in another medium. This resulted in a severe fragmentation of 
the market, the proliferation of small and unprofessional media owned by individuals, and 
the linkage of the biggest and the most influential ones with powerful local businesses and 
political parties. In this sense, it is also hard to talk about monopolies, whether on the na-
tional or on the local level. Commercial television has long been reacting to the monopo-
ly of the public broadcasting service, which, although financed from the license fee, takes 
a part of the advertising cake by selling its advertising time at dumping prices. However, 
the advertising expenditure data for 2002, show that it is actually the commercial TV net-
works A1 and Sitel, as well as few other stations based in the Skopje area, that attract the 
biggest share of the advertising money. Although the Law Against Limitation of Compe-
tition states that one company may have a maximum 30 percent share of the market, it 
seems that the Monopoly Authority is still not prepared to raise the issue of the dominant 
position of some of the broadcast media in the market. On the other hand, the issues of 
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the thresholds, of the market share or of the audience share of a broadcast medium, are 
not treated in the existing Law on Broadcasting Activity.
The future broadcasting regulation envisages a much more liberal media concentra-
tion regime, which primarily has the goal of inciting the development of the media busi-
ness and the creation of economically viable and professional media companies that will 
bring new programming quality. However, at this moment we are dealing with a working 
version of the future law, and the prevailing assessments are that cross-ownership provi-
sions are not grounded in a reliable analysis of the market and of the possible consequenc-
es of concentration for the already established pluralism. Among media professionals in 
the broadcasting field, there is a lack of knowledge about the issues of media concentra-
tion and of economic regulation, so it would be advisable to start expert discussions and 
to make appropriate analyses, before the new law is adopted.
The picture of the ownership structure of the print media is similar to that for the 
broadcast media. The print media were predominantly founded by individuals or by small 
groups of journalists who were mainly recruited from the state-run newspaper publish-
ing company NIP Nova Makedonija. Throughout this period it was facing an exception-
ally difficult financial situation, and after the unsuccessful privatisation that began in 1995, 
and the suspicious sale to the Slovenian phantom company Jugstoritve at the end of 2003, 
it was finally liquidated. The arrival of the media concern WAZ brought the first case of a 
larger concentration in the print media sector in the 13 years of media pluralism develop-
ment in Macedonia. From the media business point of view, WAZ probably represents a 
new impulse in the development of the market and the competition; on the other hand, 
it has aroused controversies related to media concentration and its possible consequenc-
es for competition and pluralism. WAZ has already made several moves that, according to 
media experts, could qualify as competition hindrance and will affect all other print me-
dia in the long run. In fact, by taking over the three biggest daily newspapers, WAZ also 
merged their marketing and their distribution, and there are announcements about the 
purchase of the two largest private printing houses, or probably of the printing house 
owned by Nova Makedonija, which is yet to be sold through a public tender.
The existence of the so-called parallel media is specific to the media space in Macedo-
nia. Their emergence is related to the linguistic and cultural diversity of the ethnic com-
munities living in Macedonia. It is a fact that, owing to linguistic preferences and language 
barriers, the relevant media markets differ. This results in a relatively small amount of ad-
vertising in the ethnic communities’ media. These are the reasons why linguistic pluralism 
in the media in the past period was continuously supported by donations and other forms 
of support. Linguistic pluralism is greater in the broadcast than in the print media sector.
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Despite the fact that the broadcasting regulation includes extensive measures for the 
protection of media and journalists from different types of influence by groups or individu-
als, practice shows that the Government, political parties and the powerful business groups 
manage to impose their control over the broadcast media, particularly television. On the 
one hand, this was particularly evident through the influence of the Government over the 
public broadcasting service and on the other, through the influence of the owners of the 
biggest TV stations, who have continually been using their media either to support their 
businesses or for personal political promotion, especially during election campaigns.
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1 In the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia 
(Article 56), it is determined that the exploitation 
of public goods of general interest (among which is 
the frequency spectrum) could be performed under 
the terms specified in the law. According to the Law 
on Broadcasting Activity, broadcasters perform the 
broadcasting activity based on a concession that is 
issued in conformation with the stipulations of this 
Law, the Concession Law and the Telecommunica-
tions Law. The system of licences is to be introduced 
with the new Law on Broadcasting activity. 
2 In March 1991 the independent magazine Zbor ap-
peared, and in August the independent daily Republi-
ka. Afterwards followed the political weeklies Puls (in 
the framework of the Nova Makedonija system) and 
Epoha, as well as the party biweekly Glas.
3 An attempt at foreign capital entrance is the example 
of the privately-owned Greek station TV Alpha that 
wanted to completely buy the local TV station TV Sko-
pje. Owing to legal limitations, or more precisely, to 
the inability to own more than 25 percent of the lo-
cal TV station’s stock, TV Alpha founded another le-
gal entity, the trade company Alfaskop, which bought 
a majority share of TV Skopje stock.
4 In July 2003, the main oppositional political party 
VMro-DPMNE appeared with another initiative for 
adopting a new Law on Broadcasting Activity. It sub-
mitted the bill to the Parliament of the Republic of 
Macedonia. In the Parliamentary debate, held in Sep-
tember 2003, the bill proposed by the VMro-DPMNE 
was not adopted.
5 Although in this document we use the commonly 
known term “licence fee”, we should point out that 
the expression used in the law is “broadcasting tax”. 
The reason is that the fee that is paid by all house-
holds that own a television set is treated as a “public 
tax” that is collected by the Taxation Office and is not 
exclusively intended for financing the public broad-
casting service, as in other countries (only 51 percent 
of the collected tax is intended for the PBS).
6 In the legal provision which has so far been used as 
a basis for allocation of these means, it is not strictly 
stated what their purpose is. According to the Law on 
the Budget of the Republic of Macedonia (Article 45), 
the Macedonian Government, on a proposal by the 
Agency for Information, allocates a certain amount of 
financial support to the local public media (local pub-
lic radio stations) and to the publishers of newspapers 
and magazines.
7 The first radio and TV stations appeared in 1991 and 
1992 (Radio Kanal 77, Radio Kanal 4, TV Teko, TV 
Tera, A1 Televizija, to name just a few of them).
8 Interview with Goran Gavrilov, owner of Kanal 77 (16 
December 2003) and with Darko Peruševski, Manag-
er of A1 Televizija (17 December 2003).
9 According to the Broadcasting Council, in the past 
period, several broadcast media, mainly local radio 
stations, were sold, but owing to the provision on 
non-transferability of the license, these acts were not 
legalised or entered into the Court Register.
10 The newspapers in Albanian (Flaka) and in Turkish 
(Birlik) were published three times a week.
11 Interview with Aleksandar Damovski, former co-
owner of Dnevnik and founder of a new daily newspa-
per Vreme, 28 October 2003.
12 Interview with Mirče Adamčevski, Editor in Chief of 
Nova Makedonija, 24 February 2004.
13 Interview with Petar Ribarski, Executive Manager of 
Večer Press Doo, 25 February 2004, and Vasko Eftov, 
Editor in Chief of Večer, 2 March 2004.
14 The data on the ownership structure of the print me-
dia were gathered from the Court Register of Trade 
Companies on 16 December 2003 and from the Mo-
nopoly Authority of the Republic of Macedonia.
15 Doo stands for a company with limited responsibility.
16 Branislav Geroski, Vladimir Bogoev, Zlate Loz-
anovski, Bojan Kicurovski and Milorad Stojma nov ski.
17 DID Most Branko Erol idr. Doo Skopje.
18 DooEL stands for a sole owner company with limited 
responsibility.
19 In the Court Register, the foreign company, Group of 
Finance and Investment S.A., appears as a founder of 
GoFI.
20 Mitevski Mančo, Tričkovski Branko, Mickovski Vasil, 
Rizaov Erol and Popovski Ljupčo.
21 Dončo Mirčev and Goran Mihajlovski.
22 Todor Kostadinov, who sits on the Managing Board of 
both Utrinski vesnik and Vest and is also the manager 
of the printing house Utrinski vesnik, is a nephew of 
NOTES
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Trifun Kostovski, the second biggest owner of these 
two dailies. 
23 Nikola Mladenov and Biljana Mladenova.
24 Ljupčo Zikov and Artun Usein.
25 Gjoko Stojanovski, Zoran Spasov, Johan Elzaser and 
Predrag Radonjanin.
26 Data about the ownership structure of the broadcast 
media are provided from the database of the Broad-
casting Council and from the Court Register of Trade 
Companies, realised on 16 December 2003.
27 AD Makpetrol is the founder of the following com-
panies: Trade and Service Company Šampion DooEL 
Import-Export Skopje, uGoTur Joint Stock Compa-
ny for Catering and Tourism, Agency and Trade Sko-
pje, Joint Stock Company for Production, Trade and 
Maintenance of Electronic Appliances and Compo-
nents Makpetrol – TEAS AD Skopje, Mines and Iron-
works Topilnica – AD for Production and Trade in 
Iron and Steel Products and AD for Production and 
Trade Makpetrol TEMA Skopje.
28 Agron Memedi and Abdula Memedi. The enterprise 
that appears as founder is not a broadcasting com-
pany i.e. broadcast medium, although it includes the 
word “broadcasting” in its title and registration.
29 Nebojša Karapejovski, Tošo Markoski and Denis La-
zoski.
30 Nebojša Karapejovski with 25 percent and Tošo 
Markoski with 25 percent.
31 The information originates from the Court Register of 
Trade Companies.
32 Founders of this company are two natural persons: 
Mirsad Jonuz and Erato Paligora-Jonuz.
33 Interview with Goran Gavrilov, owner of Radio Kanal 77.
34 The brand of Nova Makedonija was bought by the 
trade company Zonic, and the brand of Večer by the 
marketing agency Ideja Plus. 
35 The joint marketing company is registered as a sepa-
rate legal entity Media Print Makedonija Doo Skopje. 
Founders of this company are the same entities that 
publish the WAZ’s newspapers: Izdavaštvo Krug, DID 
Most and DNID Ogledalo.
36 The weeklies Kapital (no. 208, 24 October 2003) and 
Lobi (no. 140, 21 October 2003) warned about this 
kind of monopoly conduct of WAZ in other countries.
37 Interview with Panče Bardarov, Director of the Mo-
nopoly Authority, 23 February 2004. 
38 This assumption was expressed by the members of 
the Board of the Print Media Association.
39 Dnevnik, 1 November 2003, “WAZ Believes in Macedo-
nia’s European Future” <http://www.dnevnik.com.mk>.
40 Dnevnik, 1 November 2003, “WAZ Guaran-
tees Independence to the Newspapers”, <http://
www.dnevnik.com.mk>.
41 The dominant type of ownership in the former so-
cialist system was called “social ownership”, defined 
as ownership which belongs to the society, i.e. neither 
to a group nor to an individual. Thus, the term “social 
capital” refers to the part of the capital of a legal entity 
that has not yet been transformed (through the priva-
tisation process) into state or private capital. 
42 The data was obtained from the Privatisation Agency 
of the Republic of Macedonia (interview with Anela 
Darkovska, Director of Legal Department, 29 Octo-
ber 2003).
43 Interviews were held with Mirče Adamčevski (Editor 
in Chief of Nova Makedonija), Predrag Dimitrovski, 
(Deputy Editor in Chief of Večer) and Mirče Tomovski 
(editor in ehief of the weekly Puls)
44 This is a statement given to the Slovenian POP TV (10 
December 2002) by Vito Komac, owner and Manager 
of Zoom Promotion, one of the founders of this con-
sortium, which consisted of: Koroški holding, FMN, 
Zoom Promotion and the natural person Dušan Grab-
nar. The biggest shareholder is FMN with 40 percent.
45 Slovenian dailies Večer (6 August 2002) and Delo (7 
August, 29 September, 27 November 2002). Macedo-
nian dailies Dnevnik (5 August 2002) and Utrinski 
vesnik (5 and 6 August, 24 and 25 September 2002)
46 In the current affairs program Preverjeno, aired on 10 
December 2002 on the Slovenian private TV station 
POP TV, Vito Komac, the representative of Jugstoritve, 
admitted that the money intended for paying the sal-
aries was used as a guaranty for the loans Jugstoritve 
obtained from Tutunska Banka for the purchase of 
NIP Nova Makedonija.
47 Institute for Sociological, Political and Juridical Re-
search from Skopje, European Institute for the Media, 
oSCE (Media Monitoring Mission during the Elections), 
Republic of Macedonian Broadcasting Council etc.
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48 This was especially visible during the election cam-
paigns in Macedonia, the parliamentarian elections in 
1998 and in 2002, the presidential elections in 1999 
and the local elections in 2000.
49 In the Explanatory Memorandum to Rec. no. r (99) 
15, it is stated that “..due to the different nature of the 
print and the broadcast media, the press is free to 
have a distinct political leaning.”
50 Interview with Viktorio Jakovlevski, Secretary Gener-
al of the Association of Journalists of Macedonia, 30 
October 2003.
51 See Dnevnik, 6 November 2003, “A1 Without the edi-
tor in chief”. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Th e media market in the Republic of Moldova has some peculiar features. First, it is di-
vided into media sub-markets of the Romanian language and the Russian language. Sec-
ond, the media system reﬂ ects the Moldovan state’s search for national identity, and often 
serves as a tool for creating and consolidating various identity options. Th ird, media eco-
nomics seems to have little relevance in Moldova. Investors are putting money into the 
Moldovan media, but not with a return on investment as a primary objective – buying in-
ﬂ uence over society appears to be their principal motivation. 
Th ere is no signiﬁ cant push for proﬁ tability or normalisation of the market. Th e politi-
cal forces now in control do not permit change. Moldovan society and most of its elected 
representatives do not seem to have understood yet that diversity of the media is vital for 
guaranteeing pluralism of opinions, adequate political representation, and citizens’ par-
ticipation in a democratic society.
2 MEDIA REGULATION 
After gaining independence in , Moldovan society had the opportunity to under-
stand that media can be not only a tool of propaganda in a totalitarian regime, but also a 
tool for achieving everyone’s right to freedom of expression. Before , the ownership of 
mass media was a privilege exclusively reserved for the state and the party; then, suddenly, 
everyone had the right to found a newspaper, and this right was conﬁ rmed by Moldovan 
media legislation: “a publication or an audio-visual company can be founded by one or 
more natural or legal persons who is  or older and is a citizen of the Republic of Moldo-
va,” assured both the Press Law and the Audio-visual Law.¹ But if a natural or legal person 
wants to hold one or more media outlets, the legislation becomes restrictive. Th e Audio-
visual Law stipulates that a natural or legal person may hold more than a  percent stake 
in the share capital of one audio-visual company, but no more than  percent of the share 
capital in other companies.² It is not speciﬁ ed whether the permitted  percent might be 
owned in a newspaper company or in another audio-visual company. Th e Press Law does 
not specify the amount of the share capital that a natural or legal person may hold in one 
or more press companies. Th ere are no other cross media ownership regulations in either 
the Press Law or the Audio-visual Law. 
It should be mentioned that both the Press Law and the Audio-visual Law use the word 
“founder” and “cofounders” instead of the word “owner”. Also there is no mention of the 
terms “ownership” and “concentration” in the media legislation of the Republic of Moldova.
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Th e authors of the Moldovan media legislation do not seem to have conceptualised in-
formation in commercial and market terms; the dominant features of the media legisla-
tion prove this assumption. Th e ﬁ rst media regulation in the post-communist period was 
the Decision signed by the Moldovan President in April , which provided, “the sub-
vention for the press companies according to the list approved in the established way” 
and “the monopolisation of press distribution.”³ In , the Press Law was adopted. It has 
been amended eight times since then. Multiple interventions in this act have been made 
without a clear concept. Most of the modiﬁ cations concerned property issues but in such 
a way that does not resemble any standard regulation. Th us, Chapter  of the Press Law 
(“Financing”), was the subject of four amendments (in , , , and in ). Two 
amendments concerned state subsidies for publications founded by public authorities, and 
two focused on the participation of foreign owners in the Moldovan press. Th e ﬁ rst inter-
vention, made in , allowed foreign natural and legal persons to provide support for the 
press. Th e second amendment made in  forbade the governments of other states from 
supporting the Moldovan press, except in cases where bilateral agreements to this eﬀ ect 
exist between the Moldovan and another government. Th e legislative initiative came from 
the communist majority in Parliament. Th e purpose of this amendment was to stop the ﬁ -
nancial support that some periodicals belonging to the political opposition received from 
funds allocated by the Romanian government for Romanians living abroad⁴. As a result, 
the governments of the United States of America, France, Holland, Romania and Greece, 
which were carrying out programs supporting the national press, had to retreat. 
Th e Audio-visual Law was adopted in  and amended seven times. Th e most sig-
niﬁ cant amendments were those in .⁵ Th e legislative initiative came from the former 
parliamentary majority; the objective of the amendment was the creation and protection 
of a national audio-visual space. By this modiﬁ cation, Article . was introduced, which 
obliged broadcast media institutions, public or private, to broadcast at least  percent 
of their programming in the oﬃ  cial state language. Of the seventeen amendments, only 
one was directly concerned with the issue of ownership: telecommunications businesses 
and those running broadcast communications networks were banned from owning or co-
owning broadcast outlets. Th e Constitutional Court rejected this article, arguing that it 
restricted freedom of speech.⁶
In , a Member of Parliament, Vasile Spinei, launched an initiative to abrogate the 
Press Law.⁷ In his opinion, the Press Law was not needed at all, and all media-related is-
sues could be regulated by other laws. Among the main reasons mentioned was the fact 
that the law did not regulate the independence of the press but only routinely described 
the organisational structures of press companies. Also, the relationships between found-
ers, editors and journalists were regulated from the perspective of state ownership of the 
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press, and such regulations encouraged public servants to control the press in a camou-
ﬂ aged way. Th e author of the legislative initiative argued that only a few articles out of a 
total of  should be preserved and included in other laws, like the Law on Publishing Ac-
tivity, the Law on Entrepreneurship, the Penal Procedure Code, and the Civil Procedure 
Code.⁸ Neither this legislative initiative, nor other more recent ones, proposed includ-
ing media-competition regulations in the Competition Law, which was adopted by the 
Moldovan Parliament in .⁹ 
In April , the most inﬂ uential media s – the Journalists’ Union, the Independ-
ent Journalism Center, Th e Committee for Freedom of the Press, Th e Access Info-Center, 
Th e Association for Broadcast Media (), and Th e Association for Independent Press 
– sent to Parliament a bill on state support for the mass media, which intended to create 
optimal conditions for media activity through tax exemptions, reasonable tariﬀ s, and ad-
equate .¹⁰ Th e bill was categorically rejected by the ministries and departments whose 
approval was required. In , the Broadcasting Co-ordinating Council () sent to 
Parliament a draft of a new Audio-visual law.¹¹ ¹² submitted its own draft in July . 
In the  version the regulations on ownership are formulated according to internation-
al standards.¹³ For the time being, both drafts have been ignored. 
Not only the existing legal framework of the Moldovan mass media but also the cur-
rent legislative trends and initiatives show that in Moldova mass media is not understood 
in market terms. 
Another proof of this understanding of the media could be the fact that in the Repub-
lic of Moldova the mass media were not included in the process of privatisation charac-
teristic of the whole commercial sector in the post communist period. No periodical or 
broadcasting outlet that existed before  was privatised. Most of them disappeared, 
and those that remained are still state property. But there were some trends towards pri-
vatising the distribution networks, and the assets of central and local press companies. In 
the communist period there were two state distribution networks: Posta Moldovei and 
Moldsoiuzpeciati. Posta Moldovei is now a state network with the biggest distribution sys-
tem, covering the entire territory of the Republic of Moldova. In , Moldsoiuzpeciati 
became a joint stock company, Moldpresa, with state share capital.¹⁴ Moldpresa’s distribu-
tion system consists of  news stands in the capital city and urban areas. Posta Moldovei 
and Moldpresa hold monopolies, and they charge up to - percent of the cost of pro-
duction for their services.¹⁵ 
2.1 PROTECTION OF NATIONAL ATTRIBUTES IN MEDIA REGULATION 
Before , Moldova had never existed as an independent nation-state within its present 
borders. On  August , Moldova became independent for the ﬁ rst time. Subsequent 
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events proved that Moldova’s ethnic majority ( percent) was and is split internally. While 
one part of the population considered that independence was a step towards uniﬁ cation 
with Romania, the “mother-country”, another maintained that Moldova must remain inde-
pendent because it is the state of the “Moldovan people”. Over the following years the split 
became more pronounced and shaped not only the political and cultural life of the country, 
but also the everyday life of individuals, and especially the mass media system. For example, 
the lingering questions that split the ethnic majority – “Are we Romanians or Moldovans? ”; 
“Is our language Moldovan or Romanian?”¹⁶ – have been mirrored in the paradoxical exist-
ence of publications in the same language, but which contained immediately under the title 
the note: “periodical in Romanian”¹⁷ and “periodical in Moldovan.”¹⁸ 
Is the media regulation in Moldova free of bias towards one or another national iden-
tity? Is the media legislation able to consolidate the cohesion among the citizens of the 
same nation-state and to promote ethnic diversity? Th e answer is no. On the contrary, 
the speciﬁ c features of the Moldovan media legislation, like the foreign media ownership 
rules and the obligation to broadcast  percent of the total volume in the oﬃ  cial state 
language, can be understood only in the context of the Moldova’s endeavours to build a 
nation state. 
Th e Moldovan media legislation diﬀ erentiates between foreign and local owners/
founders. According to the Press Law, foreign individuals or companies may not own 
more than  percent of a print medium.¹⁹ Foreign governments are banned from proﬀ er-
ing any support to the print media, except in cases where bilateral agreements to this ef-
fect exist between the Moldovan and another government.²⁰ Also, only a citizen of Moldo-
va may be editor in chief of a publication or news agency. In the case of broadcast media, 
foreign ownership is banned, except when a broadcaster is a joint venture containing both 
Moldovan and foreign capital (no quotas speciﬁ ed). 
A series of articles from the Audio-visual Law address the creation and protection of a 
local/national audio-visual space. Th e ﬁ rst ﬁ ve criteria for granting the available frequen-
cies are: the originality of programming, with the purpose of assuring the development of 
a national/local audio-visual space; the prospects for creating a network with a large terri-
torial coverage; the amount of in-house production in the broadcast volume; the amount 
of national production in the total broadcast volume; the priority of programs in the of-
ﬁ cial state language; the propagation of the national culture of the “Moldovan people and 
cohabitant ethnic groups.”²¹
Th e Audio-visual Law abounds in content regulation, with these stipulations referring, 
for example, to the language of the broadcast media and the volume of original local pro-
gramming in the total broadcast volume. Article . thus stipulates: “Audio-visual institu-
tions, public or private, shall broadcast at least  percent of their audio-visual programs 
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in the oﬃ  cial state language. Th is provision does not extend to the  programs broadcast 
via satellite and provided by cable, nor to foreign stations and stations that broadcast in 
areas compactly inhabited by ethnic minorities.”
Th is article turned to be the most controversial and the most diﬃ  cult to respect of all 
the articles of the Audio-visual Law. In September , a  of the Alumni of Western 
and Romanian Universities, , addressed a letter to the Broadcasting Co-ordinating 
Council in which it was pointed out that several private radio and  stations were not re-
specting the legal provisions referring to language, mainly Article . of the Audio-visual 
Law regarding the obligation to broadcast  percent of the total broadcast volume in the 
state language and, therefore, “violating our (’s members) legal right to have pro-
grams in the state language.”²²
 requested the cancelling of the license for eight radio stations rebroadcasting 
programs in Russian²³ (Europa Plus, Russkoe Radio, Hit, Nashe Radio, Serebriannii 
Dojdi, Radio Nostalgie, Radio d’Or, Radio Monte Carlo) and four  channels:  Moldo-
va,  ,  , Sun  (for broadcasting Eurosport and Discovery Channel in Russian, 
although the Romanian translation was also available). 
Because the  ignored the request,  ﬁ led a lawsuit against the .²⁴ In argu-
ing their case, ’s defence mainly referred to the international media legislation that 
provides protection for the national languages and to the examples of mature western de-
mocracies, like France and Belgium, whose media legislation pursues the protection of 
national audio-visual space.²⁵ Both the defenders of the radio stations and the defenders 
of  made multiple references to Article  of the European Convention for the Pro-
tection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Th e representative of the radio sta-
tions argued that ’s request violated the freedom of expression that is guaranteed 
in Article .: “Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. Th is right shall include 
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without inter-
ference by public authority and regardless of frontiers…” Th e defence of  referred to 
the same article .: “Th is Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of 
broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.” 
 won the lawsuit. Th e Court of Appeal obliged the  to revoke the license of 
those eight private radio stations and obliged   to rebroadcast the Discovery and Eu-
rosport programs in the oﬃ  cial state language. However, the victory of  was short-
lived. Th e Russian language media from both Chisinau and Moscow wrote that ’s vic-
tory violated the rights of the Russian ethnic minority from the Republic of Moldova and 
human rights in general, and called the  members “nazis, extremists, unionists”.²⁶ On 
 September , Parliament decided to interpret article . in the following way: “Th e 
stipulation of paragraph () of Article  of the Audio-Visual Law about the requirement 
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to broadcast at least  percent of programs in the state language refers exclusively to lo-
cally-produced programs and does not refer to the transmission time during which pro-
grams of foreign channels are re-broadcast by audio-visual institutions, which operate on 
the territory of the Republic of Moldova.”²⁷
 members and observers of the legal proceedings stated that, from the legal point 
of view, article () was and is clear and unambiguous; therefore, the interpretation was 
not necessary. In their view, the interpretation was made in order to inﬂ uence the ruling in 
the  vs.  case, because “the interpretation of a law, unlike an amendment, is retro-
active…”²⁸ Indeed, after the interpretation was issued, the Constitutional Court of the Re-
public of Moldova annulled the decision of the Court of Appeal and the “ case” was 
closed. Th ose eight radio stations and three  stations won the lawsuit retrospectively. 
Th e  vs.  case shows that the Moldovan media legislation is not neutral with 
regard to the new state’s search for national identity. Being under an imperative to consoli-
date the nation-state, legislators feel free to ignore the principles of pluralism. 
2.2 STATE SUBSIDIES
Moldovan media legislation does not contain any provision stipulating support for and 
maintenance of the diversity of media outlets. Article  (“Financing”) of the Press Law 
provides that the State “takes responsibility” for publications for school children and pre-
schoolers, the cofounders of which publications are ministries and departments of the 
Moldovan Government. Also, publications and press agencies “founded by public author-
ities are ﬁ nanced from the state budget”. Neither the Press Law, nor the Audio-visual Law 
contains other provisions related to support for media outlets. Activist journalists and 
media s tried to change this situation by presenting to the Moldovan Parliament new 
legislative approaches. 
In , Parliament adopted the Decision regarding the Concept of state support to and 
promotion of the mass media for the period –.²⁹ Th e Journalists’ Union from 
Moldova drafted the Concept and proposed three directions of activity: . Reform of the 
media legislative framework according to international standards; . Elaboration of the 
mechanisms for the implementation of laws: mechanisms of privatisation and mecha-
nisms of tax exemption, preferential tariﬀ s at printing houses, renting of oﬃ  ces for media 
organizations etc.; . Th e establishment of a normative framework concerning editorial 
independence, self-regulation, and the relationships between owners and journalists. Th e 
reform of the framework presupposed amendments to the current media legislation (in-
cluding the Law on Sponsorship and Philanthropy and the Law on Advertising) and draft-
ing of the following new legislative acts: Law on the State Support to the Media, Law on 
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the Public Broadcast Institution; Law on the Social Status of the Journalist, Law on Access 
to Information.³⁰
According to the second direction of activity proposed in Th e Concept, the Govern-
ment was declared responsible for carrying out the privatisation project by providing the 
national press with assets. Th e Journalists’ Union proposed two alternative solutions³¹ for 
privatising the complex known as the “Press House”. (Th e Press House is located in the 
center of the capital and until  housed the headquarters of many publishing organi-
zations). According to the ﬁ rst one, the Government was invited to establish a joint stock 
venture of which it would have been the majority owner in the initial stage, with other 
shareholders being members of editorial staﬀ s. According to the second alternative, the 
Government could allocate the Press House to the Journalists’ Union, which would then 
transform it into a National Media Center. Both initiatives were ignored.
Th e provisions of Th e Concept had to be carried out in two stages: the proximal – 
– – when the concrete mechanisms of privatisation and tax strategies had to be 
concretised; and the maximal stage – – – in which the laws had to be adopted. 
However, the only mechanism implemented was the VAT exemption for printing services 
during the ﬁ rst stage of Th e Concept. Of the whole set of media laws, only two have been 
adopted: the Law on Access to Information and the Law on the Public Broadcast Institu-
tion. Other drafts have been ignored. 
3 MEDIA LANDSCAPE – 
PROBLEMS OF EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL PLURALISM 
Given the framework presented above, one could ask how the Moldovan mass media 
evolved and developed? How did they pass from a totalitarian media system to a plural-
istic one? Probably, the correct answer would be that Moldovan media have developed at 
“two speeds”. Th e media outlets could be categorised according to these diﬀ erent dynam-
ics of development. Th e “slow rate” of change is characteristic of the dailies with nation-
al circulation and of broadcast media with national coverage. A “faster rate” of change is 
characteristic of weeklies, local media and political parties’ publications. 
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Table  NATIONAL DAILIES AND TV CHANNELS
NATIONAL DAILIES (4-5 A WEEK)
1990 1995 2003
MOLDOVA SOCIALISTA˘ 
founder: Th e Government of the 
Republic of Moldova
T‚ ARA 
founder: Christian Democratic Popular 
Party (successor of the Popular Front) 
FLUX 
founder: Press Group Flux
SOVIETSKIA MOLDAVIA 
founder: Th e Government of the 
Republic of Moldova 
FLUX 
founder : Press Group GP Flux
JURNAL DE CHIS¸INA˘U 
founder/owner: Jurnal de Chisinau Ltd. 
TARA 
founded in  by the Popular Front 
from Moldova
MOMENTUL 
founder Săptîmîna Ltd.
MOLDOVA SUVERANA˘ 
founder: Th e Government of the 
Republic of Moldova
MOLDOVA SUVERANA˘ 
founder: Th e Government of the Republic 
of Moldova 
NEZAVSIMAIA MOLDOVA 
founder: Th e Government of the 
Republic of Moldova
NEZAVSIMAIA MOLDOVA 
founder: Th e Government of the Republic 
of Moldova
VREMEA 
founder: Vremea Ltd.
NATIONAL TV CHANNELS
TV MOLDOVA (state/public TV) TVM MOLDOVA 1 (public/state TV)
OSTANKINO (Russian state/ Public TV) ORT (Obscestvenoie Rossiskoe Televidenie 
- Russian Public TV)
PERVÎI CANAL (Russian Public TV)
Th e national  channels are the same in ,  and : the state/public television 
of the Republic of Moldova is matched by the state/public television of the Russian Fed-
eration, which in the post-soviet period “inherited” the state network no.  with national 
coverage. Th e only change is the variation in these channels’ names. Th us, in  these 
two institutions were called  and Ostankino, in   and  (Obscestvenoie Ros-
siskoe Televidenie - Russian Public Television), in  Moldova  and Pervîi Canal. 
Moldovan public television is currently in the process of transformation. On  April 
, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted Resolution  con-
cerning the functioning of democratic institutions in the Republic of Moldova.³² Article 
 of the Resolution recommended the transformation of Teleradio Moldova from a state 
company into a public broadcast entity. In July , Parliament passed the bill proposed 
by the Moldovan President, although it did not pass the expertise test of the Council of 
Europe.³³ Th e journalists and media s now demand that Parliament abrogate the cur-
rent law and replace it with the Law on the National Public Broadcasting Institution, draft-
ed by the Association for the Electronic Press and recommended by the experts from the 
Council of Europe as a model for the functional, ﬁ nancial and editorial independence of a 
public broadcasting institution.³⁴ 
A new  channel with national coverage,  , was supposed to start broadcasting 
in , but it did not manage to go on the air within a year, as the law required. Th e own-
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ers asked for additional time, and the former board of the  approved the request. But 
after a month, the new  board withdrew the license of the station following a notiﬁ ca-
tion from the General Prosecutor’s Oﬃ  ce, which argued that the Audio-visual Law did not 
provide for the prolonging of the preparation period granted to a broadcast station before 
it goes on the air. Indeed, according to the legal provisions, this decision was correct. Nev-
ertheless, opinions about the   case are divided. Some media analysts consider that 
the withdrawal of the license was a “political order”, their argument being as follows: “Th e 
 acted according to the letter of the law, but counter to the spirit of the law.”³⁵ In other 
words, the launching of a new national  channel would have contributed to the develop-
ment of the national Moldovan broadcasting sector, which is the main emphasis of the Au-
dio-visual Law. According to the assertions of   managers, at the moment of license 
withdrawal they had already invested ,, lei (approx.  . million).³⁶ 
Second, media analysts argue that “it is suspicious that amidst the messy conditions 
reigning in the activity of the private radio and  stations, the  bullied a station not 
broadcasting yet.”³⁷ And the third argument of media analysts focuses on the fact that in 
circumstances where the ruling party has a monopoly over the only nation-wide  sta-
tion and only the members of the communist ruling party have access to the screen, a new 
alternative  station would have been a threat to the authorities.³⁸ 
In contrast to dailies and television stations, the weeklies and party publications pro-
liferated. It seems that the development of the media system in Moldova followed several 
patterns, which mirrored the fragmentation of society:
a) Party publications: Ţara (–) Christian Democratic Popular Party; Comunis-
tul () Russian and Romanian editions, the Communist party of Moldova; Dialog 
(), Th e Democratic Party; Luceafărul (–) Th e Party of Rebirth and Con-
ciliation; Democraţia, () Th e Social Liberal Party; Social Democratul (), Social 
Democratic Party; 
b) Independent Romanian language weeklies with national coverage: Saptamina (); 
Timpul (); Accente (); Jurnal de Chisinau (, became daily in );
c) Independent Russian language weeklies with national coverage: Delovaia Gazeta (); 
Economicescoie obozrenie (); Kishiniovskie novosti (); Kishiniovskii obozrevate-
li, (); Komersant Moldovî (); Komersant Plus (); Moldavskie Vedomosti 
(), Novoie Vremea ();
d) Separate media systems in the Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauz-Yeri and in the 
separatist region Transnistria.
Th ere is no internal pluralism in the mass media outlets described above, i.e. pluralism 
of content oﬀ ered by individual newspapers,  or radio stations. But there is external 
pluralism that stems from the diﬀ erences among particular periodicals,  and radio sta-
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tions. Some media analysts maintain that: “In the Republic of Moldova a unique plural-
ism has been created: each media outlet shows preconceptions and narrowness of visions 
to various degrees; however, taken as an ensemble, they re-create the pluralist image of 
our society. But to perceive this pluralism you have to read, to watch and to listen to eve-
rything.”³⁹ Th e external pluralism of the Moldovan media seems to be very demanding. 
Probably, in a fragmented society such as Moldova’s, pluralism has speciﬁ c meaning: it 
denotes diﬀ erentiation along ethnic, linguistic and political lines. From this point of view 
Moldovan media pluralism is also reductive: it reﬂ ects people’s views but people speak out 
as members of speciﬁ c ethnic or political groups. A pluralism that would reﬂ ect and ad-
dress individual diversities is a pluralism that is still to be created.
3.1 PLURALISM OR POLARITY 
Th e media system in Moldova is linguistically divided; it could be said that it contains 
two separate, autonomous media subsystems, one in Romanian and the other in Russian, 
which include dailies and weeklies with national circulation, electronic media with seem-
ingly national coverage, and even separate media s.⁴⁰ But there are also bilingual edi-
tions of periodicals,⁴¹ television and radio programs, practised not only by public televi-
sion and radio stations but certain private broadcast media as well.
Among Moldovan media entrepreneurs, it is considered that “a good business is a Rus-
sian language newspaper.”⁴² Th e main explanations of why this business is considered good 
are subjective and derived from the professional experience and personal convictions of 
media people. Take, for example, the most usual explanations: a) the major part of the tel-
evision audience and readers consists of the population from urban areas inhabited by 
ethnic minorities or Russian language speakers;⁴³ b)“tradition” - “there are at least four 
Moscow dailies which have their traditional readers;”⁴⁴ c) the preference of the advertising 
companies for the Russian language media,⁴⁵ etc. Some explanations of the “good business”, 
as well as of the parallel market, are derived from Moldova’s macro-economic and politi-
cal situation: the lack of capital investment from the West; the expansion of Russian capital 
into Moldova, followed by the expansion of Russian commercial media; the pro-Russian 
orientation of the Moldovan ruling parties; the neo-imperialist strategies of Russia, the old 
patterns of behaviour and soviet mentality of the audience, etc. Because of the lack of stud-
ies, opinion polls and empirical data, these explanations of the parallel media market can-
not but be subjective. For example, it is considered that all the economic press is in Russian, 
because in Moldova “most businessmen are ethnic Russians.”⁴⁶ In the absence of empirical-
ly collected data concerning the ethnic division of labour in the Republic of Moldova, this 
type of explanation can be neither true nor false – it remains just an opinion.
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Th e question that arises at this point concerns media pluralism: is the existence of the 
Romanian and Russian media markets a proof of pluralism? Th ere are two possible an-
swers. For the time being, the linguistically divided media seem to conﬁ rm the principle, 
“the medium is the message.” In other words, criticism of the Russian Government or of 
Moscow’s foreign politics, and commentaries on the beneﬁ ts of Moldova’s European ori-
entation, are very rare in the Russian media from Moldova. On the other hand, in line 
with the “mirroring function” of the media, it could be said that the linguistic preferences 
of Romanian and Russian language speakers in the Republic of Moldova are mirrored by 
the mass-media system. Th is indeed is one criterion for media pluralism, but this plural-
ism is a weak one. It is widely accepted that the mass media have more than just a mirror-
ing functioning in a society: in such a case, the media would have only a conservative role. 
Moreover, the media have their fundamental, “watchdog” role – a critical stance pointing 
to the abnormal aspects of a society. In addition, media pluralism should not be merely a 
mirror of the existing situation - media should improve the chances of every individual to 
be heard. In this context, pluralism supposes equal access to media for everybody. Th ere-
fore, bilingual pluralism is not an adequate pluralism because in the Republic of Moldova, 
beside the Russian ethnic minority, there are speakers of other languages, but these lan-
guages are heard in an inadequate way. 
4 MEDIA MARKET
4.1 REGULATORY PROVISIONS ON TRANSPARENCY
In Moldova, provisions concerning transparency of the mass media pertain to informa-
tion that has to be provided for the audience and information required by the authorities 
that supervise the activity of media. 
Th e information for the audience is minimal: the Press Law requires that each issue 
should contain the title of the publication, the founders, the circulation, the registration 
number, the price and other technical data (Art. ()). It further obliges the publisher to 
publish, two times a year, in January and in July, information about the amount of support, 
including non-ﬁ nancial support, received from natural and legal persons from Moldova 
and abroad.⁴⁷ Th e Audio-visual Law also provides the audience with minimal information: 
the title, the place of the administration oﬃ  ce, the broadcasting frequency, and the insti-
tution’s symbols (Art. ).
Th e information for the authorities has to be rather detailed. In order to participate in 
a tender for frequency allocation, every applicant should present a ﬁ le containing the fol-
lowing documents: a copy of the Registration Certiﬁ cate issued by the Chamber of State 
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Registration; a copy of the statute of the founder associations; a declaration about the di-
rect or indirect participation of capital in the share capital of other companies; a list of ﬁ -
nancial sources.⁴⁸ Th erefore, the Broadcasting Co-ordinating Council () has access to 
the basic ﬁ nancial and ownership information about the candidates in competition for 
the available frequencies. Also, the private audio-visual companies are under obligation 
to present, at the end of each year, a report on activities to the authority that issued the li-
cense. But there is no provision that would oblige the  to communicate to the audience 
at least part of this information. 
Th ere is no separate autonomous authority responsible for the supervision of the anti-
concentration and transparency regulations. Th is role is partially performed by the , 
which has to check all aspects of the private broadcast companies, including ownership 
and concentration, at the moment of license issuing and to review these data every three/
ﬁ ve years when the broadcast license has to be renewed. 
4.2 MEDIA OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 
On the following pages we will perhaps for the ﬁ rst time since their foundation present 
ownership structure of the main Moldovan media. However, this is a minimal step to-
wards transparency, because here we do not disclose company accounts, sources of me-
dia revenue, or changes in capital, but only the owners and shareholders of the main inde-
pendent media outlets.
Table  PRINT MEDIA IN ROMANIAN LANGUAGE 
MEDIA TITLE YEAR OF 
FOUNDATION
CIRCULATION OWNER SHAREHOLDERS49
FLUX 
independent daily
1996 39,70050 FLUX LTD.51 ROS¸CA IURIE (99%) 
DELEU IURIE (1%) 52 
TIMPUL
independent weekly
2001 15,72353 TIMPUL INFO 
MAGAZIN LTD.54
TA˘NASE CONSTANTIN (10%)
TVERDUN LEONID (45%); 
MEDIA NOUA˘ LTD. (45%) 
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 
WITHIN MEDIA NOUA˘ LTD:55 
MEGADAT COM LTD. -100% 
JURNAL DE CHISINAU
free newspaper
1999 AS WEEKLY; 
BECAME DAILY 
IN 2003 
10,85056 JURNAL DE 
CHISINAU LTD.57
SINGLE SHAREHOLDER: 
BUTNARU VALENTIN58
ACCENTE 
free weekly
2001 5,40059 ACCENTE LTD.60 SINGLE SHAREHOLDER61: 
T‚ ÎRA DUMITRU
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Table  PRINT MEDIA IN RUSSIAN LANGUAGE 
MEDIA TITLE YEAR OF 
FOUNDATION 
CIRCULATION OWNER SHAREHOLDERS
KOMSOMOLISKAIA 
PRAVDA V MOLDOVE
daily
1995 51,190 
Friday edition
7,00062 
other days 
Moldovan-Russian joint 
venture 
KOMSOMOLISKAIA PRAVDA 
BASARABIA LTD.63
JOINT STOCK
IZDATELISKII DOM 
KOMSOMOLISKAIA PRAVDA 
(RUSSIA) (65%)
IVANCENCO SERGHEI (17.5%) 
PRIMAC VEACESLAV (17.5%)  64
MOLDAVSKIE VEDOMOSTI 
bi-weekly
1995 6,50065 MOLDAVSKIE VEDOMOSTI 
LTD.66
CIUBAS¸ENCO DMITRII (50%)
EDU ION (50 %)  67
KOMERSANT PLUS 
weekly
2001 5,00068 KOMERSANT PLUS LTD.69 BURLACU SVETLANA (70.%) 
PODOLELOVA TATIANA (30%)70
Table  BROADCAST MEDIA
MEDIA TITLE OWNER SHAREHOLDERS COVERAGE 
AREA
AMOUNT OF DAILY BROADCASTING
LOCAL / FOREIGN 
PRO TV Moldovan –
Romanian joint 
venture 
MEDIAPRO LTD.71
CME ROMANIA B.V., 
HOLLAND (48%) 
CHIS¸INA˘U73 1 HOUR: 
ROMANIAN 
&RUSSIAN 
LANGUAGE 
NEWSCASTS 
23 HOURS - 
REBROADCASTING 
PRO TV ROMANIA74DIAGRO COM S.A, 
ROMANIA – (36.36 %)
SÎRBU ADRIAN (14.64 %)
GIOSAN NADEJDA (1 %)72
NIT TV Moldovan-Irish joint 
venture 
NOILE IDEI 
TELEVIZATE LTD. 
(New Televised 
Ideas)75
WORLD ASSETS LTD, 
IRELAND (89.97 %) 
CHIS¸INA˘U77 2 HOURS- 
NEWSCASTS 
AND 
ANALYTICAL 
PROGRAMS,
20 HOURS 
REBROADCASTING 
TV CHANNELS NTV 
AND TV TZENTER 
FROM RUSSIA78
NOVOSTI LTD. (0.03 %)
DROBOT SERGHEI – (10 %)76
PERVII CANAL 
MOLDOVA TV 
STUDIO PERVÎI 
KANAL
Joint stock 
ANALYTIC MEDIA 
GROUP79
Joint stock 
ANALYTIC MEDIA GROUP 
(100 %)80
THE STATE 
NETWORK NO. 
III81
1 HOUR - 
NEWS AND 
ADS.
23 HOURS 
REBROAD-CASTING 
THE RUSSIAN 
PUBLIC TV 
CHANNEL PERVÎI 
CANAL82
RADIO STATION 
POLIDISC
Commercial studio 
RADIO POLIDISC
LTD.83
GALUPA VALERIU (55 %) TWO 
CHANNELS IN 
CHIS¸INA˘U AND 
TWO IN OTHER 
CITIES85
1 HOUR - 
NEWS AND 
ADS.86 OWNS 
AN ADVER-
TISING 
COMPANY. 
REBROAD-CAST 
THE RUSSIAN 
RADIO STATIONS 
RUSSKOE RADIO 
1 AND RUSSKOE 
RADIO 287
GALUPA DUMITRU (10 %)
VASILATII ANDREI (35 %)84
RADIO STATION 
HIT FM 
Studio for production 
and creation 
DIXI-MEDIA GRUP 
LTD.88
LOZOVAN JANA (75) % NATIONAL 
COVERAGE 
BASED ON 
6 FREQ. IN 
DIFFERENT 
LOCALITIES90
1 HOUR91 RUSSIAN RADIO 
STATION “HIT FM”BOTNARI VLADIMIR (25 %)89
Source: Chamber of State Registration.
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3.3 FLUX MEDIA GROUP - PRESS GROUP WITH A MISSION 
  owns the press agency Flux, the national daily Flux, and the publishing house 
Flux. Th is group owned another daily, Ţara, founded in , which folded in January 
.⁹²   opened several local branches of Flux daily: Flux de Orhei, Flux de Un-
gheni, Flux de Bălţi (no longer published). Nevertheless,   cannot be considered a 
case of vertical concentration, because the distribution network and the advertising com-
pany are missing.   belongs to the most inﬂ uential opposition party, the Christian 
Democratic Popular Party. 
Th e Press Group Flux ﬁ rst appeared in , when the press agency Flux was found-
ed.⁹³ Th e periodical Flux was launched in March . Th e daily, as well as the agency, 
declared itself completely free and independent. Th e editorial staﬀ  did not know who the 
real owner was; the editor in chief assured journalists that the newspaper was “completely 
free”, although journalists had many reasons to be suspicious about their independence.⁹⁴ 
It was a sensational disclosure when it was discovered in  that the real owner of the 
Flux newspaper was the leader of the main political party. After the disclosure, the edito-
rial staﬀ , together with the Editor in Chief, Val Butnaru, left and created, in , a new 
independent periodical, Jurnal de Chisinau. In , the second editorial staﬀ  of Flux, to-
gether with the Editor in Chief, Constantin Tanase, left and created another independent 
weekly Timpul. Th erefore, the current main independent newspapers “attended the same 
Flux school, which can be considered the pioneer of journalistic novelties in Moldova.”⁹⁵
Th is press group does not hide its mission; on the contrary, it is clearly stated that “al-
though it seeks to reﬂ ect the reality in Moldova in its complexity and diversity, the newspa-
per is unequivocal about Moldova’s total integration into pan-European bodies and its uni-
ﬁ cation, through democratic processes, with Romania.”⁹⁶ For a country in which one part 
of the population is longing for the rebuilding of the Soviet Union (the promise given dur-
ing the last election by the victorious Communist Party), the political orientation expressed 
above is not neutral. Because of the clear political orientation of this press group, there is 
an acceptable level of transparency of ownership in it compared with other media outlets. 
3.4 CROSS-OWNERSHIP 
An example of cross-ownership is a media holding whose cofounders/owners are 
  . (Ireland) and  . (Moldova).⁹⁷ Th is media holding in-
cluded  channel ,⁹⁸ the Press Agency Interlic⁹⁹ and the periodicals Delovaia Gazeta, 
Kishiniovskie Novosti, Patria Tînără and Molodioj Moldovî.¹⁰⁰ Th e last two newspapers 
ceased to be published because “they did not ﬁ nd an adequate community of readers”, as 
some analysts argue.¹⁰¹ Unlike  , this holding does not clearly state its name and 
identity. However, all media outlets owned by this holding list the same founders. 
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In this context it should be mentioned that the Director of  , Serghei Drobot, has 
been a member of the  since July ; he was appointed to this post by the President 
of the Republic of Moldova. According to media observers, Serghei Drobot’s  mem-
bership is a violation of the Audio-visual Law, Art. , which stipulates that “ members 
shall not be involved directly in the production of programs in any broadcasting institu-
tions over that period.”¹⁰² Th is violation of the Audio-visual Law was the subject of an in-
vestigation pursued by the Ţara and Flux dailies.¹⁰³
4.5 “INDEPENDENT SPONSORED MEDIA”
According to data from the Chamber of State Registration, the main media outlets are 
owned by limited enterprises. Th e shareholders in these enterprises are members of the 
editorial staﬀ . Most of the owners are unknown to the public, the only exception being the 
owner of the Flux Daily, Iurie Rosca (a  percent owner), who is the leader of the Chris-
tian Democratic Popular Party.
From the data about shareholders it is impossible to identify the three biggest media 
owners. Th e explanation is that concentration and monopolisation of the mass media did 
not take place, because of the political, linguistic and ethnic fragmentation that charac-
terizes the Republic of Moldova. Perhaps, the linguistic and ethnic homogeneity is not a 
condition of media concentration. But the market mechanisms needed to sell, buy, merge 
or take over a company are indispensable in order to have concentration and monopolies. 
However, there are no cases of purchases, mergers or takeovers of media outlets in Moldo-
va. Rather, this peculiar market is characterised by other phenomena such as sudden ap-
pearances and disappearences of media outlets, determined mainly by electoral cycles and 
sponsors’ interests. Th e mechanisms of sponsorship and donations for mass media are not 
clearly speciﬁ ed in the current legislation. Th e Law on Sponsorship and Philanthropy does 
not diﬀ erentiate between media outlets and other objects of sponsorship. Th e phenom-
enon of sponsorship conﬁ rms (proves) the existence of the “hidden owners.” For exam-
ple, Dmitrii Ciubasenco, the Editor in Chief of the Moldavskie Vedomosti, states that “the 
newspaper’s income consists of several constitutive parts: sales and advertising revenues, 
subscription and sponsorship. Th e sponsorship accounts for up to  percent of income. 
Th us, we are un-lucrative, but not completely.” Asked why he does not publish the photos 
of sponsors and articles praising them on the ﬁ rst page of each issue, he answers: “Th ere is 
not only one person supporting our newspaper, but several of them. Th ey would consider 
it nonsense to appear without reason on the ﬁ rst page.”¹⁰⁴
According to Article  of the Law on Sponsorship, the beneﬁ ciaries have the right but 
not the obligation to communicate to the audience the name of the sponsors and the ob-
jectives of sponsorship, and only with the consent of those who gave the money.¹⁰⁵ Be-
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cause of the lack of transparency, the sponsorship of mass media appears to be in con-
tradiction to the principles of a free press. Th e Journalists’ Union and other media NGOs 
have asked several times for amendments to the Law on Sponsorship in order to increase 
the level of transparency. 
How independent is a sponsored media outlet? Or, could we say that the main problem 
of sponsorship is not independence but the lack of business initiative, as some argue: “Me-
dia people are more comfortable when they are under the wing of someone who takes care 
of the money, and they can work without any concerns about how to ﬁ nance their own pa-
per. Th e absence of business tradition prevents an orientation towards proﬁ t making.”¹⁰⁶ 
Although this explanation is somehow understandable, the new concept of an “independ-
ent sponsored media,” cannot be accepted: “Th is mentality needs to be changed quickly, 
otherwise there will be no independent media.”¹⁰⁷
5 MEDIA INDEPENDENCE 
5.1 BETWEEN THE STATE AND THE OWNER 
In Moldova editorial independence has turned out to be the last hope for media plural-
ism. When it is not possible to achieve media pluralism through state protection of freedom 
of expression, or through real economic independence from the owners-sponsors, the last 
hope is that journalists will compensate for it through their professionalism and ethics.
How legitimate is this “last hope”? First, the legislative framework does not provide for 
it, because it does not contain any clear provisions concerning editorial independence. 
Editorial independence is mentioned only in the Press Law. Th e statute and basic princi-
ples of the publication are adopted by the assembly of the editorial staﬀ  and approved by 
the founders/cofounders (Art. ). Th e relations among founders, editors and the editorial 
staﬀ  are regulated by “the Press law, the Labour Code, the statute of the periodical and the 
in-house contract” (Art. ). Th e in-house contract is signed between the founder (editor) 
and the editorial staﬀ , and it stipulates the volume of expenditure necessary for the pro-
duction, the distribution of income among the editorial staﬀ  and editors, without specify-
ing the character of the relation between the owner and the journalist.
Th e interference of the state in the activity of the media resolves the dilemma regard-
ing editorial independence from the owners. After the last parliamentary election (Feb-
ruary ), when the Communist Party won the majority of seats in Parliament ( of 
 altogether), the interference of the state in the media, both public and private, was 
very frequent. Th e journalists protested repeatedly against state interference through 
strikes, picketing, and protest marches. Owing to the protests and appeals of journalists 
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addressed to international organisations, the case of Teleradio Moldova was debated at a 
special meeting of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe ( April ), 
which obliged the state to transform this state-run company into a public one. 
In the case of private media, the state does not intervene in the content, but it employs 
diﬀ erent administrative sanctions including bans on publication (Kommersant Moldovi, 
),  and radio station license withdrawals and suspensions (Vocea Basarabiei, ), 
jamming (Catalan , ), or intimidation of editorial staﬀ  by requiring them to leave 
the Press House, where most of the newspapers and periodicals have their oﬃ  ces. Th e lat-
est controversial example in this series is that of the Timpul weekly. On  February , 
the Court from the central sector of Chisinau city sequestered its assets and accounts, al-
though the editorial staﬀ  did not know that the subjects of their investigative article - the 
Moldovan government and a private company – had ﬁ led a lawsuit.¹⁰⁸
Th e Moldovan authorities prefer to apply only the ultimate penalties for all media ir-
regularities. Th e only penalty provision in the Press Law envisaged for all kinds of viola-
tions is a ban on a publication. Only the General Prosecutor may institute legal proceed-
ing regarding cessation (Art. ()). Th e General Prosecutor used this right to terminate 
the activity of the weekly Komersant Moldovî, on the ground of its “supporting the anti-
constitutional regime of the self-proclaimed separatist Transnistrian republic” (a separa-
tist region of the Republic of Moldova since ).¹⁰⁹ In the case of the broadcast media, 
the  is entitled to apply the following administrative sanctions: ) ﬁ nes; ) suspension 
of the broadcasting license or the authorisation license; ) cancellation of the broadcasting 
license or the authorisation license. Th e most frequently used sanction is the suspension 
and cancellation of the license, because the amount of the ﬁ ne and the application proce-
dure are not concretised in the Administrative Contravention Code.¹¹⁰ For example, on  
February , the , invoking formal pretexts, suspended the licenses for   and 
Antena  in response to the failure of their owners – the City of Chisinau – to adjust their 
status to legal provisions. Th e new legal status was elaborated, but the Municipal Council, 
being politically divided between communists and democrats, could not approve it. Th e 
suspension is considered as a violation of freedom of expression.¹¹¹
While it is true that journalists working for private media outlets only rarely protest 
against their owners’ interference, such protests do occur. For example, in May , a 
group of journalists from Argumenti i Facti Moldova resigned in protest at what they 
claimed was arbitrary dismissal of their editor in chief, Valentia Usakova. She states that 
her “only fault was the refusal to publish propaganda during the election campaign despite 
orders from the paper’s owner.”¹¹² Th e pressure on journalists exists and not only during 
election periods. In January , Nicoleta Bodrug, a journalist from Pervii Canal, re-
signed in protest over interference with content. Th e managers objected repeatedly that in 
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her press reviews she gave too much attention to articles featured in Timpul, Jurnalul de 
Chişinău, and Flux, rather than to the governmental newspapers Moldova Suverana and 
Nezavisimaia Moldova.¹¹³ 
5.2 SELF-REGULATION 
Journalists and owners of private media protest against state interference in the me-
dia, but they show much less agreement on independence within their own editorial of-
ﬁ ces. Th e owners can choose the orientation of the newspaper, while the journalist has to 
respect professional ethics. In an attempt to ﬁ nd an equilibrium between the interests of 
journalists and owners, the Press Law, although more suitable for abrogation, nevertheless 
stipulates that the editorial staﬀ  should adopt statutes which should specify the rights and 
obligations of journalists, editors and owners. Also, the activity of every journalist should 
be speciﬁ ed in a bilateral contract. According to an opinion poll among journalists carried 
out by the Independent Journalism Center in ,  percent of respondents had signed 
a contract with the owner and  percents did not have such a contract.¹¹⁴ Also,  per-
cent of respondents considered that they were not protected against persecution;  per-
cent thought they were partially protected, and ﬁ ve percent felt completely protected. 
One attempt of journalists to regulate the relations between journalists and owners 
was the National Convention concerning the activity of journalists drafted in  by the 
Journalists’ Union. Th is Convention, which was submitted as a bill, regulated all aspects 
of journalists’ activity: employment, labour conditions, payment, social support in diﬀ er-
ent situations and resignation. Th e Convention was sent to the Government, but the Gov-
ernment sent it on to the ministries and trade unions. Th e text was modiﬁ ed, and the ﬁ nal 
document, “Collective labour contract (branch level) for the years –,” adopted by 
the National Committee of Trade Unions and approved by the Ministry of Labour and So-
cial Protection, does not resemble the original. Although the document concerns all me-
dia employees, it is not a law, and the parties concerned did not ﬁ nd it compulsory. Th e 
document was ignored by both journalists and owners, especially because most of the 
journalists are not members of the trade union. 
Th is document having been ignored, the only mechanism of self-regulation remains 
the Code of Ethical Principles. On  May , the congress of the Journalists’ Union from 
Moldova endorsed a new Ethical Code of Journalists from the Republic of Moldova, based 
on the recommendations of the Council of Europe and the International Federation of 
Journalists. Eleven journalists’ associations from Moldova, with the aim of gaining it na-
tional recognition, countersigned the Code. According to the Code, no matter what the 
relations with the public authorities or various businesses in the course of carrying out his 
professional duties, the journalist ought to avoid any complicity that may aﬀ ect his inde-
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pendence and impartiality. And, in the case that any assignment should violate the prin-
ciples set in the code, the journalist must reject the assignment. In order to render appli-
cable the principles set in the code, the journalists created a monitoring mechanism, the 
National Council for Professional Ethics, whose members are renowned journalists elect-
ed by the Congress of Journalists. Th e Council issues expert adjudications in litigation in-
volving the journalist himself and/or the product of his professional activity. But, as the 
members of the Council have observed, “in the circumstances of ideological censorship, 
of party dictatorship and economic austerity, ethical self-regulation may not be objective-
ly functional.”¹¹⁵
5.3 INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING
In Moldova no private media outlet, not to mention any state media, encourage investi-
gative reporting, although in some cases some articles resembling investigative reporting 
have been published with the purpose of compromising political opponents. 
In the last two years, investigative reporting began to be encouraged by international 
foundations and s. For example, in – there was a series of investigations 
about human traﬃ  cking, sponsored by the Moldovan Soros Foundation. During one year 
- October  to October  – the Association for Independent Press () carried out 
the project “Investigative reporting on corruption and organised crime,” supported by the 
French Embassy in Moldova. During the project, two articles were published every month 
in each of those  periodicals, members of , mainly local newspapers. Now the  
has created a Center for Investigative Reporting with the support of the National Endow-
ment for Democracy (). 
Even though, with external support, investigative reporting could be carried out in 
Moldova, the impact of this risky media genre seems to be very peculiar. As the report-
ers from the  say, there is a lack of reaction on the part of the authorities, civil servants 
and other persons whose activities are the subject of investigation. “We proved clearly 
that a counsellor of the President was implicated in an enormous corruption aﬀ air, and 
no reaction from the authorities followed.”¹¹⁶ Th e ﬁ ndings of investigative reporting are 
completely ignored. On the contrary, as reporters noticed, sometimes the state-run peri-
odicals react by publishing articles praising the persons and institutions that have been 
exposed.¹¹⁷ Th e general conclusion is that investigative stories expose journalists to many 
risks that are considered unjustiﬁ ed, relative to the expectations of action in response. 
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6 CONCLUSIONS
In Moldova, it is “special enemies” rather than the cycles of media markets that pose 
a threat to media freedom and pluralism. An almost totalitarian communist government 
and a soviet-style understanding of media as propaganda tool rather than business are the 
current enemies. Th e legal framework and the facts show that in the Republic of Moldova 
media are not conceived in market terms. Media oﬀ erings are shaped not to serve con-
sumer needs, but to obey the requirements of ﬁ nancial subsidisers. Nevertheless, in the 
Republic of Moldova media pluralism does exist, mainly an external media pluralism, 
which is accessible to journalists, media analysts and researchers, but not to the large au-
dience, who still receives partial information. Th is situation suggests a market vacuum 
that might be ﬁ lled by a new arrival taking a diﬀ erent approach. But the macroeconomic 
misdevelopment remains; moreover the powerful forces now in control do not permit the 
changing of the status quo.
Th e media system in Moldova is determined by the political oscillations of the new 
state: the need to construct a nation-state and to respect ethnic minorities, and the im-
pulses towards European integration hindered by “traditional” links with eastern (post-so-
viet) partners. Th e Moldovan media are also shaped by the general macroeconomic situ-
ation of the country. Th e mass media cannot function as a market when other aspects of 
the market do not work properly, for example, when the shadow market is still powerful, 
or when the majority of people chronically lack income (which reduces their newspaper 
buying power).
Research on ownership concentration in Moldova is premature research. Th e concen-
tration studies and anti-concentration measures would be valid and functional in a society 
where democracy works and, more importantly, where the market works. Th e case of Moldo-
va reminds us that a free media, a free market and democracy are fundamentally related.
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no. -,  December .
 Vasile Spinei, “Freedom of speech: between an out-
dated law and a progressive law”, in Mass-Media in 
the Republic of Moldova, Annual Report , Th e 
Journalists’ Union of Moldova, , pp. –.
 Ibid, p. .
 Law no.-/ June  on the Protection of 
Competition, Th e Oﬃ  cial Monitor, no. -,  
December .
 Mass-Media in the Republic of Moldova, Annual Re-
port, , , p. .
 Report on activities of the Broadcasting Co-ordinat-
ing Council of the Republic of Moldova in the period 
August  - January . 
 Th e Association for Broadcast Media () was 
founded in September  by  audiovisual insti-
tutions, mainly private  and radio stations in Ro-
manian.  also includes two public institutions 
founded by the City of Chisinau - Antena  and  
. ’s current activities include monitoring the 
activities of broadcast media in Moldova (while ap-
pealing to public and political ﬁ gures on the national, 
European and world levels to facilitate the process) 
and attempting to bring the regulatory framework for 
the broadcast media in line with a democratic soci-
ety’s standards. See <http://www.acces-info.org.md/
sirb.htm> (accessed on  December ).
NOTES
 Interview with Victor Osipov, Executive Manager of 
 (Association for Broadcast Media), Chisinau,  
December .
 Moldpresa is a joint stock company (not a limited 
company), and, according to Moldova’s legislation, 
the registration of shareholders of joint stock com-
panies is kept by Independent Registrars. Only share-
holders have the right to request information and 
only with the approval of the whole group of share-
holders. Every attempt to obtain information on 
Moldpresa  failed.
  , which publishes the Flux daily, tried to cre-
ate an alternative national distribution network. Be-
cause of ﬁ nancial diﬃ  culties, the   asked other 
periodicals to join this initiative. Other dailies refused 
to contribute because “Flux has a diﬀ erent politi-
cal orientation”; weeklies too were not interested in 
contributing to a network of dailies, and Russian lan-
guage print media have subscribers mainly in the ur-
ban areas where representatives of the Russian ethnic 
group are concentrated; therefore they are not very 
interested in creating a network which would distrib-
ute newspapers in the “God-forsaken villages”. See Val 
Butnaru, “Sa asteptam pina le va veni mintea la cap”, 
in Mass-Media in Moldova. Analytical Bulletin, June 
, pp. –.
 Th e existence of a Moldovan language was assumed 
by the soviet ideologists who tried to justify the So-
viet annexation of the Romanian territories in . 
Despite their relative success in imposing the expres-
sion “Moldovan language”, on  August , Moldo-
va adopted the Latin alphabet and in  changed 
the name of the spoken language from “Moldovan” 
to “Romanian”. But, ﬁ ve years later, the second Par-
liament elected in  in free democratic elections 
changed the name of the state language back to 
“Moldovan” (Constitution, Article ). Th is was the 
beginning of the linguistic battle. International con-
ferences, symposia, and workshops were organized 
to demonstrate that the language spoken in Moldova 
was, in fact, Romanian. Th is scientiﬁ c proof, however, 
did not convince everybody that that their language 
was not Moldovan and was not very diﬀ erent from 
Romanian. Th ere is no simple choice when it comes 
to naming a language. Th e intellectual elite and Euro-
pean oriented part of the population call the language 
“Romanian”; those hostile to the democratic rigors 
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call the language “Moldovan”. Choosing one name 
over another leads to diﬀ erent behavior: those who 
believe their language to be Moldovan would read 
diﬀ erent newspapers, listen to diﬀ erent radio stations 
and watch diﬀ erent  stations than those believing 
their language to be Romanian. Th erefore, in this re-
port when refering to the legal and oﬃ  cial aspects of 
the spoken language the expression“ the oﬃ  cial state 
language” is used.
 Literatura si arta (founder - the Writers’ Union from 
Moldova), Tara (founder: the Popular Front from 
Moldova). 
 Moldovanul and Pamint si Oameni - periodicals of 
the Moldovans Party and the Agrarian Party, no long-
er published. 
 Th e Press Law, no. -/ October, Th e Oﬃ  cial 
Monitor, no. ,  January , Art. ().
 Ibid, Th e Press Law, Art. ().
 Criteria for granting the licences and authorisation 
decision. See <http://www.cca.md/legislatie>.
 Th e  case: <http://www.ournet.md/~cairo/
stiri/_.html>.
 According to the last census (),  percent of the 
Moldovan population are ethnic minorities, of which 
only  percent are ethnic Russians.
 Th e  Case <http://www.ournet.md/~cairo/
stiri/_.html>.
 Ibid.
 Th e campaign was promoted by Komsomoliskaia 
Pravda Moldova, Arguemni i facti Moldova,  
Moldova; the Russian  station  sent to Moldo-
va a team of expert journalists to monitor the case.
 Law no. -/ September  on the Inter-
pretation of Article  par  of the Audio-visual Law”, 
Th e Oﬃ  cial Monitor, no. -,  October .
 Th e  Case. See <http://www.ournet.md/~cairo/
stiri/_.html>.
 Th e Decision of the Parliament no. -/ Febru-
ary  on the Concept of state support and promo-
tion of mass media in the years –, Th e Oﬃ  -
cial Monitor, no. -,  March .
 Ibid.
 Valeriu Saharneanu, “Th e Beginning of the millenni-
um for the Moldovan press”, in Mass Media in the Re-
public of Moldova, Annual Report , pp. –.
  Resolution  () on the functioning of 
democratic institutions in the Republic of Moldova, 
 April ; also on <http://assembly.coe.int> Doc-
uments: adopted texts .
 Law on the national public broadcasting, Teleradio 
Moldova, no..-/ July .
 Draft proposed by Association of Broadcast Media 
. 
 Ion Bunduchi, “Th e Electronic Media in Moldova, 
Year ”, in Mass Media in the Republic of Moldo-
va, Annual Report, , p. . 
 Constantin Pirtac, “Th e Moldovan Audio-visu-
al crown of thorns”, in Mass Media in the Republic 
Moldova, Annual Report, , p.  
 Ibid.
 A. Golea, I. Bunduchi, “Introduction”, Media Guide, 
, p. .
 Dmitrii Ciubasenco, “Th e Ethical Code of Journal-
ists: necessary but non-achievable” in Mass-Media in 
Moldova, Analytical Bulletin, Independent Journal-
ism Center, March, , p. .
 <http://www.irex.org/msi/Moldova> accessed Octo-
ber , . 
 Th e press’ practice shows that in the framework of the 
bilingual newspaper - Romanian-Russian - the circu-
lation of the Russian edition increase. Take, for ex-
ample, the circulation of the two language versions of 
the newspaper Comunistul/Kommunist in  - the 
Romanian version, Comunistul, was printed in , 
copies on publication day, while its Russian version, 
Kommunist, was printed in , copies. But there 
is also the conviction that only the Comunistul/
Kommunist, proves this assumption.
 Val Butnaru, “A good business: the Russian language 
newspapers” in Mass Media in Moldova, Analytical 
Bulletin, December , p. .
 V. Renita, “Business in the written press”, in Mass Me-
dia in the Republic of Moldova, Analytical Bulletin, 
September, , p. . 
 Ibid.
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 Val Butnaru, “A good business: the Russian language 
newspapers” in Mass Media in Moldova, Analytical 
Bulletin, December , p. . 
  Ibid. 
 Th e Press Law, art. ..
 “Th e content of the ﬁ le for participation at the tender 
for available frequencies” <http://www.cca.md/ legis-
lation>. 
 Data on shareholders were obtained exclusively from 
the Chamber of State Registration during the Novem-
ber and December . Th e data were received upon 
requests made separately for each media outlet. Ac-
cording to the internal procedure of the Moldovan 
Chamber of State Registration, a natural person can 
request information about only three diﬀ erent com-
panies per day. Th e requested information is issued 
after three days. 
 Flux is published four times a week; the Friday edition 
is larger and includes a digest of the other three edi-
tions of the week. Th e newspaper’s credit box shows a 
weekly circulation of ,.
 Certiﬁ cate /-  issued by the Chamber of State 
Registration of the Republic of Moldova,  December 
.
 Ibid.
 Information provided by the publishers in the “credit 
box” as required by the Press Law; October - Decem-
ber . 
 Certiﬁ cate / - issued by the Chamber of State 
Registration of the Republic of Moldova,  December 
.
 Certiﬁ cate /-). 
 Information provided by the publishers in the “credit 
box”, October – December .
 Information provided by the publishers in the “credit 
box”, October – December  and the Certiﬁ cate 
/-  issued by the Chamber of State Registra-
tion of the Republic of Moldova,  December . 
 Certiﬁ cate /-  issued by the Chamber of State 
Registration of the Republic of Moldova,  December 
.
 Information provided by the publishers in the “credit 
box”, October – December . 
 Information provided by the publishers in the “credit 
box”, October – December  and the Certiﬁ cate 
/ - . 
 Certiﬁ cate /-  issued by the Chamber of State 
Registration of the Republic of Moldova,  December 
.
 Information provided by the publishers in the “credit 
box”, October – December . 
 Certiﬁ cate /- issued by the Chamber of State 
Registration of the Republic of Moldova, . Decem-
ber .
 Ibid. 
 Information provided by the publishers in the “credit 
box”, October – December . 
 Certiﬁ cate /- issued by the Chamber of State 
Registration of the Republic of Moldova,  December 
. 
 Ibid. 
 Information provided by the publishers in the “credit 
box,” October – December . 
 Certiﬁ cate /- issued by the Chamber of State 
Registration of the Republic of Moldova,  December 
. 
 Ibid. 
 Certiﬁ cate /-  issued by the Chamber of State 
Registration of the Republic of Moldova,  December 
.
 Ibid.
 Th e list of radio stations with transmission over-the-
air, ,  October .
 Media Guide , Independent Journalism Center, 
, p. . 
 Certiﬁ cate /- issued by the Chamber of State 
Registration of the Republic of Moldova,  December 
. 
 Ibid. 
 Th e list of radio stations with transmission over-the-
air, ,  October . 
 Media Guide , Independent Journalism Center, 
,p. ). 
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 Certiﬁ cate /- issued by the Chamber of State 
Registration of the Republic of Moldova,  December 
. 
 Ibid. According to Moldova’s legislation, the registra-
tion of shareholders of a joint stock company is kept 
by Independent Registrars. Only shareholders have 
the right to require information and only with the ap-
proval of the whole group of shareholders. In the case 
of Analitic Media Grup , the registrar is  
. Every attempt to obtain information on Analitic 
Media Grup  from  . failed.
 Th e list of  stations with transmission over-the-air, 
,  October .
 Media Guide , Independent Journalism Center, 
, p. .
 Certiﬁ cate /- issued by the Chamber of State 
Registration of the Republic of Moldova,  December 
.
 Ibid.
 Th e list of radio stations with transmission over-the-
air, ,  October . 
 Media Guide , Independent Journalism Center, 
, p. .
 Ibid.
 Certiﬁ cate /- issued by the Chamber of State 
Registration of the Republic of Moldova,  December 
.
 Ibid.
 Th e list of radio stations with transmission over-the-
air, ,  October . 
 Media Guide , Independent Journalism Center, 
, p. . 
 Ibid, p. . 
 Ibid, p. .
 Interview with Alina Radu, freelance writer, formerly 
journalist at Flux Daily, Chisinau,  October . 
 Igor Volnitchi, “Was the year  the beginning of a 
new era in the development of the Moldovan printed 
press?”, in Mass Media in the Republic of Moldova, 
Annual Report, , p. .
 Media Guide , Independent Journalism Center, 
, p. . 
 A. Golea, I. Bunduchi, in “Introduction”, Media 
Guide, , p. . Th e authors use the name “Miig” 
for this media holding, but this name is not widely 
used. Th e “credit boxes” of four periodicals show that 
the founders are    and -
 . Th e date from the Chamber of State Regis-
tration shows that  has the same owners. 
 Certiﬁ cate /-  issued by the Chamber of State 
Registration from the Republic Of Moldova,  De-
cember .
 Media Guide , Independent Journalism Center, 
, p. . 
 Information provided by the publishers in the “credit 
boxes”. 
 A. Golea, I. Bunduchi, in “Introduction”, Media 
Guide, , p. .
 Valentina Luca, Victor Bogaci, “ - an Autono-
mous Public Authority?” in Mass media in Moldova, 
Analytical Bulletin, June , p. .
 According to Flux daily, Serghei Drobot is “the man 
of Boris Birstein in the ” and “the general director 
of the media holding which includes the Moldovan-
Irish company  , the radio station, Serebreanii 
Dojdi, the press agency, Interlic, and the periodicals, 
Delovaia gazeta, Kishiniovskie Novosti, Patria Tinara, 
Molodioj Moldovi”. Flux daily,  July, , p. ; Flux 
and Tara - both belonging to   - wrote ex-
tensively on the activity of “the controversial Cana-
dian businessman,” Boris Birstein, in the Republic of 
Moldova, and in other former soviet republics, and 
about his relation with the Moldovan political elite; 
Flux daily, being accused of defamation, entered 
into several lawsuits with Boris Birstein, see: <http:
//ijc.iatp.md/curier_media/archive/cmnov.html>; 
<http://www.rferl.org/newsline//_See/see_
asp.>; <http://www.transparency.md/news/
a.htm>. 
 Dumitru Ciubasenco, “Th e Newspaper-Man” in Cap-
itala magazine, October, .
 Law -/ July  on Philanthropy and Spon-
sorship, Th e Oﬃ  cial Monitor no. ,  August . 
 Panel discussion on mass media in Moldova or-
ganised by , with the participation of  media 
managers and analysts; <http://www. Irex.org/msi/
Moldova>; accessed  October .
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 Ibid.
 <http://www.transparency.md/Docs/art_timp.pdf> 
accessed  February .
 Mass-Media and Legislation, Analysis, Opinions, 
Proposals, Freedom of Expression and Access to In-
formation Promotion Center, Chisinau , p. .
 For example, Decision no. / October ; the 
 cancelled the license   of  August , is-
sued to the association  for the radio station 
Radio d’Or, rebroadcasting a Russian radio station Av-
toradio; another example: Decision  /  May  
of  cancelled a previous decision (no. ,  Octo-
ber ) issuing a license for Emico ., the owner 
of the radio station Vocea Basarabiei, which rebroad-
cast Voice of America, Radio Free Europe/Liberty, Ra-
dio ; information/report oﬀ ered by . 
 <http://ijc.iatp.md/curier_media/moldova.html>; 
<http://www.azi.md/tribune?=>; <http://
www.rsf.org/article.php?id_article= - k>; http:
//www.ifex.org/en/content/view/full// - k.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Th e number of media outlets in Montenegro has signiﬁ cantly increased over the past 
fourteen years. In , the media market consisted of one daily newspaper, one state-run 
national radio and the inﬂ uential state-run national television, plus a few radio stations 
owned by the local authorities. 
New media legislation was adopted at the end of , but its implementation has been 
diﬃ  cult. Although there were several obvious breaches of the new laws, the authorities 
have not reacted so far. Th e implementation of media legislation has even caused a politi-
cal crisis in Montenegro, since the opposition parties withdrew from Parliament after the 
Council of Public Service Radio and Television Montenegro () decided to terminate 
the coverage of Parliament sessions that were broadcast on a special channel of Radio and 
Television Montenegro (). 
Media concentration and monopolies do not seem to pose a threat to media pluralism 
in Montenegro yet. A much more serious problem has proved to be political aﬃ  liations, 
both in the state-owned and in the private media. 
2 REGULATIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION
At the end of , the Montenegrin Parliament adopted three laws that now regulate the 
media sphere: the Media Law, the Broadcasting Law and the Law on the Transformation of 
State Television into Public Service Television. Th e three laws were prepared in co-operation 
with the Council of Europe and , and in accordance with the European standards.
Th e new media legislation stipulates that the broadcast media owned by the state or lo-
cal authorities must be transformed into public service broadcasters, and the print me-
dia privatised. In accordance with this legislation, an independent regulatory body (the 
Broadcasting Agency) was created, as well as a task force to oversee the implementation 
of the media laws. 
Th ere are still no laws in Montenegro that would regulate ownership transparency and 
concentration in the print media, whereas the Broadcasting Law addresses the issue in a 
separate chapter (), titled “Preventing unlawful media concentration”. Article  stipu-
lates that media concentration is unlawful when a holder of a national television or radio 
license owns more than a  percent share in another broadcasting company that holds 
a similar licence (with national coverage). It is also unlawful for a private broadcaster to 
broadcast more than one radio and one television program in the same area. A holder of 
a national broadcasting license may not publish a daily newspaper with a circulation ex-
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ceeding , copies, neither own more than a  percent share in another company that 
publishes a daily with a circulation exceeding , copies, nor more than a  percent 
share in a news agency. A local or a regional broadcaster is prohibited from owning more 
than  percent of another local or regional broadcaster in the same area, as well as from 
owning a local daily newspaper in the same or in a neighbouring area.¹ 
When the Broadcasting Agency completes the Strategy and Frequency plan (due in 
spring ), it will announce a tender for frequencies for all broadcast media in Mon-
tenegro. According to the Broadcasting Law, any company or entity that does not have a 
clear ownership structure will not be eligible to receive a frequency license. At the mo-
ment, there are several companies in Montenegro that have an unlawful cross-media own-
ership structure and are in breach of the Broadcasting Law. It should be stressed that all of 
these companies had been established before any restrictions were in place, and some are 
currently undergoing the process of ownership transformation. 
One of the latest developments regarding the Montenegrin media legislation was a 
meeting in Podgorica on media concentration and transparency, held on  January . 
Council of Europe experts and members of the task force responsible for implementing 
the media legislation agreed that a new law has to be drafted that will address the issue of 
ownership concentration in the print media. At present, the only regulations that can be 
applied to the print sector in terms of ownership restrictions are contained in the above-
mentioned provisions of the Broadcasting Law. Also relevant in this respect is Article  
of the general Media Law that forbids a monopoly over information provision and stipu-
lates that protection of competition in the ﬁ eld of information provision will be regulated 
by separate laws.² 
A new law that will address the issue of ownership concentration in the print media will 
be drafted by a task force that will consist of both domestic and foreign experts. 
3 PRIVATISATION
So far there has been no privatisation of the state-owned media in Montenegro. Th e 
state broadcaster is in the process of transforming itself into a public service broadcaster. 
Th e newspaper publishing company,  Pobjeda, which publishes the Pobjeda daily, is 
still owned by the state. Its estimated market value is around   million. Its privatisa-
tion has not yet been carried out because of the already mentioned delays in the imple-
mentation of media legislation, and  Pobjeda is still subsidised by Parliament. Accord-
ing to some sources,  is a serious candidate to buy Pobjeda.
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After the collapse of socialism and disintegration of Yugoslavia, all new periodicals in 
Montenegro were launched by private owners, and frequencies were also allocated to pri-
vate broadcasters. Yet it should be noted that frequency allocation at times seemed to be a 
process carried out in an arbitrary manner, rather than based on a systematic strategy. 
4 MEDIA PLURALISM
Th e size of Montenegro and its population of , do not make a big market for the 
media, yet there are four daily newspapers, two leading weekly magazines,   stations 
and  radio stations. Th ese numbers include  local public radio services and two local 
public television services.
Until , when Vijesti was established, the only daily had been the Government 
controlled Pobjeda, which was founded in . At present, there are two other national 
dailies in Montenegro, Dan and Publika. It is estimated that a launch of a new daily in 
Montenegro would take an investment of about  . million. 
Th e newspapers diﬀ er among themselves in their political orientation. Pobjeda, with 
an estimated circulation of about , copies, is only rarely, or rather never, critical of 
the Government’s work. Vijesti, a business-oriented newspaper with a strong position in 
the market, has changed its editorial policy and become more critical of the Government 
since  became its co-owner. Dan, a daily with the reputation of having supported Slo-
bodan Milošević’s politics in Montenegro, is pursuing a clear anti-government editorial 
policy. In the summer of , the Dan daily published the name of the protected witness 
 in the Hague trials on war crimes in former Yugoslavia. Its owner, director, and edi-
tor in chief, Duško Jovanović, was subsequently summoned to the Hague to explain this 
decision. His answer was that he wanted to raise circulation. Th e envisaged punishment 
for this kind of oﬀ ence is seven years in prison or a ﬁ ne of  , or possibly both. 
Duško Jovanović’s trial at the Hague Tribunal is set for  May .³ 
Th e biggest private printing house in Montenegro is Rotoslog, with the Daily Press 
company being its major owner. Th e same company owns a majority stake in the main 
distributing company Štampa as well. Th e second printing house is entirely owned by Ju-
media Mont. 
Th e  market has changed signiﬁ cantly in the past decade as well. In , there were 
only two private stations, Blue Moon  and Sky Sat. Today, there is a much greater variety: 
, , Elmag, , Glas Plava, , Montena,  , Orion, Panorama, Sky Sat, Teuta 
(all these members of , the Association of Montenegrin Independent Broadcasters), 
 Nikšić,  Budva and   (the state-run Radio and Television Montenegro). 
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5 MEDIA OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE
5.1 PRINT MEDIA
Th e estimated number of potential newspaper readers in Montenegro is somewhere in 
the range of , persons, but naturally, circulation ﬁ gures cannot reach that number, 
owing to the pass-over readership. Research has shown that daily newspapers are read by 
almost  percent of the potential readership. According to a survey conducted in June 
, Montenegrins’ favourite daily is Vijesti (. percent), closely followed by Dan (. 
percent);  percent of the respondents opted for Pobjeda, and . percent for Publika.⁴
Th e same survey showed that . percent of the Montenegrin population reads week-
lies. Th e most popular weekly is Revija D with  percent of the readership, followed by 
Monitor with . percent of the total readership.
5.1.1 VIJESTI DAILY
Th e ﬁ rst issue of Vijesti was printed on  September  and within a short period of 
time the daily established itself as a strong player in the media market. At the end of , 
Vijesti was selling , copies, but a signiﬁ cant portion of that ﬁ gure can be attributed 
to the marketing campaign “Read books.” Th ursday editions of Vijesti are supplemented 
with a book and can be bought at the price of  .. Th e regular circulation of the daily 
is in the range of –, copies.
Th e Vijesti daily is published by the Daily Press company that also owns other enter-
prises in the print media sector ( percent of the largest distribution company, Štampa, 
and  percent of the printing house Rotoslog).⁵ Th e daily was established mainly with 
money provided by donors. At the time of its establishment, the ownership of the news-
paper was divided among ﬁ ve persons with -percent shares: Katarina Perović (Miodrag 
Perović),⁶ Željko Ivanović, Slavoljub Šćekić, Saša Eraković and Ljubiša Mitrović. After 
 entered Vijesti in , through a stake in Daily Press, this picture changed dramati-
cally.  bought  percent of the newspaper for approx.   million. One shareholder, 
Saša Eraković, decided to withdraw, and the four remaining individual shareholders now 
have a . percent stake each. Th erefore, neither  nor the individual owners have an 
absolute majority. 
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Chart  DAILY PRESS OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 
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daily newspaper distribution 
company
printin house
5.1.2 DAN DAILY 
Th e daily newspaper Dan was established in  by the Jumedia Mont company that 
also publishes the weekly Revija D, runs the radio station Radio D, and owns a printing 
house. Th e newspaper has a daily circulation of –, copies. Th e ownership struc-
ture of Jumedia Mont is quite clear, as the company is owned by Duško Jovanović and 
Mladen Milutinović, each with a  percent stake.
Chart  JUMEDIA MONT OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 
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 
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5.1.3 PUBLIKA DAILY 
Th e Publika daily was established in  and is the newest arrival on the dailies market 
in Montenegro. Its circulation is only around , copies.⁷ Th e founder of Publika is the 
Millennium company, owned by Vuk Rajković. 
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5.1.4 REVIJA D WEEKLY 
Revija D, the most popular weekly in Montenegro, is  percent owned by the Jumedia 
Mont company that also owns other enterprises in the media sector (daily Dan, Radio D, 
and a printing house). Its circulation is about , copies.⁸
5.1.5 MONITOR WEEKLY 
Th e Monitor weekly was established in July . At the time, it was the only independ-
ent professional media outlet in Montenegro, and the only one that raised its voice against 
the war in the former Yugoslavia. Today, Monitor has a circulation of about , cop-
ies. Th e founder and one of the owners of the publishing company that runs the Monitor 
weekly is Miodrag Perović, a professor at the Montenegro University. In addition to him, 
there are thirty other shareholders, most of them working for Monitor. Th rough Miodrag 
Perović, the Monitor weekly is linked to the Antena radio station, the Rotoslog printing 
house, and to the Daily Press company (publisher of the Vijesti daily and the major owner 
of distribution company Štampa). 
5.2 BROADCAST MEDIA 
Th e most inﬂ uential broadcast medium is the Radio Television Montenegro (), 
which is in the process of transformation into a public service broadcaster. Once this proc-
ess is completed, Montenegro will have one national public service broadcaster and  lo-
cal public service broadcasters, as all local media that are under the control of local au-
thorities are to be transformed according to the new law. But the  broadcasters that are 
still under local governments’ control are already past the initial deadline for the comple-
tion of this process, i.e.  May . Recently, the Council of  requested approval 
from the Government to raise the license fee from  . to  . At ﬁ rst, this was re-
fused with the explanation that license fee will not be raised before  has made the 
necessary transformation. However, after several public discussions the license fee has 
been raised to  ..
In addition to the public service broadcaster, there are three other television broadcast-
ers with national coverage in Montenegro: Serbian Pink , Montenegrin   and the 
Montenegrin Broadcast Company, . 
On the radio market, public service radio still holds a signiﬁ cant position, while the 
most popular private radio station is Radio Elmag, followed by Radio D and Antena M. 
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5.2.1 RADIO ELMAG
Radio Elmag, based in Podgorica, broadcasts nationwide on several frequencies. It was 
the ﬁ rst private radio station in Montenegro, when it launched its -hour music program 
in June . At the end of the s, Radio Elmag introduced news programs as well. 
Th e sole owner of Radio Elmag is the Elmag Company, owned by Gojko Mitrović. Th e 
Elmag Company also produces  programs for its own channel, Elmag , that covers 
the southern and central part of Montenegro. It has recently faced a drop in its audience 
share, because of the reductions in programming. For the most part, Elmag  re-broad-
casts Serbian   news programs. 
Th e Elmag Company is also registered for performing trade activities, and the media 
outlets are mainly ﬁ nanced through trade business. 
Chart  ELMAG OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE
GOJKO MITROVIC´
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ELMAG COMPANY
 
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in trade industry
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5.2.2 ANTENA M RADIO
Antena M broadcasts on several frequencies throughout the country and covers about 
 percent of Montenegro. It was established in July  and played a part in making the 
ﬁ rst steps towards a democratic development in Montenegro. Th e station is currently go-
ing through ownership transformation, but at the time of writing the report it is  per-
cent owned by Miodrag Perović. Th rough his media ownership, radio Antena M is linked 
to the Monitor weekly, the Rotoslog printing house, and the Daily Press company.
5.2.3 RADIO D
Radio D covers the wider area of Podgorica with its program, mostly consisting of mu-
sic. Th e station is  percent owned by the Jumedia Mont company that also owns other 
enterprises in the media sector (the Dan daily, the Revija D weekly, and a printing house). 
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Table  OWNERSHIP OF THE MAIN RADIO STATIONS IN MONTENEGRO
RADIO STATION OWNER AUDIENCE 
SHARE
RADIO ELMAG ELMAG COMPANY 18.2%
PUBLIC SERVICE RADIO PUBLIC SERVICE 12.5%
RADIO D JUMEDIA MONT 12.0%
ANTENA M MIODRAG PEROVI 7.1%
Source: Central Court Register and Survey “Radio programs in Montenegro”, Montenegro Media Institute, November . 
5.2.4 IN TELEVISION 
 Television, the ﬁ rst private  station in Montenegro to distribute its signal via op-
tical cable, covers the most part of Montenegro. It was launched on  February  
and shortly afterwards attained a rather large market share and became the leading Mon-
tenegrin private broadcaster. Its executive director, Rade Vojvodić, stated in an interview 
that the founder of   is the billboard advertising company Montepano, established in 
 in Podgorica. According to the data in the Central Court Register, the founders of 
Montepano are Lela Vojvodić and Slobodanka Pavlović. Rade Vojvodić is the executive 
director and a member of the company board. Other board members are Zoran Jelić and 
Vladimir Pavlović, but the shareholder structure is not available.
5.2.5 MBC TV 
 , formerly Blue Moon , covers various parts of Montenegro via several local 
frequencies. It was established on  June  in Podgorica as the ﬁ rst independent TV 
station in Montenegro. Blue Moon  was a small station focused on entertainment pro-
grams with a low audience share on the national level. Later, Blue Moon  was selected 
as a partner of  Montenegro, and the station was renamed Montenegrin Broadcast-
ing Company (). About  newcomers to the station formed a newsroom and started 
to produce balanced news programs. Th e latest survey put  in the fourth place among 
nation-wide television broadcasters in Montenegro, and the third place among the private 
outlets (its audience share is . percent).⁹
Th e ownership structure of the  station has remained unchanged since it was estab-
lished - Milutin Radulović owns  percent and Svetlana Barović owns the remaining  
percent.
5.2.6 TV MONTENA
Th e private  station, Montena, a member of Prevalitana group, covers central and 
south Montenegro, and only the town of Berane in the north. Before  and Pink appeared 
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on the Montenegrin  market, Montena was one of the leading private  stations, but 
as a survey on audience shares demonstrates, Montena now holds a fairly small audience 
share (to . percent).¹⁰ 
Prevalitana has three owners - Stevo Vučinić owns  percent of the company, Đuro 
Vučinić  percent, and Miodrag Vukmanović the remaining  percent. 
5.2.7 PINK TV
In the summer of  (and practically overnight), the Serbian private  station Pink 
began to cover twelve Montenegrin cities with perfect sound and picture. Th e occurrence 
of Pink  in Montenegro caused quite a stir among the Montenegrin media associations. 
Th e ﬁ rst question that was raised was how Pink  could enter the Montenegrin broadcast 
media market, and who allowed it, since none of the Montenegrin broadcasters, mem-
bers of the Association of Montenegrin Independent Broadcasters () had been able 
to obtain a licence for several years, and no tender for allocation of frequencies had been 
invited. Th e  published a letter in which it stated that “chaos in the Montenegrin 
media market is continued through the entrance of Pink ”, and that “Montenegro is a 
republic where laws are not respected”. Pink  started its programming without the per-
mission of the Republic Information Secretary, which is required by the Media Law.
Table  OWNERSHIP OF THE MAIN TV STATIONS IN MONTENEGRO
TV STATION OWNER AUDIENCE 
SHARE
RTVCG PUBLIC SERVICE 30.2%
PINK TV ŽELJKO MITROVIC´ 25.5%
IN TV - 18.9%
MBC M. RADULOVIC´ AND S. BAROV 6.9%
TV MONTENA PREVALITANA HOLDINGS 1.9%
Source: Central Court Register and survey ” programs in Montenegro”, Montenegro Media Institute, October . 
6 THE BIGGEST MEDIA OWNERS
Th ere are six major media groups in Montenegro, and all of them can be considered as 
cases of cross-media ownership.
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6.1 JUMEDIA MONT
Jumedia Mont Co., owned by Duško Jovanović and Mladen Milutinović, owns the Dan 
daily, the Revija D weekly and Radio D that covers Podgorica, Danilovgrad and Cetinje. 
Th e same company also owns a printing house. Its ownership is illustrated in Chart no. .
6.2 MIODRAG PEROVIC´
Miodrag Perović, a professor at the Montenegro University, owns the publishing com-
pany that runs the Monitor weekly, and the radio station, Antena M. Perović is also the 
founder of the Rotoslog printing house and he or his daughter Katarina Perović¹¹ is a 
shareholder in the Daily Press company that owns the Vijesti daily and the Štampa distri-
bution company. However, the ownership structure of these media outlets, distribution 
and printing companies is currently under transformation.
Chart  MEDIA OWNERSHIP OF MIODRAG PEROVIC´
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6.3 PREVALITANA HOLDINGS
Prevalitana Holdings (shareholders Stevo Vučinić, Đuro Vučinić and Miodrag 
Vukmanović) owns Radio Montena that covers central and southern Montenegro, and  
Montena that covers the same area, plus the town of Berane in the north. Th e company 
also has a  percent share in the  news agency. 
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Chart  OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE OF PREVALITANA HOLDINGS
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
   
M NEWS MINA TV MONTENA RADIO MONTENA
news agency activities
founders:
Jasa Jovičević
Danilo Cetković
news agency
6.4 ELMAG (GOJKO MITROVIC´)
Gojko Mitrović owns the nationwide Radio Elmag and  Elmag that covers the cen-
tral and southern part of Montenegro. Th e Elmag Company is also registered for perform-
ing trade activities, and the media outlets are mainly ﬁ nanced through trade business. 
Th e media and other business ownership of Elmag group (Gojko Mitrović) is illustrated 
in Chart no. . 
6.5 IZEDIN DINO RAMOVIC´
Izedin Dino Ramović owns Radio Mir and  Teuta that cover the same market, 
Podgorica, Bar and Ulcinj.
6.6 VUK RAJKOVIC´
Vuk Rajković is the owner of the Millennium company that publishes the Publika daily. 
He is also the founder of the Gorica company that owns Radio Gorica. Vuk Rajković is also 
a board member in Jugopetrol (oil trade) and Hotel Fjord (hotels, motels, restaurants), and 
the owner or founder of several other companies outside media business. 
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Chart  MEDIA AND OTHER BUSINESS OWNERSHIP OF VUK RAJKOVIC´
DAILY PUBLIKA

MILLENNIUM
 radio and TV activities
director
board of directors member founder
 
JUGOPETROL VUK RAJKOVIC´ KIA MONTENEGRO
oil trade veichle trade company
board of directors member founder founder
  
HOTEL FJORD GORICA JUVENTA
hotels, motels, restaurants radio and TV activities trade company

RADIO GORICA
6.7 POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS OF THE MAIN MEDIA OWNERS
Th e biggest media owners in Montenegro are Jumedia Mont, Prevalitana and Elmag. 
Th e political orientation of their founders and owners is not an issue they would discuss in 
public. However, some of them have been active on the political scene. Duško Jovanović 
(Jumedia Mont) used to be a member of the Democratic Party of Socialists, and for a 
while a member of a break-away party, the Socialistic People’s Party. He left politics after 
internal problems and poor election results of the party. Despite this, the daily Dan, run 
by Jovanović, is known as an outlet for anti-government opinions. Th e political stance of 
the other shareholder, Mladen Milutinović, is not publicly known.
Th e founders and owners of Prevalitana, Stevo Vučinić and Miodrag Vukmanović, 
were also founders and politically active members of the Liberal Alliance of Montenegro. 
Vukmanović was highly rated inside the party before him and Vučinić (together with sev-
eral other founders) left the Liberal Alliance. However, Vukmanović and Vučinić have not 
completely abandoned politics since on  January , they publicly warned Liberal Al-
liance members to change the current leadership structure in order to save the party.¹² 
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7 MEDIA INDEPENDENCE
In Montenegro there is a collective agreement at the national level valid for all em-
ployers and employees. Based on that, special agreements are signed for speciﬁ c indus-
tries. Th ey enable employers and trade unions to regulate their relations through in-house 
agreements. Th e in-house agreements deﬁ ne the rights and duties of employees, job de-
scriptions, amount of salary, and categorise employees based on their education and 
working experience. In the media industry, some publishers have never made in-house 
agreements, and even where such agreements are signed, the degree to which the publish-
ers respect them varies.
Th ere are several journalists’ associations and trade unions in Montenegro, but no 
strong ’s to monitor the media or play the role of media watchdog. Th e Association of 
Young Journalists is trying to conduct a media monitoring program, but they lack the ca-
pacities to do so. A journalists’ self-regulatory body (Independent Self-Regulatory Body, 
) was established in the summer of . Its aim is to promote the Code of Ethics and 
to take initiatives in terms of the watchdog role.
Th e Association of Professional Journalists of Montenegro was established in . It 
gathered journalists who confronted the political leadership and refused to participate in 
the war propaganda. In the ﬁ rst half of the s, it played a part in raising professional 
standards and the protection of journalists. However, in recent years the association has 
been less active and a number of journalists have left it.
Th e Association of Journalists of Montenegro was set up in the communist era. Numer-
ous journalists left this association in the s because of its open support for Milošević’s 
regime and the Montenegrin Djukanović-Bulatović leadership at the time. Apart from 
granting annual awards, the association currently plays only an insigniﬁ cant role.
Th e Independent Trade Union of Journalists was established several years ago. Th e aim 
of this organisation is to improve the position of journalists in Montenegro as well as to 
educate them about their rights. It has links with a number of similar organisations across 
Europe. Th e union is not yet inﬂ uential but it invariably reacts whenever journalist’s rights 
are violated.¹³
Th e Newspaper and Printing Trade Union operates within the framework of the Alli-
ance of Independent Trade Unions, established in the communist era. Th e organisation 
does not have a signiﬁ cant inﬂ uence and has not undergone any changes since the time it 
was established.
 is the Association of Montenegrin Independent Broadcasters, which includes al-
most all private  and radio stations in Montenegro.  plays a signiﬁ cant role in the 
implementation of media laws in Montenegro. Montpress is a similar association for print 
media, but so far it has only had limited inﬂ uence.
porocilo.indb   14 22.5.2004, 13:46:40
MONTENEGRO 361
Investigative journalism is often encouraged by s, both domestic and international, 
but only rarely by publishers. Among those that have most strongly encouraged investiga-
tive journalism in the past years are the  oﬃ  ce, the Montenegro Media Institute, and 
the Independent Self-Regulatory Body () whose latest attempt to promote it was the 
Investigative Journalism Award for .
8 CONCLUSIONS
Th e new media legislation in Montenegro (the general Media Law, the Broadcasting 
Law and the Law on the Transformation of State Television into Public Service Television) 
set the grounds for signiﬁ cant changes in the Montenegrin media system, when adopted 
at the end of . However, the implementation of the ground-breaking legislation that is 
in line with the international (including ) standards has been problematic. Th e demand-
ed transformation of the state or local authorities-owned broadcasters into public service 
broadcasters is taking place, but with delays, while the privatisation of print media has not 
even begun. Th e regulations regarding media concentration (contained in the Broadcast-
ing Law) are evidently violated in more than one case of cross-media ownership. In several 
major media companies the ownership transformation is underway to bring the compa-
nies in line with the media legislation. It should be noted that the set of media laws con-
tains only indirect regulations of ownership transparency and concentration in the print 
media, and that subject still has to be addressed in a separate law. Domestic and foreign 
experts are to draft a law in near future. 
Overall, the print media market currently consists of six major players: one state-
owned and three privately owned dailies and two privately owned weeklies. A clear (pro or 
con) stance to the Government can be recognised in the majority of those media outlets, 
underlined by the fact that several major media owners have become publicly known for 
their political activities. Political aﬃ  liations, both in the state-owned and private media, 
can currently be pointed out as a more serious concern than media concentration itself. 
Th e latter issue, however, does have great importance as the owners in the print sector 
hold strong positions in broadcasting as well. It is expected that the Broadcasting Agency 
will announce tenders for frequencies for all broadcasting media in the near future. If the 
Agency is strict in the implementation of media legislation, frequencies will not be allo-
cated to the companies with unclear media ownership. 
Professional and social conditions for the work of journalists are rarely regulated 
through in-house agreements, and a number of free-lance journalists work without any 
insurance. Th ere are several professional media organisations, some inherited from the 
past regime and others “independent”, but with little impact on the protection of journal-
ists’ rights or defence of media independence. 
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 Th e Broadcasting Law, published in the Službeni list 
Republike Crne Gore (Oﬃ  cial Gazette of the Republic 
of Montenegro), no.,  September . See <http:
//www.mminstitute.org>.
 Th e Media Law, published in the Službeni list Repub-
like Crne Gore (Oﬃ  cial Gazette of the Republic of 
Montenegro), no.,  September . See <http:
//www.mminstitute.org>.
 See <http://www.un.org/icty/bhs/frames/cases.htm>.
 Survey ”Public opinion on dailies and weeklies 
in Montenegro,” Montenegro Media Institute, 
Podgorica, June .
 Th e data on ownership structure of all Montenegrin 
media companies (and all other respective compa-
nies) are collected in the Central Court Register, 
and have been available free of charge at <http://
www.crps.cg.yu>.
 In the Central Court Register, Katarina Perović is list-
ed as a co-owner of Daily Press, but in the document 
which the Executive Director of the company sent to 
the author of the report, Miodrag Perović is stated 
as a co-owner. Also, if one searches for data on the 
Daily Press company through the names of owners in 
the Cental Court Register, Miodrag Perović appears 
among the owners. 
 Montenegro Media Book, Montenegro Media 
Institute, Podgorica, July . See: <http://
www.mminstitute.org/knjigaeng.php>.
 Ibid.
 Survey ” programs in Montenegro”, Montene-
gro Media Institute, October . See <http://
www.mminstitute.org>.
 Ibid. 
 In the Central Court Register, Katarina Perović is list-
ed as a co-owner of the Daily Press, but in the docu-
ment which the executive director of the company 
sent to the author of the report, Miodrag Perović is 
stated as a co-owner. Also, if one searches for data on 
the Daily Press company through the names of own-
ers in the Central Court Register, Miodrag Perović ap-
pears among the owners. 
  news agency.
 In the openning speech at the workshop “Protection 
of Free-lancers“ in Budva , Montenegro, in January 
, the President of the Independent Trade Union 
of Journalists of Montenegro, Vesna Pejović, said that 
“within the private media in Montenegro there is only 
a small number of journalists who enjoy rights arising 
from regular employment. Free-lance journalists 
work in very diﬃ  cult conditions, have no social, 
health and pension insurance, no free weekends 
and holidays, and working for small fees. Employees 
hide the number of journalists engaged under such 
inhuman terms.” 
NOTES
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The current media ownership landscape in Poland is a result of two divergent strategies 
that originated in the political and economic transition dating from 1989. State run pri-
vatisation and deregulatory policies concerning the print press helped to establish a press 
system almost exclusively dominated by private ownership and by a commercial model of 
market supply and demand. In a different vein, the television and radio scene was subject 
to control under the broadcasting regulatory scheme, leading to the establishment and 
maintaining of a private/public ownership duopoly. Such a patchwork of media ownership 
in Poland has been subsequently modified, and also challenged by the rapid development 
of monomedia expansion, cross-media concentration, regional consolidation, synergetic 
investment, as well as commercialisation of public broadcasters. Some of these processes, 
concentration in particular, continue to have a significant impact on external media plu-
ralism in Poland, ultimately resulting in lesser diversity of media outlets and supply as well 
as sustaining consolidation. 
2 REGULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION
In general, media pluralism and ownership issues in Poland are regulated by media 
and competition laws. Both frameworks are applicable in parallel but also complemen-
tary. 2003 saw an attempt to reform the existing regulatory scheme that turned out to be 
an unsuccessful project. The failure revealed not only the political and economic interests 
that underlay the normative goal of media pluralism (Rywingate), but also the unsuitable 
definition of media policy objectives. Protection of competition on the media market and 
safeguarding media pluralism are two different objectives that can hardly operate as mu-
tually replaceable. Whilst the given regulatory framework provides appropriate condi-
tions for implementation of the latter objective, the regulation of the former seems to need 
further improvement. There is no single regulatory mechanism or institution responsible 
for the distribution of state subsidies to the media. Existing direct and indirect subsidies 
are distributed with various purposes and within the frameworks of different institutions. 
In the same vein, editorial independence from owners and publishers is not explicitly reg-
ulated by the current media law.
2.1 SOFT ANTI-CONCENTRATION RULES
In addition to constitutional provisions,1 the media landscape in Poland is regulated by 
a national media law - the Broadcasting Act of 1992,2 with subsequent amendments, the 
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regulations issued by the National Broadcasting Council, and the Press Law of 1984.3 As 
a market, media landscape in Poland is subject to national competition law - the Act on 
Competition and Consumer Protection (2000)4 and other related regulations.5 
Limits on the concentration of broadcast media ownership were laid down by the 
Broadcasting Act within the framework of the procedure for granting and revoking broad-
casting licences. Under this law, a broadcasting licence may not be awarded if transmis-
sion of programming by an applicant could result in the achievement of a dominant po-
sition in mass media in the given territory (Art. 36).6 The broadcasting license may also 
be revoked on the same grounds (Art. 37).7 Yet, the Broadcasting Act does not explicitly 
define what a dominant position in mass media in the given territory is. It is the Act on 
Competition and Consumer Protection that provides the interpretation of a dominant po-
sition. This is understood as a position which enables an entrepreneur to prevent efficient 
competition on the relevant market. At the same time, it is assumed that the entrepreneur 
holds a dominant position when his market share exceeds 40 perent (Art. 4).8 In compli-
ance with the Broadcasting Act, the National Broadcasting Council evaluates whether 
a particular applicant may achieve such a dominant position while taking into account 
one of the main goals of the Broadcasting Act – ensuring of open and pluralistic nature 
of broadcasting. It should be added in this respect that media sector markets are treated 
separately, because the Polish competition law conceives relevant markets as those where 
products are regarded by consumers as substitutes.9 
Hence, media specific legal provisions aim at limiting horizontal media concentration 
only (or monomedia concentration, referring to concentrated ownership within a single 
sector of activity). Neither diagonal media concentration, i.e. integrating ownership and 
capital among different media sectors, nor vertical media concentration, i.e. integration of 
ownership and capital across different phases in the supply chain, is regulated by the cur-
rent broadcasting law.10
Monomedia press, as well as broadcasting concentration is subject to the provisions in 
the Act on Competition and Consumer Protection, which protects competition by pre-
venting any company from acquiring a dominant position on the press market. 
As described above, anti-concentration provisions enshrined in both the media and the 
competition laws in Poland may be defined as soft, because they tackle only certain as-
pects of the problem. At the same time, unlike in many EU member states, sector specific 
media rules, additional to those stipulated by the competition law, are not applicable inde-
pendently in their entirety. They are partly parallel, partly complementary. 
In terms of powers to prevent concentration on the media market, the regulator, the 
National Broadcasting Council, may require that a broadcaster, prior to authorisation, 
supply necessary information (including ownership data) that proves that the broadcast-
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er fulfils conditions for granting the licence. The Broadcasting Act entitles the National 
Broadcasting Council to call upon a broadcaster to cease production or transmission of 
programmes if these infringe upon the provisions of the Act and terms of the broadcasting 
licence (Art. 10).11 Such control practices are not applicable to the press, except in some 
merger cases, where the Office for Competition and Consumer Protection may intervene 
on grounds of competition protection. 
2.2 NEW MEDIA LAW AND “RYWINGATE” 
The provisions limiting concentration in the broadcasting market in Poland have been 
subject to further re-drafting since 2001. The National Broadcasting Council prepared the 
Draft Amendment to the Broadcasting Act in January 2002.12 The document has been fur-
ther modified in the course of consultations with the Government, headed by the Minister 
of Culture.13 As regards limits on concentration, the rules on cross-media ownership were 
inserted into Article 36 of the Amendment, that operate through disqualification on the 
holding of license concerning both the broadcast and the print media. Hence, for instance, 
according to this draft, the publisher of a national daily would be disqualified to hold a li-
cense for a national radio or television channel.14 
The Draft Amendment received high publicity in spring 2002, when heads of the larg-
est private media companies filed a protest with the Prime Minister. In their opinion, the 
Amendment might lead to limitation of domestic media development and decrease its 
competitiveness on the internal EU market. Moreover, in the opinion of private media 
owners, the Amendment undermined freedom of speech and of the media. 
On 27 December 2002, Gazeta Wyborcza, the leading national daily in Poland,15 ex-
posed a corruption scandal widely referred to as Rywingate. In his conversation with Gaze-
ta Wyborcza’s Editor in Chief, Adam Michnik,16 in July 2002, the film producer, Lew Ry-
win,17 solicited an immense bribe in order to induce changes in the Draft Amendment, 
which would be advantageous for Agora company, the owner of Gazeta Wyborcza. During 
the conversation, recorded with the use of two hidden tape recorders by Adam Michnik, 
Lew Rywin mentioned that he was acting on behalf of “a group in power” and made it un-
derstood that Prime Minister Leszek Miller, knew about Rywin’s visit. Other names men-
tioned in addition to the PM’s name were Robert Kwiatkowski, the former Chairman of 
Polish Television, and Włodzimierz Czarzasty, a member (and former Secretary) of the Na-
tional Broadcasting Council. Lew Rywin suggested that the USD 17.4 million (EUR 14.3 mil-
lion) bribe (5 percet of the estimated value of Polsat - USD 350 million - EUR 286.9 million) 
would be used for the needs of the ruling Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and that he want-
ed to obtain a position as the future chairman of the Polsat television.18 Gazeta Wyborcza 
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waited six months before it revealed Rywingate, because its journalists were investigating, 
albeit unsuccessfully, who initiated Rywin’s proposal and what its real goal was. 
Gazeta Wyborcza’s leading story provoked an immediate public reaction. The News-
week Polska reported: “There is no clear definition of pathology. But what we have done 
with our public life has surely crossed the limit of normality.”19 Rzeczpospolita concluded: 
“No one doubts that the Rywin affair is the biggest scandal in recent years, and it will shake 
not only the world of politics and business.”20 
Shortly after the Gazeta Wyborcza’s disclosure, the Speaker of the Sejm (the lower 
chamber of the Polish Parliament) made an unprecedented decision and interrupted the 
work of the Sejm on the Draft Amendment. The Sejm appointed a special investigative 
committee on 10 January 2003 to scrutinise “corruption revealed by the mass media con-
cerning changes during the work on an amendment to the broadcasting law.” Since its for-
mation, the meetings of the Sejm Committee have taken place in public and have been 
fully covered by the media. In addition to this inquiry, the Public Prosecutor’s Appellate 
Office has conducted a separate investigation into the case. Also, journalists have started 
their own examination, aimed at uncovering the political and business background to the 
corruption scandal. 
Prime Minister Leszek Miller21 denied during the hearing before the Sejm Investiga-
tion Committee that he authorized Lew Rywin to act as his intermediary. Moreover, he 
remained firm about the controversial Amendment and insisted that there was no reason 
to stop work on the broadcasting law. Unfortunately, hearings of the Sejm Investigation 
Committee disclosed several serious irregularities concerning legislative work. Juliusz 
Braun, a former Head of the National Broadcasting Council, stated before the Committee 
that “various stages of work on the Draft Amendment involved machinations, in the pop-
ular rather than legal sense of the word.”22 In addition to problematic competency of some 
of the drafters, two words of crucial importance disappeared during the drafting proc-
ess. This was the expression “or periodicals” that vanished from a key section of the Draft 
Amendment containing the anti-concentration rules. It meant, in fact, that publishers of 
periodicals would not be restricted from holding a licence for a national TV channel, while 
the publishers of national daily newspapers were denied this possibility.23 
These circumstances led to broad criticism of the Draft Amendment and repeated 
appeals to withdraw it from the Sejm. A number of organisations demanded profound 
changes, such as a reform concerning nomination of members to the National Broad-
casting Council.24 In the proposal of the Press Freedom Monitoring Center, candidates 
for membership are to be proposed by academics and media professionals to ensure that 
they represent professional communities, not active politicians.25 Other demands includ-
ed a division of the legislative procedure into two parts: one would comprise a new Draft 
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Amendment that would be designed to encompass “European provisions” only, while all 
other matters, including anti-concentration rules on cross-media ownership, would be 
regulated by a new, future media law that would replace, not amend, the current Broad-
casting Act.26 Another point that has been criticised was the fact that under the Draft 
Amendment several institutions shared responsibility in the licence granting and frequen-
cy allocation procedure, while it could be more effective for one body to fully control these 
regulatory matters.27 
Ultimately, under the pressure of public opinion, Leszek Miller asked the Sejm Speak-
er to withdraw the Draft Amendment from the Sejm at the end of July 2003. At the same 
time, the Ministry of Culture began to work intensely on a new amendment (also called “a 
small amendment”). It was accepted by the Government in October 2003 and delivered to 
the Sejm on November 2003. 
The document itself does not contain anti-concentration provisions, nor does it regu-
late how the transparency of media ownership should be superintended. It focuses mainly 
on such issues as the portion of programming reserved for European works (Art. 15), the 
definition of “European works” (Art. 15b), provisions regulating advertising in broadcast 
media (Art. 16a,b), sponsorship (Art. 17), protection of minors (Art. 18), and the mission 
of public radio and television (Art. 21).28 The only change with an impact on ownership 
concerns foreign investment. Under Article 35, broadcasting licences may be granted to 
foreign persons or entities permanently resident in the EU. Companies with foreign share-
holders from countries other than the EU may be granted a licence if foreigners do not hold 
more than 49 percent in the opening or share capital of the company.29 The Draft Amend-
ment was enacted by the Sejm on 2 April 2004 and came into effect on 1 May 2004.30
Rywingate corruption scandal showed that effort to reform media legislation in Poland 
was a Gordian knot – one that is too tangled to be neatly untied, and so can only be cut. 
Although investigation seems to be approaching its final phase, it is nowhere near a break-
through in disclosing “a group in power,” and media reform is still far from being complet-
ed. The Sejm Investigation Committee approved as its final report an account of an MP, 
who argued that Rywin was a deceiver, acting alone and without support from “a group in 
power,” because there was no such group. Since the end of July 2003, the Appellate Pros-
ecutor has been conducting an investigation into the case of the former Draft Amendment 
from which two words of crucial meaning were removed during the legislative procedure. 
The trial of Lew Rywin, accused of “paid protection,”31 is being conducted by the District 
Court in Warsaw. Hearings have been taking place since the beginning of December 2003. 
Finally, PM Leszek Miller has announced his resignation as of 2 May 2004.
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2.3 TRANSPARENCY OF OWNERSHIP
Two authorities have the legal power to investigate, to a certain extent, the transparency 
of media ownership in Poland. As regards the broadcasting sector, the National Broadcast-
ing Council may require a broadcaster to provide materials, information and documenta-
tion in the scope necessary for the purpose of supervising the broadcaster’s compliance 
with the provisions of the Broadcasting Act and the terms of a broadcasting licence.32 In 
accordance with the Amendment to the Broadcasting Act (2001), broadcasters should 
submit to the National Broadcasting Council their annual financial statements in the form 
specified by the Act on Accounting (1994).33 The purpose of this requirement is to review 
the financial and economic situation of broadcasters including advertising revenue, finan-
cial results (profits and losses), ownership structure and capital concentration.
In practice, the national Broadcasting Council is not always able to obtain a clear pic-
ture on the basis of the analysis of these financial statements. The following is the quote 
from the report of the National Broadcasting Council, “these (the financial statements) 
do not always give a complete insight into the economic and financial situation of broad-
casters and results achieved through their broadcasting activity.”34 Over and above these 
measures, the National Broadcasting Council may control ownership transparency with 
reference to licence-granting schemes. If another person (other than that stated in the 
broadcasting licence) takes over control of the broadcaster’s activity, the broadcasting li-
cence may be revoked by the National Broadcasting Council.35 There are no such regula-
tions related to the press.
As concerns provisions in the competition law, the Office for Competition and Con-
sumer Protection performs control over media ownership and concentration on the ba-
sis of the Act on Competition and Consumer Protection (2000). The President of the Of-
fice must be notified about the intended concentration if the combined turnover of the 
merging enterprises exceeds EUR 50 million.36 The obligation to notify the Office about 
the intention of concentration concerns almost all forms of mergers in the media mar-
ket, including, among others, mergers of two or more independent companies, takeovers 
through acquisition and purchase of stocks, securities, and shares.37 It should be men-
tioned here that these provisions refer equally to print, broadcasting and other media 
companies operating on the market. After notifying the President of the Office, companies 
must wait for the final decision by which concentration may be permitted (Art. 17 and 18) 
prohibited (Article 19), or the decision may be withdrawn because of unreliable informa-
tion. (Article 20).38
The Draft Amendment to the Broadcasting Act (2002) withdrawn by the Sejm in July 
2003 included a requirement on transparency of ownership and capital as a condition 
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specified in the broadcasting licence.39 No provisions to this effect are found in the 2004 
amendment.
2.4 MEDIA SUPPORT SCHEMES
In order to protect pluralism and counteract concentration on the media market, Eu-
ropean countries have developed a system of direct and indirect subsidies (low postal and 
telecommunication rates, interest-free loans, reduction or exemption from VAT, etc.) for 
the print media publishers and other media companies. In Poland, this policy is solely 
comprised of indirect subsidies, with an exception of special types of the press, such as 
national minority press or cultural magazines. It would be an overstatement to describe 
these indirect media subsidies as a single coherent policy with a mechanism of implemen-
tation. One can rather point to scattered policy initiatives developed within different gov-
ernment departments. 
The most widely approved indirect subsidy is the exemption from or reduction of VAT. 
Until 2001, the print media (both production and distribution) benefited from a zero VAT 
rate. The 2001 amendment to the Act on Commodity and Service Tax and Excise Tax 
(1993) introduced a 7 percent VAT on the sale of newspapers, magazines and periodicals,40 
and 0 percent on print services concerning newspapers, magazines and periodicals.41 Be-
cause all newspapers, magazines and periodicals were included in VAT exemption, and 
later reduction, this policy hardly influenced pluralism within the sector of the print me-
dia. It did not help small newspapers in any particular way to survive on the market, but 
rather strengthened the print media sector as a whole in fact of the many difficulties with 
which it is confronted. 
In August 2003, a new bill on Commodity and Service Tax was proposed by the Gov-
ernment to the Sejm.42 This bill included provisions imposing 22 percent VAT on print-
ing services43 and 22 percent on the sale of newspapers, magazines and periodicals whose 
substantial space is reserved for paid and unpaid commercial announcements, advertise-
ments or advertising texts.44 These changes met with much criticism from the press pub-
lishers, who argued that the competitiveness of Polish print houses on the internal EU 
market may be reduced and that the law might be implemented in a quite arbitrary man-
ner because of the vague definition of “substantial space.”45 As a result of negotiations with 
publishers, the Sejm Committee for Public Finances accepted a correction by which “sub-
stantial space” was replaced by “at least 67 per cent of the (newspaper’s, magazine’s, pe-
riodical’s) space” following Danish and French models.46 The Act was passed by the Sejm 
in March 2004.47
Small and community publications are protected through the “specialised periodicals” 
scheme. Under the Act on Commodity and Service Tax and Excise Tax (1993), the print-
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ing and selling of specialised periodicals is exempt from VAT.48 Specialised periodicals are 
defined as periodicals focused on culture, education, science, academia, social and profes-
sional topics, regional and local issues, and those designed for the blind. They may not be 
published more often than once a week, and their circulation cannot exceed 15,000 cop-
ies.49 The new Act on Commodity and Service Tax (2004) defines specialized periodicals 
in the same terms and provides zero VAT for magazine delivery and import.50 Unlike the 
1993 tax law,51 however, the new Act does not require that the list of these periodicals is 
approved by the Minister of Finance, Minister of Culture and Minister of Scientific Re-
search and Information Technology. 
Another example of indirect subsidies for a “special category” of media includes pro-
tection of “social broadcasters” by the Broadcasting Act currently in force. The Act ex-
empts social broadcasters from fees payable for awarding or altering the licence.52 A social 
broadcaster is defined as a broadcaster who propagates learning and educational activi-
ties, promotes charitable deeds, respects the Christian system of values and strives to 
preserve national identity through its programming. Such a broadcaster cannot transmit 
advertising or teleshopping or sponsored programs and may not charge any fee for trans-
mission, retransmission or reception of programming.53
Direct subsidies are provided for a relatively modest number of periodicals. The Min-
istry of Culture, the Ministry of Scientific Research and Information Technology and the 
Ministry of Environmental Protection disburse funds to cultural magazines, academic pe-
riodicals and environmental magazines. Only a small part of these subsidies are provided 
as ongoing support, while others are awarded through competitive grants. National mi-
nority press is subsidised by the Department of National Minority Cultures with the Min-
istry of Culture. In 2003, 34 national minority periodicals were assigned subsidies totalling 
PLN 2,484,000 (EUR 552,000).54 
2.5 JOURNALISTIC AND EDITORIAL INDEPENDENCE
Editorial independence from owners and publishers is not explicitly regulated by the 
current media law in Poland. Journalistic independence is protected within a general 
clause of freedom of speech. Article 54 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland 
states that freedom of opinion and freedom to acquire and disseminate information shall 
be ensured to everyone.55 It also stipulates that preventive censorship of the means of so-
cial communication and the licensing of the press shall be forbidden.56 The Press Law 
(1984) ensures that an employee in a printing industry or distribution service cannot lim-
it printing and distribution of newspapers, magazines, periodicals or other publications 
on the grounds of their internal policy or content.57 The Press Law also contains meas-
ures against a person who suppresses press criticism58 or uses violence or threat towards a 
 372 MEDIA OWNERSHIP AND ITS IMPACT ON MEDIA INDEPENDENCE AND PLURALISM
journalist in order to compel him to publish or stop the publication of particular journal-
istic material59. The independence of broadcasters (in the sense of persons producing or 
assembling programme services) is protected by the Broadcasting Act (1992)60. 
3 MEDIA PRIVATISATION
A legacy of censorship and tight media control during the Communist era led to rela-
tively broad political acceptance of deregulatory media policies after 1989. Privatisation of 
press companies lay at the very center of the Government’s response to the problem of the 
monopolistic and centralised media system in Poland. Other policy tools aiming at the full 
liberalisation of the press included abolition of censorship and its control bodies and the 
replacement of licensing requirements for the press with registration in courts. Thus, un-
like in some other countries of the region where privatisation was mainly a spontaneous 
process, the administration in Poland chose the model of state directed privatisation61.
3.1 BREAKING UP RSW 
The Government’s privatisation initiatives in the field of the press can be largely sub-
sumed by a process of dismantling the giant publishing organisation - RSW “Prasa-
Książka-Ruch” (The Workers’ Publishing Cooperative, “Press-Book-Ruch”), that had 
dominated the Polish press landscape for 40 years. As its name suggests, RSW was a huge 
state conglomerate comprising news production, publishing, printing and distribution of 
newspapers and periodicals. At its peak, in the late 1980s, RSW was the largest press insti-
tution of its kind in Central Europe. 
The legal frame for RSW privatisation was set up by the Act on Liquidation of The 
Workers’ Publishing Cooperative “Prasa-Książka-Ruch” (1990).62 The law stipulated that 
RSW’s dismantling was to be undertaken by a liquidation commission appointed by the 
Prime Minister.63 The commission was established on 6 April 1990, and it conducted most 
privatisation transactions at the very beginning of the 1990s. Pursuant to the law on RSW 
liquidation, the commission followed three basic strategies: assignment of the newspapers 
and periodicals to staff co-operatives, sale of the press titles to private owners, and return-
ing of the remaining property to the control of the state treasury. The law also set out how 
the commission should transfer newspapers and periodicals to journalistic teams. In or-
der to do so, at least a half of the staff members were required to invest in the co-opera-
tive an amount equal to the three average monthly salaries they earned at the newspaper 
or periodical in 1989.64 
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In general, the commission tended to hand over to employees successful periodicals 
with good prospects for development and continuous publishing, while other titles were 
put up for sale. Although plausible at the level of planning, in practice the choice has not 
always been based on economic criteria. A number of the commission’s decisions were 
made on political grounds, which is a process that could hardly be seen as transparent65. 
The normal process of privatisation through sales would involve auctions and the 
highest price criterion. In some cases, the commission’s procedures lacked these two at-
tributes, thus giving rise to criticism by the Supreme Chamber of Control. Referring to the 
privatisation of 17 printing houses, the Chamber highlighted serious failures concerning 
the sale of two printing houses in Gdańsk and Kraków without an auction and at lower 
price. Ultimately, the Chamber also critically evaluated the total revenues from RSW priva-
tisation, which according to the Chamber’s estimates should have been 55 percent higher 
than they were in practice.66
Pertaining to sell-offs, one has to hint at other factors that influenced the work of the 
commission. The amended 1984 press law contained no provisions regarding intervention 
in the press market, and hence no restraints on media concentration. Although there had 
previously been widespread political agreement on this option, it appeared to be flawed in 
view of new circumstances that came about as a consequence of privatisation. The com-
mission could obviously influence the first round of sell-offs on the press market, but not 
subsequent mergers and acquisitions. This then led to a relative concentration of own-
ership on the press market. Moreover, an unbalance between a deficit of domestic capi-
tal and an abundance of foreign investment resulted in the dominant presence of foreign 
owners, unlike in the case of broadcast media safeguarded by legal barriers. 
At the beginning of its activities, the commission supervised the privatisation of 178 
newspapers and periodicals. Of these, 71 were turned over to editorial teams, including 
two leading news weeklies, Polityka and Wprost. The remaining 104 titles were sold to pri-
vate owners, and three were returned to the control of the state treasury.67 The final report 
of the commission was accepted by the Minister of Finance in November 2000. The com-
mission formally finished its mission in March 2002 when the Prime Minister abolished a 
resolution on its appointment. 
Evaluating RSW’s liquidation and subsequent privatisation, some commentators de-
scribed it as one of the most far reaching and successful privatisation projects in Poland,68 
and one that resulted in establishing conditions for the development of independent and 
pluralistic media.69 However, in sum, there were many more critics of than supporters of 
the RSW privatisation. In the view of the latter, the privatisation process was confined to 
the dismantling of the RSW conglomerate, but the main objective – safeguarding media 
pluralism - has not been achieved. It was argued that the Commission did not act to se-
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cure diversity on the press market and protect newspapers facing extinction. Ultimately, 
the critics pointed out that the liquidation commission did not envisage the careful future 
planning needed for the development of a pluralistic media landscape.70 It should be not-
ed in this connection that, despite the commission’s declared intention of contributing to 
the development of a pluralistic press, its powers were limited. Not surprisingly then, the 
commission admitted in its final report that it had failed to create a press system accurate-
ly reflecting the pluralism of Polish society.71
3.2 LONG PRIVATISATION OF THE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM 
In addition to newspapers and printing houses, RSW held a monopoly of the distribu-
tion system through the Ruch chain. Ruch’s history goes back to 1918. After WWII the en-
terprise was nationalised and since 1973 incorporated into the structures of RSW. In 1991, 
a year after the formal liquidation of RSW, the Minister of Industry created a separate en-
tity – “Przedsiębiorstwo Kolportażowo-Handlowe Ruch” (Distribution-Trade Enterprise 
Ruch), later transformed into a joint-stock company. It comes as no surprise that 40 years 
of a legally guaranteed monopoly contributed to the unquestionable leadership of Ruch 
on the press distribution market. Today, Ruch claims to be the largest retail network in 
Europe owning over 13,000 sales outlets and supplying press to more than 22,000 other 
co-operating outlets72. Yet, unlike the overwhelming majority of the press titles that once 
belonged to the RSW, Ruch is still owned by the Polish State Treasury. In answering the 
question of why this is so, we must first point out the intricate and problematic privatisa-
tion process of the company that started in September 1995. During the first privatisation 
round, 12 companies applied for negotiations, among them 5 media sector companies,73 
including two domestic and three foreign ones. The Minister of Privatisation shortlisted 
three investors, who were then asked to prepare a final offer. The deadline, 30 April 1996, 
was met by only one company – the trust Hachette Distribution Services (HDS)74. Nego-
tiations with the Minister ended by 31 December 1996, when a preliminary agreement was 
signed with the HDS. Meanwhile, the UNIVERSAL company with a group of investors rep-
resenting Polish capital (who later established the trust PGK75) declared its willingness to 
offer better transaction conditions than the HDS. As a result, the Minister of State Treas-
ury renewed negotiations and re-launched the first round of Ruch privatisation in March 
1997. Claiming that the preliminary agreement from December 1996 was legally binding, 
the HDS responded by suing the State Treasury. Since then the case has remained open 
and owing to ongoing judicial proceedings, Ruch privatisation has been suspended. In Oc-
tober 2003, the District Court in Warsaw adjourned the hearing until January 2004. 
Meanwhile, Ruch has been gradually losing its market share at the expense of new pri-
vate competitors. As early as in 1993, about 99 percent of the newspaper distribution was 
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handled by Ruch, while in 1996 Ruch’s market shares dropped to 70 percent and in 2003 to 
53 percent. Revenues from sales during 1995–2005 were comparable to operational costs, 
whilst it was expected that the company will bring high profits. This trend might be even 
intensified with the continuous prolongation of the privatisation process.76
4 MEDIA OWNERSHIP – THE PATCHWORK OF CONSOLIDATION
Dominant media owners in Poland may be divided into three categories: companies 
opting for monomedia expansion and specialisation (mainly foreign publishers – H. Bau-
er, Axel Springer, Verlagsgruppe Passau), owners developing through cross-media owner-
ship (Agora, ITI Holdings) and groups choosing synergy investment in media and outside 
media sectors (Polsat). 
The print media sector is dominated by foreign, mostly German owners. The only do-
mestic competitor with control over large circulation shares is Agora Co. It must be add-
ed, however, that a number of relatively smaller Polish owners publish highly popular ti-
tles (for instance Murator, Polityka – Spółdzielnia Pracy, AWR “Wprost”, Migut Media and 
others). Furthermore, some of them, for example news weeklies, compete quite success-
fully with well-established foreign companies. At the same time, small media companies 
still continue to merge with powerful owners. In 2000, 25 mergers took place on the press 
market in Poland, and in 2001,  31 mergers, which respectively represents 7 and 8 per cent 
of all mergers on the press market in Europe.77 
Concerning acquisitions and sell-offs, one can observe three tendencies: thematic spe-
cialisation, diversification and regional consolidation. Thematic specialisation can best be 
illustrated by the strategy of H. Bauer in Poland. Diversification is practised most notably 
by Agora, which has entered successively various fields of media activity. Finally, the strat-
egy of regional consolidation, leading practically to the prevalence of one owner in one re-
gion, has been used by Orkla Press and Polskapresse. 
4.1 NEWSPAPERS
The unquestionable leader among daily newspapers in Poland is Gazeta Wyborcza 
(Election Gazette). Since its establishment in 1989, Gazeta Wyborcza’s 100 percent own-
er has been the Agora company. Gazeta grew into the best selling daily newspaper and a 
widely used source of information. Thanks to its unique formula of combining one na-
tional section with 19 regional supplements and a number of weekly magazines, Gazeta 
has dominated both the national and regional markets. Today, its daily sales amount to 
420,000 copies, cementing the daily’s top market position. 
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The Fakt daily (Fact) was founded as recently as 22 October 2003 by the German Axel 
Springer, operating in Poland through Axel Springer Polska LTD. Owned 100 per cent by 
the AS, the daily was designed to follow the model of the German Bild, Axel Springer’s 
flagship business and the best selling daily newspaper in Europe. The first issues of Fakt 
were sold in record numbers amounting to 410,000 copies. 
Table 1 OWNERSHIP, CIRCULATION AND SALES  
OF MAIN NATIONAL DAILIES IN POLAND IN 2002 AND 2003
NATIONAL DAILY 
NEWSPAPER
OWNER CIRCULATION 
2002
SALES 
2002
CIRCULATION  
01–06 2003
SALES
01–06 2003
GAZETA WYBORCZA AGORA CO. 536,072 420,628 542,726 418,249
FAKT AXEL SPRINGER 
POLSKA LTD.
- - 628,000* 342,000*
SUPER EXPRESS MEDIA EXPRESS 
LTD.
406,695 299,495 390,795 269,723
RZECZPOSPOLITA PRESSPUBLICA 251,838 188,265 248,800 186,970
Sources: ZKDP, The Press Circulation Audit Union (2003), Media and Advertising Almanac 2002/2003.
Notes: *The data refer to the period 22 – 31.10. 2003
** The table contains average data for given periods.
Until the launch of Fakt, Super Express – modelled as the first Polish tabloid - had been 
the second largest Polish daily newspaper in terms of sales. Since its onset in 1991, Super 
Express has been published by Holding ZPR Co. (Polish capital). In December 1994, ZPR 
sold 30 per cent of the shares to the Swedish company, Tidnings AB Marieberg, belonging 
to the Bonnier Group. Currently, the ZPR and AB Marieberg International each have 50 
percent shares in Media Express LTD., the publisher of Super Express. 
Rzeczpospolita (Republic) was founded in 1982 as an official government daily. Short-
ly after its formation in 1989, the new Solidarity government decided to sell 49 per cent 
of the stock to Socpresse, owned by the French media baron Robert Hersant. Thus, since 
1991, the daily has belonged to the company Presspublica, comprising state owned PPV 
Rzeczpospolita (51 percent) and French Socpresse (49 percent). In 1995 Hersant bought an 
additional 2 percent, reaching a total of 51 percent. Today it is estimated that Hersant has 
invested USD 4.5 million (EUR 3.75 million) in Rzeczpospolita, a situation which has con-
tributed to Rzeczpospolita’s becoming a daily reputed for providing reliable information 
with a stable readership reaching 190,000. In 1996, the Norwegian company, Orkla Media, 
bought all 51 percent in Presspublica from Hersant. This ownership structure was main-
tained until recently, but Orkla has expressed its interest in buying the remaining 49 per 
cent from the Government78.
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4.2 NEWS WEEKLIES
Although established only in 2001, Newsweek Polska gained the leading position among 
news weeklies in Poland. Newsweek Polska entered the Polish press market as a new 
project of its sole owner Axel Springer Polska. Fortunately for its competitors, the weekly 
has not taken away the majority of their readers, being able to attract new audience seg-
ments. However, differences in weeklies’ sales figures have been very narrow, as can be 
seen from the table below.
The first issue of Polityka (Politics) appeared in 1957. After 1989, Polityka’s staff suc-
ceeded in taking over the weekly in the RSW privatisation process and established the co-
operative, Polityka - Spółdzielnia Pracy (“Polityka – Labour Co-operative”). This strategy 
appeared to be rewarding. It has been perceived as a phenomenon that the second most 
popular news weekly in Poland is owned by its staff while this ownership structure has not 
changed over the years.
Wprost (Straight) weekly has been present on the Polish press market since 1982. Simi-
lar to Polityka, Wprost was acquired by a journalistic co-operative in 1991. In order to in-
novate publishing, it signed an agreement with Rok Corporation, but it expired in 1993. 
Since then, Wprost has been published by Agencja Reklamowo-Wydawnicza (“Advertis-
ing-Publishing Agency”) “Wprost”. 
Table 2 OWNERSHIP, CIRCULATION AND SALES  
OF MAIN NEWS WEEKLIES IN POLAND IN 2002 AND 2003
WEEKLY OWNER CIRCULATION  
2002
SALES  
2002
CIRCULATION  
01–06 2003
SALES 
01–06 2003
NEWSWEEK 
POLSKA
AXEL SPRINGER POLSKA 
LTD. 411,952 252,117 385,091 222,322
POLITYKA POLITYKA – SPÓŁDZIELNIA 
PRACY
349,745 223,931 324,321 210,212
WPROST AGENCJA WYDAWNICZO-
REKLAMOWA WPROST LTD.
336,208 188,119 319,404 184,194
Sources: ZKDP (2003), Media and Advertising Almanac 2002/2003.
4.3 NEWSPAPER DISTRIBUTION AND PRINTING
The largest share of the press distribution market in Poland, 53 percent, is held by Ruch, 
a joint stock company owned by the State Treasury. Its main private competitor, KOL-
PORTER, owned by three Poles, claims to control 32 percent of distribution. Established in 
1990, this Kielce-based company co-operates with 22 thousand sales outlets and distributes 
press 3,000 titles.79 Distribution of the foreign press is dominated by Eupress Polska (Axel 
Springer Verlag – 50 percent, Hachette Distribution Services – 50 percent). The largest 
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printing houses in Poland are RR Donnelley in Kraków (owned 100 percent by the Ameri-
can RR Donnelley & Sons Co.) and Winkowski Co. (owned by Zakłady Graficzne Piła Co., 
58 percent – belonging to Prószyński i S-ka, and American Quad Graphics, 42 percent).
4.4 TELEVISION
The Polish television landscape is largely dominated by the public broadcaster TVP – 
Telewizja Polska Co. (Polish Television), comprising the national channels TV1 and TV2, 
regional TVP3 composed of 12 regional channels and a satellite channel TV Polonia, all 
together amounting to 53 percent of national TV audience in 2001. TVP is owned by the 
State Treasury. Its operation is financed predominantly from advertising revenues (about 
58 percent), viewer licence fees (29 percent), sponsorship (3 percent) and other sources 
(10 percent). The low percentage of revenue collected from viewers license fees results in 
a relatively high share for TVP in the national advertising market (26.7 percent in 200180 
and 29.1 percent in 200381) and in the television advertising market (47.6 percent in 200182 
and 42.5 percent in 200383). 
The superior position of TVP ensues from two reasons. First, the public (formerly state) 
broadcaster has monopolized the TV landscape for 40 years, thus securing high audience 
loyalty. Second, unlike in the area of the press, broadcasting regulation imposed limits and 
control on the broadcasting market. Until May 1 2004, foreign investors were allowed to 
hold only a minority share (up to 33 percent) in the Polish broadcasting media under the 
1992 Broadcasting Act. In consequence, the absence of influential foreign investors has 
contributed to a division of the television market into two parts: one covered by the strong 
public broadcaster (53 percent) and the other by several private broadcasters (47 percent).
Table 3 OWNERSHIP AND AUDIENCE SHARES  
OF MAIN TELEVISION STATIONS IN POLAND IN 2002 AND 2003
TV STATION OWNER AVERAGE 
AUDIENCE 
SHARES 2002*
AUDIENCE SHARES 
NOVEMBER 2003**
AUDIENCE SHARES 
DECEMBER 2003**
TNS OBOP TNS OBOP AGB TNS OBOP AGB
TVP 1 STATE TREASURY 26.5 25.5 24.4 29.0 28.3
TVP 2 STATE TREASURY 20.6 22.2 21.5 20.6 19.6
POLSAT TELEWIZJA POLSAT CO. 18.5 17.9 17.5 17.1 15.9
TVN ITI HOLDINGS CO. 13.8 14.1 14.9 13.2 14.5
TVP 3 REGIONAL STATE TREASURY 4.4 4.8 4.7 4.5 4.9
TV4 POLSKIE MEDIA CO. 3.9 3.2 3.5 3.1 3.0
TVN SIEDEM ITI HOLDINGS CO. 2.2 1.5 1.8 1.3 1.8
Sources: TNS OBOP (2003), AGB (2003), National Broadcasting Council (Annual Report 2002), Media and Advertising Al-
manac 2002/2003.
Notes: *The data refer to the percentage of average audience share in television market.
**The data refer to weekly audience share.
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In the first broadcasting licence application process in 1993 - 1994, Time Warner, Bertels-
mann, Reuters, and Central European Development Corporation were partners for Polish 
license applicants. They were, however, turned down in favour of a Polish businessman, 
Zygmunt Solorz-Żak. The National Broadcasting Council’s decision for his Telewizja Pol-
sat (Television Polsat) was backed by the argument in support of domestic instead of for-
eign investment.84 Today, Polsat broadcasts 24 hours per day and covers 70 per cent of the 
country’s territory, reaching 80 percent of the population. The television station is owned 
by Telewizja Polsat Co., being a part of Polsat Capital Group controlled by Z. Solorz-Żak.
The second largest private channel – TVN - has been present in Poland since 1997. Ini-
tially, its 33 percent owner was the American CME (Central European Media Enterprises), 
also investing in the Czech TV Nova, Slovak TV Markíza and other television stations in 
the region. The majority share belonged to the Polish ITI Holdings Co. registered in Lux-
embourg. At the end of the 1990s, CME’s shares were taken over by the Swedish Scandi-
navian Broadcasting Systems – SBS, and in 2002 and 2003 they were bought by ITI.85 ITI 
Holdings, though, is not a 100 percent owner of TVN. On July 2003, the company signed 
an agreement with the BRE bank, which entitles the bank to exchange ITI securities for 10 
per cent shares in TVN.
TV4 is the third most popular private television channel operating in Poland. It was es-
tablished in 1998 as Nasza TV by the Polskie Media company, partly controlled by @Enter-
tainment Inc. In 2000, Nasza TV, burdened with debts amounting to PLN 80 million (EUR 
18.5 million), joined the Polsat group and was renamed TV4. 
4.5 RADIO
The monopoly maintained until the beginning of the 1990s by Polskie Radio (Polish Ra-
dio, currently the public, formerly the state broadcaster), has not had as strong an impact 
on the re-shaping of the radio scene as did that in the television field. The total audience 
share for the public radio (comprising four national channels – Program I, II, III, and Ra-
dio BIS, plus one external channel and seventeen regional public radio channels) was 28.9 
percent in 2002. Two main victors in the battle for radio audiences emerged at the begin-
ning of the 1990s from the private sector. 
Radio RMF FM (Radio Muzyka Fakty – Radio Music Facts) was established in 1990 in 
Kraków as Radio Małopolska Fun in co-operation with the French Fun Radio. The new-
ly founded radio profited from the equipment and know-how provided by the French. In 
1993, Krakowska Fundacja Komunikacji Społecznej - KFKS (Cracow Foundation of Social 
Communication), together with the Bank BPH (owned by the State Treasury), formed the 
company Radio Muzyka Fakty LTD., which since then has been a formal owner of the ra-
dio. The Foundation and the Bank held 60 and 40 percent stakes in the company, respec-
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tively. Five years later, the Foundation took over the Bank’s stakes, enabling, in fact, Stanis-
lav Tyczyński, the chairman and the founder of the radio station, to control the company.
RMF’s main rival, Warsaw based Radio Zet, has been broadcasting since September 
1990. It acquired its national coverage in 1994 and soon took up the second position in the 
audience ranking. The Radio Zet is fully owned by Eurozet company. 
Although incomparable with RMF FM and Radio Zet in terms of market shares, the 
Catholic Radio Maryja is the third, non-public radio station in the ranking of listener 
numbers. The station was created in 1992 by the Redemptorist Fathers, who were granted 
a nationwide licence in 1994. In addition to Radio Maryja, there is a Catholic radio net-
work - Radio Plus (22 radio stations) operated by individual dioceses.
Table 4 OWNERSHIP AND AUDIENCE SHARES  
OF MAIN RADIO STATIONS IN POLAND IN 2002 AND 2003
RADIO STATION OWNER AVERAGE 
AUDIENCE 
SHARES 2002
AUDIENCE 
SHARES 
08–10 2003
AUDIENCE 
SHARES 
09–11 2003
RMF FM HOLDING FM
Licence holder: Krakowska Fundacja 
Komunikacji Społecznej
22.4 24.3 23.6
RADIO ZET EUROZET LTD. 17.5 19.2 19.0
PROGRAM I PR STATE TREASURY 17.9 15.9 16.0
PROGRAM III PR STATE TREASURY 4.6 5.2 5.4
RADIO MARYJA PROWINCJA WARSZAWSKA 
ZGROMADZENIA NAJS´WIE˛TSZEGO 
ODKUPICIELA
Redemptorist Fathers
3.3 2.4 2.5
RADIO WAWA WAWA CO. 1.3 0.8 0.8
PROGRAM II PR STATE TREASURY 0.6 0.8 0.6
RADIOSTACJA EUROZET LTD. 67 %,
STOWARZYSZENIE ZHP 33%
0.4 0.6 0.6
LOCAL RADIO STATIONS 
INCLUDING NETWORKS
AGORA CO., HOLDING ZPR CO., AD 
POINT LTD., Y-RADIO LTD., ETC.
24.0 - -
Sources: SMG/KRC – Radio Track (2003), National Broadcasting Council (Annual Report 2002), Media and Advertising Al-
manac 2002/2003, Catalogue of Polish Media 1999/2000 .
Note: *The data refer to percentage of average audience share in the radio market.
4.6 RADIO NETWORKS
In its 2003 report, the National Broadcasting Council noted that capital concentration 
on the radio market had increased86. In particular, the Council identified intensified ac-
tivities of two owners of local radio station networks – Agora and ZPR, who concentrate 
more than half the local radio stations operating in the 7 largest local markets in Poland.87 
Nowadays, Agora owns 28 local radio stations providing programmes in several music 
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profiles. Holding ZPR Co. owns 24 local radio stations, of which 21 broadcast under the 
heading of the Eska network. 
5 BIGGEST PRINT MEDIA OWNERS
Given the ranking of print media owners according to their revenues, the group of the 
strongest publishers includes four companies: Agora Co., Wydawnictwo H. Bauer LTD., 
Orkla Press and Polskapresse (Verlagsgruppe Passau).
Table 5 PRINT MEDIA OWNERS ACCORDING TO REVENUE IN 2002
OWNER REVENUE 
(PLN MILLION)
REVENUE  
(EUR MILLION)
AGORA CO. 826 206,5
WYDAWNICTWO H. BAUER LTD. 580 145,0
ORKLA PRESS 330 82,5
POLSKAPRESSE (VERLAGSGRUPPE PASSAU) 302 75,5
AXEL SPRINGER POLSKA LTD. 260 65,0
EDIPRESSE POLSKA CO. 258 65,0
Source: Policy Pursued by the Polish State Towards Electronic Media in the Context of the European Audiovisual Policy: 
Premises for the New Law on Electronic Media and Amendments to other Legislation, Warsaw, 2003.
5.1 AGORA
Agora was established in April 1989 by the well-known film director, Andrzej Wajda, 
and two Solidarity leaders, Aleksander Paszyński and Zbigniew Bujak, to publish Gazeta 
Wyborcza. Over time, the number of the company’s shareholders encompassed more than 
20, most of them being Gazeta Wyborcza’s employees. Leading journalists, among them 
Adam Michnik, obtained a significant portion of the company’s shares. In 1993, 12.5 per 
cent of Agora’s stock was acquired by the US trust, Cox Enterprises, and since 1999, the 
company’s shares have been listed on the Warsaw and London stock exchanges.
Agora has consequently followed the strategy of cross media expansion, complement-
ing its organic growth with mergers and acquisitions. Among the milestones of cross-sec-
tor development, the following investments should be mentioned: a network of local radio 
stations (networking began in 1996), the launch of the Internet portal, gazeta.pl (2001), ac-
quisition of 13 magazines (2002) and purchase of shares in the outdoor advertising compa-
ny – Art Marketing Syndicate (AMS) (2002).88 In 2002, Agora was rumoured to have been 
interested in buying shares in Polsat, with this alleged intention having led to a proposal of 
bribery solicitation by Lew Rywin. 
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Recently, the Agora’s ownership structure has been composed of: Agora-Holding (20 
percent), employees (individual shares – 25.2 percent), Cox Poland Investments Inc. (10.3 
percent) and public stock offering (44.6 percent).89 The company has decided to imple-
ment another phase of organisational transformation, aiming to increase the effectiveness 
of its operations within changing market conditions. This will cause the lay-off of 500 per-
sons in the first half of 2004.90
Table 6 MEDIA AND OTHER BUSINESSES OWNED BY AGORA IN 2003
MEDIA TITLE/MEDIA SECTOR ACTIVITY LAUNCHED MEDIA TYPE CIRCULATION/
AUDIENCE/
MARKET SHARE 
2003*
GAZETA WYBORCZA 1989 NATIONAL DAILY 542,726
AUTO+ FEB. 2003 MONTHLY 144,414
BUKIETY (Bouquets) 1998 QUARTERLY -
CITY MAGAZINE NOV. 1998 FREE MONTHLY 155,000
CZTERY KA˛TY (Hearth & Home) OCT. 1991 MONTHLY 149,809
DZIECKO (Child) JAN. 1995 MONTHLY 90,956
KUCHNIA (Cuisine) JAN. 1995 MONTHLY 53,239
KWIETNIK (Flower and Garden) 1994 MONTHLY 106,761
LUBIE˛  GOTOWAC´ (Fine Cooking) DEC. 1997 YEARLY MAGAZINE -
ŁADNY DOM (House Beautiful) NOV. 1998 MONTHLY 77,960
MOTOCYKLE S´WIATA (Motorcycles of the World) 1992 YEARLY CATALOGUE -
OGRODY (Beautiful Gardens) MAY 1999 MONTHLY 42,764
PORADNIK DOMOWY (Good Housekeeping) SEPT. 1990 MONTHLY 637,868
S´WIAT MOTOCYKLI (Motorcycle World) 1993 MONTHLY 64,905
WIEDZA I Z˙YCIE (Science and Life) 1926 MONTHLY 89,339
METRO 2001 FREE DAILY 154,176
GAZETA WYBORCZA. TYDZIEN´ W BIAŁYMSTOKU  
(Gazeta Wyborcza. Białystok Week)
2003 FREE WEEKLY 12,000
GAZETA WYBORCZA. TYDZIEN´ W BYDGOSZCZY  
(Gazeta Wyborcza. Bydgoszcz Week)
2002 FREE WEEKLY 15,000
GAZETA WYBORCZA. TYDZIEN´ W TORUNIU  
(Gazeta Wyborcza. Toruń Week)
2003 FREE WEEKLY 12,000
GAZETA WYBORCZA. TYDZIEN´ W TRÓJMIES´CIE  
(Gazeta Wyborcza. Trójmieście Week)
2003 FREE WEEKLY 14,000
RADIO TOK FM 1998  
(AGORA–41.6%)
SUPER-REGIONAL 
NEWS/TALK RADIO
0.71%**
28 LOCAL RADIO STATIONS IN 20 LARGEST 
POLISH CITIES INCLUDING NETWORK BLUE, 
ZŁOTE PRZEBOJE AND OTHERS.
ACQUIRED  
BY AGORA SINCE 
1996
NETWORK OF LOCAL 
RADIO STATIONS
11.9%
GAZETA.PL JAN. 2001 INTERNET PORTAL 1.0%
AAABY.PL 2003 INTERNET 
ANNOUNCEMENT 
SERVICE
-
AMS CO. (ART MARKETING SYNDICATE CO. 1990 (ACQUIRED 
BY AGORA IN 
SEP. 2002)
OUTDOOR 
ADVERTISING
27%
POLAND 383
AGORA BIAŁOŁE˛KA, AGORA PIŁA,  
AGORA POLIGRAFIA
1994, 2000, 1998 PRINTING HOUSES -
Sources: Agora webpage <http://www.agora.pl> (accessed 7 August 2003), ZKDP (2003), SMG/KRC – Radio Track (2003), P. 
Płaneta, Media and Landscape Communication in Poland, Projekt Verlag, Bochum, 2003, Media and Advertising Almanac 
2002/2003.
Notes: *Circulation refers to the period Jan. – June 2003, radio audience to Jan. – June 2003, internet users to April 2002 and 
shares in advertising revenue to Jan. – June 2003. 
**The data refer to October-December 2002, SMG/KRC – Radio Track.
5.2 H. BAUER
H. Bauer has operated in Poland through Wydawnictwo H. Bauer LTD. since 1991. Its 
started with publishing Bravo (1991), successively developing main categories of its mag-
azine segment: women’s weeklies and monthlies, TV guides, youth magazines, computer 
and electronic game magazines and motor magazines. Bauer prefers specialisation and 
sells off titles that do not fit into its thematic portfolios. The most notable example is the 
sale of Bauer’s fortnightly, Twój Weekend, and bimonthly Kawai in 2003. On the other 
hand, expansion through specialisation can be best illustrated by the purchase of the popu-
lar women’s magazine, Twój Styl, in 2002 and the establishment of the women’s weekly Bel-
la in 2003. To date, Bauer has not invested in daily newspapers or other types of media91.
Table 7 MEDIA AND OTHER BUSINESSES OWNED BY H. BAUER IN 2003
MEDIA TITLE/MEDIA SECTOR ACTIVITY FOUNDED OR 
ACQUIRED BY  
H. BAUER
MEDIA TYPE AVERAGE 
CIRCULATION 
01–06 2003
TWÓJ STYL (Your Style) 2002 WOMEN’S MONTHLY 337,333
TWÓJ STYL LOOK 2002 WOMEN’S MONTHLY, 
SINCE MARCH 2004 - 
QUARTERLY
106,964
TWÓJ STYL TRENDY 2002 WOMEN’S QUARTERLY 100,000*
FILIPINKA 2002 WOMEN’S MONTHLY 127,362
CHWILA DLA CIEBIE (Time for You) 1995 WOMEN’S WEEKLY 619,679
TAKIE JEST Z˙YCIE (That’s Life) 2001 WOMEN’S WEEKLY 212,105
TINA 1992 WOMEN’S WEEKLY 516,515
TWOJE IMPERIUM (Your Empire) 1998 WOMEN’S WEEKLY 440,060
Z˙YCIE NA GORA˛CO (Hot Life) 1994 WOMEN’S WEEKLY 817,403
BELLA 2003 WOMEN’S WEEKLY 487,740
S´WIAT KOBETY (Woman’s World) 1993 WOMEN’S FORTNIGHTLY 186,815
S´WIAT SERIALI (TV Series’ World) 2000 TV FORTNIGHTLY 178,032
IMPERIUM TV (TV Empire) 1998 TV WEEKLY 244,943
KURIER TV (TV Courrier) 2002 TV WEEKLY 418,674
SUPER TV 2001 TV WEEKLY 457,835
TELE MAX 2002 TV WEEKLY 497,408
TELE S´WIAT (TV World) 1995 TV WEEKLY 540,440
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TELE TYDZIEN´ (TV Week) 1993 TV WEEKLY 1,745,696
TO I OWO (Miscellaneous) 2001 TV WEEKLY 614,112
MAGAZYN DLA RODZICÓW: MAM DZIECKO 
(The Magazine for Parents: I Have a Child)
2002 MONTHLY 115,372
BRAVO 1991 YOUTH FORTNIGHTLY 356,078
BRAVO GIRL 1994 YOUTH FORTNIGHTLY 236,036
BRAVO SPORT 1997 YOUTH FORTNIGHTLY 138,673
TWIST 2000 MONTHLY 156,117
ACTION PLUS 2002 COMPUTER MONTHLY 48,916*
CD ACTION 2002 COMPUTER MONTHLY 158,210
CLICK! 2000 COMPUTER MONTHLY 106,339
CLICK! FANTASY KONSOLE - COMPUTER BIMONTHLY -
KONSOLE - COMPUTER QUARTERLY -
PC FORMAT 2002 COMPUTER MONTHLY 50,827
AUTO MOTO 2001 FORTNIGHTLY 112,290
MOTOR (Motorcycle) 2003 WEEKLY 65,505
KLUB DLA CIEBIE (Club for You) 2000 MAIL ORDER CLUB 800,000 
MEMBERS
BAUER – DRUKARNIA WYDAWNICTWA 
(Bauer – Publisher’s printing plant in 
Ciechanów)
1997 PRINTING HOUSE -
Sources: H. Bauer webpage <http://www.bauer.pl> (accessed 22 August and 26 November 2003), H. Bauer Annual Report 
(2002), ZKDP (2003), Media and Advertising Almanac 2002/2003.
Note: *The average circulation in 2002 provided by H. Bauer in The Annual Report 2002.
5.3 ORKLA PRESS
Poland was the first foreign market for the Norwegian Orkla, starting in 1990 in Wrocław 
with the unsuccessful launch of Dziennik Dolnośląski (Dolnośląski Daily). Since then, Orkla 
has not attempted to establish new titles, acquiring instead shares in regional daily newspa-
pers. In 1994, an unexpected sale offer came from Robert Hersant, who was forced to sell 
all regional dailies and later also the national Rzeczpospolita, owing to financial problems in 
France. In 1998, Orkla invested in the largest Lithuanian regional daily, Kauno Diena (Kau-
nas Daily – 100 percent) and in the Ukrainian Wysokyj Zamok (Upper Castle – 50 percent). 
Orkla has tended to seek monopoly newspaper positions in regions where the company 
has been active, while not interfering with provinces occupied by its competitor – Polska-
presse.92 These two companies co-operate in several ways. For instance, advertising sales 
are shared across regional newspapers, thus reducing costs. In 2000, Orkla bought a 20 
percent share in the advertising agency, Media Tak, owned by Polskapresse. The purpose 
of this transaction was to prevent domination by Gazeta Wyborcza of regional markets.93 
In addition, the weekly TV guide, Tele Magazyn, published by Polskapresse is distributed 
along with Orkla’s titles. 
Not surprisingly then, both companies found regional consolidation reasonable to 
achieve prevalence of one owner in one region. In September 2003, Orkla sold two of 
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its Wrocław dailies – Słowo Polskie and Wieczór Wrocławia – to Polskapresse. Thus, 
Wrocław and Dolnośląskie province became largely dominated by Polskapresse. By De-
cember 2003, all Wrocław dailies were consolidated into one daily appearing under the ti-
tle Słowo Polskie /Gazeta Wrocławska (Polish Word/ Wrocław Newspaper) with a 12-page 
supplement, Wieczór Wrocławia (Wrocław Evening). 
Table 8 MEDIA AND OTHER BUSINESSES OWNED BY ORKLA PRESS IN 2003
MEDIA TITLE/MEDIA SECTOR ACTIVITY NATIONAL/REGIONAL 
PUBLISHING 
COMPANY
ORKLA’S 
SHARES
MEDIA TYPE CIRCULATION 
01–06 2003
RZECZPOSPOLITA (Republic) PRESSPUBLICA 51 % NATIONAL DAILY 248,800
DZIENNIK WSCHODNI (East Daily) EDYTOR PRESS 100 % REGIONAL DAILY 30,815
GAZETA POMORSKA (Pomorze Newspaper) GP MEDIA 100 % REGIONAL DAILY 11,367
GAZETA LUBUSKA (Lubuska Newspaper) LUBPRESS 100 % REGIONAL DAILY 64,614
GAZETA WSPÓŁCZESNA  
(Contemporary Newspaper)
KRESY 100 % REGIONAL DAILY 28,649
GŁOS KOSZALIN´SKI/GŁOS SŁUPSKI
(Voice of Koszalin/Voice of Słupsk)
RONDO 39 % REGIONAL DAILY 35,406
GŁOS POMORZA (Voice of Pomorze) FORUM 100 % REGIONAL DAILY 29,893
GŁOS SZCZECIN´SKI (Voice of Szczecin) SZCZECIN PRESS 100 % REGIONAL DAILY 26,553
KURIER PORANNY (Morning Courrier) AWH EDYTOR 100 % REGIONAL DAILY 23,761
NOWINY (News) R-PRESS 64 % REGIONAL DAILY 37,600*
NOWA TRYBUNA OPOLSKA  
(New Opole Tribune)
PRO MEDIA 53 % REGIONAL DAILY 50,942
TYGODNIK OSTROŁE˛CKI  
(Ostrołęcki Weekly)
TYGODNIK 
OSTROŁE˛CKI
60 % REGIONAL WEEKLY 24,557
WYSOKYJ ZAMOK (Upper Castle) - 50 % FOREIGN REGIONAL 
DAILY (UKRAINE)
54,898*
KAUNO DIENA (Kaunas Daily) - 100 % FOREIGN REGIONAL 
DAILY (LITHUANIA)
35,951*
MEDIA TAK 20 % ADVERTISING AGENCY -
JOBS.PL INTERNET PORTAL -
Sources: Orkla webpage <http://www.orkla-press.pl> (accessed 7 August 2003 and 23 March 2004), A. Nalewajk, „Redaktorzy 
Excela,” Press, no 3 15.03 – 14 April 2003, ZKDP (2003), Media and Advertising Almanac 2002/2003.
Note: *The data refer to average sales in 2002.
5.4 POLSKAPRESSE (VERLAGSGRUPPE PASSAU)
The history of the publishing success of Verlagsgruppe Passau in Poland goes back to 
1994, when the Bavarian concern paid 100 million German marks for regional dailies sold 
off by Robert Hersant. The new empire of regional press grew quickly. Polskapresse’s main 
aspiration was to control regional readership in provinces where the company was a major 
player. In the cities, where Polskapresse acquired two or more dailies, some dailies were 
liquidated and others consolidated. Thus, Wieczór Wybrzeża and Dziennik Bałtycki, both 
published in Gdańsk, were merged into one daily. On the other hand, Express Poznański, 
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published in Poznań, was liquidated. Most spectacular, though, was the consolidation of 
the three Wrocław titles, eliciting a prompt response from the Office of Competition and 
Consumer Protection.94
Like Orkla, Polskapresse did not tend to invest outside the market for regional dailies. 
According to the Polish Agency for Foreign Investment, Polskapresse spent USD 174.5 mil-
lion (EUR 145.4 million) in Poland.
Table 9 MEDIA AND OTHER BUSINESSES OWNED BY POLSKAPRESSE IN 2003
MEDIA TITLE/ 
MEDIA SECTOR ACTIVITY
REGIONAL PUBLISHING 
COMPANY
POLSKAPRESSE 
SHARES
MEDIA TYPE CIRCULAT. 
01–06 2003
DZIENNIK BAŁTYCKI/
WIECZÓR WYBRZEZ˙A  
(Baltic Daily/ Evening Coast)
POLSKAPRESSE LTD.,  
BRANCH PRASA BAŁTYCKA 
IN GDAN´SK
100 % REGIONAL DAILY 91,481
DZIENNIK ŁÓDZKI  
(Łódź Daily)
POLSKAPRESSE LTD.,  
BRANCH PRASA ŁÓDZKA 
IN ŁÓDZ´
100 % REGIONAL DAILY 76,508
EXPRESS ILUSTROWANY  
(Illustrated Express)
POLSKAPRESSE LTD.,  
BRANCH PRASA ŁÓDZKA 
IN ŁÓDZ´
100 % REGIONAL DAILY 79,877
GAZETA KRAKOWSKA  
(Kraków Newspaper)
POLSKAPRESSE LTD.,  
BRANCH PRASA 
KRAKOWSKA IN KRAKÓW
100 % REGIONAL DAILY 60,906
DZIENNIK POLSKI  
(Polish Daily)
WYDAWNICTWO 
JAGIELLONIA CO.
25 % REGIONAL DAILY 90,483
GAZETA POZNAN´SKA  
(Poznań Daily)
POLSKAPRESSE LTD.,  
BRANCH PRASA 
POZNAN´SKA IN POZNAN´
100 % REGIONAL DAILY 61,383
GŁOS WIELKOPOLSKI  
(Voice of Wielkopolska)
OFICYNA WYDAWNICZA 
GŁOS WIELKOPOLSKI LTD.
24.5 % REGIONAL DAILY 77,373
SLOWO POLSKIE /GAZETA 
WROCŁAWSKA
(Polish Word/ Wrocław 
Newspaper)
POLSKAPRESSE LTD.,  
BRANCH PRASA 
WROCŁAWSKA IN WROCŁAW
100 % REGIONAL DAILY 67,500*
DZIENNIK ZACHODNI  
(West Daily)
POLSKAPRESSE LTD.,  
BRANCH PRASA S´LA˛SKA IN 
KATOWICE
100 % REGIONAL DAILY 113,220
TRYBUNA S´LA˛SKA  
(Silesian Tribune)
GÓRNOS´LA˛SKIE 
TOWARZYSTWO PRASOWE 
LTD.
76% REGIONAL DAILY 74,213
NASZE MIASTO (Our City) - FREE WEEKLY 87,900
TELE MAGAZYN  
(TV Magazine)
TELE MAGAZYN LTD. MAJORITY 
SHARES
FREE WEEKLY 
SUPPLEMENT
1,779,781
TV PILOT - - FREE WEEKLY 
SUPPLEMENT
370,000**
SUPER TELE - - FREE WEEKLY 
SUPPLEMENT
340,000**
MOTO EXPRESS - - ANNOUNCEMENT 
WEEKLY
-
JARMARK WYDAWNICTWO JARMARK 
LTD.
MAJORITY 
SHARES
ANNOUNCEMENT 
WEEKLY
41,225
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AUTOGIEŁDA 
WIELKOPOLSKA 4 KOŁA
- - FREE WEEKLY 
SUPPLEMENT
-
20 COMMUNE WEEKLIES  
(e. g. Tygodnik Kociewiak, etc.)
- MAJORITY 
SHARES
COMMUNITY 
WEEKLIES – 
SUPPLEMENTS TO 
REGIONAL DAILIES
-
MEDIA TAK - 73.2 % ADVERTISING 
AGENCY
-
WIELKOPOLSKI DOM 
MEDIOWY
WIELKOPOLSKI DOM 
MEDIOWY LTD.
MAJORITY 
SHARES
ADVERTISING 
AGENCY
-
GRATKA.PL GRATKA LTD. MAJORITY 
SHARES
INTERNET 
ANNOUNCEMENT 
SERVICE
1,200,000 
INTERNET 
USERS**
NASZEMIASTO.PL - - NETWORK OF 
INFORMATION 
SERVICES 
COVERING 99 
POLISH CITIES
800,000 
INTERNET 
USERS**
SIX OFFSET PRINTING 
PLANTS
- - PRINTING HOUSES -
Sources: Polskapresse webpage <http://polskapresse.pl> (accessed 27 November 2003), ZKDP (2003), M. Karaźniewicz, G. 
Kopacz, “Jedna mocna gazeta”, Press, no 12, 15 December 2003 – 14 January 2004, pp. 16 –17, K. Cira, Zagraniczne koncen-
rny prasowe na polskim rynku dzienników regionalnych, in Zeszyty Prasoznawcze, no 1-2, Kraków, 2000, pp. 7 –33.
Notes: *The data refer to the first issue of 3 aggregated titles, which appeared on 1 December 2003.
**Data provided by Polskapresse.
6 BIGGEST BROADCAST MEDIA OWNERS 
6.1 POLSAT
The Polsat capital group is centered around Telewizja Polsat (Polsat Television), owned 
by the Polish businessman, Zygmunt Solorz-Żak. Since the launch of its core TV channel 
in 1992, broadcast via satellite from the Netherlands, Polsat has vigorously engaged in a 
number of business activities including the establishment of new channels (Polsat 2, Pol-
sat Sport), operation of the digital platform, Polsat Cyfrowy (1999), investments abroad 
(Lithuanian Baltjos TV), incorporation of TV4 (2000) and re-animation of TN Puls which 
was connected to the Catholic Church and facing financial problems (2003). In 2002, the 
National Broadcasting Council accepted a resolution to grant Polsat a licence for the sat-
ellite broadcasting of Radio Polsat. 
In recent years, the Polsat group has followed the main strategy of its chairman and own-
er, paving its way to benefit from a synergetic development of complementary functioning 
companies. This helps to explain why Polsat has invested in banking (INVEST-BANK), the 
Pension Fund, Polsat, and the life insurance company, POLISA – ŻYCIE. At the beginning 
of 2003, Polsat Media signed an agreement to acquire a 21.4 percent share in the Elektrim 
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company. This is widely regarded as the next step in achieving control over Telefonia Cy-
frowa, the operator of the cellular telecommunication network, Era, owned by Elektrim 
and Telekomunikacja Polska (Polish Telecommunication).95 This has also proved that Pol-
sat is in the possession of substantial financial sources and thus does not necessarily need 
a strategic investor, such as Agora or some other source.
Chart 1 POLSAT OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE
POLSAT CAPITAL GROUP
87.7%
↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
POLSAT 
FOUNDATION
POLSAT 
CYFROWY
POLISA
Z˙YCIE
TELE AUDIO ANTENA 1
digital 
broadcasting
life insurance telemarketing TV production
↓ ↓ ↓
TELEWIZJA 
POLSAT CO.
POLSAT 
MEDIA CO.
→ TN PULS
broadcasting finance
advertising
broadcasting
36.8% 41.1% 5.85% 21.4%
↓ ↓ ↓         ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
POLSAT 1 POLSAT 2 PENSIONIST 
FUND POLSAT
Ù19.3% INVEST BANK 
CO.
TV4 ELEKTRIM CO.
↑ ↑ digital 
telecommunication
2.7% 2.95%
TOTALIZATOR 
SPORTOWY
Z. SOLORZ-
ŽAK
Sources: Polsat webpages <www.polsat.com.pl>, <www.ptepolsat.com.pl>, <www.polisa-zycie.com.pl> (All accessed on 9 
December 2003), Media and Advertising Almanac 2002/2003, Catalogue of Polish Media 1999/2000.
6.2 ITI
ITI was established in 1984 by two Poles – Jan Wejchert and Mariusz Walter. In 1991 
they were joined by Bruno Valsangiacomo. All three constitute the management board of 
the ITI group and are its main shareholders.96 Since 1995, the company has focused exclu-
sively on media and entertainment. ITI’s flagship TV station – TVN - was launched in 1997. 
Four years later, the company set up TVN 24 - the first 24-hour news channel in Poland. In 
2002, ITI bought the RTL7 channel from CLT-UFA and transformed it into TVN Siedem. Fi-
nally, in May 2003, TVN Meteo was established. These four TV channels now make up the 
main segment of ITI activities – television broadcasting. The next two segments involve 
new media and entertainment. It has to be mentioned in this context that ITI operates the 
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most popular internet portal in Poland – onet.pl (46 percent of market share). In the first 
half of 2003, ITI’s revenues amounted to USD 78 million (EUR 65 million). The company’s 
future plans include buying majority shares in the football club, Legia Warszawa.97
6.3 HOLDING FM
The largest private radio station in Poland, RMF FM, is the core business of the Holding FM, 
controlled by its chairman, Stanisław Tyczyński. In addition to RMF radio, there are six other 
main areas of Holding FM’s activities: multimedia, photography, internet, advertising, PR and 
concerts. Recently, Holding FM has been preparing the basis for launching a new entertain-
ment-music TV channel, by seeking a strategic investor able to finance the new enterprise.
6.4 EUROZET
Among the Eurozet shareholders are two heiresses of Radio Zet founder Andrzej Woy-
ciechowski – 23 percent each, the French company EDI Pologne (belonging to Lagardère 
Active Radio International) – 40 percent, Kanoko company (belonging to American Ad-
vent International) – 9 percent and Manaco (the company established by the managers of 
the radio) – 5 percent. The company owns three radio stations: Radio Zet, Radiostacja (67 
percent shares - Eurozet, 33 per cent – ZHP98) and Radio 1 (supra-regional station in Hun-
gary). In addition, Eurozet produces radio and TV ads through Studio Zet and operates the 
advertising agency, RRM.
7 MEDIA PLURALISM
Referring to transition and reform of the Polish media after 1989, Tomasz Goban-Klas 
wrote that “the Polish press became pluralistic but not really independent.”99 The difficulty 
with assessing media pluralism stems from the complexity of the issue and the lack of a pre-
cise and widely agreed definition of this term. Most authors, however, distinguish between 
internal and external pluralism. Thus, media pluralism would encompass both diversity of 
media supply reflected in the existence of a plurality of independent and autonomous me-
dia (external) as well as diversity of media contents available to the public (internal). 
7.1 EXTERNAL PLURALISM – DIVERSITY OF MEDIA SUPPLY
External media pluralism would be reflected in the existence of a plurality of autono-
mous and independent media. The table below shows the number of newspapers, maga-
zines and television channels in subsequent periods.
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Table 10 NUMBER OF NEWSPAPERS, MAGAZINES AND TV STATIONS IN POLAND
MEDIA TYPE 1995 2000 2002
NEWSPAPERS 108 66 53
MAGAZINES 4340 5468 5762
TV CHANNELS 12*  
(+15 PUBLIC)
42*  
(+16 PUBLIC)
44*  
(+16 PUBLIC)
Sources: Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Poland, 2001; GUS, Central Statistical Office (2003) – 
<http://www.stat.gov.pl/english/serwis/polska/2003/rocznik11/ksiaz.htm> (accessed 10 December 2003), ZKDP (2003), Me-
dia and Advertising Almanac 2002/2003, Catalogue of Polish Media 1999/2000.
Note: *The number includes regional, supra-regional and national private TV channels, thematic satellite and cable chan-
nels, and digital platforms. It does not contain channels of public broadcasters and cable TV operators. 
In some respects, newspapers numbers have declined in absolute terms during the last 
14 years. The period following 1989 saw a proliferation of manifold new titles on the Polish 
press market. At the beginning of the 1990s, 100 new titles on average were registered each 
month. At the same time, many of these never got off the ground. During the later period, 
the number of newspapers began to decline gradually. This process was intensified, espe-
cially at the regional level, in the second half of the 1990s, when owners have repeatedly 
used the pracice of consolidation. 
On the other hand, the number of magazines has been increasing. Publishers often de-
cide to introduce a new title similar in content to the best-selling category. Accordingly, Bau-
er publishes eight TV guides, slightly differing one from another. The average circulation of 
dailies is decreasing, while circulation of magazines is stable and in some cases increasing. 
Financial and business dailies represent an exception to this trend, as their circulation has 
been stable and recently even increasing. In comparison to 2002, the number of daily news-
papers in 2003 diminished, as three regional dailies (two Wrocław dailies and Bydgoszcz’s 
Ilustrowany Kurier Polski ) and two national dailies (Życie and Prawo i Gospodarka) were 
discontinued. One national daily (Fakt) entered the newspaper market in October 2003.
The television landscape in Poland was fundamentally shaped during the first licence-
granting period (1993–1994). The aim was to set up a model that would provide initial plu-
ralism of broadcasters, not competing for the same audience but complementarily address-
ing different audiences and their needs. As a result, licences were granted to 11 domestic 
broadcasters (one national – Polsat, one supra-regional – Telewizja Wisla and nine local) 
and one foreign broadcaster (pay TV – Canal Plus).100 Ideally, this should balance the dom-
inance of the public broadcaster already offering two national channels (TVP I, TVP II), 11 
regional channels, 1 satellite channel (Polonia) and a TV newspaper channel (Telegazeta). 
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A significant change in the number of TV channels broadcasting terrestrially, via satel-
lite and cable, took place in the next five years. During this period more than 20 thematic, 
mostly foreign, TV channels appeared on the market (including three Discovery channels, 
MTV Polska, Animal Planet, Le Cinema, HBO Polska, Eurosport Polska and others). Thus 
in 2000, there were more than 40 TV channels broadcasting in Poland, among them two 
digital platforms (Wizja TV, Cyfra+), eight national and supra-regional domestic channels 
and nine local TV channels. The situation had not significantly changed by 2003. Some 
new players entered the television scene (MTV Classics, Tele 5 – Fincast, digital platform – 
Polsat Cyfrowy, TVN Meteo), some merged with others (Wizja and Cyfra+), some changed 
owners and were renamed (RTL 7 for TVN Siedem and Nasza for TV4) and some inter-
rupted broadcasting (TN Puls). The National Broadcasting Council granted a licence to 
TV Trwam, which was connected to the Redemptorist Fathers and Tadeusz Rydzyk, who 
chairs Radio Maryja and publishes Nasz Dziennik. When launched, TV Trwam will be the 
second Catholic television channel in Poland, after TN Puls. 
7.2 CONDITIONS FOR ACCESS 
The press landscape in Poland is relatively diverse, although it is far from being satu-
rated. There are still a number of niches to be filled in terms of interests and groups of 
readers. The experience of recent years has shown that new titles (Agora’s monthly Auto+, 
Newsweek Polska) can successfully attract new audience segments. At the same time, more 
newspapers are being closed down than newly established. 
At present it is estimated that an investment of PLN 100 million (EUR 22 million) would 
be needed to launch a new daily newspaper with national coverage in Poland, which is ap-
proximately twelve times less than would be needed to launch a new national private TV 
channel. These costs may be correspondingly lower for regional dailies and regional TV 
channels. Ironically, it is the market of regional daily newspapers that suffers most from 
the effects of concentration, mergers and consolidation. 
As regards the foundation of new newspapers in Poland, the re-establishment of the 
Życie daily (approaching a circulation of 150,000) in January 2004 should be mentioned. 
The rights to publish both Życie and Prawo i Gospodarka – two titles of Dom Wydawnic-
zy Życie (Publishing House Życie) - were bought by AIB Investments LTD. for 750,000 PLN 
(EUR 166,666).101 The initial investment of the publishers in Życie was EUR 3 million.
Access to the broadcasting landscape depends heavily on the regulation policy of the 
National Broadcasting Council. In March 2003, the Council announced a call for applica-
tions to grant a nation-wide TV frequency. Since Polsat television was the only applicant, 
the Council accepted a resolution to award the licence to Polsat. The final decision of the 
Council will be taken in spring 2004.
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7.3 DIVERSITY OF CHOICE
Internal media pluralism may be best reflected in diversity of media types and contents 
available to the audience. A good example to describe diversity of choice would refer to 
daily newspaper with national coverage, given their specific contribution to exchange of 
information and opinion. In 2003, a potential reader in Poland could choose between 6 
general interest dailies with national coverage (Gazeta Wyborcza, Rzeczpospolita, Super 
Express, Fakt – since 22.10.2003, Nasz Dziennik, Trybuna), 4 financial and business dailies 
(Parkiet, Puls Biznesu, Gazeta Prawna, Rynki Zagraniczne), 2 sport dailies (Dziennik Spor-
towy-Przegląd Sportowy/Tempo, Sport) and 2 free dailies (Metro, Metropol). 
Gazeta Wyborcza (GW) has no broadsheet format, but in terms of content it is undoubt-
edly a quality daily. It offers both information and thorough analyses and essays. Sławomir 
Majdan described GW as: “an information factory, but also a picky and stuck-up aunt who 
sits on the couch fiendishly dispensing biting remarks about the guests who were unlucky 
enough to drop in for tea”102. GW is generally perceived as a newspaper with a liberal ori-
entation, but socially sensitive and investigative in its reporting. Rzeczpospolita evolved 
gradually from a government controlled daily established during the communist period 
towards an independent information and analysis-oriented newspaper. In comparison 
with GW, Rzeczpospolita devotes more space to in-depth economic and legal analyses and 
less to political and historical essays. 
Super Express (SE), the first Polish tabloid, offers a mix of infotainment and human inter-
est stories. In recent years, SE has gained a more dynamic image and earned some notoriety 
for its blunt headlines and paparazzi photographs invading the privacy of some politicians. 
As already mentioned, Fakt was designed to follow the model of Axel Springer’s flagship ti-
tle – BILD Zeitung – traditionally perceived in Germany as a tabloid with a right-wing ori-
entation, reflecting anti-communist views and the Cold War experience of Axel Springer 
himself.103 It is too early to indicate this orientation for Fakt. For now, the daily seems to be 
overwhelmed, just like SE, with infotainment, scarcely tackling analysis of political issues. 
Nasz Dziennik (Our Daily) belongs to the media empire of Father Tadeusz Rydzyk and 
the Redemptorists already running Radio Maryja and paving the way for the broadcast-
ing of TV Trwam. It strongly supports right-wing politicians, especially those who are con-
nected with a Catholic organisation – the Radio Maryja Family. Before the EU accession 
referendum, Nasz Dziennik exhibited an EU-sceptical orientation, often with anti-German 
sentiments. 
Trybuna (Tribune) is linked to the previously published Trybuna Ludu (People’s Trib-
une), one of the leading newspapers during the communist period. It has remained close-
ly tied to left-wing politicians and offers mostly information and opinion. During 2002 it 
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faced an immense drop in sales (-23 percent), similar to the other daily with a distinct po-
litical orientation (right-wing) – Życie.
Diversity of choice is also affected by editorial habits and innovations. Economic pres-
sure compels some editors to replace serious news journalism with infotainment, while 
others resort to internal circulation and “recycling” of press articles and background infor-
mation. This undoubtedly saves on the cost of journalistic production, but also decreases 
diversity of content and limits readers’ choice.
The range and offer of national private TV channels in Poland is far from being fully di-
verse. The main private terrestrial TV channel, Polsat, is predominantly oriented towards 
entertainment. In 2002, its programming consisted of movies (43 percent), entertainment 
(29 percent), information and opinion (5.5 percent), sport (4 percent), education and ad-
vice (2 percent) and other genres. This structure resembles the programming of the main 
Polsat competitor – TVN, whose offer includes movies (36 percent), entertainment (30 
percent), information and opinion (6.8 percent), education and advice (3.8 percent), sport 
(0.2 percent) and others.104 In both cases, entertainment, as the main programme genre, 
comprises mainly talk shows, reality shows and tele-competitions. Accordingly, TV4 and 
TVN Siedem focus mainly on movies, TV series and entertainment. 
8 MEDIA INDEPENDENCE
8.1 PRESSURE ON JOURNALISTS 
One of the main dangers posed by present developments in the Polish media is that of 
pressure on journalists and devaluation of journalistic independence. There are several 
kinds of pressure, with a variety of causes. The most obvious, perhaps, is the economic 
one, closely tied to journalistic employment. The fear of losing a job compels journalists 
to accept difficult working conditions and to follow orders from their managing editors.105 
Presenting results of a sample survey among Polish journalists, Andrzej Krajewski pro-
vides evidence of another source of risk: “Reporters are officially censored or quietly cor-
rupted by the local authorities. It is mostly those authorities that are themselves publishers 
of local dailies and weeklies.”106 
An additional serious problem is that of pressure from advertisers. As recently as in No-
vember 2003, the Management Board of the Chamber of Press Publishers condemned ad-
vertisers’ attempts to intervene in editorial content.107 This protest emanated particularly 
from the publishers’ raising awareness of pressure and reiterated complaints about adver-
tisers threatening publishers and editors with the withdrawal of advertisements if they fail 
to publish favourable articles.108
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A study of Polish journalists, conducted in the 1990s by Zbigniew Bajka, exposes the 
problem of restrictions on journalistic freedom. The question “Who or what restricts jour-
nalistic freedom?” was clearly answered by the journalists interviewed. An overwhelming 
majority of respondents – 42 percent – asserted that journalistic freedom was restricted 
through “pressure exerted by owners, editors in chief, stations, and direct supervisors”. For 
19 percent of respondents, the main source of restriction was “censorship in the editor’s 
office”, for 13 percent “other reasons, such as political preferences, etc.”, for 11 percent “au-
tocensorship”, and for 8 percent “external pressure.”109
The pressure on publishers exerted by politicians serves as just another illustration of 
restraint on journalistic practice. This issue has been repeatedly raised by Polish publish-
ers. One of the most insistent comments was addressed during the debate about the con-
ditions of Polish journalism organised by the Senate Commission on Culture and Mass 
Media in April 2002. A representative of a large foreign media owner stated that publish-
ers are frequently approached by politicians to mitigate critical reporting and local politi-
cians seek repeatedly support from Warsaw to influence media coverage.110 
8.2 INDEPENDENCE FROM OWNERS
Needless to emphasise, ownership structures and processes, such as consolidation or 
concentration, are reflected in the relations among owners, editors, and journalists. One 
salient issue of inter-dependency in the media environment is the question of whether 
a collective agreement between journalists and owners should be external, for instance, 
concluded on the national level, or internal. In Poland, journalists and owners have not 
formalised an agreement of this kind within the structure of national organisations repre-
senting both groups. However, there are some in-house arrangements. One such arrange-
ment was recently initiated by journalists working in newspapers published by Orkla. In 
the fall of 2003, representatives of the journalists’ unions established the Forum of Ork-
la Media Employees, to provide a space for debate and negotiations between owners and 
employees.111
Some journalist-owner relations are specific to situations where journalists are share-
holders of the media in which they work, as is the case of Gazeta Wyborcza and Agora, 
or the weeklies Polityka and Wprost. The close relations and overlapping, sometimes even 
conflicting, interests may lead to an intricate dilemma between safeguarding corporate 
interests or respecting journalistic independence. Thus, journalists of Gazeta Wyborcza 
were criticised by some colleagues from other newspapers for the fact that they waited five 
months before revealing Rywingate which has been perceived by some as protecting cor-
porate interests of Agora.112
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9 CONCLUSIONS
Our study of media ownership patterns in Poland and their effects on media freedom 
and pluralism followed three steps: analysis of the normative framework and media poli-
cies, description of media ownership structures, and a brief portrayal of media diversity 
and pluralism. 
At the normative level, media ownership patterns are regulated gently in Poland. Anti-
concentration provisions enshrined in both media and competition laws tackle a small 
scope of the problem, basically because they address neither diagonal, nor vertical media 
concentration. An attempt to reform media regulation in Poland failed not only due to Ry-
wingate and the revelation of the political and economic interests that underlay a norma-
tive goal of media pluralism, but also because of the inconsistency of the policy objectives 
that were to be addressed in one regulatory model. The need to secure media pluralism 
stems from disparate conditions and it is a different policy objective than ensuring appro-
priate functioning of the market through competition. This missing distinction may help 
to explain the absence of a structural regulatory mechanism which could aim at safeguard-
ing media pluralism. 
Evolution of media ownership patterns follows three basic developments in Poland. 
Monomedia expansion and concentration through specialisation is primarily the domain 
of foreign magazine publishers (e.g. H. Bauer, Axel Springer). By contrast, cross-media 
ownership and concentration has been practised largely by domestic groups (Agora, Hold-
ing FM, ITI Holdings). As for now, few players choose synergy investment in media and the 
outside media sector (Polsat). Small media owners continue to merge with powerful ones. 
In terms of media acquisitions and sell-offs, the three tendencies may be distinguished: 
thematic specialisation, diversification and regional consolidation. The last in particular 
has been placed at the center of concern, as it has led to an almost clear division of the re-
gional press market in Poland between two competitors (Orkla and Polskapresse). 
The changes in media ownership patterns in Poland have been accompanied by 
strengthened links between sectors and common strategies used by owners. These in-
clude sharing of costs and services (Orkla and Polskapresse), establishment of new com-
panies controlled by existing ones (Polsat), agreements made to benefit from cross-secto-
ral provision and cross-ownership of disparate service providers (ITI, Holding FM). These 
links and common strategies might be furthered by technological convergence between 
the traditional media, telecommunications and computer sectors. 
Media ownership patterns and related processes have a significant impact on external 
media pluralism in Poland. As a result of the above mentioned developments, the diversity 
of the print media landscape has been continuously affected by decline and consolidation 
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of newspapers. Because of sustaining concentration, the regional press market achieved 
the state of a duopoly, as it is controlled by two strong publishers (Orkla and Polskapresse). 
There is a private and a public sector duopoly in the television landscape, with four major 
channels (public TVP 1, TVP 2, and the private Polsat, TVN). A similar picture emerges in 
the radio landscape, which is dominated by four leading players (private RMF FM, Radio 
Zet and public Program I PR, Program III PR).
The need to safeguard media pluralism in Poland may be addressed by policy responses 
tailored as structural regulation. Over and above these provisions, structural regulation 
should be designed to encourage diverse forms of media ownership and control, as well as 
diversity of media types and content.
First, this calls for the introduction of long-standing and systematic monitoring of both 
external and internal media pluralism and transparency of media ownership, including 
content and service providers of the new communication services. Second, external and 
internal media pluralism may be reinforced by positive and negative measures. The posi-
tive measures for stimulating external media pluralism would encompass empowerment 
of diverse (local, community and in particular minority) media, direct financial support 
schemes and indirect subsidies, as well as the extension of public service broadcasting 
beyond existing public corporations. The negative measures protecting external media 
pluralism could include the re-shaping of current anti-concentration provisions with the 
purpose of limiting not only horizontal, but also diagonal and vertical concentration, the 
introduction of limits on press consolidation at the regional level and chain broadcasting 
rules explicitly aiming at keeping ultimate control over content at the level of local broad-
casters rather than networks.
Internal media pluralism could be fostered by positive measures including promotion 
of diverse media content, indirect and direct support for investigative, creative and qual-
ity reporting and encouragement of media organisations to strengthen editorial and jour-
nalistic independence through self-regulatory means, in-house agreements and nationally 
agreed standards. Negative measures, on the other hand, could include securing inde-
pendence of journalists from owners (e.g. through influence on the employment of edi-
tors) and a requirement for a certain portion of original programming in broadcasting and 
original content in the print press to limit recycling of media content. Where relevant, all 
of these measures should be extended to the new technology services.
POLAND 397
1 The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, adopt-
ed on 2 April 1997, Official Gazette no. 78, item 483, 
1997, mainly Articles 22 and 54.
2 Broadcasting Act, adopted on 29 December 1992, Of-
ficial Gazette no. 7, item 34, 1993.
3 Press Law, adopted on 26 January 1984, Official Ga-
zette no. 5, item 24, 1984, as amended.
4 Act on Competition and Consumer Protection, 
adopted on 15 December 2000, Official Gazette no. 
122, item 1319, 2000, as amended.
5 The regulation concerning media content, advertising 
and intellectual property rights has not been included 
in this respect.
6 Broadcasting Act, adopted on 29 December, 1992, Of-
ficial Gazette no. 7, item 34, 1993, as amended, Art. 
36, para. 2, p. 39. See also: <http://www.krrit.gov.pl/
stronykrrit/english.htm> (accessed 3 October 2003).
7 Ibid, Art. 38, para. 2, p. 41.
8 Act on Competition and Consumer Protection, 
adopted on 15 December 2000, Official Gazette no. 
122, item 1319, 2000, as amended, Art. 4, para. 9, p. 3.
9 C. Banasiński, R. Rittler, M. Kolasiński, Prawo radio-
fonii i telewizji w Polsce w świetle standardów euro-
pejskich (The Broadcasting Law in Poland in the Light 
of European Standards), Wydawnictwo KiK Koniecz-
ny i Kruszewski, Warsaw, 2001, p. 140.
10 Ibid, p. 141.
11 Broadcasting Act, adopted on 29 December 1992, Of-
ficial Gazette no. 7, item 34, 1993, as amended, Art. 
10, para. 3, p. 27.
12 Projekt nowelizacji ustawy o radiofonii i telewizji. 
Tekst przyjęty przez Krajową Radę Radiofonii i Te-
lewizji na posiedzeniu w dniu 14 stycznia 2002. (The 
Draft Amendment to the Broadcasting Act accepted 
by the National Broadcasting Council at its session on 
14 January 2002).
13 Krajowa Rada Radiofonii i Telewizji (The Nation-
al Broadcasting Council): Sprawozdanie KRRiTV z 
rocznego okresu działalności, (The Annual Report), 
2003, p. 31, available on: <http://www.krrit.gov.pl/
index.htm> (accessed 3 October 2003).
14 Sejm Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (The Sejm of the Re-
public of Poland), Document no. 1424, The Report 
of the Sejm Committee on Culture and Mass Media 
Including the Draft Amendment to the Broadcasting 
Act, Art. 36c, para. 1, p. 21.
15 Gazeta Wyborcza was established in 1989 with the 
purpose of supporting the Solidarity during the first 
free elections after the collapse of communism in Po-
land. It was meant to be a temporary newspaper, but 
with Adam Michnik as its Editor in Chief, it has be-
come the most popular daily in Poland. It has ac-
quired the status of a publicly influential institution 
and became part of a multimedia corporation benefit-
ing from paramount business success.
16 Adam Michnik is the former anti-communist, dissi-
dent and political prisoner, author of numerous books 
and essays, a moral authority and one of the most in-
fluential Poles. Since 1989, he has been Editor in Chief 
of Gazeta Wyborcza and one of the shareholders of 
the Agora company.
17 Lew Rywin is a film producer, since 1991 owner of the 
company Heritage films producing and co-producing 
films such as “Schindler’s List” by Steven Spielberg, 
“Pan Tadeusz” by Andrzej Wajda and “The Pianist” by 
Roman Polański. He was President and Head of the 
Supervisory Board of Telewizyjna Korporacja Party-
cypacyjna, a company controlling Canal Plus and Cy-
fra+ platform. After disclosure of Rywingate, he re-
signed from these positions.
18 The cover story, with a written record of the conver-
sation between Adam Michnik and Lew Rywin was 
reported by P. Smoleński, “Ustawa za łapówkę, czy-
li przychodzi Rywin do Michnika.” (The Law for a 
Bribe or Rywin Calling on Michnik), Gazeta Wyborc-
za, no. 300, 27 December 2002. See also: <http://
www1.gazeta.pl/kraj/1,42985,1237212.html> (accessed 
1 November 2003).
19 W. Maziarski, M. Karnowski, “Polityka sięgnęła 
bruku”, (Politics Touched the Pavement), Newsweek 
Polska, 12 January 2003, pp. 10–15. 
20 M. Majewski, A. Marszałek, L. Zalewska, “Nowe tro-
py w aferze Rywina” (The New Tracks in the Rywin’s 
Scandal), Rzeczpospolita, 13 January 2003, p. 1.
21 Leszek Miller announced that he and his government 
will resign on 2 May 2004. One reasons for the lack of 
support from the ruling SLD concerned the Rywin cor-
ruption scandal and the failure of media law reform.
NOTES
 398 MEDIA OWNERSHIP AND ITS IMPACT ON MEDIA INDEPENDENCE AND PLURALISM
22 “Krajowa Rada do dymisji” (The National [Broadcast-
ing] Council to Resign), Rzeczpospolita, 11 March 
2003, p. A3. “Resignation Please”, Warsaw Voice, 13 
March 2003. See: <http://www1.warsawvoice.pl/
view/1613> (accessed 27 October 2003).
23 Under Article 36c, para 1b of the Draft Amendment to 
the Broadcasting Act, it would be the Office for Com-
petition and Consumer Protection that would be au-
thorized to control whether an applicant for a nation 
wide licence for TV or radio broadcasting attains an 
influence on a national daily newspaper or regional 
daily newspapers and his market share, figured on a 
basis of sold or distributed copies, exceeds 30 per-
cent. Sejm Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (The Sejm of the 
Republic of Poland), document no. 1424, The Report 
of the Sejm Committee on Culture and Mass Media 
Including the Draft Amendment to the Broadcasting 
Act, Art. 36c, para. 1, p. 21.
24 Under the Broadcasting Act currently in force, 4 
members of the National Broadcasting Council are 
appointed by the Sejm, 2 by the Senate and 3 by 
the President. Broadcasting Act, adopted on 29 De-
cember 1992, Official Gazette no. 7, item 34, 1993, as 
amended, Art. 7, para. 1, p. 25.
25 Centrum Monitoringu Wolności Prasy (The Moni-
toring Center for Press Freedom), “Apel w sprawie 
nowelizacji ustawy o radiofonii i telewizji” (An appeal 
concerning the Draft Amendment to the Broadcast-
ing Act), <http://www.freepress.org.pl/210302_apel_
rtv.html> (accessed 11 October 2003).
26 See: J. Braun, “Czas na nowe prawo o mediach”, (The 
Time for a New Media Law), Rzeczpospolita, 8 July 
2003, A7; “Napiszmy od nowa” (Let’s Write it from 
Scratch), Gazeta Wyborcza, 9-10 August 2003, p. 27.
27 J. Braun, “Czas na nowe prawo o mediach”, (The Time 
for a New Media Law), Rzeczpospolita, 8 July 2003, A7.
28 Ustawa o zmianie ustawy o radiofonii i telewizji, pro-
jekt uwzględniający uwagi zgłoszone na posiedzeniu 
Rady Ministrów w dniu 21 października 2003 r. (The 
Amendment to the Broadcasting Act, the draft in-
corporating comments notified at the session of the 
Council of Ministers, on 21 October 2003), <http://
www.mk.gov.pl> (accessed 22 January 2004).
29 Ibid, Art. 35, pp. 13–14.
30 See the text passed on to the Senate: Ustawa z dnia 
4 marca 2004 r. o zmianie ustawy o radiofonii i tel-
ewizji (The Amendment to the Broadcasting Act of 
4 March 2004), <http://ks.sejm.gov.pl/proc4/ustawy/
2213_u.htm> (accessed 14 March 2004).
31 “Paid protection”, as interpreted in the Polish Penal 
Code, is an act liable to prison term up of to three 
years, while the charge of “corruption or fraud” can 
be sentenced by up to 12 years.
32 Broadcasting Act, adopted on 29 December 1992, Of-
ficial Gazette no. 7, item 34, 1993, as amended, Art. 
10, para. 2, p. 27.
33 Ibid, Art. 37a, p. 40. See also: Act on Accounting, 
adopted on 29 September 1994, Official Gazette no. 
121, item 591, 1994, as amended; Biuletyn Informa-
cyjny KRRiTV (The Information Bulletin of the Na-
tional Broadcasting Council), Sytuacja finansowa 
mediów publicznych i koncesjonowanych (The Fi-
nancial Situation of the Public and Licensed Media), 
January/February 2003, p. 7; available on: <http://
www.krrit.gov.pl/index.htm> (accessed on 3 October 
2003); Krajowa Rada Radiofonii i Telewizji (National 
Broadcasting Council), Informacja o podstawowych 
problemach radiofonii i telewizji (Information about 
Basic Issues of Broadcasting), 2003; p. 10, available 
on: <http://www.krrit.gov.pl/index.htm> (accessed 3 
October 2003).
34 Krajowa Rada Radiofonii i Telewizji (National Broad-
casting Council), Informacja o podstawowych prob-
lemach radiofonii i telewizji (Information about Ba-
sic Issues of Broadcasting), 2003; p. 10, available on: 
<http://www.krrit.gov.pl/index.htm> (accessed 3 Oc-
tober 2003).
35 Broadcasting Act, adopted on 29 December 1992, Of-
ficial Gazette no. 7, item 34, 1993, as amended, Art. 
38, para. 3, p. 41. 
36 Act on Competition and Consumer Protection, adopt-
ed on 15 December 2000, Official Gazette no. 122, item 
1319, 2000, as amended, Art. 12, para. 1, p. 6.
37 Ibid, Art. 12, para. 2 and 3, p. 7.
38 Ibid, Art. 17, 18, 19, 20, pp. 8–9.
39 Sejm Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (The Sejm of the Re-
public of Poland), Document no. 341-A, Autopopraw-
ka do projektu ustawy o zmianie ustawy o radiofonii 
i telewizji oraz o zmianie innych ustaw ( Auto-cor-
rection to the Draft Amendment to the Broadcasting 
Act), Art. 37, para. 1.10, p. 12.
40 Act on Commodity and Service Tax and Excise Tax, 
adopted on 8 January 1993, Official Gazette no. 11, 
POLAND 399
item 59, 1993, as amended, Art. 18, para. 2, p. 25 and 
enclosure no. 3, p. 78.
41 Ibid, Art. 50, para. 5, p. 56.
42 Sejm Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (The Sejm of the Re-
public of Poland), Ustawa o podatku od towarów i 
usług (Act on Commodity and Service Tax), Draft of 1 
August 2003, Document no. 1874. 
43 Ibid, Art. 36, para. 1, p. 62.
44 Ibid, Art. 36, para. 1 p. 62 and the enclosure no 3.
45 G. Kopacz, “Nadciąga VAT”, (The VAT is Coming), 
Press, 15 October –14 November 2003, pp. 46–49.
46 G. Kopacz, “Granica 67 procent”, (67 Per Cent Limit), 
Press, 15 February–16 March 2004, p. 16. See also the 
text passed to the Senate: Ustawa z dnia 20 lutego 2004 
r. o podatku od towarów i usług (Act on Commodity 
and Service Tax of 20 February 2004), enclosure no. 3, 
<http://ks.sejm.gov.pl> (accessed 14 March 2004)
47 See the text passed on to the Senate: Ustawa z dnia 
20 lutego 2004 r. o podatku od towarów i usług (Act 
on Commodity and Service Tax of 20 February 2004), 
<http://ks.sejm.gov.pl> (accessed 14 March 2004).
48 Act on Commodity and Service Tax and Excise Tax, 
adopted on 8 January 1993, Official Gazette no. 11, 
item 59, 1993, as amended, Art. 50, para. 5, pp. 55–56.
49 Ibid, Art. 50, para. 5b, p. 56.
50 See the text passed on to the Senate: Ustawa z dnia 
20 lutego 2004 r. o podatku od towarów i usług (Act 
on Commodity and Service Tax of 20 February 2004), 
Art. 148.1.3.a,b <http://ks.sejm.gov.pl> (accessed 14 
March 2004).
51 The Law expired on 1 May, 2004. See the text passed 
to the Senate: Ustawa z dnia 20 lutego 2004 r. o po-
datku od towarów i usług (Act on Commodity and 
Service Tax of 20 February 2004), Art. 172, <http://
ks.sejm.gov.pl> (accessed 14 March 2004).
52 Broadcasting Act, adopted on 29 December 1992, Of-
ficial Gazette no. 7, item 34, 1993, as amended, Art. 
39b, para. 2, p. 41.
53 Ibid, Art. 4, para.1a, p. 24.
54 Among them, the receivers of the largest subsidies 
have been: the weekly Niwa (PLN 310,000 – EUR 
6,888) for the Belorussian minority and the week-
ly Nasze Słowo (PLN 340,000 – EUR 7,555) for the 
Ukrainian minority.
55 The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, adopted 
on 2 April 1997, Official Gazette no. 78, item 483, Art. 
54, para. 1.
56 Ibid, Art. 54, para. 2.
57 Press Law, adopted on 26 January 1984, Official Ga-
zette No 5, item 24, 1984, as amended, Art. 3, p. 1.
58 Such a person may be fined or imprisoned. Ibid, Art. 
44, para. 1, p. 12.
59 Such a person may be imprisoned up to 3 years. Ibid, 
Art. 43, p. 12.
60 Broadcasting Act, adopted on 29 December 1992, Of-
ficial Gazette no. 7, item 34, 1993, Art. 6, para. 1, p. 25 
and Art. 13, para. 1, p. 27.
61 A. Gulyás, “Print Media in Post-Communist East 
Central Europe,” in European Journal of Communica-
tion, no. 1, 2003, p. 87.
62 Act on Liquidation of the Workers’ Publishing Coop-
erative “Prasa-Ksiazka-Ruch”, adopted on 22 March 
1990, Official Gazette, 1990, no. 21, item 125.
63 Ibid, Art. 3, p. 1.
64 Ibid, Art. 5, p. 2.
65 See: The report from the 30th session of the Sejm, on 
25-27 September 2002, document no. 40 (521) and the 
Bulletin no. 948/IV of the Sejm Committee on Culture 
and the Mass Media.
66 T. Mielczarek, Między monopolem a pluralizmem. 
Zarys dziejów środków komunikowania masowego w 
Polsce w latach 1989–1997, (Between Monopoly and 
Pluralism: Review of the History of Mass Media in 
Poland in 1989 – 1997) Wyższa Szkoła Pedagogiczna 
im. Jana Kochanowskiego, Kielce, 1998, p. 42.
67 K. Jakubowicz, “Media in Transition. The Case of Po-
land” in Media Reform: Democratizing the Media, De-
mocratizing the State. Ed. M. E. Price, B. Rozumilowicz 
and S. G. Verhulst, Routledge, London, 2002, p. 212.
68 L. Giorgi, The Post-Socialist Media: What Power the 
West? Avebury, Hants, 1995, p. 80.
69 Komunikat Komitetu Ekonomicznego Rady Min-
istrów, 27 May 1999, Warsaw; available at: <http://
www.kprm.gov.pl/1937_2879.htm> (accessed 15 De-
cember 2003).
70 See: The report from the 30th session of the Sejm, on 
25–27 September 2002, document no. 40 (521) and 
Bulletin no. 948/IV of the Sejm Committee on Culture 
and the Mass Media.
 400 MEDIA OWNERSHIP AND ITS IMPACT ON MEDIA INDEPENDENCE AND PLURALISM
71 K. Jakubowicz, “Media in Transition. The Case of Po-
land” in Media Reform: Democratizing the Media, De-
mocratizing the State. Ed. M. E. Price, B. Rozumilowicz 
and S. G. Verhulst, Routledge, London, 2002, p. 215.
72 Official web-site of Ruch, available at: <http://
www.ruch.com.pl> (accessed 26 November 2003).
73 These included: ZPR company from Warsaw, Ruch’s 
main private competitor – KOLPORTER, Norwegian 
Orkla Media Newspapers, Swiss Polinvest Holding 
AG and French Hachette Distribution Services who 
applied with the Polish investor – Wydawcy Prasy. 
A company Wydawcy Prasy (Press Publishers) was 
established by the Union of Press Publishers and the 
National Association of Press Publishers.
74 The HDS trust was established by the companies HDS 
– WP and SPC. HDS – WP consists of Hachette Distri-
bution Services (85 percent) and Wydawcy Prasy (15 
per cent). SPC comprises Polish companies – “Echo 
Press” Co. (34 percent), ELEKTRIM Co. (33 percent), 
“Forin” controlled by the BIG Co. (33 per cent).
75 PGK – Polska Grupa Kapitałowa (The Polish Capital 
Group).
76 In consequence, Ruch management prepared a new 
strategy for the years 2003–2005, aimed at raising 
company’s profit and its value before privatisation is 
completed.
77 Report on the Media Market in Poland, Arthur and 
Andersen, 2002.
78 “W druku” (In the Press), Press, no. 6, 15 June-14 July 
2003, p. 7.
79 In 2003, KOLPORTER merged with the Warsaw press 
distributor Jard Press and opened a new distribution 
center in Warsaw.
80 The data refer to 2001. Artur and Andersen 2002, CR 
Media 2002.
81 Data provided on the basis of: Expert Monitor, Rynek 
reklamy 2003 (Advertising Market 2003), January 
2004.
82 The data refer to November 2003, AGB.
83 Monitor, Rynek reklamy 2003 (Advertising Market 
2003), January 2004.
84 R. Filas, “Kapitał zagraniczny w polskich mediach au-
diowizualnych” (Foreign Capital in the Broadcasting 
Media), in Zeszyty Prasoznawcze, no. 3–4, Kraków, 
2000, p. 88.
85 In December 2002, ITI bought 2.6 percent shares in 
TVN from SBS paying USD 11 million (EUR 10 million) 
and in December 2003 purchased the remaining 30.4 
per cent shares for EUR 131.5 million.
86 Krajowa Rada Radiofonii i Telewizji (National Bro-
adcasting Council), Informacja o podstawowych pro-
blemach radiofonii i telewizji (Information about the 
Basic Issues of Broadcasting), 2003; p. 7, available 
on: <http://www.krrit.gov.pl/index.htm> (accessed 3 
October 2003).
87 Ibid, p. 9.
88 In 2003, AMS acquired Media System Europlakat 
Group paying PLN 1.9 million (EUR 454,545).
89 <http://www.agora.pl> (accessed 12 March 2004).
90 <http://www.agora.pl> (accessed 12 March 2004), see 
also: “W druku” (In the Press), Press, no. 2, 15 Febru-
ary–14 March 2004, p. 8.
91 <http://www.bauer.pl> (accessed 22 August and 26 
November 2003).
92 In February 2004, the Office of Competition and Con-
sumer Protection initiated an anti-monopoly pro-
cedure against Orkla Press, as it has dominated the 
market of regional daily newspapers in Białystok after 
acquiring a majority share in Gazeta Współczesna. In 
addition to Gazeta Współczesna, Orkla Press publish-
es the daily Kurier Poranny in Białystok. See: A. Nal-
ewajk, “Dominacja” (The Domination), Press, no. 3, 15 
March–14 April 2004, pp. 36–40.
93 A. Nalewajk, “Redaktorzy Excela” (The Editors of Ex-
cel), Press, no. 3, 15 March–14 April 2003, p. 52.
94 On October 2003, the Office of Competition and 
Consumer Protection initiated an anti-monopoly 
procedure, condemning Polskapress that the compa-
ny had neither notified the intention of concentration, 
nor applied for the transaction permission. Under the 
competition and consumer protection law, a com-
pany is obliged to apply for such approval if the to-
tal amount of transaction exceeds EUR 50 million. In 
February 2004, the President of the Office judged that 
Polskapresse did not meet this obligation and ordered 
it to sell off the Słowo Polskie daily. In addition, Polsk-
apresse was fined EUR 50,000. A similar decision was 
issued in February 2004, in the case of the companies 
Prasa Poznańska and Oficyna Wydawnicza Wielko-
polski, owned and co-owned by Polskapresse. In this 
case, the President of the Office ordered the cancella-
tion of an agreement of co-operation between the two 
POLAND 401
companies and requested that Polskapresse sell off 
part of Oficyna Wydawnicza Wielkopolski’s property. 
In addition, he urged Polskapresse to pay a penalty of 
EUR 50,000. Reacting to both decisions, Polskapresse 
decided to appeal to the Court of Competition and 
Consumer Protection, which will be the first such 
case concerning the print press in Poland. See: <http:
//www.uokik.gov.pl> (accessed 23 March 2004).
95 There has been an initial agreement between Polsat 
and Vivendi Universal for the purchase of 49 per cent 
of Elektrim’s shares for EUR 600 million. “W druku” 
(In the Press), Press, no. 2, 15 February–14 March 
2003, p. 16.
96 <http://www.iti.pl> (accessed 9 December 2003).
97 <http://www.press.pl> (accessed 30 March 2004). 
98 Związek Harcerstwa Polskiego – Polish Scouts Union.
99 T. Goban-Klas, The Orchestration of the Media: The 
Politics of Mass Communications in Communist Po-
land and the Aftermath, Westview Press, Boulder, 
1994, p. 223.
100 Krajowa Rada Radiofonii i Telewizji (National Broad-
casting Council), Sprawozdanie KRRiT za 1995 rok 
(The Annual Report 1995 ), 1996; available on: <http://
www.krrit.gov.pl> (accessed 10 December 2003).
101 “Druga próba” (The Second Test), Press, no. 10, 15 Oc-
tober–14 November 2003, p. 16; G. Kopacz, “’Życie’ w 
pośpiechu” (’Życie’ in Hurry), Press, no. 2, 15 Febru-
ary–14 March 2004, p. 8.
102 S. Majdan, “Slinging Some Mud”, Warsaw Voice, 13 
January 2003.
103 H.J. Kleinsteuber, “Federal Republic of Germany”, in 
The Media in Western Europe: The Euromedia Hand-
book, Sage, London, 1997, pp. 82–83.
104 Krajowa Rada Radiofonii i Telewizji (National Broad-
casting Council), Informacja o podstawowych prob-
lemach radiofonii i telewizji Information about Ba-
sic Issues of Broadcasting), 2003; p. 25, available on: 
<http://www.krrit.gov.pl/index.htm> (accessed 3 Oc-
tober 2003)
105 T. Goban-Klas, The Orchestration of the Media: The 
Politics of Mass Communications in Communist Po-
land and the Aftermath, Westview Press, Boulder, 
1994, p. 241.
106 A. Krajewski: “Shackling the fourth estate”, Warsaw 
Business Journal, 12 May 2003, available at: <http://
www.freepress.org.pl> (accessed 11 October 2003).
107 The Chamber stated: “The Management Board of the 
Chamber (...) considers it unacceptable that condi-
tions are stipulated in relation to editorial content, 
whose approval or disapproval could lead to an order 
of for advertising...” “W druku” (In the Press), Press, 
no. 11, 15 November–14 December 2003, p. 9.
108 Ibid, p. 9.
109 Z. Bajka, “Dziennikarze lat dziewięćdziesiątych” 
(Journalists in the 1990s.), in Zeszyty Prasoznawcze, 
No 3-4, Kraków, 2000, p. 55.
110 Zapis stenograficzny (188) z 8. posiedzenia Komisji 
Kultury i Środków Przekazu w dniu 9 kwietnia 2002 
r. (Report [188] from the 8. session of the Culture and 
Mass Media Committee on 9 April 2002), <http://
www.senat.gov.pl> (accessed 25 November 2003).
111 “W druku” (In the Press), Press, no. 10, 15 October –
14 November 2003, p. 12.
112 “Samoświadomość” (Self-consciousness), Press, no. 
12, 15 December 2003–14 January 2004, pp. 50–53.
 .
ROMANIA
Manuela Preoteasa
porocilo.indb   1 22.5.2004, 13:46:48
 404 MEDIA OWNERSHIP AND ITS IMPACT ON MEDIA INDEPENDENCE AND PLURALISM
1 INTRODUCTION
Romanians cannot complain about the number of media outlets. Th ey have plenty of 
these. Th ere is only one problem – it is possible to count the reliable ones on the ﬁ ngers. 
Soon after the fall of communism, more than , new titles emerged. Five years later, 
some of these disappeared, others took root. Th e ﬁ gures have not changed much lately. 
Nowadays there are about , publications in Romania, the majority of which are week-
lies, supplemented by a couple of hundreds of daily newspapers;  of these are based in the 
capital of the country, and between one and ﬁ ve in every county. Despite such an impressive 
plurality of sources, independent media analysts cannot sleep well. 
Professor of Journalism Mihai Coman stated: “Journalists in the whole region have lost 
control of the profession, which has become mostly dominated by media owners.”¹ Free-
dom House classiﬁ ed the Romanian media as partially free.²
After having identiﬁ ed no critical report against the Government in an entire week 
of  news, of which  percent covered Government activities,³ the Media Monitoring 
Agency () expressed concern: “With the approaching of electoral year, the political 
pressure on media is increasing; the phenomenon with the most negative impact (…) is 
the political distortion of information broadcast by  stations; at the local level, a phe-
nomenon of media “Berlusconisation” is taking place”. 
Dr. Mark Percival, Head of the Romanian think-tank, said: “In spite of the country’s ap-
parent progress towards  membership, in the last two to three years there has been a no-
table deterioration in the position of the independent media, particularly on a local level.”⁴
Th e legislation on access to public information and on transparency has been improved, 
but there are still problems with implementation. Th ere are dozens of media organisations 
and associations operating countrywide. Th e most inﬂ uential, but also the most contro-
versial, the Romanian Press Club, gathers data on owners of media outlets. In , about 
 media s joined the Convention of Media Organisations, trying to act together to 
protect freedom of expression and the professional community. Th ere is still much to be 
done in this ﬁ eld. As Ioana Avadani, head of the Centre for Independent Journalism said: 
“Media is as good as the society is“. And Romanian society is still plagued by corruption, 
scandals, lack of economic resources and political battles. 
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2 REGULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION
In Romania, economic concentration needs to be authorised by the Competition Coun-
cil (), on the basis of the Law on Competition (adopted in ), modiﬁ ed by order of the 
’s President (in ). In contrast to radio and television, print media concentration cas-
es are treated within the general framework applicable to all businesses. Th e main criterion 
is the dominant position on the market. Such a position is considered illegal when it is like-
ly to lead to a signiﬁ cant restriction, prevention or distortion of competition on a certain 
market or a part of it.⁵ Breaking the law implies ﬁ nes of up to  per cent of the company’s 
turnover. Since the Competition Council is the only body with the authority to decide on 
the matter, its autonomy is a must. Despite this, the opposition has repeatedly accused the 
Government of trying to politicise the Council, last time in December . Th is speciﬁ c 
legislation is mostly harmonised with  regulations,⁶ yet companies usually ﬁ nd ways to 
circumvent the Competition Law, even by hiding their real ownership. Th e lack of legisla-
tion regarding holdings, as economic entities, can also have eﬀ ects in this regard. Broad-
casting regulation is stricter; the Audiovisual Law (adopted in ) restricts the market 
share of one player to  percent.⁷ On the other hand, the Audiovisual Law eliminated the 
diﬀ erences in the treatment of foreign media investors and Romanian nationals. 
Th ere are no provisions on ownership transparency pertaining to the media. However, 
Article () of the Constitution reads: “By law, it is possible to obligate the mass media to 
disclose their ﬁ nancial source.”
As a rule, Romanian legislation forbids the anonymity of owners; every company is 
obliged to publish this data in the Trade Register Oﬃ  ce () and to communicate chang-
es. In practice, few companies meet this obligation to update data, since there are no sanc-
tions in force. When the Government decided to move the  to the Ministry of Justice, 
⁸ reported “concerns that the Government would try to censor information regarding 
the ownership of companies”. One thing is certain: censored or not, the  only shows 
the tip of the iceberg, while the real owners may hide in tax havens. Despite imperfections, 
the  remains the main source of data on Romanian companies’ ownership. But trans-
parency does have its price: although public, the information is not free of charge. One 
simple check can cost between   and , or even more, depending on its complexity. 
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3 MEDIA MARKET AND OWNERSHIP
3.1 TELEVISION
Private owners of the print media were the ﬁ rst to arrive on the media market in Roma-
nia, followed by private broadcasters a couple of years later. In  there were three main 
national players on the television market: Antena , Tele  abc, and, at the end of , Pro 
. During the next eight years, three other national channels appeared: Prima  (), 
Realitatea  (, the ﬁ rst attempt at launching an “all-news” station in Romania) and 
National  (the autumn of ). In addition, there are many local stations, usually af-
ﬁ liated with a national operator. Public television consists of four national channels,   
and  ; the smaller  Cultural and  International broadcasted via satellite. 
Television remained the most widely available source of information, with almost  
percent of the population getting their information from television newscasts.⁹ Despite its 
vast power, diversity is limited by the low penetration of cable television: only half of the 
households with a  set are subscribers to cable television services; moreover, a certain 
number of households do not even have a  set. Consequently, public television remains 
the only national broadcaster able to reach the majority of the rural population. A private 
television station usually reaches from  to  percent of the Romanian population, com-
pared to the  percent reach of the public station,  . 
By analysing nationwide television coverage, we can get an idea about the number of 
people inﬂ uenced by a certain source of information. On the other hand, in urban areas, 
the battle for audience is rather ﬁ erce. From this point of view, public  is behind com-
mercial stations. Th e two channels of the public broadcaster,   and  , have a com-
bined audience share of about  percent,¹⁰ but when analysing ratings in urban areas, 
they only have about half of that.
Th ere are six major television channels competing on the national  market. Th e ﬁ rst 
two with a combined . percent audience share are the public service channels,   
and   (combined rating); the third is the  owned Pro , followed by Antena  
(owned by the Voiculescu family, with an audience share very close to that of Pro ). Th e 
ﬁ fth channel is Prima  (owned by C. Burci), and the sixth is another  owned televi-
sion channel, Acasa .
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Table  MAIN TELEVISION CHANNELS IN ROMANIA
CHANNEL POPULATION 
REACH
AUDIENCE 
SHARE11
OWNER
COMPANY MAIN OWNER
TVR 1 AND 
TVR 2 
BOTH 
98-99 %
28.1% (TVR 1) PUBLIC
PRO TV 68% 15.4% PRO TV (MPI) 66%
19%
15%
CME
ION TIRIAC
ADRIAN SARBU
MEDIA VISION 70%
24%
CME
MEDIAPRO BV AMSTERDAM & 
MEDIA PRO MANAGEMENT
ANTENA 1 68% 13.1% ANTENA 1
INTACT ADVERTISING
60% THE VOICULESCU FAMILY
PRIMA TV 62% 7.1%* AMEROM TELEVISION 82%
 4%
RBC (46.5% SBS + 53.5% RID)
MANAGERS OF PRIMA TV, 
INCL. CRISTIAN BURCI 
ACASA TV 52% 6.6% SAME DATA AS FOR PRO TV
Source: For audience share: /, quoted in the  report, May .
Note: *Arbo Media, July 2001, quoted by Media Monitoring Agency – Academia Catavencu, Report on the Freedom 
Speech in Romania, Bucharest, October 2002.
Television attracts the major part of advertising expenditure. According to data from 
the weekly Capital,¹² . percent of the advertising expenditure in Romania in  
went to , . percent to print media and only . percent to radio. Th e total advertising 
expenditure in Romania for  is estimated at   million. 
3.1.1 PRO TV GROUP
Pro  is the leading private television channel, reaching  percent of the Romanian 
population, with a nationwide all-day audience share of . percent in .¹³ In the same 
group is Acasa , oriented towards a female audience and with a nationwide all-day au-
dience share of . percent in ¹⁴ (and  percent audience share in urban areas¹⁵). It 
broadcasts mainly telenovellas, soap operas, other entertainment, and a few news pro-
grams. Th e third channel in this group, Pro  International, is targeted at the audience 
from abroad.
On  July , a new law was introduced that obliges broadcasters to have a sole 
holder of the license and operations.  started this process and set up Pro   (for-
merly Pro  ), in which it holds a  percent ownership stake.¹⁶ Pro   will be-
come the sole owner and operator of ’s broadcasting licenses (Pro , Acasa and Pro 
 International) when the transfer from Media Pro International and Media Pro  is 
completed. As the major owner,  also changed the governance structure in its favour. 
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After the completion of a multi-year series of payments to Ioan Tiriac for his interest, its 
main partner will remain Adrian Sarbu. 
Chart  PRO TV OWNERSHIP 
PRO TV SA
(the sole owner and operator of 
the licenses for Pro TV, Acasa 
TV, Pro TV International and 
the Pro FM radio network).
CME 
Adrian Sarbu 

MEDIA PRO SRL MEDIA PRO INTERNATIONAL 
(MPI)
MEDIA VISION
(former license-holder of  Pro 
TV stations and the entire radio 
Pro FM network)
CME 
Adrian Sarbu 
Ioan Tiriac (Rootland Trading 
Cyprus)* .
(former main license –holder of 
 Pro TV stations)
CME 
Adrian Sarbu 
Ioan Tiriac (Rootland Trading 
Cyprus)* 
(TV production house for all  
channels)
CME 
Media Pro Pictures  
(shared between Media Pro BV 
Amsterdam . and Media Pro 
Management )
Source: National Trade Registry Oﬃ  ce.
Note: * Ioan Tiriac has agreed to sell to Adrian Sarbu, Rootland Trading Cyprus (the company through which Tiriac oper-
ates).
Th e   Commission Report on Romanian’s accession progress, included a men-
tion of Pro ’s debt. “Pro  is heavily indebted to the Romanian state and has applied to 
the tax authorities for a rescheduling of its outstanding tax liability. Th is makes the chan-
nel’s continued operation dependent on the good will of the Romanian authorities.”¹⁷ An 
agreement with the Romanian tax authorities has reduced and re-scheduled a portion of 
these interest and penalty charges in return for speciﬁ c deposits and an agreed repayment 
schedule. According to the Ministry of Finance, tax liabilities in the approx. amount of 
 . million were re-scheduled on  December . In ’s ﬁ nancial reports, these 
liabilities are considered a major problem: “Should the Romanian tax authorities demand 
immediate payment of all potential tax liabilities, the Romanian operations would experi-
ence diﬃ  culties in continuing to operate.”¹⁸
3.1.2 ANTENA 1
Antena  is the main competitor of Pro . Launched in , Antena  reaches  per-
cent of the population. Its market share in urban areas is . percent, approximately . 
percent less than that of Pro , according to /.¹⁹ Antena  is operated under the 
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license held by the company Corporatia pentru cultura si arta Intact, owned by the Voicu-
lescu family. Dan Voiculescu is the key person in this company, and he is also the leader of 
the Romanian Humanist Party (). It is clear that the owner put a lot of eﬀ ort into in-
creasing the rating of Antena  before the  elections.
3.1.3 PRIMA TV
Prima  is the third ranked private television channel in Romania, with an audience 
share of about  percent. Its license holder and operator is Amerom Television, while Cre-
ative Vision International is the main producer. Both are controlled by a company sub-
stantially ﬁ nanced by the state, through the Ministry of Transportation. Th e name of this 
company is Romanian Investment & Development (). It is based in Bucharest, but is 
wholly owned by a New Jersey ﬁ rm. Th e second owner of Prima  with a  percent own-
ership share is Scandinavian Broadcasting System (), registered in Luxemburg. Prima 
 currently reaches approximately  percent of the television households in Romania.
Th e key person in this company is the minor shareholder and Manager of Prima , 
Cristian Burci, a former Romanian emigrant to the  during communist times. After 
, he returned to Romania. He has American citizenship, which explains the registra-
tion in the  of some companies under his control. Th erefore, Prima  is licensed and 
operated by Amerom Television , registered in Romania; but this company is wholly 
owned by Amerom Television  based in New York. 
Cristian Burci started Prima  in , and in March ,  bought a  percent 
interest in it. Th e station later experienced serious ﬁ nancial problems, so in July  SBS 
decided to deconsolidate its business in Romania. On the same date, a “strong” investor 
took over the main stake in Prima . Th is investor was Romanian Investment Develop-
ment (). A few months earlier,  had been ﬁ nancially strengthened with   mil-
lion, provided by state companies owned by the Ministry of Transportation. Coincidental-
ly,  purchased a . percent share in Prima  for a similar amount of money.
Since direct subsidies are forbidden by law, a complicated ﬁ nancial engineering scheme 
has been applied in the case of Prima . In April , the Romanian Government ap-
proved the creation of a state-owned  production house,²⁰ Maritime Training Centre 
Television (-), under the authority of the Minister of Transportation. Th e Govern-
ment described it as a “strategic company”, with the declared mission of better reﬂ ecting 
the activities of the Ministry of Transportation in the Romanian media, according to of-
ﬁ cial documents. Th e Ministry of Transportation ordered three companies under its au-
thority to associate with -, with the prospect of sharing future proﬁ ts. To attain this 
remote “beneﬁ t”, each of these companies had to pay  . million in advance. Th e Na-
tional Railroad Company, Th e National Harbour Administration and Th e Railroad Freight 
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Company paid between them a total amount of   million. None of them really needed 
promotion, as they are either monopolists or have only administrative assignment. 
Who was it that really gained from this transaction? Not - itself, but Cristian 
Burci, Prima ’s small shareholder, who also controls . As the ﬁ rst link in the chain, 
- passed the money on to , but not on the basis of any contract, as was revealed 
after the opposition had initiated a motion in Parliament.²¹ Th e only document related 
to this transaction that could be retrieved was a partnership agreement between - 
and another of Burci’s companies, Global Media. 
Despite media reports and even a Parliamentary moratorium, neither the Government 
nor other Romanian authorities has taken any action to investigate this case.
Chart  HOW PRIMA TV WAS FINANCED BY THE TRANSPORTATION MINISTRY
TRANSPORTATION MINISTRY (TM)
Head: Miron Mitrea
  
THE NATIONAL RAILROAD 
COMPANY
THE NATIONAL HARBOUR 
ADMINISTRATION
THE RAILROAD FREIGHT 
COMPANY
State-owned, under the TM 
authority, paid EUR . 
million.
State-owned, under the TM 
authority, paid EUR . million.
State-owned, under the TM 
authority, paid EUR . 
million.

MARITIME TRAINING CENTRE 
TELEVISION (MTC-TV)
 GLOBAL MEDIA
Owned by the TM, it transferred 
EUR  million to RID.
and MTC-TV signed a 
partnership agreement.
 
RID Key person in these 
transactions: Cristian Burci, 
who controls both Global Media 
and RID. Despite the payment 
to RID, MTC-TV only has 
partnership with Global Media.
Received EUR  million from 
MTC-TV.
. 
 
AMEROM TELEVISION, CREATIVE VISION 
INTERNATIONAL
License-holder and operator 
of Prima TV.
the main producer for Prima 
TV.

PRIMA TV
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As a result,  decided in April  to no longer consolidate the ﬁ nancial transac-
tions of Prima .²² Th e Capital weekly explained: “To get rid of the losses at Prima , 
 handed over control of Prima  to the ‘local partner’ (). Th e only condition was 
that , the company under Burci’s control, ensured the ﬁ nancing of Prima  by provid-
ing  . million in .”²³ Th e “de-consolidation” period lasts three years, and after 
that  can regain its shares, which is precisely the duration of the association between 
- and the three transport companies.²⁴
3.1.4 B1 TV 
Although it has not reached a signiﬁ cant audience share, the ownership of   is in-
teresting. It is a local station covering the Romanian capital, launched in  by one of the 
Paunescu brothers. Th ey are among the ﬁ rst media “moguls” who emerged immediately 
after the communist period. Th ey still own national and regional papers, but their main 
areas of business lie in other ﬁ elds (hotels, oil, etc). Th e Paunescu brothers were investi-
gated in connection with the ﬁ rst bank bankruptcy in Romania, as beneﬁ ciaries of ques-
tionable loans. Holding the third position on the  Richest People list, with a fortune 
estimated at  – million, the Paunescu brothers are still supporters of the Social 
Democrat Party (). 
3.1.5 REALITATEA TV
Launched in November , Realitatea  is the only channel wholly dedicated to 
news and talk shows. It also hosts the only program about media issues. Realitatea  was 
founded by Silviu Prigioana, the owner of a powerful urban sanitation company, Rosal. In 
December , Prigoana sold  percent of Realitatea  to Bluelink Comunicazioni, 
an Italian company registered in Switzerland only a couple of months earlier. Speculation 
about the real owner of this company cannot be conﬁ rmed, as Swiss law protects the an-
onymity of ownership for some categories of companies. Prigoana also has a traditional 
music channel (), and a sports channel,  Sport (). 
3.1.6 NATIONAL TV 
A new competitor on the Romanian television market, National , founded by the 
Micula brothers, appeared in the autumn of . Th e Miculas (mostly active in the food 
processing business) were rather close to the former ruling coalition, but after the last 
elections they became very discreet about their political preferences. Among the  
richest businessmen, they have invested in the media ﬁ eld only recently. Besides , they 
founded a daily, Realitatea romaneasca, with no audited circulation. 
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3.2 RADIO MARKET
Th ere are more than  private local  stations, which usually broadcast music and 
hourly news bulletins. Th e largest is Europa , with an audience share of . percent. 
Th e second position is held by Pro , with . percent, followed by Radio . 
On the radio market, the most inﬂ uential owner is the French group Lagardère, which 
owns a majority stake in Europa , but it also has an important stake in Radio  ( 
percent).²⁵
3.2.1 EUROPA FM 
Founded in , Europa  was the ﬁ rst and only radio broadcaster to obtain a re-
gional private license. All its competitors had to obtain approval for every local station 
they launched; some of them protested at the time. Europa  covers  percent of Ro-
manian territory, reaching  percent of the population. It is part of Lagardère Active Ra-
dio International network (Lagardère owns  percent of Europa ), which operates in 
Romania through Europe Development International Romania  (). 
In May , Europa  found itself at the center of a scandal about political pressure 
inside the newsroom. Th e head of the News department at the time, Rodica Culcer, and 
her two colleagues, resigned because of editorial censorship imposed by the management. 
Th ey testiﬁ ed to the pressure exerted by the management not to broadcast news reports 
about a sales transaction involving airplanes which would have upset the Government. 
Th e fact is, that in addition to its media division, Lagardere owns  percent of the power-
ful European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company ().²⁶ Not long after the resig-
nation of the three journalists, the Romanian Government publicly revealed plans to buy 
four new A planes from Airbus, the aircraft maker whose majority owner is .²⁷ 
Th ese new aircrafts are to be added to the predominantly Boeing jet ﬂ eet, and they will 
cost Romania approximately   million.²⁸
Several papers criticised the position of Europa ’s management. Cotidianul put it 
bluntly: “Culcer, Prelipceanu and Forga denounced political pressure.” Th e headline of the 
Ziarul de Iasi read, “ Manoeuvres Destroy Europa .” Independent media organisa-
tions, e.g. the Centre for Independent Journalism in Bucharest and the Media Monitor-
ing Agency, also protested against censorship inside Europa . Th e Journalist Alexandru 
Lazescu stated that “the case of Europa  reveals that not even foreign capital guarantees 
editorial independence.”²⁹
3.2.2 PRO FM 
Pro  is Pro ’s brother in the radio ﬁ eld. Th e network has  local stations, either 
owned or aﬃ  liated, reaching . percent of the population. In , Pro  had an aver-
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age all-day audience share of . percent. As with Pro  station, Pro  is planned to be 
held and operated only by Pro  .
3.2.3 RADIO XXI
Th e ownership structure of Radio  (based on Trade Register Oﬃ  ce data last updated 
on  September ) points to a rather peculiar connection between the French media 
group, Lagardère (owner of a stake in the airbus company, ), and the Romanian Min-
ister of Defence, Ioan-Mircea Pascu. 
Radio  is the third most popular radio network in Romania, with a . percent audi-
ence share. It is also the Romanian number one station for people under .³⁰ Lagardère 
owns  percent of the shares in Radio , and presents the station on their website as 
part of the Lagardère Active Radio network.³¹ Furthermore, Radio ’s General Manager 
is Europa ’s Chairman, Ilie Nastase, a former  candidate for the position of Mayor 
of Bucharest. Moreover, the current Minister of Defence, Ioan Mircea Pascu, was among 
its board members until  April , when the Anti-Corruption Law explicitly forbade 
members of the Government to run private companies. Th e same Minister Pascu initiated 
a law that would oblige the media to publish all replies from state authorities to media ar-
ticles. Th e initiative was very controversial at the time, and after many public debates, was 
ﬁ nally rejected. At the time, Minister Pascu expressed his dissatisfaction over disobedient 
media, stating at a press conference that “some papers don’t want to be controlled.”³²
3.2.4 KISS FM
One of the ﬁ rst  radio stations in the post-communist period, Contact , became 
Kiss  under the control of Cristian Burci. Alex Ulmanu, an assistant professor at the 
University of Bucharest, School of Journalism and Mass Communication, stated that ”the 
move could be seen as part of a wider strategy by the  to take control over or estab-
lish new media outlets to gain more visibility and inﬂ uence before the parliamentary elec-
tions scheduled in .”³³ At the end of , Contact  was ranked in fourth position 
in terms of audience share.
3.2.5 STAR FM AND THE EXPULSION OF BBC
Although it is not among the top ranking radio stations, it is important to mention Star 
, “the elder brother” of Kiss . Th rough , the same company which owns part of 
Prima , Cristian Burci took over the former Uniplus network. He changed its editorial 
policy and began to target especially women aged -. As a result, the retransmission 
of the Romanian  programs (renowned for their criticism of the Government) was 
dropped by the new Star  network. Uniplus had transmitted  since its ﬁ rst day, as 
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one of its key programs. Christian Mititelu, the Director of the Romanian department of 
, told Capital that the radio network retransmitting  “was not loved either by the 
former Government or by the one in power, which deconsolidates it in ﬁ nancial terms.”³⁴ 
Journalist Alexandru Lazescu described the discontinuation of  programs as an exam-
ple of “the actual consolidating inﬂ uence of the Government on private news and  pro-
grams.”³⁵ Since , as such, is not licensed in Romania, the loss of the several broadcast-
ing partners over the last three years caused its audience share to drop by  percent.³⁶ Th e 
 management has also faced problems inside its Romanian section, when one of the fa-
mous Romanian journalists working with the  in London saw his contract terminated. 
Other colleagues left the station as a sign of solidarity, accusing the management of edito-
rial compromises. Th e  management replied that it was part of a new strategy: down-
sizing of the bureau staﬀ  in London, and increasing the number of journalists in their Bu-
charest oﬃ  ce, in order to improve the quality of programming. Th e oﬃ  cial explanation 
does not hold water, since  programs in Romanian are less and less often retransmitted 
by local stations, so there is no justiﬁ cation for an increase in personnel. 
Table  MAIN PRIVATE RADIO CHANNELS IN ROMANIA
RADIO START COVERAGE AUDIENCE 
SHARE
OWNER
EUROPA FM 1999 REGIONAL LICENSE: 60% OF 
THE COUNTRY’S TERRITORY.
19.1% 76% LAGARDÈRE ACTIVE 
RADIO INTERNATIONAL SA
PRO FM 1993 25 URBAN STATIONS. 10.7% 66% CME
ADRIAN SARBU
IOAN TIRIAC
RADIO XXI 1993 21 URBAN STATIONS. 7.7% 52.5%
20%
FUNDATIA SECOLULUI XXI
LAGARDÈRE ACTIVE 
RADIO INTERNATIONAL SA
RADIO KISS FM (former 
Contact FM)
1990 21 URBAN STATIONS. 7.6%
 
Ownership structure data 
has not been updated in the 
public records, but Cristian 
Burci is believed to be the 
new owner.
Sources: , Market Research in Urban Areas, quoted by Reichl und Partner Communication Group. National 
Trade Register.³⁷
3.3 PRINT MEDIA MARKET
In the market of daily newspapers in Romania, Th e one with the highest circulation is 
the tabloid Libertatea.
Speaking about non-tabloid dailies, the main players are Adevarul, in the top position, 
closely followed by its strong competitor, Evenimentul Zilei (). Th eir circulation ﬁ gures 
are , and , copies respectively. Romania Libera and National, with the Ger-
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man  being a signiﬁ cant shareholder in each, trail after with , – , copies. 
Other publishers’ print circulations average around , copies or less; these are mainly 
companies that are part of other Romanian business groups.
3.3.1 RINGIER GROUP 
Th e undisputed leader on the print media market is the Swiss group Ringier. It owns the 
largest circulation daily (app. , copies) in Romania, the Libertatea tabloid. Ringier 
Romania recently expanded its operation by purchasing the most popular sports newspaper, 
Pro Sport in June , while its latest acquisition is the daily Evenimentul Zilei. Th us, Ring-
ier controls a signiﬁ cant percent of the national newspaper market. Additionally, this media 
group publishes the largest circulation business and economic weekly, Capital, and several 
, women’s and music magazines. While Ringier focuses on media industries, its Romanian 
competitors have usually evolved from big business groups engaged in other ﬁ elds.
3.3.2 ADEVARUL DAILY
 Adevarul is a successor to Scanteia, the most widely read daily during communist 
times (it was the Communist party’s mouthpiece). In the post-communist period, Ade-
varul managed to remain on top. Its publisher, the joint stock company, Adevarul , has 
been sold gradually, mainly to its journalists. In December , its main oﬃ  cial owner 
was Dumitru Tinu (. percent), who was its General Manager at the time. After Tinu 
tragically lost his life in a car accident on New Year’s Eve of , the paper found itself 
amidst a huge controversy as to who its real owner was. Normally, the shares would have 
passed to Tinu’s daughter, Anamaria. However, Tinu’s alleged second natural son, Andrei 
Iucinu, appeared after his death, and claimed in court his share of the Tinu inheritance 
Adevarul’s ownership became even more complicated when allegations were aired that 
an Arab businessman, Fathi Taher, together with an  leader, were behind Tinu’s shares. 
In an open letter, Iucinu’s lawyer asked both to clarify the matter.³⁸ Taher denied any in-
volvement and thus protected the reputation of the newspaper. Th e inheritance suit is still 
underway. Th e practice of hiding behind “harmless” names has become increasingly wide-
spread in Romania. Th e procedure is quite simple: the person who wants to remain hid-
den signs a document by which he transfers his interests to a second person. However, the 
latter has only a formal role, but not the proper right to use these shares without the real 
owner’s agreement. Th e documents remain secret, but the operation can be risky, espe-
cially in unpredictable situations (such as death, divorce etc.).
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3.3.3 EVENIMENTUL ZILEI DAILY
Bertelsmann’s paper division, Gruner + Jahr, agreed to sell the daily Evenimentul Zilei 
() to Ringier at the end of , with the arrangement coming into force on  Janu-
ary . Th e sale is part of a broader strategy, in which Gruner + Jahr have sold all their 
newspaper operations in Eastern Europe. Evenimentul Zilei has been managed by Cornel 
Nistorescu (formerly a signiﬁ cant owner), and the change of ownership did not modify the 
management structure.
3.3.4 ROMANIA LIBERA AND NATIONAL DAILIES
Th ird and fourth ranked by the Audit Bureau of Circulation, Romania libera and Na-
tional are both owned by the Balkan division of the German Westdeutsche Allgemeine 
Zeitung ():  percent and  percent respectively. Th e East European Development 
Fund holds . percent in Romania libera, half of whose circulation is subscription cir-
culation; the paper is famous for its classiﬁ ed ads. Regarding the National, the other half 
of the shares are owned by founder-journalists, who have maintained an editorial content 
rather close to tabloid style. 
Table  MAIN DAILIES IN ROMANIA
TITLE CIRCULATION SALES OWNER
LIBERTATEA 272,000 222,000 RINGIER
ADEVARUL 151,000 141,000 80.7% ADEVARUL SA
(owned by the Tinu family)
EVENIMENTUL ZILEI 130,000 103,000 RINGIER
ROMANIA LIBERA 76,000 71,000 35%
21.6%
WAZ
EEDF
NATIONAL 60,000 54,500 50%
50%
WAZ
N&V PRESS GROUP
ZIUA 42,000 34,000 42%
26%
ZIUA SRL (GEORGE GAITA)
SORIN ROSCA-STANESCU) 
JURNALUL NATIONAL* 41,000 32,000 JURNALUL SA
(Dan Voiculescu’s family)
Sources: Audit Bureau of Circulation in Romania, Trade Register Oﬃ  ce (data accessed in December ), and companies.
Note: *Period January – June ; Th e circulation of Jurnalul National has signiﬁ cantly increased in , which brings it 
up to the ﬁ rst positions.
3.3.5 CAPITAL WEEKLY 
Owned by Swiss Ringier, Capital is the leading business weekly. Founded  years ago, 
it ranks among the top economic print media. It has the reputation of a neutral paper, fo-
cused on business matters but also on general interest topics, analysed from an economic 
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point of view. It sells about , copies, of which more than half are subscriptions, in-
dicating a stable audience. 
3.3.6 ACADEMIA CATAVENCU WEEKLY
Academia Catavencu’s ownership is transparent and published on its website. 
Academia Catavencu was founded thirteen years ago by several journalists who are still 
the major shareholders of the paper (either personally, or via  Editex company). Mainly a 
satirical paper, it has the reputation of publishing investigative stories, written in a satirical 
way. It sells about , copies, of which  percent account for direct sales. 
Table  MAIN WEEKLIES IN ROMANIA
TITLE CIRCULATION* SALES OWNER
CAPITAL 61,000 50,000 RINGIER
ACADEMIA CATAVENCU 56,000 43,000 SC ACADEMIA CATAVENCU 
(owned by the journalists)
Sources: Audit Bureau of Circulation in Romania, Trade Register Oﬃ  ce (data accessed in December ), and companies.
Note: *Period January – June .
3.3.7 DISTRIBUTION CAPACITIES
Th e largest distribution company is the formerly state-owned Rodipet, privatised on  
December , for  . million. Th e buyer, Magnar System Com, based in a village 
near Bucharest, is suspected of being the successor to a company with the same name that 
police and tax authorities had investigated for ﬁ scal fraud three years earlier. Th e on-line 
investigative publication, Anchete.ro,³⁹ discovered the same names among their owners 
and managers. Although the print media quoted the story, there were no oﬃ  cial reactions. 
State-controlled distribution has had a signiﬁ cant eﬀ ect primarily on the local press; the 
most signiﬁ cant case is Ziarul de Vrancea, a small local paper repeatedly excluded from 
Rodipet’s network, because of its criticism of the local administration. Th e Convention of 
the Media Organisations took action against “the discriminatory treatment, which limits 
freedom of expression.”⁴⁰ Even the powerful media group, Ringier, faced problems and ac-
cused Rodipet of censorship. Th e  stated that “Rodipet has been frequently used to 
intimidate or prevent from entering the market those publication unfavourable to the gov-
ernment.”⁴¹ Sales represent about  percent of Romanian newspapers’ income.⁴²
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3.3.8 PRINTING CAPACITIES
In the print ﬁ eld there are many competitors, foreign and Romanian. Th e costs are 
much higher for small papers, as a larger number of copies means bigger discounts. Some-
times, publishers prefer to pay for transport if the costs of printing in their town are high-
er. But, in general, there are many printing facilities all over the country and many papers 
have bought their own, even if second-hand. Possible political pressures may interfere 
mostly with newsprint provision. At the beginning of , a Romanian printing plant was 
purchased by the  Mayor Dumitru Sechelariu (in Bacau) and another  member. 
Sechelariu has his own local media holding (newspaper, radio and ), as well as interests 
in a local advertising company. 
4 MEDIA OWNERSHIP PATTERNS
4.1 MAIN MEDIA OWNERS AND THEIR POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS
Several media outlets often grow under the same patron, thus nourishing media con-
centration. A newspaper owner will not be happy unless he makes an attempt at launching 
at least one radio station, if not a  network. From this perspective, there are three main 
media players. One is widely known as Media Pro. In fact, Media Pro does not exist as a 
holding, but the companies belonging under this umbrella are related through common 
shareholders. Th e Media Pro family has two main branches. 
Th e ﬁ rst branch is mainly owned by the American  and, signiﬁ cantly, by the busi-
nessmen Adrian Sarbu and Ioan Tiriac. It comprises the leading private  channel, Pro 
, a production house, Media Vision, and the radio network, Pro . Central Europe-
an Media Enterprises () is a Bermuda company, part of the American Lauder group, 
which invested in Romania via a subsidiary in Amsterdam. Both Ioan Tiriac and Adrian 
Sarbu are among the richest  people in Romania, the former with an estimated fortune 
of  – million.⁴³
Th e second branch includes the news agency, Mediafax, regional weeklies published by 
Publimedia International, and the National Distribution Company (). 
Th e second media owner in terms of inﬂ uence is Dan Voiculescu’s family, the owner of 
the second leading private  channel Antena , the  production house, Intact Advertis-
ing, a local radio station, Romantic , and the dailies Jurnalul National and Gazeta Spor-
turilor. 
Th ird place belongs to Cristian Burci, whose inﬂ uence has recently undergone a consid-
erable increase. He controls the television channel Prima  (third in terms of audience 
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share), the  production company, Creative Vision International, and two radio networks 
Radio Star and Kiss . 
While both Adrian Sarbu (Media Pro) and Cristian Burci (Prima ) invested mostly in 
media, entertainment and advertising, Dan Voiculescu has businesses in diﬀ erent ﬁ elds, 
among these commerce, agriculture and industry. He is also a politician, the Chairman of 
the Humanist Party in Romania (), which last year withdraw from the coalition with 
the ruling Social Democrat Party (). It is not known on whose side the  will be in 
the  elections. 
Regarding political aﬃ  liation of the other two big media owners, Cristian Burci is noto-
rious for his support of the , while  and Adrian Sarbu’s companies are not free to 
“vote” against the Government, because of the companies’ huge debt to the state. Romani-
an media investors are among the  richest people in Romania, for instance Voiculescu 
is among the ﬁ rst ten, with an estimated fortune of  – million.⁴⁴
Others among the  richest Romanians have also developed media groups. For ex-
ample, the Paunescu brothers or the Micula brothers,  and Liberal Party oriented, re-
spectively. So far, their media outlets have not achieved signiﬁ cant audience shares at the 
national level. Th e richest Romanian, Iosif Constantin Dragan, has his own local media 
kingdom, although of a rather low proﬁ le.
4.2 POLITICIANS AS MEDIA OWNERS
Th e number of politicians who buy newspapers to gain power and inﬂ uence has been 
increasing. One example of such a conduct has been the case of the Bacau based Destepta-
rea paper, as revealed by the Capital weekly.⁴⁵ In the s, the local Social Democrat Par-
ty leader and the Mayor of Bacau, Dumitru Sechelariu, took over the former communist 
paper and renamed it Desteptarea. He publicly admitted that the newspaper was really 
useful to his political career. “It is the Mayor’s best property. /…/ Of course it helped me in 
the elections, I could tell people what I thought.”⁴⁶
4.3 HIDING MEDIA OWNERSHIP
Founded in , Mediafax has become the main news agency, providing information 
for  percent of the Romanian media. While the state-owned news agency lacks cred-
ibility, other small private agencies like  Press,  Press, and Rom Net remain just mi-
nor players.
Mediafax is largely known as part of the Mediapro group; in , the initial owner-
ship structure changed discreetly. Th e former main shareholder was replaced by Medi-
apro , registered in Amsterdam (. percent). In fact, there is nothing behind Medi-
apro  but the Caribbean company, Treadolo Investments , registered in Curacao, 
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Netherlands Antilles. Both are managed by the local based  Trust, a unit of the Dutch 
 Group that specialises in trustee services.⁴⁷ All traces of the real owners have been 
kept secret, and , invoking a conﬁ dentiality agreement made with its client, declined 
to comment.⁴⁸
Lack of ownership transparency in the Mediafax news agency may call into question 
the credibility of thousands of pieces of information daily spread countrywide by most of 
the Romanian media.
Chart  MEDIA PRO BV IN AMSTERDAM (MEDIAFAX OWNER)
MEDIAPRO BV 
(AMSTERDAM)
(Owned by Treadolo 
Investments NV based 
in Netherlands Antilles, 
both managed by ING 
Trust in Amsterdam 
and Antilles, 
respectively)
    
    
MEDIAFAX PUBLIMEDIA 
INTERNATIONAL
NATIONAL 
DISTRIBUTION 
COMPANY (NDC)
MEDIA VISION PRO VIDEO SRL
(leading news agency, 
provider for  
of the Romanian 
media)
(Pro TV’s production 
company), via Media 
Pro Pictures

regional weeklies
BANATEANUL
CLUJEANUL
IESEANUL
BIHOREANUL
HUNEDOREANULL
5 MEDIA INDEPENDENCE
Th e Media Monitoring Agency () considers that several media outlets are increas-
ingly becoming a tool for their owners to gain inﬂ uence. Businessmen involved in politics 
have founded their own media groups and set clear directions for their employees as to 
who are the “good guys” and who are the “bad guys”. Th ese kinds of media companies have 
not been created for proﬁ t, but in order to exercise inﬂ uence, to protect business and to 
attack economic and political adversaries.⁴⁹
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As a result of increasing political, but also economic, pressure, investigative journalism 
has appeared less frequently and almost disappeared from  screens. Occasionally, news 
programs do broadcast investigative peices, but mostly about petty corruption. Th ere are 
no radio programs with a clear investigative format; only talk-shows and news reports 
cover corruption and other sensitive topics. Rather than radio and television, it is the print 
media that cover corruption or other sensitive topics. Moreover, investigative journal-
ism lacks credibility. Special budgets for investigative stories are very rare, and a journal-
ist working in this ﬁ eld does not have any special status inside the oﬃ  ce, apart from a few 
small privileges (e.g. a more ﬂ exible schedule and sometimes higher payment, but not sig-
niﬁ cantly higher). Moreover, investigative reporters are sometimes the victims of physical 
violence, and one investigative journalist was found dead in the town of Timisoara. 
A collective agreement on the national level between journalists’ associations and me-
dia publishers has often been debated. However, s have never come to a common con-
clusion. Journalists in private media are not united within unions. Th is is an issue that is 
regarded as very sensitive. Without any in-house agreement protecting their rights, jour-
nalists can easily be ﬁ red if they refuse to write an article. When an employee tries to pro-
test, the owner usually replies: “Th ree young persons are waiting at my door to be hired.” 
Most of them earn less than the average wage (  per month), not to mention jour-
nalists working for local publications.⁵⁰ An independent press can only exist in a function-
al and sound market based on economically sound operation and well trained journalists 
who are aware of their own value: transparent editorial policies and good salaries for em-
ployees, which provide them with the proper motivation and lead to better professional 
performance, are just two of the solutions in this respect.⁵¹
In practice, the pressure on journalists has increased considerably, and often without a 
clear boundary between political and commercial interests, between journalism and hid-
den advertising. One of the three largest circulation dailies in the country oﬀ ers through 
its web-site two types of advertising: one clearly marked with A (from advertising), the 
other, twice as expensive, without a distinguishing mark for advertisement. One A catego-
ry page costs  ,, while an advertising story without A costs  ,. 
In , the International Advertising Association accused a segment of the Romani-
an media of blackmailing international companies with attacks on their images. Th e issue 
reached the pages of the Financial Times, which quoted several investors who faced such 
situations. A journalist working for the local media described the principle as follows: “If 
you pay, you’re the best. Otherwise, you’ll be in media scandals.”⁵² Th ere is also a practice 
where advertisers provide ﬁ nancial support to the media without requesting that their 
advertisements are published in the media. Th is kind of arrangement is related to either 
political or economic motives. Usually, such payments go to newspapers that criticise lo-
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cal authorities, where the respective companies do not want to see themselves associated 
with a newspaper running against the mainstream. But companies often ﬁ nance newspa-
pers just in order not to be attacked, without any advertising being published. Th e main 
source of these unhealthy practices is the lack of money on the advertising market. With 
few exceptions, advertising revenue is so low that it does not allow the paper to survive 
with transparent resources. Th e paradox is that almost no media outlet has gone bank-
rupt; on the contrary, the number has been constantly increasing. It seems that money 
talks: Romania is the only candidate for accession to the  belonging in the category of 
countries with a partially free press, according to the Freedom House ranking.⁵³
6 CONCLUSIONS
Th ere are no legal provisions forcing media outlets to reveal their real owners. Owner-
ship data should be public as for any other company, but media owners sometimes hide 
their traces using legal means guaranteeing secrecy. Foreign ownership is present in every 
media ﬁ eld, but sometimes it has behind it companies registered in tax haven jurisdictions 
( Bermuda, Albany Holdings in New Jersey). Often, the foreign investors are only part 
of a big business. Romanian entrepreneurs usually created their own media outlets to gain 
more inﬂ uence. One leading television is owned by a political leader. Until April , the 
law did not clearly sanction such conﬂ ict of interest, so there were cases of ministers run-
ning media businesses. A new law that came into force in mid  prohibits public serv-
ants from running businesses.
While the provincial Romania politicians try to directly control small media outlets, the 
Government perseveres in keeping an eye on the majority of the big players - especially 
because of tax liabilities, and in some cases, through indirect subsidies. 
Monitoring of  news and print media revealed the lack of investigative journalism 
in broadcast programming and almost no criticism of the Government. Consequently, 
media organisations have warned several times both civic society and the international 
community that little formal advancement and no substantial progress have been made in 
 concerning freedom of the media in Romania.
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Th e Serbian media market is characterised by transition. Media ownership is continu-
ously changing, for economic and political reasons. Th e transformation of socially owned 
capital into private property is still underway, and it is accompanied by numerous diﬃ  -
culties and irregularities. Th e diﬃ  culties are mostly generated by bad implementation or 
misuse of legal acts. Th e new laws lack strong support from the state apparatus and justice 
mechanism. On the other hand, some laws, like for example the Law on Public Access to 
Information, are yet to be adopted. Th at is why Serbia is an attractive market for risk in-
vestments of all types. Th e investors are especially fond of media, as the Serbian market 
remains one of the largest in South East Europe.
Th e most important media are owned by local businessmen, with foreign companies 
slowly taking over. Th e local businessmen are mainly entrepreneurs who generated their 
basic capital by working closely with the regime of Slobodan Milošević in the s (for 
instance  Telekom,  Pink). Th e foreign investors in Serbia are media groups that have 
been focusing on the South East Eureopean market in the last years (, Gruner + Jahr, 
Ringier). Th ere is also a phenomenon of journalists securing their ownership shares and 
stability of their media through foreign donations (for instance B, Danas).
Nowadays, we cannot really talk about direct and brutal attacks on media freedom, but 
a new trend involving pressure from local and foreign capital is emerging. When buying 
media, the owners are taking over journalists as “labour force”, thus creating a sort of me-
dia proletariat. Media freedom is no longer endangered by political projects but by busi-
ness interests. Freedom of speech is not succumbing to ideology, but to proﬁ t. In the tran-
sitional times of Serbian media privatisation, journalists and copyrighted programs are 
transferred like money or merchandise (the Klopka  show was transferred from  
Pink to  ; the movie program editor, Robert Nemeček, left  Pink for ; the  
chief editor, Bojana Lekić, has now joined  , etc). And neither local, nor foreign inves-
tors care for improvement of journalists’ professional and social standards.
2 REGULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION
Th e media scene in Serbia is regulated by three basic acts: the Broadcasting Law,¹ the 
Public Information Law² and the Law on Telecommunications.³ Representatives from all 
the relevant professional organisations and associations, media and legal experts, repre-
sentatives from the  and the Council of Europe, and other interested parties took part 
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in the process of law-making with belief that the Serbian media scene could be success-
fully transformed.
2.1 BROADCASTING LAW AND ROLE OF THE BROADCASTING AGENCY
 Th e main regulatory body for the broadcast media is the Broadcasting Agency or, to 
be more precise, the Council that runs the Agency. Th e Broadcasting Law establishes the 
Agency,⁴ and deﬁ nes its role and functions. Th e role of the Agency is to deﬁ ne a develop-
ment strategy for the broadcasting sector, to issue broadcasting licenses, to set working 
conditions for broadcasters, to protect the interests of minors and authors’ rights, and to 
stop broadcasting of any program which induces discrimination, hatred or violence. Th e 
Agency should also control the legality of the broadcasters’ work. Th e method of electing 
the nine members of the Broadcasting Council is intended to ensure the Agency’s inde-
pendence from the authorities. Th e members of the Council have to be highly respected 
individuals, with large credibility before the public, and should by no means engage in 
conﬂ icts of interest, or the appearance of conﬂ ict of interest.⁵ 
2.1.1 OWNERSHIP RESTRICTIONS 
Th e Broadcasting Law contains restrictions regarding the founders of and ownership 
shares in the broadcast media, but has no provisions on transparency about the origins 
and ownership of the capital used for starting a media. Both the Broadcasting Law and the 
Public Information Law require the media to make basic data on the founding organisa-
tion public, including their addresses and the names of the responsible individuals (chief 
editors and editors in charge). 
According to the Broadcasting Law, any concentration of media ownership is prohib-
ited; no single broadcaster can invest in the founding capital of another broadcaster or 
company publishing printed media, and vice-versa.⁶ But that provision is often ignored in 
practice and circumvented by establishing “sister companies”. Th e concentration of me-
dia ownership is highest in the big media groups, especially those under direct control or 
inﬂ uence of the previous regime. For example, the media group Politika publishes three 
daily newspapers, ten weeklies, newsmagazines and other periodical publication; it also 
owns a television station,  Politika, a radio station, Politika, and one of the largest print-
ing companies as well as a sales and distribution network. Th e group Novosti, owns a radio 
station, the most popular daily newspaper, Večernje novosti, and twelve other publications. 
Th e group Braća Karić owns a  and a radio station and publishes magazines. Th e group 
Pink has a  and a radio station.
According to the Broadcasting Law and the Public Information Law, a license to broad-
cast a program or publish a newspaper cannot be obtained by political parties, organisa-
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tions or coalitions, nor any legal entity founded by a political party.⁷ No public enterpris-
es, institutions or other legal entities founded by the State or Autonomous Provinces, can 
be granted a license, with the exception of public broadcasting service entities. But many 
Serbian municipalities are still owners of television and radio stations, and they exert po-
litical inﬂ uence over their editorial policies by appointing members to editorial boards in 
line with their political merits. Th is is the biggest problem with most of the local media 
and the greatest obstacle to their professionalisation and independence. Under the Broad-
casting Law, these stations must be privatised by .
2.1.2 TRANSPARENCY PROBLEMS AND BROADCASTING WITHOUT LICENSES 
Because of the lack of legal provisions on the transparency of ownership shares in the 
media, it is often very diﬃ  cult to ﬁ gure out who owns what on the media scene, and it is 
even more diﬃ  cult to ﬁ nd out in which way and in what percentage certain media have 
shares in other media. All sorts of information on media operation, such as the owner-
ship structure, the value of the company or its accountability, are kept as a business secret. 
One part of the information on the management and the ownership of the media can be 
obtained from the Court of Commerce, where companies are registered, but this informa-
tion is not reliable because the data on ownership structures are not regularly updated, 
despite the legal obligation. 
Th e Ministry of Culture and Public Information that should have all the data on the me-
dia, is relying on an incomplete register of the media and waiting for further instructions 
from the Broadcasting Agency, which is about to start operating. In addition, access to this 
information will be more diﬃ  cult under the Public Information Law that speciﬁ es that the 
founders of media are not obliged to be listed in the media register.⁸ Th is register has been 
abolished, and the founders are now only obliged to found a legal entity that publishes the 
media or broadcasts the program. 
An inside look at the state of the media scene is limited by the fact that most of the 
broadcast media operate without any broadcasting license. In order to understand the sit-
uation, one should know that after the democratic change in , the new authorities in-
troduced a moratorium on the allocation of public frequencies, preserving the status quo 
in the number and operations of radio and  broadcasters, in an attempt to avoid major 
abuses of the lack of legal grounds. It was said that the moratorium would be lifted in a few 
months, but it is practically still in force. Everyone is waiting for the Broadcasting Agency 
to prepare a plan, to set frequencies and to allocate them by way of public tender, along 
with the criteria that need to be met by broadcasters before they are awarded licenses. Un-
til this process is over, neither the restrictive legal provisions on the concentration of me-
dia ownership, nor other anti-monopoly provisions can be implemented.
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Th e big turning point in the number of electronic media operating in Serbia will hap-
pen once the Broadcasting Agency starts to implement the law, which deﬁ nes that pub-
lic broadcasting systems have to ensure quality reception for no less than  percent of 
the country’s population, while commercial broadcasting systems have to ensure quality 
reception for no less than  percent of the population.⁹ In addition, the following provi-
sions are likely to further limit the number of media operating: the broadcaster has to have 
 percent of its own programming, of which no less than  percent has to be produced 
in Serbian language; the radio and  stations broadcasting programming for national mi-
norities also have to have no less than  percent of their own programming.
2.2 TELECOMMUNICATION LAW AND ROLE 
OF THE TELECOMMUNICATION AGENCY
Th e Telecommunications Agency should focus on preventing the concentration of me-
dia ownership and market monopolies. It was established by the Law on Telecommunica-
tions (adopted in April )¹⁰ as an independent body running the Serbian frequencies. 
Its task is to prepare a development strategy for the telecommunications sector, to issue li-
censes for using frequencies, to ensure the quality level of the services and to prevent anti-
competition and monopoly activities.
2.3 PUBLIC INFORMATION LAW
Th e Public Information Law was adopted in April  too. Th e fact that the law was 
subject to an accelerated passage procedure during the state of emergency declared after 
the assassination of the Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić cast a shadow over this act, so it nev-
er gained the conﬁ dence of media circles. Th e Government claimed the law to be very re-
strictive,¹¹ because most of the articles deal with various sanctions against journalists and 
editors, while only a few promote, in a general manner, freedom of information and opin-
ion (the right to information is guaranteed; no one has the right to deny the right to infor-
mation; presentation of opinions and ideas is guaranteed; public institutions and political 
leaders have to make all relevant information public, etc.). In the Public Information Law, 
media pluralism is promoted, to a certain extent, only in the section relating to national mi-
norities and persons with special requirements; the state has a general commitment to sup-
port their media, but there are no provisions on the terms and the level of support.
2.4 PUBLIC SERVICE BROADCASTING
Th e delay in implementing the Broadcasting Law, and thus in appointing the Broad-
casting Council, also blocked the transformation of the state broadcaster Radio Televi-
sion Serbia (), into a public service. Th is state-owned company was left without relia-
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ble funding or a new management structure, and open to continuing outside interference. 
Preparations for public bidding for broadcast frequencies were also brought to a halt, and 
the chaotic media market was needlessly allowed to continue. Th e delayed application of 
the law also set back the transformation of media owned by local governments.
Th ere was an attempt to amend the Broadcasting Law regarding the ﬁ nancing of Radio 
Television Serbia. Th e Government proposed that until the radio and television subscrip-
tion system comes into force, state television should be ﬁ nanced through a special tax on 
ﬁ nancial transactions. Explaining the proposal, the Government speciﬁ ed that state tel-
evision could be ﬁ nanced from the current budget only until  October , and that the 
ability of the  to meet its obligations as a future public service broadcaster for Serbia 
and Vojvodina was doubtful. Th e Parliament, however, dismissed the proposal from its 
agenda, and it remains unclear when the amendments will be debated, if at all. 
3 PRIVATISATION
In Serbia, the privatisation of the socially owned media started in , under the law 
passed by the pro-liberal government of the former Yugoslavia, led by Prime Minister Ante 
Marković. But the authorities were largely unprepared to renounce social property and 
rather keen to retain control over the media. Th e privatisation had turned chaotic, with 
diﬀ erent acts regulating media ownership, some on the Serbian, and others on the federal 
level. Provisions for the models of privatisation were controversial, and media organisa-
tions were free to choose the legal basis for their privatisation. Th e authorities occasionally 
responded by canceling privatisation. It was mostly eﬀ ected by government decrees.
3.1 CASE OF VECˇERNJE NOVOSTI
Privatisation of the Večernje Novosti daily newspaper is one of the best examples of how 
the regime behaved towards the media in s.
According to the  Law on Companies (the Yugoslav federal law), the Borba public 
enterprise split into  companies, one of these being Večernje Novosti.¹²
Th e ﬁ rst privatisation of the evening newspaper, Večernje Novosti, took place in , 
according to the Law on Social Capital passed by the ex-Yugoslav Parliament.¹³ Th e law 
provided the basis for Večernje Novosti to become a shareholder company, the entire capi-
tal of which was distributed among the company’s employees.
Th e change in ownership structure took place in , according to the Serbian Law on 
Transformation, and new re-deﬁ nition of capital in , under the Serbian Law on Compa-
nies: an additional  percent of the capital was divided among employees, the State contin-
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ued to directly own  percent of shares, and the company’s employees were now owners of 
 percent of the shares. Večernje Novosti was registered as a stockholders company.¹⁴
But, in March , the Federal Government issued a decree, which was Milošević’s 
favourite way to circumvent the law, removing the company from the court register and 
making it once more part of the Federal Public Enterprise Borba.
A year later, in , the new pro-democratic government repaired some of the me-
dia problems created by Milošević’s regime. Apart from having abolished the Public In-
formation Law, it managed to return the money that the previous government had taken 
from the media under the rapid penalty system, and the Novosti company was given back 
to its previous owners. Th e Government gave the Novosti company its legal ground for 
functioning, by passing a decision on the transformation of the Public Enterprise Borba, 
splitting it into three diﬀ erent companies. Th e former stockholders of the Novosti com-
pany were approved ownership rights for about  percent of the new company, while  
percent remained state-owned property. Th e state still owns the building in which Nov-
osti have their corporate headquarters. Th e main consequence of such decision is that the 
company cannot make strategic decisions and appoint management without representa-
tives of the state. 
For two years now, the Novosti company has been trying to break its bonds with the 
state and become  percent privately owned, but so far without success.
3.2 DILEMMAS ON PRIVATISATION OF LOCAL MEDIA
According to the Broadcasting Law, radio and  stations owned by local and region-
al governments have to be privatised within no later than four years from the day the law 
came into eﬀ ect (i.e. by mid , since the Broadcasting Law was adopted in mid ).¹⁵ 
Furthermore, the Ministry of Privatisation was obliged under the law to come up with a 
bylaw regulating the methods of television and radio station privatisation, no later than 
within six months from the day the law came into eﬀ ect.¹⁶ But the Ministry failed to do 
that, most probably because it was incapable of such a move and lacked the political will.
Th ere are some open questions regarding the expecting privatisation of radio and tele-
vision stations owned by local and regional authorities. Th eir privatisation might be risky 
from the point of view of their participation in a tender for frequencies. Being a kind of pub-
lic broadcasters, as they are at present, and providing programs of special importance for 
the public, these radio and  stations have better chance to pass the tender for frequencies 
(one that will establish legal distribution of frequencies and broadcasting licenses).
Another problem is that programs of special importance for the public are expensive, 
especially those designed for national minorities and produced in minority languages. 
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Taking into account the above mentioned it seems that local authorities will have to 
contribute to sustainability of the local radio and  stations also in future to make them 
able to provide minority programs. Th e situation causes certain fear from privatisation of 
local media especially in Vojvodina because of the number of national minorities there 
and a need to provide for them space in the media.
4 MEDIA OWNERSHIP 
4.1 PRINT MEDIA
4.1.1 DAILY VECˇERNJE NOVOSTI 
Th e Novosti company is the founder and publisher of two daily newspapers, ten maga-
zines and one radio station. According to a public opinion poll conducted by the  Me-
dium Gallup in September , their daily Večernje Novosti is the most popular daily in 
Serbia. About , copies are sold every day, and it has , regular readers.
Th e oﬃ  cial estimated value of the Novosti company is  . million.¹⁷ Th e compa-
ny is a joint venture. Th ere are , stocks in total, of which . percent are privately 
owned by former and present employees of the company, while . percent is owned by 
the state. Th e Novosti company has  stockholders; its bodies are the stockholders as-
sembly ( members, each of them representing at least  stocks, their own or with au-
thorisation from the owners), the management board, the supervisory board, the execu-
tive board of directors, the general manager and the chief editor.
4.1.2 DAILY BLIC
Blic is the second-highest rated daily newspaper in Serbia, in terms of circulation and 
readership, according to data obtained by the Strategic Marketing and Media Research In-
stitute (): , copies are printed every day, and more than , people read 
the newspaper all around Serbia and Montenegro.¹⁸
Th e newspaper was founded in the autumn of , with shared Serb-German capital. 
Th e owner of the German share was the Gruner + Jahr  Co from Hamburg, part of the 
Bertelsmann media group. Soon after  and the democratic changes in Serbia, Blic be-
came entirely owned by the German company, and the Serbian owner withdrew. 
In November , the company Blic bought the radio and  station Košava from Slo-
bodan Milošević’s daughter. Th e transaction was conducted despite a moratorium on any 
move involving frequency allocation and ownership in the media proclaimed by the new 
democratic authorities. Th e purchase price has never been made public.
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 Košava was founded and technically equipped by means of “donations” from large 
state-run companies, some of whom have later been liquidated for their huge business 
failures. It was later made public that one of the many “donations” to  Košava was 
 , (approx.  ,) worth of interior decoration for the editorial premis-
es, paid by Beobanka and Jugopetrol. Th e media expected that  Košava would ﬁ le for 
bankruptcy, instead of undergoing an ownership change.¹⁹ 
Th e Hamburg company, Gruner + Jahr  , had the business goal of making  
Košava a regional radio-television station focused on entertainment. It is rather signiﬁ -
cant that, regardless of the moratorium on frequencies,  Košava was strengthening 
and widening its signal area, and it now covers more than  percent of the Serbian terri-
tory, while in  its signal was limited to the region of Belgrade. ²⁰
In , the entire property owned by Gruner + Jahr   in Serbia was sold to the 
Swiss media group Ringier.²¹ According to the company’s statement, Ringier will take over 
the major share in Blic in early .
4.1.3 DAILY POLITIKA
One of the oldest daily newspapers in the Balkans, Politika was founded in  and 
was the basis on which a powerful media group was built, nowadays consisting of three 
companies: Politika , Politika Newspapers & Magazines, and  Politika.
For decades before the rise of Slobodan Milošević, the newspaper Politika enjoyed great 
respect, and the same goes for the media group as a whole, which includes the largest print-
ing plant in Serbia and the best developed distribution and sales network. In the early s, 
Politika became a stock company, with large state-run companies as major stockholders; 
their representatives entered the Executive Board and allowed Milošević to exercise total 
control over editorial boards within the whole group and to determine its business and ed-
itorial policy. Th e largest stockholder was a Belgrade-based bank, Komercijalna Banka, an 
important cornerstone of the Milošević regime. Th e Komercijalna Banka claimed its capi-
tal in Politika on the basis of loans and interests to the company during the s.
Supporting Milošević’s regime for nearly a decade, Politika’s business were down, and 
the company was facing a debt crisis. Today, the General Manager of the Komercijalna 
Banka is an inﬂ uential member of the Executive Board of Politika , and at the same time 
his long-time advisor is the General Manager of Politika .
Th e entry of German capital into Politika was made oﬃ  cial on  March  when a 
company called Politika Newspapers & Magazines was formed as a : joint venture of 
Politika  and a German corporation, .²² Th e contract on founding the new Serbian-
German media company was signed on  November  in Essen by the General Man-
ager and one of the owners of the German corporation, Erik Schumann, and the Chairman 
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of the Executive Board of Politika , Darko Ribnikar, a descendant of the family which 
founded Politika back in .
Standing behind the men who signed the contract were those who negotiated the whole 
deal: Bodo Hombach, Chairman of the Executive Board of , on one side, and on the 
other, Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić, Minister for Foreign Economic Relations 
in the Government of Serbia, Goran Pitić, General Manager of the Komercijalna Banka, 
Ljubomir Mihajlović, and General Manager of Politika , Mirko Đekić.
Th e Company Politika Newspapers & Magazines () owns three daily newspapers 
distributed all across Serbia and Montenegro: Politika, the serious, morning daily news-
paper read by the middle class, political leaders, businessmen and intellectuals, with a cir-
culation of , copies and a readership of no less than , people on a daily basis; 
Politika Ekspres, the evening newspaper with a low circulation of about , to ,; 
and Sportski Žurnal, printed in , copies.  also publishes  magazines. It owns a 
large printing house with three new oﬀ set machines, and a sales network including , 
newspaper stands.²³ Th e market value of the  company has been oﬃ  cially estimated 
at   million.²⁴
As for the other two companies of the Politika group, Politika  owns not only one half 
of , but also half of its real estate, printing plants, multimedia and publishing compa-
nies, three buildings with over , square meters of business premises and an addi-
tional , square meters of industrial space. In the Belgrade industrial zone, the compa-
ny owns , square meters of land and a printing house of about , sq. meters. 
Th e third company,  Politika, founded in , covers almost  percent of the Ser-
bian population with its signals and, unlike other broadcast media, this radio-television 
station has its own transmitters that cover most of the Serbian territory.²⁵
Following the venture in Politika,  bought another two daily newspapers in Serbia 
and Montenegro. It bought the Novi Sad-based Dnevnik and the Podgorica-based Vijesti. 
On  October ,  oﬃ  cially became owner of a majority share in the Novi Sad-
based daily newspaper Dnevnik, the third media organisation engaging in a partnership 
with .  became the owner of  percent of the capital in Dnevnik, while  percent 
remains owned by the Vojvodina Parliament, the founder of the newspaper.²⁶ 
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Chart  POLITIKA GROUP OWNERSHIP AND WAZ SHARE
POLITIKA 
GROUP
 
WAZ POLITIKA AD RTV POLITIKA
             
    
DNEVNIK Politika newspapers 
and magazines
Buildings, real 
estate etc.
RADIO 
POLITIKA 
TV POLITIKA
Novi Sad daily 
newspaper

    
daily newspapers  magazines NIN printing plant sales network
POLITIKA
(general)
POLITIKA 
EXPRESS
(evening)
SPORTSKI 
ŽURNAL
(sports)
weekly magazine
Table  OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE OF THREE BIGGEST DAILIES IN SERBIA
DAILY OWNER OWNERSHIP 
SHARE (%)
BLIC RINGIER MEDIA GROUP 100
POLITIKA POLITIKA AD 50
WAZ 50
VECˇERNJE NOVOSTI EMPLOYEES OF NOVOSTI COMPANY 70.52
STATE 29.48
Source: Court of Registers, end of .
4.1.4 WEEKLY NEDELJNI TELEGRAF
Momčilo Đorgović has been the sole owner of the weekly Nedeljni Telegraf from the be-
ginning. Th is weekly has existed for about ten years and it is entirely ﬁ nanced from sales 
revenue – there are no foreign donations and no other assistance of any kind. Beside pub-
lishing the weekly Nedeljni Telegraf with a circulation of , copies, Đorgović’s Nedelj-
ni Telegraf company is the publisher of two additional magazines (Zdravlje i Lepota/
Health and Beauty with a circulation of , copies, and Ljubav/Love with a circulation 
of , copies²⁷.
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Đorgović has stated²⁸ that he is open for talks on selling part of his share in Nedeljni Tel-
egraf, but so far the right oﬀ er has not appeared. For him, selling part of his share would be 
a way to improve production capacities. 
4.1.5 WEEKLY NIN
 is one of the oldest and one of the most prestigious Serbian political weekly maga-
zines, founded in . Its founder was the Politika Company, but it later split. In , it 
was registered as an independent company, which began the transfer of socially-owned to 
private capital under the  Federal Law on Companies. Nowadays, Politika  owns 
. percent of shares in ; . percent is owned by the employees, and . percent 
remains socially-owned capital. Politika  plans to buy shares in  as soon as they ap-
pear on the market.²⁹
4.1.6 WEEKLY VREME
Th e weekly Vreme was founded in October  by a group of journalists from the larg-
est Serbian publishing house Politika, led by Dragoljub Žarković. Th e group became pri-
vate owners of the newsmagazine Vreme. Th e whole project was ﬁ nancially backed by the 
well-known Serbian lawyer, Srđa Popović, who became the majority shareholder (. 
percent) of the company Vreme Newspapers Company, with eleven other shareholders 
being a group of journalists.³⁰
4.2 BROADCAST MEDIA
4.2.1 RTV PINK
Th e sole owner of  Pink is Željko Mitrović. In the early s, he started the second 
private radio station in Serbia, Radio Pink, Belgrade. He was elected a Member of the Yu-
goslav Federal Parliament in , as a candidate for a party led by Milošević’s wife – Yu-
goslav Left ().  Pink has  frequencies. “Th e hardware for a new  station in Ser-
bia would cost about   million, but the ratings are worth up to   million. Th e 
key to Pink’s success is not the hardware, nor the building, nor the equipment, but the rat-
ings, the position Pink has gained on the media market”, explains Željko Mitrović, saying 
that “it all started as a radio station, with a highly commercialized program playing lots of 
folk music”³¹.
 Pink was one of the cornerstones of Milošević’s regime. According to Miša Đurković, 
a research fellow with the Institute of European Studies, it was far more important than 
. “Pink is a more supple and therefore more successful mechanism for governing. Its 
enormous manipulative and political potential is actually based on its (alleged) absolute 
lack of political interest.”³²
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Željko Mitrović is widely suspected to have used his political and business relation-
ships, and personal friendship with some of Milošević’s henchmen, to create a technologi-
cally and commercially powerful  station. According to the article “Document on Pink 
Empire Rising” written by Vreme journalist Dejan Anastasijević, Mitrović’s claims that it 
is possible to establish a -million-dollar company on the basis of a – million annual 
revenue sounds rather unrealistic.³³
Željko Mitrović started his  station with a helping hand from Milorad Vučelić, the 
General Manager of Radio Television Serbia in the early s. At that time it was the  
that had control over the broadcast sector rather than the Federal Ministry which only is-
sued licenses.³⁴ In the existing media and legal conditions, everyone was using the only 
avenue for obtaining frequencies, i.e. by establishing formal business links and techni-
cal cooperation with the . According to the contract, Pink had certain obligations to-
wards  in return for its services. “But we took nothing from the , nothing at all,” says 
Mitrović.³⁵ Th e cooperation with  ceased in , but the contract was oﬃ  cially termi-
nated much later, in . 
Mitrović claims³⁶ that the contracts with  were just a formal framework so that  
Pink could begin broadcasting, like the other media formally founded by the  coup de 
main at the time.
 Pink is now one of the most powerful companies in Serbia. According to Pink com-
pany newsletter, their net proﬁ t has been growing geometrically in the last three years. 
In , the annual revenue was between   and  million. In , it is above   
million.³⁷
Željko Mitrović also has an interest in Radio Pingvin. He bought the radio station from 
the heirs of the assassinated criminal warlord, Željko Ražnatović Arkan. Being obliged by 
the law,³⁸ he oﬃ  cially sold his ownership stake last year, but Radio Pingvin is still described 
as “a part of Pink family since ” on the  Pink web site.³⁹ Mitrović is also the owner 
of the City Records Company and the Media System Company. He said⁴⁰ he was never in-
terested in having a role on the political scene, yet he ran as a candidate for the Yugoslav 
Left () party in the  federal elections. It seems he was elected Member of the Fed-
eral Parliament for business reasons – to protect his business.
Th e tax on the satellite pay-per-view programs Pink Plus and Pink Extra, watched only 
by subscribers with Irdeto cards, is paid in Austria, where the Media System Company is 
based and whence it distributes the programs. Mitrović is one of a number of shareholders 
in the Media System Company and the only non-Austrian shareholder.
“Unlike the initial turbo-folk concept that proved successful in the ﬁ rst few years,  
percent of Pink’s program nowadays is Hollywood productions. Only  percent of the pro-
gramming involves folk music, which is actually a very important business arrangement 
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for the City Records Company, a good advertisement and a guarantee of success in pro-
duction,” explains Mitrović about the changed program concept of Pink.⁴¹
Pink’s programming cornered the market in Serbia and has continued to develop and 
spread around the region. Pink Plus and Pink Extra now function as separate satellite 
programs. Pink is developing a network of ﬁ ve channels broadcast in the region. Togeth-
er with the two satellite programs,  Pink has become the strongest and most proﬁ t-
able media network in the South East Europe, leaving behind Murdock, ,  and  
Nova, claims Mitrović.⁴² According to him, Pink also plans to launch authentic local pro-
gramming in the region (in Bulgaria, Macedonia and Slovenia). 
Chart  PINK GROUP – OWNERSHIP OF ŽELJKO MITROVIC´
ŽELJKO MITROVIC´
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4.2.2 BK TELEKOM
Th e  station  Telekom was founded in December , under the slogan “Symbol 
of Good Television.”⁴³ Th e founder and the major shareholder is the Karić family. It started 
to work under a business and technical cooperation contract signed with , like many 
other  stations at that time.  Telekom is member of the Astra Group (owned by the 
Karić family) that consists of  companies “with the annual income of over   mil-
lion operating in the following areas: telecommunications, Internet, ﬁ nance, construction, 
trade, consulting, agriculture, travel, marketing, education and sports.”⁴⁴   has about 
 employees.
Th e family also owns  Radio, which is one of few formatted stations, broadcast-
ing music for teenagers. Th ey own the Jeﬁ mija magazine, and are major shareholders 
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in the magazines Proﬁ l and Dama. Th e Chairman of the  Telekom Executive Board is 
Ljubomir Mihajlović, the owner of the Komercijalna Banka (the one with interest in the 
Politika/ media group in Serbia). 
4.2.3 RTV B92
Radio B was founded in , as an experimental youth station broadcasting in Bel-
grade on a ﬁ fteen-day license. Th e station rapidly expanded into a multi-media organisa-
tion. Apart from broadcasting a mixture of news, culture, entertainment and phone-in radio 
shows to Belgrade audiences, B also comprises a television and ﬁ lm production section, 
books and  publishing division, while also acting as an Internet service provider.
Television B was launched in September , ahead of the crucial elections in Yu-
goslavia. Its news and current aﬀ airs programs were produced in Belgrade and distributed 
via satellite to local  stations,  members of the   Network, as well as to other 
stations in the region. After the events of  October  (the day when Milošević’s re-
gime was overthrown by a great mass of people demonstrating in downtown Belgrade), 
B was able to restore control of its operations, transmitters and premises which had 
been seized by Milošević regime since  (the time of  bombing of Yugoslavia). 
By the end of the year , Radio B ranked as the most popular station in Belgrade, 
while its television counterpart, after only three weeks on the air and covering just  per-
cent of the capital city, ranked th out of  stations,  of which had been on the air for 
at least two years.⁴⁵
  has come a long way from a limited company to the stockholders company 
“Radio Broadcasting Company  , Belgrade”, thanks to the privatisation process. Th e 
founding capital of the    is ,, dinars (approximately  ,), ac-
cording to the Court of Commerce Register. Th e major stockholder is the American fund, 
Media Development Loan Fund (), with . percent; the B Trust Company 
(owned by the three founders of  : Veran Matić, Saša Marković, Ksenija Stefanović) 
has . percent, the Republic of Serbia Stocks Fund owns . percent, and the rest (. 
percent in total) is shared by present and past employees. In the further process of owner-
ship structure transformation of B scheduled to take place in the spring of , a large 
part of the stocks currently owned by the B Trust Company will be oﬀ ered to  employ-
ees, so in , the employees would own  percent of the stock, while the company would 
keep only  percent of the stock. Th e Radio B program is broadcast on three frequencies, 
and   is broadcast and re-broadcast on no less than  channels in Serbia.⁴⁶ 
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Table  OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE OF THREE BIGGEST TV CHANNELS
TV CHANNEL OWNER OWNERSHIP 
SHARE (%)
TV PINK ŽELJKO MITROVIC´ 100
BK TV BK COMPANY 100
TV B92 MDLF 48.06
B92 TRUST COMPANY 42.38
EMPLOYEES 9.54
REPUBLIC OF SERBIA 
STOCKS FUND
0.02
Source:  Boards, Court of Registers, end of .
4.3 NEWSPAPER DISTRIBUTION 
Th e main newspaper distribution company is Borba Distribution Company, part of the 
Borba Company, with , employees and  newsstands in Serbia and Montenegro. At 
the moment,  of the  newsstands are being rented (under a franchise). Th e number 
of rented newsstands varies from time to time, but is not changing a lot. Apart from the 
newsstands and building plots, the Distribution Company owns a network of depots, the 
largest one being located in downtown Belgrade.
Th e Borba Distribution Company was  percent owned by the Yugoslav Federation, 
and the founder of this company was the Federal Government. Nowadays, the owner of 
the Borba Distribution Company is still the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro.
4.4 NEWSPAPER PRINTING HOUSE
Th e main printing house is a Belgrade-based printing company, Borba , prints eight 
dailies and many magazines. It is  percent owned by the state, that is, the Republic of 
Serbia, while the present and past employees own  percent of the shares. Nowadays, the 
printing company, Borba , employs about  full-time workers on a long-term basis, 
the majority of whom are graphics technicians. 
5 MEDIA PLURALISM
In Serbia, there is even a problem of listing media: some of the founders and owners 
decline to give any information on the media, and some of them do not know the relevant 
data such as a basic description of the media, its circulation, signal area, frequency and 
the like. In a couple of cases the media representatives were totally unaware of the exact 
name of the media they were representing at the time, so they tried to guess it in front 
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of the audience, causing many laughs, not to mention embarrassment.⁴⁷ Prvoslav Plavšić 
has mentioned this issue in his introduction to “Th e Yugoslav Media Guide”, when trying 
to explain why his eﬀ orts to list all the media and their relevant references had been un-
successful, in spite of hard work that lasted for several months. Th is was always happen-
ing with the radio and  stations. Th e oﬃ  cial state agency’s “Media Guide for ” lists 
 radio stations, while independent estimates⁴⁸ push this ﬁ gure to more than  radio 
stations operating in Serbia in , and more than  in . Th e situation with  
stations is much the same. Th e Federal Agency for Media Research and Public Relations, 
Belgrade,  has counted   broadcasters in Serbia, and independent sources ( 
Strategic Research and Strategic Marketing) claim that there are more than  of them. 
One should bear in mind that not only are the ﬁ gures changing, but so are their frequen-
cies and the area covered by their signals.
If we look at the statistics, three quarters of the total number of media operating nowa-
days in Serbia were launched in the last  years. By looking at statistics, we can note that a 
media, a broadcasting media in most cases, was founded or shut down every two or three 
days. Th e statistics failed to register all of them, let alone to note how many of them were 
shut down and how many continued to operate. We can only rely on the Federal Agency for 
Media Research’ estimates and on the estimates made by the Strategic Marketing agency.
According to them,  media were launched in the period  to  (the period 
of Milošević’s rule) and  media were launched in the period  to  (the post-
Milošević era). 
Th e record was set in , with  new media emerging. In addition, there were  
new media in ,  in  and  in . Th e reasons for the lack of sustainability 
of such a large number of media are mostly economic.  Strategic Research and Strate-
gic Marketing’s researchers say that the Serbian economy, consumer conﬁ dence and the 
needs of the big advertisers show that less than one-third of the present number of me-
dia can remain sustainable on the market. Th e Federal Agency for Media Research claims 
that the motive for establishing new media in the last few years “was not the needs of the 
population or the economy, but rather the combination of two dominating issues – po-
litical interests and income. Some were ﬁ ghting for position, some were just hoping for 
money.” For example, in  advertisers in Serbia spent about   million (taxes not 
included). Most of this sum was spent on  advertising – about  million; the printed 
media took   million, and radio took  . million. Th e rest of the money was spent 
on other forms of advertising.
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6 MEDIA INDEPENDENCE
Th ere is no direct government pressure on the media. At least not like that which char-
acterized Milošević’s regime. If we take a look at the period from December  to De-
cember , i.e. from one Serbian parliamentary election to another, the most obvious 
attempt of the authorities to retain control over broadcast media was recorded when the 
majority in the Parliament decided to form the Broadcasting Council in an illegal way, by 
clearly ignoring legal procedure. Th e  and the  have issued oﬃ  cial letters of protest. 
In January , the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe examined the issue 
at its winter session and concluded that the Broadcasting Council was illegal. 
Th e most straightforward answers about the pressures on media and journalists by pol-
iticians and owners were obtained in a poll conducted by the Belgrade Media Center, with 
the support of , in December .⁴⁹ Among other important conclusions that show 
diﬀ erent lines of pressure on the media, the following is unprecedented: “Businessmen are 
taking over the championship of limiting media freedom from political leaders. We also 
found answers that testify to the large submission of journalists, and the inferiority of pro-
fessionals, even in cases involving elementary standards. For example, our respondents 
say that the owner can do whatever he/she wants to, that his/her word is always the last, 
that the owner’s instructions, shared via the editors, take priority over professional norms 
– and that’s the way it’s got to be. Th erefore, one of the crucial issues of professional jour-
nalism is whether the professional code is also binding on the media owners. Th e given an-
swers testify to a strong appeal for professional or unionist action to do something for the 
improvement of working conditions, but also to show that the journalists still have high 
expectations from the state.”
Th ere are no collective contracts between journalist associations and publishers of the 
media. Th e publishers cannot keep their hands oﬀ  the editorial work; they continue to 
wage private warfare using their media and give preferential treatment to certain political 
or business parties. Covert advertising and commissioned and paid articles remain regu-
lar practices.
Investigative journalism is being neglected, mainly because of the weak interest in dis-
covering the truth. Th ere are attempts to promote investigative journalism, but these are 
somehow limited to enthusiastic ventures, not appealing to professionalism. When some 
media reveals the truth, it often means that they gain some beneﬁ t by doing so, and that 
they are endangered by an opposing position. But, in Serbia, it seldom happens that edi-
tors or owners are ready to pay for an investigation for the sake of truth itself.
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7 CONCLUSIONS
 Pink is spreading all around the Balkans by broadcasting a very commercial program 
popularly known as “turbo-folk” culture. It is estimated that its advertisements account 
for approximately  percent of total advertising in Serbia. At the same time, the would-
be public broadcaster, , is not showing any signs of improvement. Bearing in mind a 
variety of problems ranging from securing sources of ﬁ nance to implementing the neces-
sary legal provisions for its operations and establishing the Broadcasting Council, which 
is connected to the unstable political developments, there is a real danger that  could 
be shut down in .
It seems that in order to secure media pluralism in the South East European region, the 
public broadcasters should form a network, and have norms and standards set on the re-
gional level. Th ere should be a counter-weight to the regional expansion of  Pink’s con-
cept of culture.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Slovakia’s media market is fairly concentrated. Th is partly stems from the small size of 
the country, making larger media outlets more eﬃ  cient and productive. On other hand, 
the state’s substantial holdings continue to restrain competition necessary to limit the 
negative eﬀ ects of high ownership concentration. Most signiﬁ cantly, this is the case in the 
 market, where the dominant  Markíza has been left without any meaningful com-
petition for several years. 
Moreover, anti-concentration legislation had not been in place until , but even af-
ter that it has not been properly implemented. Furthermore, there has been little public 
pressure on publishers and broadcasters towards transparency and disclosure of conﬂ icts 
of interest. Th e Slovak media continue to publish news about their owners, while disclos-
ing little relevant information about their interests or ownership ties. In such an atmos-
phere, highly concentrated media ownership can have a negative impact on the country’s 
democracy as well as on its economic development. 
2 REGULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION
In , the ﬁ rst year of its independence, Slovakia, alongside the Czech Republic, inher-
ited its legislation from the times of Czechoslovakia. Media legislation was no exception. 
Issues of media ownership had been dealt with only vaguely in Slovakia’s legislation 
during the ﬁ rst seven years of the country’s existence. Th e ﬁ rst,  version of the Broad-
casting Law¹ contained only a brief stipulation referring to the obligation of the Council 
for Broadcasting and Retransmission, the body authorised to issue broadcasting licenses, 
to take into consideration the ensuing market position of the applicant when issuing a li-
cense, with a view to preventing market dominance of individual license holders (not-
withstanding this provision, as this report highlights below, the media group around  
Markíza achieved exactly that by the late s). 
In  Parliament adopted a new Law on Broadcasting, which included anti-concen-
tration clauses.² According to this law, in order to insure information pluralism, no person 
or company can hold, or have ownership ties with a holder of, more than one national tel-
evision or radio license, nor can such a person be a publisher of a national daily. Ownership 
ties and human resources sharing within a network of broadcasters are allowed, unless such 
a network covers more than  percent of the population. However, this is restricted to a 
television or radio network, but cannot include a national newspaper. Should these provi-
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sions be breached, the Council can revoke the given license. Th e Council itself is entitled to 
request the necessary information on ownership and personal ties of license holders. 
Th e law also stipulates ownership transparency rules for broadcasters: every license ap-
plicant needs to provide a list of its owners (shareholders), as well as their sources of mon-
ey to service the broadcasting. Ownership ties with other media outlets, local or foreign, 
have to be highlighted. In turn, the Council may issue a license (which has to be approved 
by Parliament), after taking into consideration the following issues:³ plurality of informa-
tion and media content; ownership transparency; transparency of the sources of ﬁ nance; 
preventing the applicant from acquiring a dominant position on the market; and ensuring 
adequate representation of Slovak owners and representatives in a joint-venture company 
with a foreign partner (this does not imply a minimum of  percent ownership of Slovak 
entities, however).
A license applicant or holder needs to announce any changes to the information pro-
vided in its application, including the ownership data. Th e law does not address the edito-
rial independence of  or radio channels in any way. 
Despite the provisions in the law, some experts have noted the diﬃ  culties in its en-
forcement – friendly ties would escape the letter, if not the spirit, of the law.⁴ Th ere was 
no Council ruling involving a breach of the anti-concentration clause, nor any request ad-
dressed to it to look at such breaches, neither by the end of  nor during the three years 
the law has been eﬀ ective.⁵ Moreover, the Council, which is authorised to impose sanc-
tions, is elected by Parliament, which gives any powerful media group leverage against any 
attempt to strip it of its licenses. 
Th ere are no anti-concentration nor ownership transparency rules for the press, oth-
er than the provisions in the broadcasting law mentioned above. Th e Press Law (amend-
ed several times since ) requires publishers to register with the Ministry of Culture 
and provide the name and address of the publisher and its printing house, as well as the 
personal data of the editor in chief. However, no information about owners is required. 
By law, all newspapers and periodicals need to publish in every issue the following infor-
mation: name of the publisher, address of the newspaper, name of the editor in chief and 
his or her deputy, plus date, place of issue, number and price.⁶ Much as in the ﬁ eld of the 
broadcast media, there are no provisions shielding editorial independence from owners 
or publishers. 
Nor does the legislation provide for state subsidies to media as a means of protect-
ing media pluralism, if one disregards the subsidies to public  and radio and the state-
owned Press Agency of the Slovak Republic (). Th e only pluralism-motivated subsi-
dies have been provided on an annual basis to the ethnic minority press. In , support 
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to these periodicals amounted to . million Slovakian koruna (about  ,), of 
which about half went to the local Hungarian community periodicals.⁷
3 PRIVATISATION
Th ere is no single pattern in the privatisation of newspapers in Slovakia. Nevertheless, 
all print media have gone through ﬁ erce encounters with government political interests, if 
not during the privatisation process itself, then certainly later, in the struggle over access 
to distribution and printing capacities. 
Nový Čas started in  as a successor to a minor party newspaper Ľud. Th e paper was 
bought by two Austrian entrepreneurs and re-launched as a tabloid. Early foreign own-
ership in combination with strong foreign media investors (Germany‘s Gruner+Jahr, and 
currently the Swiss Ringier) has proved a boon to the paper – it soon became the most 
successful and best-selling paper in Slovakia.⁸ Moreover, all attempts to launch a rival na-
tionwide tabloid have failed to date.
Th e former communist party ﬂ agship daily, Pravda, was sold to its journalists in . 
However, they could not stop the heavy decline in circulation caused by many new com-
petitors, and, in , they sold their shares to its present owners, a group of investors 
known as Harvard investment funds (a set of privatisation funds). 
Th e journalists of the formerly communist youth paper, Smena, failed to emulate Prav-
da’s example. When political pressures on the paper increased at the onset of the Vladimír 
Mečiar’s government (in its second term), the journalists left the paper to establish a new 
one, . It was supported and owned by another privatisation fund, . , as a main 
opposition daily, survived consequent attacks on its owner, , as well as the politically-
motivated loss of a contract with its then printing house. Only after the German Verlags-
gruppe Passau (Passauer Neue Presse) merged with ’s publisher, , in , was the 
paper assured of long-term stability. 
Poštová novinová služba (), the former monopolist in the press distribution ﬁ eld, 
was privatised in February  (half a year before the parliamentary elections), into the 
hands of Danubiaprint (itself privatised in December ), the biggest printing house 
owned by people close to the ruling  party. Although the Antimonopoly Oﬃ  ce de-
clared the transaction invalid in late , the purchase created immense pressure on pub-
lishers in the meantime – while ’s late payments multiplied, Danubiaprint insisted 
on payment deadlines for its printing services.⁹ On top of this,  has apparently been 
stripped of its assets by its managers in the meantime and went bankrupt in .¹⁰ It was 
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later bought back by the state-owned Slovak Post, which is currently negotiating its sale, 
possibly to a consortium of publishers. 
During its troubled times  sold over four ﬁ fths of its newsstand outlets to a company 
personally connected to its only competitor, Mediaprint Kapa Pressegrosso owned by the 
tycoon, Ivan Kmotrík. He took over the by then bankrupt printing house, Danubiaprint, 
and renamed it Versus; it remains the largest printing house in Slovakia. 
Only one nationwide  channel (the one with the smallest signal coverage of the three 
state-owned channels at the time) has so far been privatised in Slovakia, since the rest of the 
former state-owned radio and  channels were declared public, and the numerous present-
day private stations were issued new licenses. Th is so-called third  channel was awarded 
in August  to Markíza-Slovakia in a public tender.  Markíza grabbed  percent view-
ership within four months of its existence, while continuously expanding its coverage.¹¹ 
4 MEDIA OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE
Th e Pravda daily remains the only one among the top three newspapers without a for-
eign partner. Up to now it has been able to ﬁ nance its re-branding and heavy promotion 
campaigns thanks to the investments of its own publisher, Perex, a company belonging to 
one of the largest privatisation funds established in the s. Th e ownership of Perex is 
murky (Pravda has not responded to inquiries about Perex), with the company having lit-
tle interest in transparency – not even its phone number appears in the daily’s masthead. 
Th e top Slovak daily, the tabloid Nový Čas, is fully owned by the Swiss media company 
Ringier. One in four Slovaks reads it on a daily basis. Both Pravda and  reach about  
percent of the population, according to the spring-summer poll by Median Sk agency. Half 
of those polled claimed to read newspapers.¹²
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Table  OWNERSHIP OF MAIN PRINT MEDIA
DAILY NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION* PUBLISHER OWNER
NOVÝ CˇAS 157,957 VYDAVATEL´STVO 
CˇASOPISOV A NOVÍN, LTD.
RINGIER 100% 
(AS OF 01/01/04)
SME 76,049 PETIT PRESS, JSC. PSIS (PETER VAJDA) 50%, 
VERLAGSGRUPPE PASSAU 50%
PRAVDA 72,841 PEREX, JSC. HARVARDSKÉ INVESTICˇNÉ FONDY 
(JURAJ ŠIROKÝ)
WEEKLY 
PLUS 7 DNÍ 217,415 SPOLOCˇNOST´  7 PLUS, LTD. JOZEF DUKES, KAROL BUSTIN, 
ŠTEFAN ŠIMÁK (EACH A THIRD)
FORMÁT 10,000 -20,000**** ECOPRESS, JSC. ECONOMIA, JSC.(HOLTZBRINCK 
+DOW JONES INVESTMENTS 77.5%)
Table  OWNERSHIP OF MAIN BROADCAST MEDIA
TV CHANNEL AUDIENCE**/ SIGNAL 
COVERAGE***
BROADCASTER OWNER
MARKÍZA 67/86% MARKÍZA-
SLOVAKIA, LTD.
CME MEDIA ENTERPRISES, NETHERLANDS, 34% 
A.R.J., JSC. 50% (MILAN FIL´O 51%, FRANTIŠEK 
VIZVÁRY 34%, JÁN KOVÁCˇIK 15%), MEDIA 
INVEST, LTD. 16% (JÁN KOVÁCˇIK)
STV 1 28/96% PUBLIC TV -
JOJ 20/82% MAC TV, LTD. GRAFOBAL GROUP, J.S.C. (IVAN KMOTRÍK) 50%, 
CˇESKÁ PRODUKCˇNÍ INVEST, J.S.C., PRAGUE 
(PPF) 47.5%, VLADIMÍR KOMÁR 2.5%
STV 2 6/89% PUBLIC TV -
TA3 4/CABLE+DIGITAL 
SIGNAL
C.E.N., LTD. J&T 90%
RADIO CHANNELS
SLOVENSKO 27/100% PUBLIC RADIO -
EXPRES 13/62% D.EXPRES., JSC. EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND 
DEVELOPMENT 26%, VÁCLAV MIKA 8%, DUŠAN 
BUDZÁK 5%, ROBERT BARTOŠ 5%, EFM, LTD. 
(CYPRUS), FRAMLINGTON (JERSEY)
ROCK FM 10/92% PUBLIC RADIO -
OKEY 9/34% OKEY RÁDIO, JSC. MICHAL ARPÁŠ, L´UBOMÍR MESSINGER, 
DRUKOS, JSC., MARIÁN PAKSI
FUN 9/57% RADIO, JSC. PATROL LTD. (ŠTEFAN GVOTH), BRATISLAVA, 
SOCIETE D´EXPLOITATION RADIO CHIC, FRANCE
Sources:  daily, Broadcasting Council, company registers and .
Notes: *Circulation average in third quarter , sold copies, based on Audit Bureau of Circulation ( )¹³
**Median Sk poll, May-August ; audience describes people who watched or listened to the program yesterday 
***Signal coverage of population as of , unless otherwise noted
****Formát does not release its circulation data, yet it claims to have a readership of around ,¹⁴ – hence the author’s 
estimate.
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Slightly fewer than two-thirds of Slovaks read weeklies. A large majority of these are 
life-style weeklies. Th e most popular news weekly (as well as the top weekly on the mar-
ket) is the locally-owned Plus  dní, with a  percent share of readership. Th e other gen-
eral news weekly is a young upstart, Formát, with up to  percent audience. Its majority 
owner is the Dow Jones-Handelsblatt group, which also has a majority stake in Hospodár-
ske noviny. 
 Markíza has been a dominant media player since its successful launch in . It 
continues to attract the largest and overall the most lucrative audience. It reached a  
percent  audience share in the mid- year poll by Median Sk agency, trailed by  
 with a  percent and Joj with a  percent audience share. 
Markíza is owned by three local businessmen and the  media company (Central Euro-
pean Media Enterprise), well-known for its  holdings across Central and Eastern Europe. 
Joj is half-owned by the owner of Nova, the dominant private  channel in the neigh-
bouring Czech Republic. Th e other half of Joj belongs to the company of Ivan Kmotrík, a 
big media player in Slovakia. 
Th e all-news channel, , belongs to , an investment and ﬁ nancial group with 
the reputation of a ruthless investor in Slovakia operating on the edge of the law and 
exploiting opportunities with little regard for ethics.
Public radio channels dominate the radio market. Its ﬂ agship outlet, Radio Slovensko, 
grabbed a  percent market share in the above-mentioned Median Sk poll, and one of its 
channels, Rock , claimed a further  percent. 
Th e top private radio, Expres, has a  percent share. It is owned by several institutional 
investors, together with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the 
investment vehicle of the rich  countries meant to support development in the market 
economies of Eastern Europe. Th e other two important players, Okey and Fun, keep a  
percent share of the audience each. While the ﬁ rst one is owned by local entrepreneurs, 
the other is co-owned by a French media group.
5 MEDIA CONCENTRATION
5.1 MARKÍZA MEDIA GROUP
Media ownership in Slovakia is practically in several pairs of hands. Th e dominant me-
dia group revolves around Pavol Rusko, the former co-founder, co-owner and manager of 
by far the most inﬂ uential and powerful Slovak medium,  Markíza. Rusko is currently 
the Minister of Economy in the centre-right government. Markíza pulls in about  per-
porocilo.indb   7 22.5.2004, 13:46:56
 454 MEDIA OWNERSHIP AND ITS IMPACT ON MEDIA INDEPENDENCE AND PLURALISM
cent of  advertising revenues or over a third of the total advertising market in the Slovak 
media (author’s estimates based on  Broadcasting Council data).¹⁵
On entering politics last year, Rusko sold his stake in Markíza to a friend, František Viz-
váry, who has since become his advisor at the Ministry.¹⁶ Vizváry, with two other Slovak 
businesspeople (Ján Kováčik, Milan Fiľo) and with American , controls Markíza at the 
moment – although  is looking to acquire complete control of the  station.¹⁷ Th e 
group as a whole, and taking into account its indirect personal and capital ties, is cited to 
include  Markíza (no.   with half of the total  audience share), the lifestyle weekly, 
Markíza (no.  weekly), the Národná obroda daily (no.  broadsheet) and Radio Okey (no. 
 or  radio channel; survey data vary).¹⁸ While this concentration would oﬃ  cially be in 
breach of the anti-concentration clauses of the Broadcasting Law, there are no direct ties 
that could be a subject of the Broadcasting Council’s investigation.¹⁹
As the company register indicates, the group gathered around Markíza is also tied 
through Ján Kováčik to a popular theatre, Štúdio +, as well as to the Forza agency, whose 
activities include modelling (the Miss Slovakia contest) and music production. Milan Fiľo 
is a co-owner of Neusiedler , a leading paper and pulp manufacturer. 
Th is group has been criticised time and again for skewing their reporting towards the 
interests of Pavol Rusko (also referred to as the Slovak Berlusconi) and his political party 
 (claiming liberal orientation), a part of the government coalition. Th e Broadcasting 
Council itself issued several ﬁ nes to Markíza during the election year , mostly for un-
due preference for Mr Rusko and his party in news reporting. Similarly, the independent 
media watchdog,  , has pointed out bias in Markíza’s news reporting on several 
occasions in .²⁰
5.2 IVAN KMOTRIK MEDIA GROUP
Th e second most important media owner is Ivan Kmotrík. His empire stretches 
through Grafobal Group from  Joj ( percent ownership share, no.  channel) to Me-
diaprint-Kapa Pressegrosso, . (the largest newspaper distributor and retailer), four big 
printing houses (Versus, Bratislavské tlačiarne, Polygraf print, Svornosť), a book publisher, 
-Mladé letá, and the largest Slovak advertising agency,   Artmedia. 
Kmotrík himself has wielded muscle in the past. His printing house, Versus, asked 
Perex, the publisher of the Pravda daily, to sign an unacceptable contract for  at 
the last moment, shortly before the end of the year . Perex was forced to use sev-
eral smaller printing houses but at journalists’ expense, because they had to work against 
tighter deadlines as the printing process now took longer.²¹ Perex has since acquired its 
own printing capacities. 
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5.3 PETIT PRESS MEDIA GROUP
Petit Press has become another important media player thanks to an investment by 
the German Verlagsgruppe Passau. Th is publisher produces the no.  () daily, , the 
no.  daily in Hungarian, Új Szó, the English-language weekly, Th e Slovak Spectator, the 
Roľnícke noviny weekly, as well as  local dailies and weeklies all over Slovakia. Petit Press 
owns the only more or less complete network of regional newspapers in Slovakia.
5.3 RINGIER MEDIA GROUP
Since Ringier bought from its partner Gruner+Jahr stakes in several publications, it is ex-
pected to become another strong player by the end of . It now owns the top daily tab-
loid Nový Čas, and several lifestyle periodicals, including weekly Život and monthly Eva.
5.4 STATE (PUBLIC) MEDIA
State-owned (public service) media remain signiﬁ cant as well. Two state  channels 
are watched by a third of the population, with one of these channels ( ) being second 
in terms of viewership to the leader Markíza. Similarly, radio stations no. ,  and  on the 
market are also state-owned, as is one of the two press agencies, , which depends on 
government subsidies for its operations. Public radio and television are ﬁ nanced through 
license fees (every owner of a  set or a radio is required to pay  . and   per 
month, respectively) as well as advertising. Annual subsidies to operations or program-
ming have been a common feature in ﬁ nancing public services, although there have been 
attempts by the Government to cut oﬀ  these subsidies. 
With such substantial holdings, the ruling government can inﬂ uence media compe-
tition through media legislation – or by threatening to privatise them and thus create 
stronger competition for advertising revenues. While the pressure on public media has 
substantially weakened since , it is unlikely to be completely eliminated.²²
Th e public has partial access to media ownership information in Slovakia. All elec-
tronic media need to include data about their owners in their license application to the 
Broadcasting Council, and they also need to declare any subsequent changes. Th e Coun-
cil publishes this information on its website. However, there is no such system established 
for print media. Publishers are generally chary of publishing such information (it is rarely 
published on their websites or inside newspapers), including their ﬁ nancially results. 
At the end of , most of the big publishers, together with the associations of adver-
tising agencies and brandname retailers, set up an Audit Bureau of Circulation ( ), 
an oﬃ  cial body tracking the circulation of newspapers and periodicals on a monthly av-
erage basis.²³ 
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6 MEDIA PLURALISM
After ten years of independence, Slovakia’s media began to oﬀ er a respectable level of 
pluralism unseen for most of the country’s independent history. As of , there have 
not been pro-government papers or  programs. Other than support for speciﬁ c issue in 
the media (such as the European Union accession information campaign), there is no of-
ﬁ cial government funding of the private news media. Even the public  or radio stations 
are far from toeing the Government line. Th is situation is in stark contrast to the polarised 
mid-s media scene, characterised by several, mostly state-ﬁ nanced pro-governmen-
tal media contested by private outlets that made the ouster of the then Vladimir Mečiar’s 
government their main goal. 
By the admission of the Mečiar’s party top oﬃ  cial in late , about a third of the local 
and regional newspapers in Slovakia were open to the party’s meddling with their news 
and opinion pages.²⁴ 
Nominally, public Slovak  as well as the state news agency, , were openly used 
as tools by the Government ( started publishing a pro-government daily, Slovenská 
republika, in , and later sold Salus . with Mečiar’s party as one of its owners). In 
, at a cost of  million Slovakian koronas (about  . million at the time), the 
Government helped launch and subsidise the Nová Smena mladých daily, but it ﬂ opped 
and folded the same year. 
Th e Government also exerted inﬂ uence through the state-owned companies on which 
many newspapers depended for their advertising revenue. Th e most notorious was , 
a large steel mill in eastern Slovakia, which in this way held at bay several regional dailies 
at the time, among them Lúč, Košický Večer and Nové Korzo.²⁵ Mečiar’s government even 
handed out direct subsidies to Slovenská republika and the like, by allocating funds no-
tionally reserved for minority projects, even though the winners had little experience and 
even fewer minority readers.²⁶
Even after the Mečiar’s government lost the  election, many journalists kept their 
instinctive sympathies in their news reporting for one or the other political orientation. In 
the last few years, however, the Slovak media have become increasingly weary of political 
aﬃ  liation. Th ey have started paying much more attention to the pros and cons of particu-
lar policies regardless of their political background. Consequently, even the media most 
supportive of the current government’s policies have kept their critical distance and have 
served as genuine government watchdogs. 
Th e regime change in  has produced a print media boom. Th ere were two sources 
of the boom, both temporary (see Table ). Th e opening up of media market opportuni-
ties by pulling down political restrictions was used by entrepreneurs for business purpos-
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es (return on investment), and for political purposes (buying inﬂ uence with voters or de-
cision-makers). Both were also supported by the huge wave of privatisation in the s, 
creating a class of wealthy businessmen able to create media empires, which is a situation 
not unlike that in many other East European countries, of which the most notable example 
is Russia. In addition, the governments themselves felt obliged to provide direct or indi-
rect (advertising orders) support to selected media outlets. Th e ebbing of the main privati-
sation wave, together with the departure of Mečiar’s government led to a decline in artiﬁ -
cially supported publications. One such daily, Slovenská republika, folded in . Práca, 
a daily traditionally owned by, and associated with, labour unions, went out of business in 
 (it was taken over by a bigger daily, ). 
Table  CHANGING NUMBER OF NATIONAL DAILY NEWSPAPERS 
AND TV CHANNELS SINCE 1989
1989 1995 2002
DAILIES: ALL / NATIONWIDE 12 / 7 19 / 10 16 / 9
TV CHANNELS 2 2 5*
Sources: Gindl²⁷ and Ministry of Culture²⁸.
Note: *One of them, the all-news channel , is transmitted by cable and digital satellite signals.
Many analysts expect a further consolidation of the daily newspaper market, owing to 
business constraints.²⁹ According to their forecasts, only three national newspapers will 
remain on the market in a few years: the politically middle-of-the-road Nový Čas tabloid, 
the leftist Pravda and the centre-right . Th e latter two are already heavyweights in 
newsmaking and analysis or commentary. Th e centrist Národná obroda as well as Nový 
deň, which is in essence a party paper of the former Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar, are 
expected to stay in the business as long as their owners continue covering their losses in ex-
change for political inﬂ uence. With their readership on the wane, this may not last long. 
Alongside the general broadsheets, there are several dailies with a speciﬁ c focus, such 
as Hospodárske noviny (business), Šport (sports) and Roľnícke noviny (agriculture – in 
 turned into a weekly). Even here consolidation has occurred. Hospodársky denník, 
another business daily, has capitulated in its battle with Hospodárske noviny, and turned 
itself into a business news website in November . 
Th ere has been no single attempt to launch a broadsheet national daily since . Even 
the last,  adventure was a government ﬁ nanced scheme to break into the ranks of pri-
vate dailies hostile to the policies of the then Mečiar’s government. Th e project of launch-
ing Nová Smena mladých, however, folded the same year. 
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Several publishers have tried their luck in pushing a new daily tabloid on the market, 
in an attempt to imitate the hugely successful market leader, Nový Čas. None of them has 
succeeded, though. Nonstop lasted a year (–) and Trhák almost three (–). 
In , Ringier launched its successful Hungarian tabloid, Blikk, in southern Slovakia for 
the local, half a million-strong Hungarian minority (the local version of Blikk includes a 
few pages of local news as well). 
Th e public  channel, , oﬀ ers a typical menu of programs provided by other pub-
lic broadcasters in western Europe: a strong news, analysis and debating focus mixed with 
entertainment (movies, talk shows, quiz shows). Th e other public  channel, , gives 
much more space to sports, documentaries and other minority programs such as classical 
music concerts, language courses or broadcasts for various ethnic and religious groups. 
Th e market leader,  Markíza, combines heavyweight entertainment (including Hol-
lywood blockbusters, telenovellas, teenage movies and music shows, as well as adult mov-
ies) with tabloid news as well as often surprisingly serious debating shows. 
 Joj is in many ways similar to Markíza. However, it tries to undercut Markíza with 
yet more tabloid-format news and more Hollywood movies and shows. 
Finally,  is a -hour news channel seasoned with the occasional talk show and news 
documentary. Its programming is heavily focused on local politics, even more so than the 
likes of  or . 
Like the present-day public  and Joj news programs, the matter-of-fact  has had 
no obvious political aﬃ  liation or sympathies. Th e big political player remains Markíza, 
whose former boss heads the  coalition party as well as the Ministry of Economy (see 
the section on media owners above). 
According to Valéria Agócs, head of the Council of Broadcasting and Retransmission, 
there is no nation-wide frequency or set of frequencies available for a new  network to 
set up shop in Slovakia. More competition may be provided by digital broadcasting, which 
is planned to be tested in several cities in the course of . However, it may take a dec-
ade before it is accessible to most of the Slovak population.³⁰ 
7 MEDIA INDEPENDENCE
Th e main journalists’ association, Th e Slovak Trade Union of Journalists (), pro-
duced a code of ethics in , which includes a few clauses (article ) aiming to support 
journalists’ independence from publishers: the right to legal protection, the right to refuse 
to write a  piece, consultations and reasonable pay rights.³¹ Th e code, however, along 
with the  itself, remains little respected throughout the local media scene. 
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Given the ever-present double pressure on the media in the s (quick money, quick-
ly-achieved political inﬂ uence), journalists’ work as well as their working conditions suf-
fered.³² Th e publishers’ upper hand has shown in low quality journalism, even at the most 
serious media outlets. Th e poor critical reading skills of much of the audience have fur-
ther weakened the demand for high-quality work as well as for deeply researched investi-
gative pieces.³³ 
Little help has been provided to journalists by the Press Council, which was established 
in spring  by the , together with the print publishers’ association. Th e Council 
deals with ethical breaches in the Slovak press – although its rulings are not published or 
discussed publicly by local media. Moreover, it does not even deal explicitly with journal-
ists’ independence from publishers per se.³⁴ From April  to the end of , it pub-
lished thirty adjudications, of which one-third referred to complaints dismissed as unre-
lated to the work of the Council. It conﬁ rmed one case of plagiarism and a few breaches of 
privacy. In several cases the newspapers in question did not reply to the Council’s queries. 
Th is silence of the Council is all the more curious because the visible result of publish-
ers’ pressure on journalists, the so-called PR articles, are far from being unknown in Slo-
vak media, as claimed by insiders themselves.³⁵ Th e Slovak Press Watch, a weblog moni-
toring the main Slovak press media (edited by the author of this report), has highlighted a 
number of instances when an article resembled all too closely a classic  piece.³⁶
8 CONCLUSIONS
Slovakia’s media market is a fairly-concentrated one, yet it has become less so in the last 
few years. Th e dominant media player,  Markíza, is starting to feel the challenge of Joj. 
Expres has managed to become the top private radio station in less than three years. No big 
player has arrived on the print market, yet the competition for the top spots has become 
intense, as witnessed by the ’s challenge to the once unbeatable serious paper, Pravda. 
None of this competition is driven by anti-concentration regulation, however. Th e issu-
ing of broadcasting licenses appears to play a much bigger role. Th is points to the very im-
portant role played by the Broadcasting Council. Nevertheless, the state could help compe-
tition by relaxing its ownership of some radio and  channels, such as Rock  or  . 
Th is would, in the author’s view, boost competition on Slovakia’s media market and limit, 
most eﬀ ectively at the moment, the potential negative impact of unclear ownership ties. 
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1 INTRODUCTION
Th e media situation in Slovenia is rather speciﬁ c. After almost  years of market econ-
omy and completed privatisation process, many media companies are still directly or in-
directly owned by the state. Media legislation is thorough and restrictive, but media con-
centration is high and regulatory bodies do not have political support or the autonomy 
necessary to implement it. Data on ownership are easily accessible but change rapidly, 
making the media landscape diﬃ  cult to map and interpret. 
So, when in June  Prime Minister Anton Rop announced changes to the Mass Me-
dia Act, he stressed that it was necessary to introduce more order and clarity into the me-
dia ﬁ eld, restrict concentration and ensure plurality. Th is move came in response to warn-
ings that “the media are controlled by the owners and managers of big companies that are 
at the same time the largest advertisers in these media, then by the owners of advertising 
agencies who buy and sell media advertising space, and the presidents of executive boards 
of the largest Slovenian companies (mainly state-owned) as well as secret representatives 
of political interests.”¹ 
Other threats to media pluralism include the monopolisation of print media distribu-
tion and of the distribution of radio and television signals via cable networks. All this led 
to the Government’s decision to amend the media law and introduce tighter media regu-
lation, at least as regards ownership, cross-ownership and takeovers.
But the problem the state will have to confront is the conﬂ ict of interest involving the 
state itself – in fact, it will have to impose restrictions on media companies in which it in-
directly has considerable stakes via state funds. People who sit on the supervisory boards 
of these funds, banks and companies are a group of individuals with unambiguous political 
proﬁ les. Another salient question is whether legislative amendments are indeed necessary, 
given that the current law includes a suﬃ  cient number of mechanisms that could prevent 
media concentration if only there were suﬃ  cient political will. Why have not the Govern-
ment and institutions responsible for this ﬁ eld taken steps earlier if they believe that con-
centration in the media sector has occurred and that media plurality has been threatened?
Th e print media in Slovenia mainly do not have strategic owners. For example, among 
the owners of the largest mainstream daily, Delo, which is also the owner of the Sloven-
ske novice tabloid, a daily with the highest circulation in the country, one can ﬁ nd a large 
brewery, several state funds and an investment company. Th e Dnevnik daily is controlled 
by a company that is oﬃ  cially involved in the publishing business, but the bulk of its prof-
it goes to the purchase of shares in marinas, spas, insurance companies and distribution 
companies. Th e major shareholder in the Večer daily is a bank and a related investment 
company whose major owner is the state. Th e present owners buy and sell media shares 
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with such alacrity that even while writing this report we had to update it several times to 
reﬂ ect all the changes that had happened in the meantime. Th e buyers of media shares are 
banks, investment and insurance companies, most of them with the state as a signiﬁ cant 
owner. Th e reasons propelling this media brokerage, where the property only apparently 
changes hands, remain guesswork.
It is fairly easy to obtain data on owners and their ownership stakes in media companies. 
Th e Mass Media Act stipulates that the publishers must provide information on owners 
when registering a medium, and these data are published in the Uradni list  (Th e Oﬃ  cial 
Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia). Data from the media registry are publicly available on 
the web pages of the Ministry of Culture,² and the law envisages high penalties for those 
who fail to meet these requirements. But it is obvious that the main problem does not 
arise from any ﬂ aw in the current law, but from the fact that legal obligations are not met. 
Th ere are many reasons for this and they range from ineﬃ  ciency of supervisors and short-
age of staﬀ , to the lack of will to actually impose sanctions for the most serious violations. 
Accordingly, while media ownership may appear dispersed at ﬁ rst glance, what it actually 
comes down to in practice is an intricate web of links among various companies.
Th e present ownership structure is the result of two factors: the absence of distinct me-
dia policy and a speciﬁ c model of media privatisation. Th e law that regulated the trans-
formation of ownership of enterprises indeed enabled media employees to become ma-
jor shareholders in media companies. However, these employees, whose interests the law 
was protecting, “sold out” their advantage (by selling their shares). Th e state, on the oth-
er hand, has directly or indirectly preserved its ownership stakes via state funds. Does 
the state adhere to its media stakes because of economic or political gains? Th e Ministry 
of Finance, which regulates this ﬁ eld, has proposed that the new law should be adopted 
through an accelerated procedure “in order to forestall consequences that cannot be easily 
repaired and that could aﬀ ect the operation of the state.”³ It seems that the story of privati-
sation will obtain its epilogue only now, ten years on, at the time of Slovenia’s accession to 
the . And it is precisely the kind of epilogue Slovenia once tried to avoid. 
2 MEDIA PRIVATISATION 
Th e factor that most importantly contributed to the present ownership structure was a 
speciﬁ c privatisation model implemented at the beginning of the s. Th e fundamental 
dilemma widely discussed during the early stage of privatisation was whether media priva-
tisation should have been subject to the Transformation of the Ownership of Enterprises 
Act⁴ or a separate law. A group of s who participated in the drafting of the Transfor-
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mation of the Ownership of Enterprises Act were of the opinion that media privatisation 
(with the exception of the public institution  Slovenija whose ownership was regulated 
by the   law)⁵ should have been governed by the law observed in the privatisation 
of any other company. Th is raised the issue of whether the capital investment by the state 
should be taken into account in the process of privatisation, the same as in the privatisa-
tion of all other, previously state-owned companies, because this could lead to a situation 
in which the privatisation of the state-owned media could have eﬀ ectively resulted in their 
nationalisation. Th e ultimate decision – a political one – was to use a special model of me-
dia privatisation, which implied an internal buyout. In this way, the media could remain 
the property of their employees, and this was expected to ensure their political autonomy. 
It was in this spirit that Article  of the  Mass Media Act ()⁶ was adopted – the ar-
ticle that represented a kind of “safety valve” aimed at preventing nationalisation by stipu-
lating dispersed ownership. In other words, it forestalled the possibility of the media end-
ing up in the hands of a single owner.
In practice, media privatisation was based on the following scheme: a certain amount 
of ordinary shares was transferred to special funds, i.e.  percent to Kapitalski sklad inva-
lidskega in pokojninskega zavarovanja (Capital Fund of the Pension and Disability Fund, 
hereafter ),  percent to Odškodninski sklad (Indemniﬁ cation Fund, hereafter ) 
and  percent to Razvojni sklad (Development Fund of the ). Th ese shares were later 
to be distributed to authorised investment agencies. Th e second stage of the privatisation 
process consisted of the internal buyout. Th e part of the socially owned capital allocat-
ed for the internal buyout was transferred to the Ordinary Shares Fund, and these shares 
were subject to a  percent discount. More than one-third of all employees had to partici-
pate in the internal buyout. Th e company had to buy back all shares from this fund within 
the next four years, at least one-fourth of all shares annually, at a price that was equal to 
their nominal value. Th e company could not grant any loans or issue any guarantees to the 
employees for the purchase of common shares.
2.1 PRIVATISATION OF DAILY DELO
Although formally this model of media privatisation enabled employees to acquire 
the majority shareholding in their companies, the outcome was contrary to what was 
expected, as the case of the largest daily newspaper, Delo,⁷ clearly demonstrates. It was 
the state that emerged as one of the largest media owners, albeit indirectly, because it 
acquired media shares through state funds and other companies in which it had consid-
erable shareholdings. 
Th e goals of privatisation, as they were presented to the future owners of Delo, were as 
follows: to preserve the autonomy and independence of the company, to achieve better 
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business results and to ensure the highest possible standard of living and work conditions 
for employees, which would be based on capital gains among other things. 
Delo decided on the following privatisation scheme:  percent of socially-owned capi-
tal was allocated to the state funds, i.e. the Pension Fund ( percent), the Indemniﬁ cation 
Fund ( percent) and the Development Fund ( percent), while its employees were to 
become a  percent owner. Th e internal buyout scheme was as follows:  percent of the 
property was distributed among the employees, their close family members, former and 
retired employees in the form of ownership certiﬁ cates;  percent was to be sold through 
the internal buyout, and  percent was to be sold to Delo’s readers. Th is privatisation 
model indeed provided the chance for Delo’s employees, ex-employees, their families and 
readers to become a majority owner. However, the story took a diﬀ erent twist.
As a result, the current dispersed ownership of media in Slovenia, as it was envisaged by 
the provisions of the Mass Media Act, is only apparent, while in reality media are concen-
trated in the hands of few companies that are directly or indirectly owned by the state. De-
lo’s journalists, much like their colleagues at other daily newspapers, as well as employees 
and former employees, simply sold out the option of having control over their media.
3 REGULATION 
Apart from a speciﬁ c model of media privatisation, the absence of distinct media policy 
also contributed to the present ownership structure. 
Th e Mass Media Act (Zmed)⁸ passed in  addresses the issues of media plurality and 
diversity in minute detail in Section . Much like the previous law dating from , this 
act also treats anti-concentration provisions inside a wider framework embracing the pro-
tection of media pluralism and media diversity. But unlike the  law, the new act explic-
itly addresses concentration restrictions in Article . Furthermore, unlike the  act, 
according to which investment funds were exempt from anti-concentration measures, the 
new act does not mention exemptions. Th e question that remains open, however, is how 
the anti-concentration measures listed in the  law will be harmonised with Article  
of the Protection of Competition Act (m),⁹ which stipulates that interests in busi-
nesses acquired by investment companies shall not be treated as concentration cases if the 
rights resulting from these interests are exercised with the purpose of preserving the value 
of the investment and if this does not aﬀ ect the competitive performance of the company. 
It should be added at this point that Article  of the  media law stipulates that media 
publishers and broadcasters are subject to the provisions protecting competition. 
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3.1 MEDIA OWNERSHIP RESTRICTIONS
What ownership restrictions are stipulated by the  law? Under this law, a publisher of 
a daily newspaper, or any natural or legal person, or group of related persons, who has more 
than a  percent interest in the capital or assets of that publisher, or more than  percent 
of management or voting rights, may not be an owner or co-founder of a radio or television 
broadcaster, and may not engage in radio and television activities. Th e same restriction ap-
plies to a radio or television broadcaster, who under this law may not be a publisher of a daily 
newspaper (Article ). Paragraph  of Article  further restricts ownership by stipulating 
that a publisher or broadcaster, a legal or natural person, or group of related persons¹⁰ with 
more than a  percent share in the assets of another publisher or broadcaster, may not hold 
an ownership stake of more than  percent, or a share in the management or voting rights 
of more than  percent, in the assets of any other publisher or broadcaster. 
Article  of this law stipulates that in order to acquire an ownership or management 
stake, or a share in the voting rights in the assets of a broadcaster of  percent or more, it 
shall be necessary to obtain approval from the Ministry of Culture, which shall issue such 
approval following a prior opinion from the Agency for Telecommunications, Broadcast-
ing and Postal Services. And, according to Article , it is the Broadcasting Council that 
takes a decision regarding the preliminary opinion in connection with the restriction of 
concentration. In other words, the Broadcasting Council decides whether a speciﬁ c case 
represents concentration, and that decision is then adopted as a preliminary opinion of the 
aforementioned Agency, on the basis of which the Ministry of Culture issues approval.
As regards restriction of concentration, Slovenian law is very precise, if only apparently. 
Th e ﬁ rst paragraph of Article  explicitly states that in order to acquire an ownership or 
management stake of  percent or more in the assets of a broadcaster, or a share of the 
voting rights of  percent or more, it shall be necessary to obtain approval from the rel-
evant ministry which can refuse to issue such approval if any of the following conditions is 
fulﬁ lled: ﬁ rst, if by acquiring that stake the broadcaster would obtain a dominant position 
on the advertising market in such a way that its sale of advertising time in a particular ra-
dio or television program would exceed  percent of the total sales of radio or television 
advertising time in the Republic of Slovenia; second, if by acquiring that stake the broad-
caster would obtain a dominant position on the market in such a way that either alone or 
together with its subsidiaries its station signal would cover more than  percent of the 
Republic of Slovenia, with regard to the overall coverage of Slovenian territory by all radio 
and television stations; and third, if by acquiring that stake the publisher of one or more 
daily newspaper would have a dominant position on the market, alone or via one or more 
subsidiaries, such that the number of copies sold would exceed  percent of the total 
number of dailies sold in the Republic of Slovenia
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If the Ministry establishes that any one of these conditions has been fulﬁ lled, it will 
refuse to issue approval.
In February , the Ministry of Culture considered the ﬁ rst such application apply-
ing criteria laid down in Article  of the Mass Media Act. Th e applicant was KBM Infond, 
which intended to increase its share in the Večer daily, but the Ministry refused to issue 
approval unless the applicant sold oﬀ  the “excessive” stakes in Radio Tehnik Ptuj, a broad-
caster and a publisher of a weekly.
In the / report,¹¹ the Broadcasting Council, which takes decisions regard-
ing concentration, explicitly stated that paragraph  of Article  of the Mass Media Act, 
which establishes the cases in which the Ministry of Culture may refuse to issue approval, 
is not suﬃ  ciently detailed, and that a methodology for establishing media concentration 
had not yet been formulated. Finally, it pointed out that provisions in this paragraph were 
incompatible with the law regulating protection of competition. Th e Council thus con-
cluded that this issue should be adequately resolved within the shortest possible time. At 
its session in April , the National Assembly Committee for Culture, Education, Young 
People, Science and Sports approved this report by the Council and, among other things, 
demanded from the Ministry of Culture and the Government that the articles referring to 
restriction of concentration should be amended. 
In February , the Securities Market Agency¹² focused its attention on media takeo-
vers, particularly the purchase of  percent of Delo shares by Pivovarna Laško. As a result, 
in July  the Agency sent a letter to the Prime Minister drawing his attention to a fail-
ure to comply with the provisions of the Mergers and Acquisitions Act¹³ relating to the ac-
quisition of shares via indirect ownership stakes in the media. Th e Agency, therefore, pro-
posed that the Mass Media Act should be amended in such a way that the Agency would 
be authorised to revise the related persons’ transactions and their ownership links. In July 
 the Government convened the ﬁ rst meeting to which were invited all relevant insti-
tutions and the representatives of the Journalists’ Association. Th is meeting marked the 
beginning of the preparations for the amendments to the Mass Media Act.¹⁴
4 MEDIA OWNERSHIP 
According to the data in the media registry as of  January ,¹⁵ there are  electron-
ic (web) media in Slovenia,  radio broadcasters,  television broadcasters (including lo-
cal and cable operators), and  print media outlets, with the last group including practi-
cally every kind of media from daily newspapers to papers published several times a year, 
various life-style magazines, then magazines targeted at speciﬁ c demographic or other in-
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terest groups, as well as local community bulletins, and even some media that have not yet 
seen the light of the day.
4.1. PRINT MEDIA 
Our analysis will include the following print media: the dailies Delo, Dnevnik, and 
Večer, and the news weeklies Mladina and Mag. Other important dailies and weeklies 
in Slovenia include the tabloid Slovenske novice, a daily with the largest circulation in the 
country almost entirely owned by the joint-stock company Delo d. d. (which is also the 
publisher of the Delo daily); Finance, a business newspaper, published ﬁ ve times a week 
and owned by the GV group and Dagens Industri (a member of the Swedish media group 
Bonnier), each having a  percent share; and Žurnal, a free weekly published on Satur-
days. Th e ﬁ rst issue of Žurnal, the latest arrival on the newspaper market in Slovenia, ap-
peared on  November . It is the ﬁ rst weekly in Slovenia fully ﬁ nanced by a foreign 
owner, the Austrian publisher Styria Verlag. Also the other free paper, Dobro jutro, is ﬁ -
nanced by Austrian capital provided by the Leykam print company, which is one of the 
major shareholders in the Večer daily.
Table  MAIN DAILIES AND WEEKLIES
DAILY CIRCULATION 
(PRINTED)
READERSHIP
   
SLOVENSKE NOVICE* 107,000 355,000
DELO 90,000 237,000
DNEVNIK 66,000 159,000
VECˇER 62,000 170,000
FINANCE** 10,000 36,000
WEEKLY   
   
MLADINA 19,300 102,000
MAG 17,000 58,000
ŽURNAL*** 214,000 /
Sources: Nacionalna raziskava branosti  (National Survey of Readership ), and Delo, Dnevnik, Večer, Mladina, 
Mag, Žurnal, Finance.
Notes: * tabloid
** business newspaper
*** free newspaper
4.1.1 DELO DAILY
Delo d. d. is a controlling company in the concern that also includes Slovenske novice 
d.d., the publisher of the Slovenske novice tabloid, the only daily that recorded a signiﬁ -
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cant increase in circulation in the past year. Delo is recognised as the most important daily 
in Slovenia. It is the only daily newspaper with a truly “national” character, since the oth-
er two dailies are more locally oriented. It has six local editions. Its daily supplements – 
Vikend ( guide), Ona (women), Polet (men), Delo in dom (household), Znanost (science) 
and Književni listi (literature) – also have large readerships, as well as its Sunday edition 
and the “elite” Saturday supplement (Sobotna priloga). On  December , the news-
paper company Delo launched a new weekly called Več (More).
According to the data of the Klirinška depotna družba (Central Securities Clearing 
Corporation, ),¹⁶ the largest individual shareholder in Delo is Pivovarna Laško (Laško 
Brewery), the owner of nearly  percent of Delo shares. Th e state funds  and  are 
. percent and . percent shareholders respectively, while approximately  percent of 
the shares is in the hands of various investment companies many of which are owned by 
banks, insurance companies, other big companies and investment companies. Th e largest 
individual owner among Delo’s employees is its current chairman, Jure Apih (. percent), 
while journalists and other employees virtually do not have ownership stakes any longer.
4.1.2 DAILY DNEVNIK
Dnevnik d. d. is the publisher of the Dnevnik daily, the Nedeljski dnevnik (the Sunday 
edition with a circulation of ,), and Hopla, a tabloid weekly (circulation ,). 
Th e majority owner (. percent) of Dnevnik is the , one of the largest book and sta-
tionery publishers and traders in Slovenia. Until the end of , the second largest owner 
had been  Holding (. percent), a company predominantly involved in strategic in-
vestment, marketable securities and other securities not quoted on the exchange market. 
It is a member of the  Group which is a . percent owner of Ljubljanski kinematograﬁ , 
a ﬁ lm distribution company, a majority owner of the Kolosej multiplex cinema, and of the 
largest Slovenian cinema network. Th e other shareholders are the state fund  (. 
percent), Večer, the publisher of the Večer daily (. percent), and the largest state-owned 
mobile operator, Mobitel (. percent).¹⁷ According to public statements,  Holding re-
portedly sold its . percent share in Dnevnik, along with its . percent share in the 
Sarajevo Oslobođenje daily, to the Austrian company Styria Medien . In the words of the 
Deputy Manager of the  Group, this sale was prompted, among other reasons, by their 
disagreement with the management style and lack of clarity in Dnevnik’s business opera-
tion, imposed by the majority shareholder,¹⁸ i.e. the .
4.1.3 DAILY VECˇ ER
Th e Večer publishing company is the third most important newspaper publisher in 
Slovenia. Its main line of business is the publishing of the Večer daily, the most inﬂ uen-
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tial print medium in the north-eastern part of Slovenia, then of the  weekly, the Naš 
dom magazine and some other special editions. Th e largest shareholder in Večer is Infond 
Holding (. percent), which is one among the three companies that was formed after 
the transformation of the authorised investment company Infond Zlat. Infond Holding is 
a member of  Infond, an investment group whose majority owner is Nova  bank, 
whose majority owner, in turn, is the state.  Infond main line of business is the man-
agement of investment funds; at the moment it manages Infond , an authorised invest-
ment company, Infond , an investment company (the third largest shareholder in Večer 
with a  percent stake in this daily), and three mutual funds. Th e second largest share-
holder in Večer is Leykam Hoče (. percent), the Slovenian branch of the Austrian print 
company Leykam. Other important shareholders are the  fund ( percent), and the 
largest distribution company in Slovenia, Delo Prodaja (. percent). Obviously, the ma-
jor owner Infond Holding and the related company Infond  together hold a  percent 
stake in the Večer daily. We should add that a considerable stakeholder in both funds is 
the state.
Table  OWNERSHIP OF THE MAIN DAILIES IN SLOVENIA
DELO % DNEVNIK % VECˇER %
PIVOVARNA LAŠKO D.D. 25.0 DZS D.D. 51.0 INFOND HOLDING D.D. 36.3
SLOVENSKA ODŠKODNINSKA 
DRUŽBA D.D.
11.7 STYRIA VERLAG 25.7 LEYKAM HOCˇE 26.7
ID MAKSIMA D.D. 11.1 KAPITALSKA DRUŽBA D.D. 10.1 INFOND ID D.D. 15
KAPITALSKA DRUŽBA D.D. 7.5 CˇZP VECˇER D.D. 6.5 SLOVENSKA ODŠKODNINSKA 
DRUŽBA D.D.
10.0
INFOND ID D.D. 6.8 MOBITEL D.D. 2.7 DELO PRODAJA D.D. 6.9
NFD 1 
INVESTICIJSKI SKLAD D.D.
5.1 LB MAKSIMA D.O.O. 0.9 SENICA MARTIN 0.8
4.1.4 WEEKLY MLADINA
Mladina is one of the most important political weeklies in Slovenia. Its reputation for 
investigative journalism and its popularity date primarily from the s, when several of 
its issues were banned for political incorrectness and when it uncovered a series of politi-
cal and economic scandals. On  December , the publisher of the Mladina weekly, 
Mladina d.d. merged with Infomedija, the publisher of computer journals and computer-
related books. According to the media registry records at the Ministry of Culture as of 
 April , the shareholders (holding more than a  percent stake) in Mladina d.d. are 
members of the editorial oﬃ  ce, Bernard Nežmah (. percent), Miha Fras (. percent) 
and Robert Botteri (. percent); director Andrej Klemenc (. percent); and Delo  
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(. percent) and Factor Leasing d.o.o. (. percent).¹⁹ Mladina’s ownership structure 
has been unclear ever since Franci Zavrl, the founder and co-owner of the Pristop Group 
(the group incorporates several companies involved in advertising, media buying, brand-
ing and PR, and has branches in several countries of South East Europe), sold his majority 
stake in Mladina in . It is not clear to whom he sold this share.²⁰ But although he for-
mally withdrew as an owner, Zavrl had remained the president of the supervisory board 
of Mladina d.d. until it merged with the Infomedija company in . Since then, Mladina 
d.d. and Pristop, have been sharing oﬃ  ce space and facilities in downtown Ljubljana. 
4.1.5 WEEKLY MAG
Th e other important political weekly is Mag. In terms of point of view, it is perceived as 
the opposite pole of Mladina and all three dailies. Its publisher is the Salomon  com-
pany, which is also the publisher of the Ekipa sports daily, of Salomonov oglasnik, the larg-
est Slovenian classiﬁ ed ads paper, and a youth magazine. Th e Salomon group consists of 
three companies each of which has a one-third stake in the Salomon and Salomon  
companies. Th e Salomon group also owns two radio stations, Radio Veseljak and Radio 
Salomon. In addition, it is connected with the radio station , since a nearly  percent 
owner of  d.d. is the  company, whose . percent owner is Salomon, while Salo-
mon  is the holder of an additional . percent stake in this company.
4.1.6 PRINTING AND DISTRIBUTION CAPACITIES
Printing and distribution are prerequisites for the survival of a daily newspaper. By con-
centrating content, production and distribution resources, it is possible to eﬀ ectively in-
crease the market share, as this provides an important lever that can be used in ﬁ ghting 
(restricting) competition. Th e costs of setting up a newspaper’s own distribution network 
are very high, but the owner of a distribution network can easily adjust the price of its 
services in such a way that it aﬀ ects the price of the competitive product. 
Th e largest Slovenian printing house is Delo Tiskarna. Th e larger shareholders in Delo 
Tiskarna are Infond holding²¹ (. percent),  (. percent) and  (. percent). 
Delo Tiskarna and its shareholders have considerable shareholdings in two smaller print-
ers. However, concentration in the print market is not so pervasive, because other bigger 
printers – Tiskarna Ljubljana, Mladinska knjiga, Leykam, Gorenjski tisk and Novo mesto 
– have completely diﬀ erent ownership structures, with foreign capital being predominant 
in Leykam and Mladinska knjiga.²² 
Th e picture of the distribution sector is, however, completely diﬀ erent. Th e largest Slov-
enian distributor and seller of both Slovenian and foreign newspapers and magazines is 
Delo Prodaja, with more than  million copies of newspapers and magazines distributed 
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each month. Th e company has its own network of retail outlets. Its main competitors are 
Dnevnik and Večer, each holding only a  percent market share. In , the Salomon 
and Salomon  companies terminated all business contracts with Delo Prodaja and 
handed over the distribution of their nine publications to Dnevnik. In , the publica-
tions of Salomon and Salomon  accounted for as much as one-tenth of the net sales 
revenue of the distribution sector, so the termination of the contract with Delo Prodaja 
somewhat changed the relations in this segment.
Th e largest shareholder in Delo Prodaja is Banka Celje (. percent) whose largest 
owner, in turn, is the mainly state-owned Nova Ljubljanska banka. A  percent share-
holder in Delo Prodaja is the state fund . Another interesting shareholder is the , 
one of the largest book publishers and traders in Slovenia. On several occasions the  
expressed its interest in acquiring a bigger share in Delo Prodaja. 
Th e print and distribution sectors also contribute to the peculiar picture of the Sloveni-
an media market. All companies that still have Delo as part of their names – the publish-
ers of the Delo and Slovenske novice dailies, Delo Tiskarna (printing plant), Delo Prodaja 
(distribution network), Delo Tisk časopisov in revij (newspapers and magazines printer) 
and Delo Revije (the publisher of magazines) – are actually a case of vertical concentration 
to a certain extent, given that they have in their hands the entire production and distribu-
tion and together hold a huge market share. Yet, it would be diﬃ  cult to ﬁ nd formal proof 
of these companies’ interrelatedness through ownership links. For example, the owners 
of a competitor newspaper have potentially a greater inﬂ uence on Delo Prodaja than the 
former parent company ( Delo). Th is may appear strange, but an explanation may be 
indicated by a rhetorical question frequently posed by the political opposition: is it possi-
ble to say that Slovenian dailies really have diﬀ erent owners and that they compete among 
themselves?
A simple listing of newspapers’ shareholders does not reveal much. Th erefore, in the 
next section we describe another useful approach in investigating media ownership, or 
rather, two other levels on which inﬂ uential links may be formed. Th ese involve links be-
tween the owners of media companies, and links between board members of oﬃ  cial me-
dia owners and companies that are not direct shareholders in media companies but can 
still promote/realise certain interests.
4.1.7 BEHIND PRINT MEDIA OWNERSHIP
Th e reason why we dedicate so much space to the print media is simple: newspapers 
and political magazines remain the major private agenda-setters. Public broadcasting is 
excluded from this report, while commercial radio stations and television stations in Slov-
enia do not seem to have any political (content) aspirations, although they did use politi-
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cal connections to either obtain broadcast licenses or realise mergers. But the Slovenian 
newspaper sector presents a completely diﬀ erent picture. Th e question of who will con-
trol the most important dailies is not just a question of political prestige. It also reveals a 
close relationship among politics, economy and media that did not cease to exist despite 
the fact that the privatisation process has been completed and that all companies have of-
ﬁ cially become private enterprises. 
At the beginning of this report we said that the current state of media ownership was 
most inﬂ uenced by the privatisation of the formerly socially owned companies. Brisk 
changes in the ownership structure of the three largest dailies between  and  
clearly illustrate events in the aftermath of privatisation.
Changes in the ownership structure of Dnevnik in the period – make a sto-
ry about a takeover. However, the case of Dnevnik also illustrates how complicated an at-
tempt to establish links between apparently unrelated media shareholders can be. Th e  
increased its shareholding in Dnevnik step by step, and in so doing, it made use of com-
panies popularly known as “parking lots” – these are companies that are brought into the 
game in order to temporarily store (“park”) the shares of a company targeted by a buyer 
i.e. in which this buyer is interested in the long run. In this way, the investor circumvents 
the provision according to which it has to obtain approval from the competition author-
ity before buying a stake in that company. In our study published at the end of ,²³ we 
hypothesised that the “parking lot” for the  was Rent A. Our hypothesis was based on 
the data from publicly accessible sources and our long-time tracking of newspaper arti-
cles, which all indicated a number of connections between the two companies. Th e data 
from December  conﬁ rmed our hypothesis, because Rent A was removed from the 
shareholder register and its share today oﬃ  cially belongs to the .
Th e daily that experienced the greatest number of changes in its ownership structure in 
the period – was Večer. Most of the small shareholders, who at the end of  
owned  percent of the company, have sold oﬀ  their shares since then, and the Talum com-
pany withdrew. Th e largest owners of Večer have thus become Infond Holding, the Aus-
trian print company Leykam, Probanka, , Delo Prodaja and the . In  Probanka 
sold its stake, and Infond Holding, Leykam and Infond  increased theirs. Th e ownership 
structure of Infond  is practically the same as that of Infond Holding, meaning that the 
owners of these two companies are indirect owners of a  percent stake in Večer. 
4.1.8 LINKS BETWEEN PRINT MEDIA OWNERS 
A closer inspection of the list of Delo’s owners will show that several of its shareholders 
- , , Infond holding and Infond  – together own nearly a  percent stake in the 
Delo’s largest individual shareholder, Pivovarna Laško. Th e remaining part of Pivovarna 
Laško’s shares is in the hands of investment companies founded by big banks and insur-
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ance companies, in which  and  still own signiﬁ cant stakes, and whose owner is the 
state, either directly or indirectly. Among important shareholders in both Infond Holding 
and Infond  are the Radenska company, whose majority owner is Pivovarna Laško, and 
the parent company Nova , in which major shareholders are ,  and the Zavar-
ovalnica Triglav insurance company, in which  and  hold an  percent share. 
A similar pattern is found in the Dnevnik daily. Th e main shareholders in the  (the 
major owner of Dnevnik) are the Nisa company (we could not obtain data on its owner-
ship structure, but we presume that it is controlled by the ), two state funds, Dnevnik, 
Portorož Marina (controlled by the  through related companies), Delo Prodaja (the 
largest distribution company), and Fond Invest. 
Infond Holding and  together have a  percent ownership stake in Večer, the pub-
lisher of the Večer daily. Since we have already treated Infonda in the section dealing with 
Delo shareholders, at this point we will concentrate on the state fund , Delo prodaja, 
which is one of the  shareholders, and the Slovenian branch of the Austrian print com-
pany Leykam. 
Leykam’s share in Večer is the only case of foreign capital directly invested in a Sloveni-
an daily, and it is a rare example of an ownership stake that cannot be described as “state-
owned.”  and  are state funds that are not majority shareholders in any daily news-
paper, but they are owners of other big media owners or owners of those owners (in many 
cases the owner of an owner of a big media owner is the state itself, particularly of banks 
and insurance companies). Th is means that we have good grounds to propose that only 
two large owners of daily newspapers in Slovenia cannot be categorized as state-related: 
Leykam, with its stake in Večer, and  Group²⁴ with its stake in the Dnevnik daily. All oth-
er owners may be controlled by the state through companies that are formally independ-
ent. Th erefore, it is relatively unimportant in which companies individual media owners 
actually have stakes, since the question that has to be answered ﬁ rst is whether there are 
several media owners or there is, in fact, just a single owner.
Another way to approach this issue is to look at it from an entirely diﬀ erent perspective. 
Slovenia is a small state with a small economy, small stock exchange and a small number 
of large companies. An important source of income for banks, insurance companies and 
other large companies are short-term and long-term investments, and the situation for 
the investment companies is similar. Proﬁ table companies do not have inﬁ nite investment 
opportunities but can only invest in other bigger companies. Th e logical outcome is own-
ership links between virtually all important players on the market, and media companies 
could hardly be left out. Why, then, do we ﬁ nd it so diﬃ  cult to accept the thesis that a stake 
in an important daily newspaper should be seen solely as a good investment? Th e answer 
is simple: because regardless of what the owners (and the Government) publicly assert, 
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they are still aware of the importance of capital acquired through media ownership – one 
that enables them to inﬂ uence public opinion.
Links between owners within the Slovenian media industry are just one aspect of re-
distribution and concentration of inﬂ uence and power. In order to understand how pow-
erful current media owners are, we have to look at the composition of the supervisory 
boards of these companies. Th e members of these boards are chairpersons of the largest 
Slovenian companies (which are also the largest advertisers), owners of advertising agen-
cies and chairpersons or supervisory board members of the largest banks. Th is means that 
media power is closely connected with economic power, and with political power, which, 
although not identiﬁ able at ﬁ rst glance, is nevertheless present. 
Composition of the supervisory boards of Slovenian dailies is similar to that of their 
largest shareholders. Th e economic and political power of people who supervise Sloveni-
an dailies is under the control of economically and politically powerful supervisors of me-
dia owners, who are, most importantly, linked through capital and vested interests.
Although media owners invariably insist that media stakes are exclusively a lucrative in-
vestment, political interests have always been part of the game. One proof is an agreement 
between the two state funds ( and ), the holders of interests in all three dailies, on 
not selling these stakes. Th is agreement was aimed at preventing “politically unsuitable” 
companies from obtaining inﬂ uence (political takeovers), particularly those companies 
that had close relations with the opposition parties.
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Chart  LINKS BETWEEN PRINT MEDIA OWNERS IN SLOVENIA
Proof that this is not mere speculation was provided in  when the coalition gov-
ernment headed by Janez Drnovšek was brought down. Among the ﬁ rst steps taken by the 
new government was an attempt to replace the directors of  and ²⁵ in order to ob-
tain control over their decisions involving the sale of ownership stakes. Two weeks before 
he was released from duty in July , the director of  sold . percent of ’s shares 
in Delo. Th e price was approximately  million tolars and the shares were sold to Co-
bito (a stockbroker company), Gorenje,²⁶ and Emona Maximarket. Th is is the maximum 
percentage of shares that may be sold without seeking approval of the company meeting 
(which is an important piece of information because, given political changes at the time, 
it is very likely that such approval would not have been given). Delo came under further 
pressures in November , when  and  allegedly decided to sell their shares in 
Delo.²⁷ Presumably, the buyer was Mohorjeva družba,²⁸ or the “right” wing of Delo share-
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holders. In their public statements directors of both state funds asserted that Delo’s shares 
were not for sale, at least as long as the executive boards of both funds did not lift the ban 
on their sale.
Th is was not the end of the redistribution of ownership stakes, nor of the events that 
clearly indicate that media ownership is primarily a form of political capital (if only insofar 
as the state is concerned). In February , Pivovarna Laško (whose chairman sits on 
Delo’s supervisory board) purchased a . percent share in the newspaper company 
Delo from Krekova družba. Th e price was . billion tolars (approx.   million). 
Krekova družba, the former owner of a one-quarter stake in Delo and a one-third stake in 
, had to sell its media shares in order to bring these in line with the provisions of the 
Mass Media Act.²⁹ It sold its interest in Delo to Pivovarna Laško and that in  to the 
Croatian businessman Ivan Ćaleta. Th e media spread various interpretations of the “real” 
motives behind this purchase. According to one, Pivovarna Laško was “forced” into this 
transaction in exchange for the promised permission to take over the Union brewery;³⁰ 
other explanations were that “Delo was under the control of persons not listed among the 
shareholders,” that “Krekova družba has always been an undesired owner,” that “people 
from Laško overpaid the stake in Delo” and that politics played an important role in the 
sale/purchase transaction.
Before Pivovarna Laško purchased a one-fourth stake in Delo, the media extensively 
wrote about the ’s alleged plan to takeover Delo.³¹ In an interview given to Finance on 
 February , when asked about the motives for the purchase of Delo, the chairman of 
the , Bojan Petan, stated that Delo was more than an ordinary joint-stock company so 
“when buying Delo shares one has to pay for some other values in addition to the share 
capital value.” In his opinion these “other values” were related to the “shaping of public 
opinion.” Th is means that a purchase of a medium is not an “ordinary business transac-
tion.” A media owner may inﬂ uence medium proﬁ ling (according to Petan this is possible 
“in the long run, but is more diﬃ  cult to achieve in the short run”) and the structure of me-
dia ownership may aﬀ ect media pluralism.
4.1.9 FUTILE ATTEMPTS TO ESTABLISH NEW DAILIES 
Ever since the early s, political parties, particularly opposition parties, have insist-
ed that the media space in Slovenia is “politically unidimensional” and that the media fa-
vour the political standpoints of the largest coalition party. Complaints about the bias and 
absence of media pluralism are thus an invariable component of the relations between the 
ruling parties and the opposition. In January , Janez Janša, the  opposition party 
leader, presented to the Government six requirements, the majority of which related to 
the ensuring of media pluralism. Th e opposition parties demanded live coverage of the 
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National Assembly sessions and all other important sessions of parliamentary working 
bodies; they also demanded that  Slovenija should have two channels (one under the 
control of the ruling government and the other under the control of the opposition par-
ties) and that the Mass Media Act should be amended to include an article which would 
stipulate the establishment of a fund for the pluralisation of the print media (the money 
would be provided from the state budget). Th e ’s demands were supported by a civil in-
itiative called “Something has to be done”, which collected more than , signatures. 
All of the previous governmental interventions aimed at ensuring the pluralism of the 
print media proved futile. In March , Lojze Peterle, Prime Minister at the time, man-
aged to introduce a new item into the state budget – approx.  . million earmarked 
for media democratisation and the setting up of new media. Th e problem was that for 
the Government media democratisation meant primarily the introduction of a new dai-
ly that would pursue editorial policy reﬂ ecting the Government’s point of view. Accord-
ingly, most of this fund was spent on the launching of the “right-wing” daily, Slovenec.³² 
Th e chronology of Slovenec’s downfall is quite illustrative. It shows that the media cannot 
function as a proxy for political interests, at least not in a democratic society. In Novem-
ber , ﬁ ve months after the ﬁ rst issue saw the light of the day, the owners replaced the 
ﬁ rst editor in chief. Political interference with the editorial policy was obvious. Th is and 
subsequent replacements inspired rumours about the newspaper’s radical right orienta-
tion, created the impression of instability in the eye of the public and had negative eﬀ ect 
on circulation by diverting readers belonging to the political centre.³³ Even though the 
right and centre-right parties won  percent of votes at the election, the Slovene politi-
cal right never consolidated around its “own” newspaper. Venčeslav Japelj, then president 
of the Trade Union of Journalists, wrote that the management of Slovenec ventured into 
the new project “in an amateurish and economically adventuresome manner”.³⁴ Th e media 
company Slovenec d.o.o., the publisher of the newspaper, accumulated nearly a one billion 
tolar debt (approx. .  . million) during the seven years of its existence, and the news-
paper eventually folded in .
Neither were the left-wing parties satisﬁ ed with the state of aﬀ airs. Towards the end 
of , a new daily called Republika was launched – also another political project. Th e 
newspaper had reportedly been launched with strong support from some leftist circles as 
a “counterbalance to right-wing media aspirations.” But both newspapers, the “right” Slov-
enec and the “left” Republika, were political projects. Th eir editorial policies were seen as 
following the political requirements of the parties that were behind their launch. Th is was 
also obvious from the manner of covering major political events in the country. Although 
editors and journalists made eﬀ orts to adhere to professional standards in editorial mat-
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ters, it was clear that the agenda setting was not under their control but in the hands of 
the newspapers’ owners. 
Th e designers of the Slovenec and Republika projects (and particularly of the even more 
tragic Jutranjik that folded within one month of its appearance, in June ), were motivat-
ed primarily by political interests. One could even argue that all of these newspapers were 
political rather than market-based projects, so they could not undermine, let alone serious-
ly threaten, the domination of the existing daily newspapers Delo, Dnevnik and Večer.
4.3 BROADCAST MEDIA 
4.3.1 RADIO
Among the broadcasting media, it is precisely radio stations that never really recovered 
from the consequences of privatisation and the lack of strategy. Th e allocation of broad-
cast licenses was based on personal relations rather than on agreed, pre-set criteria.
From  to the foundation of the Broadcasting Council in , the allocation of 
broadcasting frequencies had been under the control of the Telecommunications Oﬃ  ce 
of the Republic of Slovenia. By  April  when the Mass Media Law took eﬀ ect, the 
Telecommunications Oﬃ  ce had issued  television licenses and  radio licenses. Th is 
means that by the time the Mass Media Act took eﬀ ect and the Broadcasting Council was 
founded, the Telecommunications Oﬃ  ce had allocated more than  percent of the avail-
able frequencies, including all of the important ones.³⁵ A review of frequencies allocated 
from  to May  (when the Council allocated the last license according to the cri-
teria established by the Mass Media Law) shows that the majority of new license holders 
have ended up as part of one or another radio “network” and with it discarded the pro-
gramming concept on the basis of which they acquired their broadcast licenses.
A peculiar approach to license allocation is the main reason for the present state of af-
fairs in this sector. First of all, too many frequencies were allocated, although the major-
ity of small commercial radio stations can hardly survive unless they join some radio net-
work. And, since the setting up of these networks was not based on any clear strategy and 
was not subjected to supervision or regulation, the whole sector is now in disarray. In ad-
dition, it is diﬃ  cult to assess the size of individual radio stations given that their actual size 
loses signiﬁ cance once they are incorporated in a wider network.
Radio and television broadcasters can form a network under the conditions speciﬁ ed 
in Article  of the Mass Media Law. Th e fundamental requirement is that each network 
member broadcasts only within the area for which its license was issued, that each broad-
casts a minimum of two hours of in-house produced programming, and that each network 
member acquires approval from the Agency if its programming concept has been changed 
as a result of networking. Obviously, Article  addresses only association through pro-
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gramming, while capital and ownership links are an area regulated by the provisions con-
cerning the restrictions of concentration.
Th ere are six radio “networks” in Slovenia. Of these, just one – Infonet – is a real net-
work and as such it was entered in the media registry in . Th e Infonet network in-
cludes  radio stations that share the technical service department, musical section, pro-
gram and advertisements production sections, legal service and promotion departments. 
Infonet member stations are linked in several ways, i.e. through programming, advertising 
and ownership links, all of which can importantly inﬂ uence the programming concepts on 
the basis of which these radio stations acquired broadcasting licenses. When entering the 
network into the media registry in , the Ministry of Culture did not check if Infonet 
fulﬁ lled the requirements set down by law. Th e statement of the broadcaster that the net-
work fulﬁ lled these requirements was taken as suﬃ  cient.
Other existing networks cannot be classiﬁ ed as such if we adhere to legal deﬁ nitions, 
although these networks are based on certain forms of association through programming, 
advertising or ownership links.  ur – radijske novice ( hours – radio news) is a news 
program broadcast by  radio stations. Pro Plus, the broadcaster of the two largest com-
mercial television programs, heads the project. 
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Th ere are six radio channels with national coverage. Four of them belong to the public 
radio broadcaster, Radio Slovenija: Program A, Program Ars, Val  and Radio Slovenia 
International. Th e other two are Radio Ognjišče, owned by the Slovenian Roman Catholic 
Church, and , a member of the Salomon Group (which is the owner of two other radio 
stations, the weekly Mag and the sports daily Ekipa). Th e signal areas of other commer-
cial or regional radio stations depend on the region. Other important radio stations that 
reach³⁶ more than , citizens are Radio Trbovlje, Radio Štajerski val, Radio Veseljak, 
Radio Zeleni val, Radio Salomon, Radio Poslovni val, Radio Hit, Radio Gama , Radio 
Dur and Radio Antena. 
A cursory look at the list of radio broadcasters would not reveal any ownership con-
centration in the radio sector. But the reality is just the opposite. Our scrutiny of sources 
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showed that many radio stations were related in one way or another – through ownership 
links, advertising and programming, or through related persons. Th erefore, while there 
are  radio stations altogether, the number of owners is far lower. Most of the commer-
cial radio channels are owned by private persons or by joint-stock companies that are not 
legally bound to reveal all the facts about their operation. In addition, there is another, and 
quite obvious, systemic ﬂ aw in the radio ﬁ eld: while data entered into the court registry 
are not checked, it is a copy of the court registry record that is required when ownership 
has to be conﬁ rmed or authenticated. So the question that should be posed here is wheth-
er an attempt to establish or map ownership links is sensible at all, knowing that even this 
basic source of data is quite problematic.
4.3.2 TELEVISION
Unlike the print media and radio sectors, where foreign capital is virtually absent, the 
television sector is dominated by it. Th e main commercial  channels are   and 
Kanal . Th e owner of the broadcasters of both channels is Pro Plus, which is, in turn, 
owned by the  Slovenia, a branch of the   corporation.
Th e main change in the television sector in Slovenia occurred with the launch of the 
  channel in . It brought with it many “ﬁ rst-timers” in Slovenia. It involved the 
ﬁ rst substantial foreign investment (although oﬃ  cially it was called “a loan” and not an 
investment, because only in such a way could Slovene partners retain equal shares). Th e 
American corporation  invested   million and hence acquired a  percent share 
in the production company Pro Plus that is responsible for the management, production, 
technical operation and ﬁ nances of  . Other shareholders were Slovenian compa-
nies  and Tele , but the former sold its  percent share in Pro Plus one and a half 
years later to  for   million, so  increased its share to  percent. Besides, 
  was the ﬁ rst television station that “was not a television station.” Th e executives 
of Pro Plus strictly adhered to the explanation that   was a program, a trademark, 
and not a television station. Why was this necessary? Th e answer is simple. Th e  me-
dia law restricted ownership stakes of individual owners of a radio or television broad-
caster to  percent.  could thus acquire a majority share in the production company 
Pro Plus because it was not subject to this legal restriction, although Pro Plus produced 
  programming which was broadcast by three television stations where  was 
a legally permitted  percent shareholder. In October  some complex moves were 
taken in order to link Pro Plus and Kanal A. Super Plus Holding acquired a majority stake 
in Kanal A, which signed the contract about the long-term cooperation with Produkcija 
Plus d.o.o. According to the words of some leading people, the “goals of this business link-
ing were primarily the reduction of program purchase costs, the streamlining of program 
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libraries and ensuring of domestic production.” In December , Pro Plus got a loan 
from Bank Austria Creditanstalt and Nova Ljubljanska banka (). Th e loan amounted 
to   million and was intended for further expansion of the company and reinforcing 
of its position on the Slovenian media market, as was asserted in the public statement. At 
the same time,  became a . percent owner of Pro Plus. After that Pro Plus applied 
to the Ministry of Culture for approval of the purchase of a share in excess of  percent 
in   and Kanal . In the words of F.T. Klinkhammer, the Chairman and the Director 
General of , the approval was needed in order to simplify their complicated owner-
ship structure.³⁷ Th e Broadcasting Council was of the opinion that although the bringing 
of   and Kanal  under the roof of one owner would result in the two broadcasters 
exceeding the  percent advertising share with regard to the size of the entire advertis-
ing space in Slovenia, this would not secure for it the predominant position on the mar-
ket. Th is view was also corroborated by the opinion issued by the Oﬃ  ce for Competition 
Protection, which was an arbitrator in the conﬂ ict between   and the public institu-
tion  Slovenija concerning dominance on the advertising market. Th e Council issued 
its decision with some reservations: the merger could receive the green light, but only on 
the condition that the two programs remain separate, that is to say, that their program-
ming concepts are not changed.
Foreign capital is also involved in , formerly owned by the Catholic Church.³⁸ In 
February , the then Church-related shareholders, Tiskovno društvo Ognjišče, Koper 
Diocese, Marketing  and Franc Bole, sold  to four buyers from Croatia. At the mo-
ment, a  shareholder is the Croatian businessman Ivan Ćaleta³⁹ against whom several 
legal proceedings have been brought in Croatia concerning the ownership and manage-
ment of the Croatian television Nova . One-quarter of the shares were retained by Kre-
kova družba and Mladinska knjiga. Th e former shareholders saw this sale primarily as a 
contribution to the plurality of the Slovenian media and a move that would at least par-
tially obstruct the victorious march of the political left. 
Table  MAIN TELEVISION CHANNELS IN SLOVENIA
TV CHANNEL BROADCASTER MAIN OWNER
(%)
AUDIENCE 
SHARE* (%)
TV SLOVENIJA
1 AND 2 CHANNEL
RTV SLOVENIJA PUBLIC SERVICE TV SLO1 25.4
TV SLO2 9.3
POP TV PRO PLUS CME 96.7 29.7
KANAL A PRO PLUS CME 96.7 8.8
TV3 TV3 IVAN C´ALETA 73 1.8
Source: Media Services , Ljubljana.
Note: *In the period October–December , including individuals over  years of age.
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One of the questions relating to media regulation that will certainly gain signiﬁ cance 
in the next few years is that of convergence. Cable operators and Internet providers are 
increasingly active distributors of television content. Cable operators have already begun 
to consider the provision of their own television programs (e.g.  Pika,  Paprika and 
many other local televisions), and the largest Slovenian Internet provider oﬀ ered, in , 
the transmission of television programs as part of its  package. Its range of programs 
is already wider than that oﬀ ered by cable operators. In addition, mobile telephony opera-
tors have also begun to show interest in content provision. For them, this is a way to sell 
the mobile telephony services of the third generation. Since content providers of this type 
are not bound by the media law in principle, and since their distribution channels are not 
limited by technical restraints, which is one of the more important arguments in support 
of the regulation of the broadcasting ﬁ eld (i.e. a limited number of frequencies), we can 
expect that this area will be plagued with diﬃ  culties that the current legislation will not 
be able to resolve.
5 MEDIA INDEPENDENCE 
In the words of the President of the Journalists’ Association, Grega Repovž,⁴⁰ the main 
problems that trouble Slovenian journalists are their social status, demands for ever high-
er productivity and non-observance of the copyright law. Th ese problems are not notice-
able at ﬁ rst sight. Slovenian journalists have signed the collective agreement that regulates 
employment relations, wages, allowances, compensations and refunds, as well as rights 
and obligations of parties in dispute. Th e problem is that the provisions of the collective 
agreement are not observed in practice. At the beginning of , a new law on employ-
ment⁴¹ took eﬀ ect. It regulates individual relations, while collective relations are the sub-
ject of the agreement between partners. Th e law does not bring any explicit changes nor 
does it impose deadlines for the amendments to the existing collective agreements, but 
some employers nevertheless understood the new situation to mean the invalidation of 
the collective agreement. Iztok Jurančič,⁴² the president of the Journalists’ Trade Union, 
drew attention to these pressures, primarily aimed at reducing the price of the journalists’ 
work. In fact, media owners frequently view journalists as “items on the costs sheet” that 
reduce both the potential and actual proﬁ ts of the media.⁴³
However, for many journalists in Slovenia, and here we have in mind free-lance journal-
ists, this is not an issue, because in practice the collective agreement is not applicable to 
them. On top of that, the number of journalists employed by media companies has been 
decreasing, meaning, among other things, that many young journalists in Slovenia are left 
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outside the system of medical insurance and the pension scheme. But these free-lance and 
contract journalists freely set dumping prices on the grey market, thus indirectly aﬀ ecting 
the salaries of regularly employed journalists. Th eir salaries hence appear high compared 
to free-lance journalists’ fees and this discrepancy is exploited by employers as a conven-
ient argument. Th e unsatisfactory social status of journalists raises still another important 
question – that of pressure exerted on journalists.
Th is is another area where relations only appear to be in order. In the debates about le-
gal requirements related to data in the media registry, the Association of Journalists suc-
ceeded in securing acknowledgement for the legal explanation⁴⁴ that says that the funda-
mental legal act of the publisher is the act adopted by the publisher’s highest ranking body 
which, in addition to the components of its organisation and operation, also regulates the 
issues laid down by the media law. Th is means that the autonomy of the editorial board 
and editors in chief must be explicitly mentioned in the company’s statute (in the case of a 
joint-stock company) or in partnership agreements (in the case of a limited liability com-
pany). Th e owners, therefore, cannot aﬀ ord to behave arbitrarily when shaping their me-
dia contents, since they are not completely independent when choosing editors in chief. 
Some media require approval from journalists (e.g. the daily Dnevnik) or the supervisory 
council (if the editor in chief is appointed by the management board), while others seek an 
opinion from journalists. Th e Journalists’ Association has further observed that sensitiv-
ity to pressure exerted by advertisers has increased. Th ey have partly attributed this to the 
impact of the new journalistic code of ethics and its explicit warning about covert adver-
tising,⁴⁵ and to the Honourary Tribunal’s contribution to the resolution of such cases. Th e 
Journalists’ Association has also noted that media companies began to cover the costs of 
journalists’ foreign trips that were not covered in the past – escorting state delegations to 
foreign countries or participations at “educational seminars” carried out by domestic or 
international multinational companies.
Recently, investigative journalism in Slovenia has been discussed mainly in the con-
text of the case of Miro Petek. At the end of February , Mirko Petek,⁴⁶ a journalist for 
the regional daily newspaper, Večer, was brutally beaten by unknown attackers. Petek was 
the author of a series of critical articles dealing with corruption in the region from where 
he reported. In these articles he disclosed the links between banks and local business-
men, who allegedly exploited the privatisation process to acquire possession of certain 
socially owned companies at low prices. Th e police were quick to give assurances to the 
public that the identiﬁ cation and arrest of perpetrators was expected in a matter of days. 
Th e person who was most frequently mentioned in these articles ﬁ led claims for damag-
es against Miro Petek and several other journalists who took up “the story.” At the same 
time, the chairman of the supervisory board of the newspaper Večer (who, at the time of 
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publication, was the president of the bank which was the subject of Petek’s articles and 
whose major owner is the state), claimed that “journalists had no business investigating 
irregularities in banks.”⁴⁷ It was only at the end of September  that the police and the 
public prosecutor announced that ten persons suspected of the attack were detained. In 
their public statements following these arrests, the General Manager of the Police and the 
Public Prosecutor “accused” the media and the public of being directly responsible for the 
prolongation of this case.
Th e most recent actively debated issue has been that of copyright.⁴⁸ “Nearly all Slov-
enian journalists have signed contracts by which they renounce their copyright in favour 
of the employer,” writes Grega Repovž.⁴⁹ Journalists do not receive compensation for texts 
published in internal publications, sales of documented materials, or sales of articles by 
clipping services. Neither do they receive compensations for the second or any further re-
production of their copyrighted texts.⁵⁰
Finally, we would like to propose another, journalist-less-friendly conclusion in which 
injustice suﬀ ered by journalists is not wholly blamed on social pressure. Indeed, only a few 
journalists sincerely care for their education, read widely or have a good overview of inter-
national and domestic developments. Similarly, few of them are willing to dig deeper into 
their subjects and few have the feeling that their reporting based on references to “oﬃ  cial 
sources,” or their comfortable cohabitation with the political or commercial power centers, 
or their stenographic coverage of Parliament’s sessions or press conferences, are ﬂ awed in 
any way. Th ere are more international seminars and scholarships available to journalists 
than journalists interested in undertaking such courses. Few journalists are willing to par-
ticipate in projects not directly related to personal advantage, while solidarity with fellow 
journalists and awareness about the primary interests that journalists should represent are 
very low. Th is said we can conclude that journalists themselves should be blamed for many 
things that have gone wrong. Th erefore, if they want to exercise their rights they will have 
to ﬁ ght for them, and they will also have to gain respect for their own profession.
6 CONCLUSIONS
Th e main feature of the present day media space in Slovenia is its extraordinarily high 
concentration with the consequence being corporatisation of media discourse – media 
content is subordinated to the interests of media owners and the largest advertisers. Th e 
model of media privatisation used in Slovenia enabled journalists and other media em-
ployees (excluding employees of the public service television  Slovenija) to retain 
ownership of and control over the media. Unfortunately, journalists sold this opportunity 
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when the value of media shares increased. As an illustration, in the daily Večer, the pro-
portion of small shareholders (internal owners) decreased by nearly  percent in the pe-
riod –. Unlike journalists, the state adheres to its ownership stakes in the largest 
media companies. Th e privatisation of the formerly socially owned property is currently 
drawing to an end and its outcome is a special form of state ownership. Although the state 
maintains, speaking through the voice of media owners, that investment in media is just 
another way to augment capital, it is evident that certain political interests underpin every 
single instance of media shares sales. Being a media owner means having an opportunity 
to inﬂ uence media content and editorial policy. And this is the kind of inﬂ uence that the 
state will not easily let slip from its hands.
At ﬁ rst glance, daily newspapers in Slovenia appear to be characterised by relatively 
dispersed ownership. But at closer inspection, this seemingly great number of unrelated 
owners in practice boils down to a few persons related through capital and management 
functions. Th e owners of one newspaper sit on the supervisory boards of other newspa-
pers. Th e media are thus under the control of owners and managers of large companies 
that are at the same time the largest advertisers in these media, the owners of advertising 
agencies that sell and buy advertising space in these newspapers, the chairmen of some 
of the largest, mainly state-owned, Slovenian companies, and “hidden” representatives of 
political interests. Th ese supervisors actually supervise themselves and take care that their 
economic and political interests are safe against undesired media reporting. Our inspec-
tion of the lists of supervisory boards members has shown that power is actually concen-
trated in the hands of a small group of individuals. Pressure on media and journalists’ au-
tonomy has become more concealed and this may have long-term implications.
Th e number of hybrid articles/ advertorials that pretend to be editorial content, but are 
in fact paid advertisements, has been increasing. Th e barrier separating advertisements 
from editorial content has been breaking down under the weight of the drive for proﬁ t. 
Th e responsibility for market success of the media is placed with editors leaving them with 
little maneuvering space for the shaping of editorial policies.
Our analysis showed a number of links between media owners that point to media con-
centration, but it eludes the classical deﬁ nition because of the absence of formal links. 
Th e situation in the broadcasting sector is even more serious owing to the uncontrolled 
allocation of broadcast licenses. Th e Slovenian market is too small to enable the survival 
of  radio stations and  television stations. So, we can expect networking that will es-
sentially alter individual programming concepts. Th ose radio stations that adhere to in-
house production and fulﬁ llment of their basic task, i.e., providing information to citizens, 
cannot cover the extremely high price of production and cannot compete eﬀ ectively with 
networks whose programming costs are much lower. Yet, while the price of radio adver-
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tising time has been falling and the value of professional journalists’ work hit its lowest 
level, the market price of radio stations has been increasing. Th e major part of the  mil-
lion tolars (approx.  ,), the current market value of a local radio station, is the 
value of broadcast license. On the other hand, only a few more frequencies are still avail-
able for allocation. 
In the popular game Monopoly, the winner is the player with the largest property and 
most money, the one who remains a sole player by excluding others. In the realistic media 
world in Slovenia, it could happen that a group of ten owners and ﬁ ve of the most inﬂ uen-
tial supervisors come through sharing between themselves the entire media property. Th e 
game will probably end with their selling oﬀ  ownership stakes to foreign investors. But it 
is ironic that, in contrast to other East and Central European countries with the socialist 
past that sold oﬀ  their media to foreign owners at the beginning of the transition period 
(–), Slovenia took the whole decade to carry out the privatisation process, im-
pose restriction on media ownership, and pass two media acts, only to be confronted in 
the end with the outcome that it strived to prevent at the beginning of the s.
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 Delo,  September, 
 See <http://www.gov.si/mk/>.
 Finance,  January .
 Uradni list , /, pp. –. Th e law was 
amended two times in  (Uradni list , / and 
/).
 According to the Radio and Television Act, the found-
er of the public institution  Slovenija is the Repub-
lic of Slovenia (Article ). See Uradni list , -/
).
 Th e  Mass Media Act (Uradni list , /) 
stipulated in Article  that an individual natural or 
legal person can have the maximum of  percent in-
terest or  percent of management rights in the as-
sets of a company or an institution that is a publisher 
of the daily newspaper or creates, prepares or broad-
casts a radio or television program. Article  re-
stricted cross-ownership to  percent. Th ese restric-
tions did not apply to the funds listed under Article 
 of the Transformation of the Ownership of Enter-
prises Act, i.e. Kapitalski sklad invalidskega in poko-
jninskega zavarovanja, Odškodninski sklad and Sklad 
 za razvoj.
 Th e privatisation of Delo is a good example of the 
privatisation formula used by other companies, with 
smaller or bigger alterations. 
 Th e Mass Media Act came into force on  May . 
It replaced the  Mass Media Law. 
 Th e Protection of Competition Act was published on 
 July  in Uradni list  /.
 Th e Mass Media Act (Article ) precisely deﬁ nes the 
meaning of related persons. 
 Poročevalec Državnega zbora , /,  January 
.
 “We have been studying the ﬂ uctuation of Delo shares 
in the certain time period - from October  to 
February  Delo shares went up by  percent. If 
we suspect any strange transactions, we shall inspect 
the transactions by all those involved which could in-
ﬂ uence the price. Th is would represent a market ma-
nipulation, which is one of the most serious forms of 
the violation of rules observed on the securities mar-
ket” said the Director of the . See Delo,  Feb-
ruary .
 Uradni list , / and /.
 Amendments to the law are still at the drafting stage 
at the Ministry of Culture.
 Under Article  of the Mass Media Act, before the 
beginning of any activity the publisher must register 
the medium with Ministry of Culture. Given that the 
report has not been updated for a whole year now, 
on  December  we checked at the Ministry of 
Culture whether the state as of  January  has 
changed in the meanwhile. We were told that the reg-
istry now includes  media, that is,  more than 
listed in the last published registry. We could not ob-
tain an answer to the question why the registry has 
not been updated. 
 December .
 Klirinško depotna družba (Central Securities Clear-
ing Corporation, ), December .
 Delo,  December .
  See the media registry records at the Ministry of Cul-
ture at <http://www.kultura.gov.si/cache/bin?bin.svc
=obj?bin.id=> (accessed  April ).
 See Kaja Jakopič, “Kdo so lastniki Mladine?” 
(Who Are the Owners of Mladina?), Medijska 
preža (Media Watch journal), /, at <http:
//mediawatch.ljudmila.org/bilten/seznam//trg/
print.html>.
 Infond holding and it related companies are a , per-
cent shareholder in Delo,  percent in Večer (Večer is 
a . percent owner of Dnevnik) and . percent in 
Delo Tiskarna. Th e largest owners of Infond holding 
are  Infond,  and Radenska; a  percent 
owner of Radenska is Pivovarna Laško, the owner of 
 percent of the Delo shares.
 A . percent shareholder in the Mladinska knjiga 
printing company is the Dutch company  Hold-
ing (source ).
 Sandra B. Hrvatin and Lenart J. Kučić, Medijska preža 
(Media Watch) no. , December .
 Technically speaking, the share of  could also be 
classiﬁ ed as a foreign capital, since the owner of al-
most  percent of its shares is Bank Austria.
 Kapitalski sklad invalidskega in pokojninskega zavar-
ovanja and Odškodninski sklad.
NOTES
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 After Gorenje was damaged by ﬁ re the Government 
headed by Andrej Bajuk demanded from Gorenje to 
sell its share in Delo if it wanted to receive state aid. 
Th e management of Gorenje refused to do it. Th e op-
position parties insisted that  temporarily stored 
its shares with the politically “friendly” company thus 
preventing the takeover by the right wing parties. 
 Finance,  November .
 It is not clear how Mohorjeva družba, whose assets in 
 amounted to  million tolars and its capital to  
million tolars, could buy a . percent of Delo shares 
worth  million tolars.
 Th e deadline for harmonisation was the end of Octo-
ber .
 At that time, the main economic topic was “brew-
ers’ war” involving the Belgian trans-national com-
pany Interbrew that tried to buy the largest Sloveni-
an brewery, Union. Pivovarna Laško (Laško Brewery) 
prevented this and thus earned public approval for its 
presumed “defense of the public interest.” 
 Th e  is the majority owner of Dnevnik.
 Th e name is not without historical symbolism, since 
the newspaper bearing the same name supported the 
Christian democratic political option at the beginning 
of the previous century. 
 Delo,  May .
 Večer,  December , Delo, Readers Letters,  De-
cember .
 Report by the Broadcasting Council, Poročevalec, no. 
, .
 Source: Radiometrija /.
 Finance,  January .
  never managed to dispel prejudice that it was a 
“political project,” a television owned by the Church 
and the political right. 
 According to Croatian analysts, all four Croatian 
companies are related to Ćaleta. See article by Petra 
Šubic, Medijska preža (Media Watch journal), no. , 
p. .
 Grega Repovž: “Optimizem!”, E-novinar, no. , p. 
 Emplyoment Act. See Uradni list  /.
 Neva Nahtigal: “Ne smemo se izgubiti v tej peni” (We 
must not get lost in this foam), E-novinar, no. , p. . 
For more on the situation of journalists, see Medijska 
preža (Media Watch journal), no. , , , -.
 “Th e biggest costs are those of paper and salaries,” 
said the chairman of Delo Jure Apih in an interview 
for Delopis, a bulletin of Delo’s journalists (December 
).
 Th e application for entry into the register must be ac-
companied with the company fundamental legal act 
(Article  of the Mass Media Law).
 Th e Journalists’ Association regularly publishes the 
examples of violation of the Document about the un-
acceptability of covert advertising and abuse of news-
paper space. See <http://www.novinar.com/krsitve>. 
Although the Mass Media Law (Article ) explicit-
ly prohibits such advertising, no publisher has been 
sanctioned so far.
 For the chronology of events, main actors, me-
dia articles by Petek and commentaries see <http://
www.primerpetek.net>.
 Published on  June  in the weekly Kapital in 
Maribor.
 Medijska preža (Media Watch journal) featured many 
texts about the copyright laws.
 Grega Repovž: “Optimizem!”, E-novinar, no. , p. .
 Copyright in Slovenia is protected by the Copyright 
and Related Rights Act adopted in  and amended 
in . Th e rights arising from scientiﬁ c, artistic, and 
research activities and inventions are also protected 
by Article  of the Constitution. 
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